Elite Identity and Political Accountability: A Tale of Ten Islands*

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Abstract

We study the effect of changes in elite identity on political outcomes through a novel political accountability channel. In particular, we examine whether political outcomes are improved by replacing unaccountable elites (e.g. aristocrats, colonial elites) with elites who are more accountable to the citizenry. Accountable types face stronger re-election concerns and thus prefer to vote against extractive policies. Analyzing a dynamic model of legislative voting, we show that outcomes improve less than expected, and sometimes worsen. We identify three mechanisms that preserve an *iron law of oligarchy* in the face of rising elite accountability, including the possibility that elites alter institutions to shield themselves from accountability. The theory is applied to a case study of ten Caribbean plantation islands, where the emancipation of slaves created a mixed British (unaccountable) and local (accountable) elite. Elite members' roll-call voting behavior depended on their own type and the elite's overall composition in a manner predicted by the theory. As the share of accountable elites rose, the legislatures replaced themselves with less transparent non-elective institutions.

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"The English of the islands are melting away. [...] Families who have been for generations on the soil are selling their estates everywhere and are going off" (Froude, 1888, ch. XVII), reporting on the Caribbean islands

"If we want things to stay as they are, they will have to change." – di Lampedusa, *The Leopard*

1 Introduction

The economics of identity has catalogued ways in which social identity shapes economic behavior (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2010; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011; Akerlof, 2017). This paper contributes to the literature by examining the effect of elites' social identity on political outcomes. This topic is important because major political transitions have involved shifts in the composition of the political elite as much as changes in formal institutions (e.g. North and Weingast, 1989). Specifically, many countries have seen a transition in power from elite groups with distinct social and economic identities (e.g. aristocrats, colonial elites) to elites that more closely resemble the citizenry. For example, the Reform Act in 1832 made British Parliament more representative by removing rotten boroughs and the aristocrats elected by them. Latin America in the 18th century saw the emergence of 'Creole elites' who were tied to the land and had incentives that were fundamentally different from those of Spanish colonial administrators (Anderson, 1983). In much of the developing world, the end of colonialism saw the replacement of European elites with a mix of indigenous, European-origin Creole, and transplanted elite groups.

There are two primary channels through which changes in elite identity can affect extractive policies by the elite, i.e. policies that benefit the elite at the expense of the citizenry.[1] One candidate is the *ingroup bias channel*: elite members who are socially closer to the citizenry support non-extractive policies due to altruistic in-group preferences and norms (Shayo, 2009; Bramoullé and Goyal, 2016).[2] We focus on an alternative, *political accountability channel*. Political accountability is

[1] Extractive policies are typically modeled simply as a regressive tax in the related literature (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). In our empirical application, we will have three types of extractive policies: (*i*) policies to depress agricultural wages, (*ii*) regressive land taxes, (*iii*) lowering of public-good provision.

[2] There is a large literature on ethnic, religious or caste-based politics (e.g. Franck and Rainer, 2012). While an elite member's social identity shapes his political choices in this literature, it does not examine interactions among different elite types, nor does it distinguish between elite types based on their social distance from the citizenry. A critical distinction is that this literature examines cases where different elites represent different identity groups among the

the degree to which elite members are punished for supporting extractive policy. Punishment can take several forms, including revolt (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; Aidt and Franck, 2015), social sanctions (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), and electoral punishment—voting against candidates who support extractive policies in subsequent elections. There is a large literature demonstrating that better institutions and policy outcomes are brought about by greater political accountability, due for example to shocks to the cost of collective action by citizens (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Brückner and Ciccone, 2011) and improvements in the ability to monitor elites (Tabellini and Persson, 2000; Besley and Prat, 2006; Ferraz and Finan, 2008). Changes in elite identity have received less attention as a driver of political accountability, despite being potentially important. Elites that are socially closer to the citizenry may face greater political accountability because they have less control over voters, weaker military protection and poorer exit options than the aristocrats and colonial elites that came before them. In addition, social sanctions against elites may be more effective when social distance to the citizenry is low, as in Miguel and Gugerty (2005), and citizens may feel greater betrayal by leaders from their own group, as in Di Tella and Rotemberg (2016).

We find in this paper that increasing the political accountability of individual elite members does not necessarily aggregate to greater accountability of the political system as a whole. To make our argument, we focus on *electoral* accountability because it is the most prevalent notion of political accountability in the literature.[3] We begin by analyzing an infinite-horizon model of roll-call voting over an extractive policy in an n member legislature. Legislators are drawn from the elite which is heterogenous in terms of political accountability and economic interests. More accountable types pay a larger electoral penalty than less accountable types when voting in favor of extractive policy. In addition, legislators have one of two economic types, with high-rent types receiving a larger benefit from extractive policy than low-rent types. While existing work focuses on conflict between elite groups, in many cases political factions cooperate to enact extractive policies.[4] Hence, in our model, all legislators benefit from extractive policy to some extent, reflecting the fact that policies are often made by an established political class whose interests are partially

citizenry, as opposed to one elite group being closer to the citizenry overall.

[3] We examined riots as a source of political accountability in an earlier version of the paper (Carvalho and Dippel, 2016).

[4] As Frey (1994, p. 340) suggests: "The Schumpeter-Downs model of democracy needs to be complemented by a model in which (between elections) [...] members of parliament are a well-defined group jointly reaping rents. They have (with exceptions) spent their lives together in all kinds of meetings and sessions, committees and commissions."

aligned.

We investigate the consequences of changes in elite composition in terms of both political accountability and economic interests. Such changes in 'elite identity' matter for political outcomes. Accountable types are less likely to vote for extractive policy. Hence the likelihood that extractive policy is passed falls as the share of accountable legislators rises. But the effect is weaker than expected, and in some cases political outcomes worsen. There are three specific factors preserving an *iron law of oligarchy* in the face of changing elite identity. First, when accountable types are rare, it is mostly unaccountable types who vote for extractive policy because they do so at lower electoral cost. Accountable elites free-ride because they do not vote for extraction despite economically benefitting from it. Unaccountable types thus provide an elite 'club good.' As the share of accountable types grows, however, they need to 'step up' and begin voting for the extractive policy for it to pass.[5] Second, speeding up the replacement of unaccountable types weakens their re-election concerns and increases their support for extractive policy. Under certain conditions, the likelihood that extractive policy is passed increases as a consequence. Third, when legislators anticipate a collapse in support for extractive policy due to their increased accountability, they may alter the institutional framework, at some cost, in order to reduce their accountability.

Our theory is applied to an empirical case study of ten British Caribbean sugar-plantation islands after the emancipation of slaves in 1838. This setting offers unique advantages in terms of measuring elites' types and observing exogenous variation in their distribution. Most important to our study is that the islands' history of slave-based plantation agriculture suggests a single highly salient dimension of elites' social identity, namely race, that also mattered greatly in terms of political accountability. In 1838, the islands' population consisted of 2–3% "whites, mostly landed," 8% "coloreds, who had been freed earlier and possessed, in many cases, substantial property," and almost 90% "blacks, recently emancipated" (Taylor, 1885, p. 207).[6] Colored legislators were socially far closer to the black citizenry than their British counterparts, who were also less po-

[5] The 'stepping up' is needed because a legislative majority is required to pass extractive policy, giving it the character of a threshold 'club good' (Schelling, 1978; Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984). Modern-day examples of stepping up may include the *Muslim Brotherhood* in Egypt during the presidency of Mohamed Morsi and Aung San Suu Kyi's *National League for Democracy* in Myanmar.

[6] Colored elites depended on the votes of the recently emancipated blacks. Blacks did not have the property required to run for elected office, but many did soon obtain enough property for the right to vote, and then overwhelmingly voted for propertied coloreds (Rogers, 1970, p. 187). The distinction between a 'colored elite' and a 'black citizenry' is true to Caribbean social history. See Section 3.

litically accountable because they were elected through long-standing patronage networks that had been established over the course of 200 years.[7] Other advantages of this setting are that the islands' plantation-based economy meant that we can control for elite members' economic interests, which were well defined by occupation (planter or merchant); and that important decisions were made in locally elected legislatures, with legislators that were drawn from the islands' elites. Finally, as in our dynamic model, the composition of the islands' elites was exogenously changing, primarily because the franchise was gradually obtained by emancipated slaves.[8]

To measure the impact of the changing composition of the elite, we compiled an array of novel archival data: Electoral cycles, and the names and roll-call votes of individual legislators came from the *Colonial Office Records* in the British National Archives. Legislators' race (political accountability) and occupation (economic interests) were coded from an extensive collection of individual islands' social histories, as well as the *1820s Slave Ownership Registries*, the *1835 Emancipation Compensation Tables*, and 60-odd distinct island-specific post-Emancipation plantation surveys.

We describe a number of empirical patterns that show that colored legislators were more politically (electorally) accountable. Furthermore, a legislator's roll-call voting behavior depended on his own type and the overall composition of the legislature in the manner predicted by our theory. Importantly, as the share of white planters in the elite declined, individual colored elites indeed 'stepped up,' i.e. increased their support for extractive policies. We also analyze a series of dramatic institutional changes that mark the end of the period we study: between 1861 and 1877, elites in all but one of the islands voluntarily voted their legislatures out of existence and invited the Queen to re-organize them as appointed bodies under 'Crown Rule' (Wrong, 1923). Our theory provides an explanation for this puzzle: While crown rule meant relinquishing de jure power, it also shielded the elite from its rising political accountability for supporting extractive policies. We show that white and colored elites often cooperated in enacting extractive policies between 1838 and the 1860s, with colored planters in particular often voting with the British planters, and that many legislatures had colored majorities at the time they dissolved themselves. The patterns we

[7] While our model and empirics are focused on electoral accountability, colored elites were undoubtedly more accountable to the citizenry in other ways as well: As creole residents of the islands, their social network, wealth and status were confined to them. Unlike the British planters, they could not easily exit and immigrate into British society, and in the event of revolt, they could rely less on support by the British garrison.

[8] Before Emancipation, the legislatures were composed almost exclusively of white British plantation owners. By the 1860s, there were colored legislative majorities in most of the islands.

document are consistent with the political-accountability explanation suggested by our theory. By contrast, they are inconsistent with the conclusion of many Caribbean historians — who did not have access to our novel data on elites' identities and their voting patterns — that the dissolution of the legislatures was as an attempt by white elites to prevent the colored elite from taking control (Ashdown 1979, p.34, Lowes 1994, p.35).[9]

By examining how elite identity affects political accountability and political outcomes, we make a number of contributions to the political economy literature.

We complement the literature on political institutions (North and Weingast, 1989; Persson, Roland, and Tabellini, 1997; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001), with two critical distinctions. First, existing work predicts an iron law of oligarchy in non-democracies (Michels, 1911):[10] new elites simply hijack the extractive institutions put in place by old elites, e.g. after military coups (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, ch.12). This makes political outcomes independent of elite identity. We show that an 'iron law' may hold even under elective institutions, and when elite members face strong political constraints. Second, political constraints on extractive behavior, including constitutions, separation of powers, checks and balances, and elections, are usually taken to apply uniformly to a unified or homogenous elite. By contrast, we examine a disaggregated elite, which is heterogeneous in terms of political accountability and economic interests.[11] In modeling an elite member's type as having both a social (political accountability) and economic dimension, our approach is closest to that of Bisin and Verdier (2015) who model elite heterogeneity along economic and cultural dimensions. Their focus is not on the political accountability channel we study here, however.

The question of whether elections can limit moral hazard in political decision-making is central to the literature on political agency. As in our model, legislators with career concerns, but no commitment, are disciplined by retrospective voting: voters punish candidates with a record of supporting extractive policy (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986). Unlike our model, however, there is

[9] This interpretation is akin to Trefler and Puga (2014), who show that in Medieval Venice incumbent elites eroded formal institutions in an attempt to shut out new elites.

[10] Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) describe it as follows: "The reason for persistence is not persistence of the elites, but the persistence of incentives of whoever is in power to distort the system for their own benefit."

[11] Like us, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Lizzeri and Persico (2004), and Ashraf, Cinnirella, Galor, Gershman, and Hornung (2017) decompose the elite into groups by economic interest. Similarly, Mattozzi and Snowberg (2015) analyze a model of legislative bargaining with rich and poor legislators. None of these papers focus on the social distance between the elite and the citizenry. On the other hand, Shayo (2009) and Abramson and Shayo (2017) examines the identity composition of the citizenry but not in relation to the elite.

usually a single political decision maker in these papers. We examine a legislative setting with many decision makers. Not only do legislators have different types, but the composition of the legislature changes over time with elections and political shocks. To our knowledge, we are the first to study the role of elite identity in this way.

Our theory of the connection between elite identity and political outcomes is more general than the specific model of legislative voting that we use to operationalize it. One can imagine alternative setups that generate predictions similar to ours. For example, the 'stepping up' phenomenon that we uncover, which preserves a winning coalition in support of extraction, could occur if a shrinking bloc of unaccountable elites uses side-payments to co-opt accountable elites, as in the literature on vote-buying in legislatures (e.g. Groseclose and Snyder, 1996).[12] Another possible setup could focus explicitly on coalition formation, where a stable ruling coalition may re-form to include accountable elites (in a manner different to the process we analyze), as in e.g. Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008). Without discounting such alternative approaches, we note that they would not affect the key insights of our model, but would add complexities that would be difficult to track in the data.

Our finding that elites alter the institutional framework to shield them from rising accountability relates to a literature on the interplay between *de facto* and *de jure* institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) present a model in which elites respond to a loss of de jure power by investing in de facto power, e.g. collective action. In our case, the direction of causality is reversed. We show that extractive policies may persist in the face of increasing de facto accountability if elites can alter de jure institutions to protect themselves. The dissolution of legislative institutions in the Caribbean sets an interesting counter-point to the more common empirical pattern whereby temporary increases in political accountability tended to strengthen, reinforce and lock in democratization (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; Brückner and Ciccone, 2011; Aidt and Franck, 2015). Our results suggest one reason why good institutions may not last.

Finally, our finding that exogenously lower re-election probabilities strengthen extraction relates to existing results in the political economy literature. The 'common agency' literature frequently uses term limits to identify this effect (Besley and Case, 1995; Ferraz and Finan, 2008).

[12] See also Auriol and Platteau (2017) on co-option by an autocrat of religious elites through side payments. A setup like that could also see accountable elites being co-opted to permanently change electoral institutions.

The logic is also present in non-legislative models of elite extraction, e.g. the distinction between 'stationary bandits' and 'roving bandits' in Olson (1993). We embed this logic into a fully dynamic setup and show how increasing the replacement rate of less accountable types induces polarization in voting behavior and can increase the likelihood that extractive policy is passed.[13]

Section 2 presents our theory. Section 3 provides an historical account of ten Caribbean islands after the Emancipation of slaves created mixed political elite. In Section 4, we discuss the data and analyze the voting networks of white and colored elites in the post-Emancipation Caribbean. Section 5 concludes.

2 The Theory

Existing work models the political elite as a monolithic and unified actor. We disaggregate the elite into groups with different degrees of political accountability (determined, for example, by traits like race or ethnicity that make some elite members socially closer to the citizenry) and different economic interests. In other sections of the paper, we refer to changes in elite identity, but in this section we refer to changes in elite composition, formally defined as changes in the distribution of types. We focus on electoral accountability, with an elite disciplined by re-election concerns. To our knowledge, we are the first to analyze a model with (*i*) re-election concerns, (*ii*) multiple decision makers (legislators), and (*iii*) a changing distribution of political accountability and economic interests among legislators over time. We analyze whether elections can discipline the political elite and the extent to which this depends on the distribution of elite types.

2.1 The Model

Consider an infinite-horizon model with discrete time indexed by $t = 0, 1, 2 \ldots$ Policy is determined by voting in a legislature composed of $n > 2$ members. (Our model could also apply to other entities where members have varying re-election concerns, including committees and boards.) Each legislator is a member of the elite, which is a finite set of individuals E_t with typical member i.[14] The set of legislators in period t is denoted by N_t. While the size of the legislature n

[13] The paper of course also speaks directly to the literature on Caribbean post-Emancipation political history. See for example Rogers (1970), Heuman (1981), Brizan (1984), Craton (1988), and Holt (1991).

[14] This is a departure from citizen-candidate models in which a single decision maker is selected from the citizenry (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997). Models of legislative bargaining have more than one political

is fixed, its composition N_t changes over time.

Voting and Policy: Each period t, every $i \in N_t$ votes either for extractive economic policy $v_{it} = 1$ or against it $v_{it} = 0$. Denote the profile of voting choices in period t by $v_t \equiv (v_{it})_{i \in N_t}$. The policy implemented is determined by majority rule and denoted by $x_t \in \{0, 1\}$, where $x = 1$ is the extractive policy. For example, $x = 1$ could be a wage-depressing policy which increases economic rents to the elite. For convenience, ties are broken in favor of the extractive policy.

Elite Types: Elite members, hence legislators, differ in their political accountability and economic interests. We model economic interest as a separate trait, though it may be correlated with political accountability, especially if both traits are connected through race, ethnicity, or religion.[15] Agent i's political accountability is denoted by $\theta_i \in \{L, H\}$, where L (H) denotes low (high) political accountability, in a manner to be made precise below. Agent i's economic interest is $\vartheta_i \in \{h, \ell\}$, where h indicates a larger direct benefit from extractive policy. A legislator's two-dimensional type is denoted by $\Theta_i = (\theta_i, \vartheta_i)$, which is fixed for all time. The space of individual types is denoted by $\mathcal{I} \equiv \{L, H\} \times \{\ell, h\}$.

Payoffs: Legislators are forward-looking and maximize the expected discounted sum of their payoffs over time. There are two (additively separable) components of stage-game payoffs. First, every elected legislator receives per-period political rents worth r, which could be salary, perquisites, and 'ego rents' from being in office. All others receive no political rents. Second, each elite member (elected and unelected) receives an economic rent worth $\pi_{\vartheta_i}(x)$ which depends on whether extractive policy is passed. Naturally, we assume

$$\pi_h(1) - \pi_h(0) > \pi_\ell(1) - \pi_\ell(0) > 0.$$

That is, all elite members benefit directly from extractive policy, with h types benefitting more than ℓ types.[16]

decision maker (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Weingast, 1979), but their focus is on dividing a fixed budget among districts (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989), whereas we examine voting over a common, extractive policy.

[15] For example, most large farmers in Zimbabwe were British under Mugabe until the land reforms in 2000.

[16] Our results do not hinge on the assumption that every elite member benefits from the extractive policy. One can imagine models where some elite members do not benefit from extractive policy directly: elite members who are socially closer to the citizenry might dislike voting for extractive policy due to altruistic in-group preferences and norms (Shayo, 2009; Bramoullé and Goyal, 2016), or elite members with $\vartheta_i = \ell$ may actually have a negative payoffs from extraction, as in Lizzeri and Persico (2004). Such models could still generate very similar results to ours in the presence of side-payments that co-opt elites groups into supporting extraction, as in the literature on vote-buying in legislatures (e.g. Groseclose and Snyder, 1996).

Changes in Elite Composition: Political turnover occurs both endogenously and exogenously. With probability λ_i, $i \in N_t$ is exogenously replaced in period $t+1$. We refer to λ_i as i's *replacement rate*. If i is replaced exogenously in period t, his successor is of type Θ with probability $q(\Theta|\Theta_i)$. The replacement rates $(\lambda_i)_{i\in N}$ are an important exogenous force in the model. Together with the transition probabilities $(q(\Theta|\Theta_i))_{\Theta\in\mathcal{I}}$, they determine the pace of change and the long run distribution of elite types.

With probability $1-\lambda_i$, i is not exogenously replaced, and his likelihood of re-election depends on his roll-call voting choice.[17] Though we do not explicitly model voting by the citizenry, re-election of legislators occurs in a manner consistent with retrospective voting by citizens.[18] If legislator i votes against extractive policy in period t ($v_{it} = 0$), he is re-elected with probability $\bar{p} \in (0, 1]$. If he votes for extractive policy in period t ($v_{it} = 1$), his likelihood of re-election is a random variable P_{it}, which determines his electoral penalty for supporting extractive policy. The realization p_{it} is drawn from the distribution F_{θ_i}, independently across agents and time.[19] F_{θ_i} is continuous and strictly increasing on $[0, \bar{p})$ with a mass point at $\bar{p}$ (i.e. no electoral penalty). Specifically, $\mathbb{P}(P_{it} = \bar{p}) = \psi < 1$ and $\mathbb{P}(0 \leq P_{it} < \bar{p}) = 1 - \psi > 0$. Thus, a legislator voting for extractive policy faces no electoral penalty with probability ψ and a random electoral penalty with probability $1-\psi$.[20] Naturally, H accountability types expect to pay a larger electoral penalty than L types when supporting extracting policy. Formally, F_L dominates F_H in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance: $F_H(p) > F_L(p)$ for all $p \in (0, \bar{p})$. Note that the re-election probabilities $p_t \equiv (p_{it})_{i\in N_t}$ need not be deterministic functions of a legislator's type; they can also depend on variation in district-level conditions, including electoral mobilization, information and discontent.

In summary, a legislator's likelihood of re-election is

$$(1-\lambda_i) \times [\mathbb{I}(v_{it} = 0)\bar{p} + \mathbb{I}(v_{it} = 1)P_{it}].$$

[17] Unlike standard political agency models (e.g. Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986), electoral turnover occurs in equilibrium in our model.

[18] The importance of retrospective voting in practice has been established since Fiorina (1981). Much of the literature focusses on the role of monitoring in political accountability (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Bobonis, Fuertes, and Schwabe, 2016). Monitoring in our context is straightforward. An extractive policy can be unambiguously identified and support for extractive policy is observable from voting records.

[19] Independence over time is assumed for expositional convenience. Our results hold more generally, with various forms of autocorrelation in P_{it}.

[20] The equilibrium construction and all comparative static results hold when $\psi = 0$. The mass point simply permits equilibria in which a supermajority of legislators vote for extractive policy in some states.

If a legislator fails to be re-elected in this manner (endogenously), we assume his successor j has the same type, $\Theta_i = \Theta_j$.[21] Whenever a legislator fails to be re-elected, endogenously or exogenously, we assume he is never elected again but remains a member of the elite.

The complete information case is analyzed in which period t voting choices are made after p_t is publicly observed.

Timing: The stage game unfolds as follows.

1. The vector of electoral penalties determined by p_t is publicly observed.
2. Each $i \in N_t$ votes for or against an extractive policy, $v_{it} \in \{0, 1\}$.
3. The policy $x_t \in \{0, 1\}$ is implemented based on majority voting in the legislature.
4. Payoffs are received.
5. N_{t+1} is determined by replacement and election, given voting behavior v_t and electoral penalties p_t.

Agents have a common discount factor $\delta \in (0, 1)$. There is no discounting within periods. The structure of the game is common knowledge.

2.2 Equilibrium

We focus on subgame perfect equilibria that exhibit a particular kind of monotone voting, to be defined shortly. These equilibria will also be Markov perfect.

The stochastic stage game to be played by legislators is described by a two-dimensional state denoted by (z, p). Let $n_t(\Theta) \equiv \sum_{i \in N_t} \mathbb{I}(\Theta_i = \Theta)$ be the number of type Θ legislators in period t. An *ex ante* state is a type distribution

$$z_t \equiv (n_t(\Theta))_{\Theta \in \mathcal{I}} .$$

An *ex post* state is the vector of realized re-election probabilities $p_t \equiv (p_{it})_{i \in N_t}$. Notice that the likelihood of each *ex post* state depends on the current *ex ante* state.

[21] Replacement by an identical agent is assumed for convenience in models with retrospective voting (e.g. Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Persson et al., 1997). Relaxing this assumption, i would have to consider how his replacement would affect the likelihood that extractive policy is passed when deciding how to vote himself. This effect, however, would disappear as $n \to \infty$ and the likelihood that any given legislator is pivotal goes to zero.

The component state spaces are respectively

$$Z = \left\{ z \mid n(\Theta) \in [0, n],\ \textstyle\sum_{\Theta \in \mathcal{I}} n(\Theta) = n \right\} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathcal{P} = [0, \bar{p}]^n.$$

Define the following random variable as a function of the re-election probability P_{it}:

$$D_{it} = \underbrace{\pi_{\vartheta_i}(1) - \pi_{\vartheta_i}(0)}_{\text{Increment in economic rent}} - \underbrace{\frac{\delta(1-\lambda_i)}{1-\delta(1-\lambda_i)\bar{p}}}_{\text{effective discount factor}} \underbrace{(\bar{p} - P_{it})}_{\text{electoral penalty}} \underbrace{r}_{\text{political rent}} \tag{1}$$

We refer to D_{it} and its realization d_{it} as i's *interest in extractive policy* in period t. The first term is the increment in i's economic rent when extractive policy is passed. The second term is an upper bound on the discounted sum of lost political rents as a result of the electoral penalty $\bar{p} - P_{it}$. Thus, i's interest in extractive policy is a lower bound on his net benefit from voting for extractive policy. H accountability types expect a larger electoral penalty for a given increment in economic rent and so have a smaller expected interest in extractive policy. In contrast, h types have a larger interest in extractive policy for a given electoral penalty.

Denote the $\lceil \frac{1}{2}n \rceil$th largest values of D_{it} and d_{it} among $i \in N_t$ by D_t^* and d_t^* respectively. Also define the rank of i as $\tilde{R}_t(i) = \sum_{j \in N_t - \{i\}} 1 + \mathbb{I}(d_{it} \leq d_{jt})$. The unique rank denoted by R_t is a bijective function ranking players as in $\tilde{R}_t$ except with ties broken at random.

Definition 1 *A* voting equilibrium *is defined as follows. For each $i \in N_t$ and $t \geq 1$:*

(i) *If $d_t^* \geq 0$, $v_{it}^* = 1$ if only if $p_{it} = \bar{p}$ or $R_t(i) \leq \lceil \frac{1}{2}n \rceil$.*

(ii) *If $d_t^* < 0$, $v_t^* = \mathbf{0}$.*

Proposition 1 *A voting equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.*

All proofs are in Appendix A.

Several remarks are in order. Denote the $\lceil \frac{1}{2}n \rceil$th largest value of p_{it} among $i \in N_t$ by p_t^*. First, if the legislators incurring no electoral penalty comprise a (weak) majority ($p^* = \bar{p}$), they each

vote for extractive policy and $x = 1$ passes, possibly with a supermajority. Otherwise, either a minimum winning coalition votes for extractive policy or nobody does. In this case, the extractive policy is passed if and only if a weak majority of legislators has a non-negative interest in extractive policy. Second, a voting equilibrium specifies not only when extractive policy is passed, but also who votes for extractive policy. The legislators voting for extractive policy are those who face no electoral penalty and those who have the largest interest in extractive policy. In this sense, voting choices are monotone. Note that we do not directly condition the equilibrium on a legislator's political accountability or economic interest. Rather, a legislator's type is related to his voting behavior through his interest in extractive policy. Equilibrium voting behavior can thus be conceived as a noisy kind of coalition formation, in which the coalition supporting extractive policy is a probabilistic function of the identities involved. Third, while a voting equilibrium is not the most efficient from the perspective of the elite, it is simple, with voting choices in each period T depending solely on the current *ex post* state p_T. A more efficient equilibrium, involving a tighter bound on the net benefit of voting for extractive policy, would impose an unrealistic computational burden requiring agents to compute the likelihood of each trajectory $\{z_t, p_t\}_{t=T}^{\infty}$, among other things. Thus, we have constructed a subgame perfect equilibrium that can be played by plausible (boundedly rational) human players.

Henceforth, all references to equilibrium behavior are with respect to voting equilibria defined above. It should be clear now, if it were not already from the setup, that rent extraction through voting is akin to provision of a threshold club good, the club here being the elite E_t and the club good being economic rents from extractive policy. A subset of the elite needs to contribute to the good (i.e., vote for extractive policy) for it to be provided. All elite members benefit from provision of the club good, but only contributors bear the cost of provision, in terms of an electoral penalty. For the good to be provided, the benefit must exceed the cost for the threshold number of club members. This is a simple but powerful insight which we exploit in the theoretical and empirical analysis.

2.3 Elite Composition and Political Accountability

Proposition 1 characterizes voting equilibria for a given realization p_t. We are interested in how voting depends on the composition of elite types z_t. Because p_t is not always observable, we

compute expectations conditioned only on z_t, without any knowledge of p_t other than its prior distribution. We call this the *ex ante* perspective. In this section we examine how z_t affects (i) the likelihood that extractive policy is passed and (ii) the likelihood that a given elite member votes for extractive policy.

Henceforth, we focus on type-symmetric replacement rates: for each $i \in N_t$ and all t, $\lambda_i = \lambda(\Theta_i)$. We assume

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda(L, \vartheta) &\geq \lambda(H, \vartheta) \text{ for } \vartheta \in \{\ell, h\} \\ \lambda(\theta, h) &\geq \lambda(\theta, \ell) \text{ for } \theta \in \{L, H\}. \end{aligned}$$

This assumption of (weakly) higher attrition rates for legislators with low electoral accountability and high economic rents is empirically motivated by changes in elite identity over the last century. The roll-back of colonialism after the two world wars involved a transition in many countries from a colonial or European-backed elite to a mixed elite composed of indigenous groups, colonizer-origin creole elites and 'transplanted' elite groups. The end of the Cold War also removed foreign-backed elites, replacing them with elites purportedly more accountable to their citizenries.

2.3.1 Elite Composition and Policy

Across all elite members $i \in N_t$, we have n random variables $(D_{it})_{i \in N_t}$. The $\lceil \frac{1}{2}n \rceil$th largest value is a random variable D_t^*. In equilibrium, extractive policy is passed whenever its realization d_t^* (which depends on p_t) is nonnegative. Without any knowledge of p_t, the (prior) likelihood that extractive policy is passed in state z_t in a voting equilibrium is then

$$\mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 \,|\, z_t) = \mathbb{P}(D_t^* \geq 0 \,|\, z_t).$$

Observe that (1) is negative for some $P_{it} \in (0, \bar{p})$ if and only if

$$\frac{\pi_{\vartheta_i}(1) - \pi_{\vartheta_i}(0)}{r} \leq \frac{\delta(1 - \lambda(\Theta_i))\bar{p}}{1 - \delta(1 - \lambda(\Theta_i))\bar{p}}, \tag{2}$$

that is, if economic rents from extractive policy are sufficiently small relative to political rents from

holding office.

If (2) is violated then i will vote for extractive policy whenever pivotal irrespective of the state (z_t, p_t). Hence if (2) is violated for all types $\Theta \in \mathcal{I}$, the likelihood that extractive policy is passed equals $\mathbb{P}(D_t^* \geq 0 \,|\, z_t) = 1$ for all z_t. In this case, policy outcomes are invariant to elite composition.

To focus on the case in which the composition of the elite matters for political outcomes, we henceforth make the following assumption.

Assumption 1 (2) *holds for all types* $\Theta \in \mathcal{I}$.

Proposition 2 *Consider two states* z *and* z' *such that* $n'(H, \vartheta) \geq n(H, \vartheta)$ *for* $\vartheta = \ell, h$ *and* $n'(\theta, \ell) \geq n(\theta, \ell)$ *for* $\theta = L, H$*, with at least one inequality strict.*

The likelihood that extractive policy is passed is lower in state z'*:*

$$\mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 \,|\, z) > \mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 \,|\, z').$$

Ceteris paribus, the likelihood that extractive policy is passed is decreasing in the share of legislators with high political accountability (H types) and low economic rents (ℓ types). The relationship between the composition of the elite and extractive policy is illustrated in Figure 1.[22] When we start with a high proportion of (L, h) types, the likelihood of extractive policy being passed is high. As L accountability types are replaced by H types and h rent types are replaced by ℓ types, the likelihood of extractive policy being passed falls. For the particular numerical values chosen, the effect of a rising share of H types is larger than the effect of a rising share of ℓ types.

Thus the composition of the elite matters for political outcomes. The reader should recall, however, that this conclusion holds when economic rents from extractive policy are not too large relative to political rents from holding office (Assumption 1). Otherwise, the benefit from voting for extractive policy can be too large for differences in electoral accountability to have any effect on policy outcomes.

[22] Figure 1 is constructed as follows. Let $n_h = n(L, h) + n(H, h)$ be the number of h types and $n_H = n(H, h) + n(H, \ell)$ be the number of H types. Each point (n_h, n_H) can potentially be generated by a number of distributions $z = (n(\Theta))_{\Theta \in \mathcal{I}}$. Let $S(n_h, n_H) = \{z \,|\, n(L, h) + n(H, h) = n_h \text{ and } n(H, h) + n(H, \ell) = n_H\}$. For each $s \in S(n_h, n_H)$, we computed the probability that extractive policy is passed $\mathbb{P}(D^* \geq 0|s)$. The functions depicted in Figures 1 and 2 are unweighted averages over all relevant combinations. That is, the function evaluated at (n_h, n_H) equals $\frac{1}{|S(n_h, n_H)|} \sum_{s \in S(n_h, n_H)} \mathbb{P}(D^* \geq 0|s)$.

Figure 1: Probability of extractive policy being passed



Notes: Parameter values: $\lambda(L,h) = \lambda(L,\ell) = 0.5$, $\lambda(H,h) = \lambda(H,\ell) = 0.25$, $\delta = 0.5$, $\bar{p} = 1$, $r = 6$, $\pi_h(1) - \pi_h(0) = 0.8$, $\pi_L(1) - \pi_L(0) = 0.2$, $n = 6$, $f_L(P_i) \sim Beta(3,1)$, $f_H(P_i) \sim Beta(1,3)$, where $Beta(\alpha,\beta)$ is the pdf of the Beta distribution with parameters α and β.

2.3.2 Individual Elite Type and Voting

Let us now examine how a legislator's own type affects his voting behavior. By Proposition 1, i votes for extractive policy whenever $d_t^* \geq 0$ and either $P_{it} = \bar{p}$ or $R_t(i) \leq \lceil \frac{1}{2}n \rceil$. By computing the likelihood that this occurs, we arrive at the following proposition:

Proposition 3 *High accountability and low rent types are less likely to vote for extractive policy:*

(i) *Suppose* $\Theta_i = (L,\vartheta)$ *and* $\Theta_j = (H,\vartheta)$*, for* $\vartheta \in \{\ell,h\}$ *and* $i,j \in N_t$*. Then* $0 < \mathbb{P}(v_{jt} = 1 \,|\, z_t) < \mathbb{P}(v_{it} = 1 \,|\, z_t)$ *in all states* z_t*.*

(ii) *Suppose* $\Theta_i = (\theta,h)$ *and* $\Theta_j = (\theta,\ell)$*, for* $\theta \in \{L,H\}$ *and* $i,j \in N_t$*. Then* $0 < \mathbb{P}(v_{jt} = 1 \,|\, z_t) < \mathbb{P}(v_{it} = 1 \,|\, z_t)$ *in all states* z_t*.*

Voting for extractive policy depends on a legislator's accountability and economic interests. Low accountability and high economic rents from extractive policy raise the likelihood of voting for extractive policy. (L,h) types are the most likely to vote for extractive policy and (H,ℓ) types

are the least likely. This is apparent in Figure 1. But for a fuller understanding of the figure, we need to analyze not only how an individual's voting choices depend on his own type, but also on the distribution of types in the legislature.

2.3.3 Elite Composition and Voting Interactions

Legislative voting is an interactive exercise. Let us now examine how an individual's voting behavior depends on the distribution of elite types z_t.

Proposition 4 *From state z, produce state z' by switching the type of one player j, such that $n'(H,\vartheta) \geq n(H,\vartheta)$ for $\vartheta = \ell, h$ and $n'(\theta,\ell) \geq n(\theta,\ell)$ for $\theta = L, H$, with at least one inequality strict.*

For all $i \neq j$:

$$\mathbb{P}(v_{it}=1\,|\,z) - \mathbb{P}(v_{it}=1\,|\,z') \;<\; \mathbb{P}(x_t=1\,|\,z) - \mathbb{P}(x_t=1\,|\,z') \;<\; \mathbb{P}(v_{jt}=1\,|\,z) - \mathbb{P}(v_{jt}=1\,|\,z').$$

Proposition 4 reveals a more complex relationship between z_t and voting outcomes than suggested by Propositions 2 and 3. Raising j's accountability or lowering his economic interest in extractive policy reduces the likelihood that j votes for extractive policy more than it reduces the likelihood that extractive policy is passed. The difference is made up by an increase in the relative frequency with which all other members of the legislature $i \neq j$ vote for extractive policy. We call this behavior 'stepping up'. It arises from the underlying structure of the strategic environment which is akin to provision of a threshold club good. When H types are rare, they tend to vote against extractive policy, free riding on the large number of L types who are likely to vote for it. An increase in the share of H types induces legislators who did not previously support the extractive policy to step up and vote for the policy in order to get it passed. The same applies to economic interest, i.e. an increase in the share of ℓ types. Thus one can underestimate the support for extractive policy by high accountability and low economic rent types when extrapolating from their voting behavior when they are rare.

With this in hand, let us return to Figure 1. We know the likelihood that extractive policy is passed is decreasing in the share of high accountability (H) types and the share of low economic

rent (ℓ) types (Proposition 2). The precise curvature of the graph can be understood as follows. Replace one L type with an H type. The direct effect is that the new member of the legislature votes for extractive policy at a lower rate (Proposition 3). This is partially offset by existing members who increase their likelihood of voting for extractive policy (Proposition 4)—the indirect effect. The difference in the sizes of the direct and indirect effects depends on the type composition of existing members of the legislature. For the numerical values used in Figure 1, the difference is non-monotonic in the share of high accountability types. Hence the likelihood that extractive policy is passed could fall at an increasing or decreasing rate depending on the composition of the legislature.

2.4 Speeding up the Process of Elite Change

Policy outcomes can be improved by replacing low accountability types with high accountability types [Proposition 2]. When the replacement rate of low accountability types $\lambda(L, \vartheta)$ is low, this transition in the elite's composition occurs slowly. One possible response is to raise the replacement rate for L types, for example through voter mobilization and political purges. We show, however, that attempts to speed up the process of elite change can produce unintended consequences. The first consequence is polarization in the voting behavior of low accountability and high accountability types.

Let $\lambda \equiv (\lambda(L, \ell), \lambda(L, h))$ be the vector of replacement rates for low accountability L types.

Proposition 5 *Compare voting equilibria under replacement rates λ and λ' for L types, such that $\lambda'(L, \vartheta) > \lambda(L, \vartheta)$ for some $\vartheta \in \{\ell, h\}$, all else held equal.*

Denote the prior likelihood that i votes for extractive policy in state z given replacement rate λ by $\mathbb{P}(v_i = 1 \mid z, \lambda)$.

Suppose $\Theta_i = (L, \vartheta) \neq \Theta_j$.

(i) $\mathbb{P}(v_i = 1 \mid z, \lambda') > \mathbb{P}(v_i = 1 \mid z, \lambda)$.

(ii) $\mathbb{P}(v_i = 1 \mid z, \lambda') - \mathbb{P}(v_j = 1 \mid z, \lambda') > \mathbb{P}(v_i = 1 \mid z, \lambda) - \mathbb{P}(v_j = 1 \mid z, \lambda)$.

Replacing L types more frequently (independent of their voting record) weakens re-election concerns, reducing the expected value of the stream of political rents they stand to lose when voting for extractive policy [see (1)]. Therefore, low accountability types vote *more* frequently for extractive policy [part (*i*)]. A similar logic is present in political agency models including Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). In these models, a representative citizen decides whether to retain or replace a single incumbent legislator based retrospectively on his voting record. It is counterproductive for the citizen to vote out a legislator whenever he chooses a positive level of extraction. This would give the incumbent no incentive to be re-elected, producing a sequence of legislators holding office for one period each of whom would choose the maximal level of extraction. Some tolerance of extraction is required. We extend this logic into a setting with many heterogenous legislators. In doing so, we also show that raising the replacement rate of L types induces H types to 'step down' and vote relatively less frequently for extractive policy. According to part (*ii*) of the proposition, attempts to speed up the transition to a more accountable elite polarizes legislative voting behavior along political accountability lines.

Now we turn to the effect on extractive policy. First, we show that raising the replacement rate of L types increases the likelihood that extractive policy is passed in a given state z. The rise in voting for extractive policy by L types [Proposition 5] is only partially offset by the stepping down response of H types. It could still be that raising $\lambda(L,\vartheta)$ lowers the likelihood that extractive policy is passed *over time* as low accountability legislators are more rapidly replaced by high accountability legislators. To investigate this possibility, denote a finite sequence of states from T running through $\hat{T}$ by $s = \{s_t\}_{t=T}^{\hat{T}}$. The average likelihood that extractive policy is passed over time horizon $(T, T+1, \ldots \hat{T})$ is then

$$\overline{\mathbb{P}}(x_t = 1 \,|\, z_T, \hat{T}) = \sum_{s \in Z^{\hat{T}-T+1}} \mathbb{P}(s \,|\, z_T) \; \tfrac{1}{\hat{T}-T+1} \sum_{t=T}^{\hat{T}} \mathbb{P}\left(x_t = 1 \,|\, z_t = s_t\right). \tag{3}$$

Recall that if i is replaced, his successor is of type Θ with probability $q(\Theta|\Theta_i)$. We show that raising the replacement rate of L types increases the likelihood that extractive policy is passed over any finite time horizon if L types are sufficiently likely to be replaced by their own type, i.e. if $\min_{\vartheta \in \{\ell,h\}} \; q\left((L,\vartheta)|(L,\vartheta)\right)$ is sufficiently close to one.

The results are stated in the following proposition.

Proposition 6 *Compare voting equilibria under replacement rates λ and λ' for L types, such that $\lambda'(L,\ell) > \lambda(L,\ell)$ and $\lambda'(L,h) > \lambda(L,h)$. All else is held equal.*

(i) *Denote the equilibrium likelihood that extractive policy is passed in state z given replacement rate λ by $\mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 \,|\, z, \lambda)$. For all states z in which there is at least one L type legislator,*

$$\mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 \,|\, z, \lambda') > \mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 \,|\, z, \lambda).$$

(ii) *Denote the average equilibrium likelihood that extractive policy is passed over time horizon $(T, T+1, \ldots \hat{T})$ given replacement rate λ by $\overline{\mathbb{P}}(x_t = 1 \,|z_T, \hat{T}, \lambda)$, as defined by (3). The following holds for all z_T in which there is at least one L type legislator and all finite time horizons $\hat{T}$:*
If $\min_{\vartheta \in \{\ell, h\}} \; q\,(\,(L,\vartheta)|(L,\vartheta)\,)$ is sufficiently close to one, then

$$\overline{\mathbb{P}}(x_t = 1 \,|z_T, \hat{T}, \lambda') > \overline{\mathbb{P}}(x_t = 1 \,|z_T, \hat{T}, \lambda).$$

Figure 2 illustrates Propositions 5 and 6(i). Increasing the replacement rate of L types λ_L raises the graph, i.e. raises the likelihood that extractive policy is passed. It also polarizes voting among H and L types, dividing the elite primarily along political accountability lines. This is apparent in Figure 2(iii) in which the likelihood that extractive policy is passed is far more sensitive to the composition of the elite along political accountability lines n_H than economic lines n_h. Thus attempts to remove L types render political accountability more salient in voting patterns.

Finally, removing L accountability types from office at a faster rate only improves political outcomes over time when they are replaced by H types with sufficiently high probability. Otherwise, citizens face a succession of L types with weaker re-election concerns. As such, attempts to speed up the transition toward a more accountable elite can be counterproductive when there are few high accountability alternatives to existing low accountability legislators. This can occur, for example, when the elite has control over the nomination of candidates, and simply replaces like with like.

Figure 2: Probability of extractive policy being passed



(a) Low $\lambda_L = 0.25$

(b) Intermediate $\lambda_L = 0.5$

(c) High $\lambda_L = 0.75$

Notes: $\lambda(L,h) = \lambda(L,\ell) = \lambda_L \in \{0.25, 0.5, 0.75\}$. Parameter values are otherwise as in Figure 1.

2.5 Elite Composition and Political Accountability over the Long Run

We have examined how voting depends on elite composition z_t. We now analyze the long run frequency that extractive policy is passed, given changing elite composition over time. The transition probabilities specified above determine a finite Markov chain z_t on state space Z. The long run behavior of the process is given by a stationary distribution μ which is a probability distribution over states $z \in Z$.

Recall that if i is replaced, his successor is of type Θ with probability $q(\Theta|\Theta_i)$. Now assume $q(\Theta|\Theta_i) > 0$ for all $(\Theta, \Theta_i) \in \mathcal{I}^2$. The Markov chain z_t is then irreducible and aperiodic. This means the stationary distribution is unique and provides substantial information about elite composition in the long run: from any initial state z_0 both the proportion of time the process spends in each state up through time t and the probability of being in each state at time t converge to the stationary

distribution μ as $t \to \infty$.

The long run frequency with which extractive policy is passed is then:

$$\mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 \,|\, \mu) = \sum_{z \in Z} \mu_z \, \mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 \,|\, z) \tag{4}$$

We can now state the following proposition:

Proposition 7 *Let μ be the stationary distribution under transition probabilities $\left(q(\Theta|\Theta')\right)_{(\Theta,\Theta') \in I^2}$. Let μ' be the stationary distribution under alternative transition probabilities $\left(q'(\Theta|\Theta')\right)_{(\Theta,\Theta') \in I^2}$.*

Suppose (a) $q'((H,\vartheta)|\Theta) \geq q((H,\vartheta)|\Theta)$ for all $\vartheta \in \{\ell, h\}$ and $\Theta \in \mathcal{I}$, and (b) $q'((\theta,\ell)|\Theta) \geq q((\theta,\ell)|\Theta)$ for all $\theta \in \{L,H\}$ and $\Theta \in \mathcal{I}$, with at least one inequality strict.

Then $\mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 \,|\, \mu') < \mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 \,|\, \mu)$.

This proposition is straightforward. Any change in the transition probabilities that favors replacement of existing legislators with high accountability and/or low economic rent types reduces the long run frequency with which extractive policy is passed. The elite's composition matters over the long run. But once again the relationship between accountability at the individual level and political outcomes is more complex than this may suggest, as we shall now see.

2.6 Elite Composition and Institutions

Despite mitigating factors, an increase in the share of high accountability types reduces the likelihood that extractive policy is passed in a representative democracy (Proposition 2). Since all elite members gain from extractive policy, legislators may respond to increasing electoral accountability by weakening institutions in manner that shields them from greater accountability. The question we address here is how much would legislators be willing to do so?

The weakening of institutions can take many forms: In Sierra Leone, Siaka Stevens simply severed physical railway connections to parts of the country where he did not enjoy political support, at a great cost to not only the country but also the elite's ability to raise tax revenue (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, ch.12). When Mugabe in Zimbabwe came under increasing pressure in 2000, he eventually re-distributed land from white land owners as he had long promised, again at high

economic cost to the country and Mugabe himself (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, ch.13). A particularly interesting response is to purchase institutional protection by abolishing elections and ceding power to a foreign nation or the military. Many past military coups and foreign interventions were clearly invited or encouraged by a local elite trying to preserve its own power. In Online Appendix E we discuss some examples, including the military coups in Greece in 1967, in Turkey in 1971, and Thailand in 2014.

We consider one example of an institutional response, the dissolution of the legislature and end to elections, though other responses could be analyzed. Suppose that prior to date 1 at some stage T, there is a date 0 at which legislators $i \in N_T$ can choose to pay an amount B to permanently abolish elections. If this occurs, extractive policy is permanently imposed and each $i \in N_T$ receives political rents of r in every $t \geq T$. If not, the game proceeds as usual. We are interested in the maximum amount members of the legislature as a whole would be willing to pay for such a change in institutions, denoted by $B(z_T)$.

If elections are abolished in period T, the discounted sum of subsequent payoffs to each $i \in N_T$ is $\frac{\pi_{\vartheta_i}(1)+r}{1-\delta}$. Prior to observing p_T, each legislator $i \in N_T$ would thus be willing to individually contribute up to an amount $B_i(z_T)$ equal to the difference between this payoff and his expected equilibrium payoff under elections. The maximum the legislature would be willing to pay as a whole in period T is $B(z_T) = \sum_{i \in N_T} B_i(z_T)$. The amount the legislature would pay to abolish elections depends on the elite's composition in the following manner.

Proposition 8 *Consider two states z and z' such that $n'(H,\vartheta) \geq n(H,\vartheta)$ for $\vartheta = \ell, h$, with at least one inequality strict, and $n'(H,\vartheta) + n'(L,\vartheta) = n(H,\vartheta) + n(L,\vartheta)$ for $\vartheta = \ell, h$.*

Legislators would pay more to abolish elections in state z':

$$B(z') > B(z).$$

The price the political elite is willing to pay to shield themselves from electoral accountability is increasing in the share of H accountable types (holding economic composition fixed). Hence

the relationship between accountability of elite members at the individual level and political accountability at the aggregate level depends critically on the quality of institutions. If institutional quality is low, that is, if the political elite can alter institutions at low cost, then it will respond to rising electoral accountability by weakening formal institutions. This is another way in which attempts at boosting political accountability by changing the social composition of the political elite can be counterproductive. Thus, the elite's composition matters for political outcomes, but not independently of institutions.

3 The British Caribbean Sugar Islands After Emancipation

Our theory of elite identity and politics is grounded in a study of ten British Caribbean sugar colonies: Antigua, Barbados, Jamaica, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Kitts, Dominica, Tobago, St. Vincent, and Grenada. Sugar was introduced into these islands around 1700, and with this emerged an elite of 'great planters', whereas white commoners left the islands for the American colonies, their place taken by an ever-expanding population of imported slaves (Taylor, 2002, ch. 11).[23] By 1800, these great planters had become the "wealthiest men in all of English America" (Galloway, 2005). From the peak of their powers in 1800 the tide turned against the great planters. Slavery, which was critical to Caribbean wealth, came under increasing attack from the rising Abolitionist movement in London (Ragatz, 1928, ch.10). In 1807, British parliament abolished the slave trade. Finally, in 1833, British parliament passed *An Act for the Abolition of Slavery* which ended slavery throughout the Empire in 1836. We study the islands in the 30-40 years that followed.

Legislative Institutions: Local Caribbean elites' political power had traditionally been vested in their control of the locally elected legislative assemblies. These assemblies were powerful institutions, which "in addition to their legislative functions, had extensive executive powers. Colonial Acts assigned all important administrative tasks to special boards, or commissions, upon which members of the assembly enjoyed either exclusive or majority control" (Green, 1991, p. 68). Morrell and Parker assert that the assemblies "seriously curtailed the powers of the governors in the colonies" (1969, p. 435). Rogers writes that "in the West Indies, the executive was almost com-

[23] The first six (plus the Virgin Islands for which we have no data) were founded in the 1600s by British settler-farmers. The other four were annexed from France at the end of the Seven Years War in 1765, and were then resettled by sugar planters from the existing British Caribbean islands. The British annexed three more Caribbean colonies — Trinidad, St. Lucia, and Guyana — from Napoleon between 1797 and 1803, but these never had comparable legislatures.

pletely isolated from public finances, over which the assemblies exerted an extraordinary influence. Indeed, all representative bodies exercised the functions of three separate [British] agencies. As a lawmaking chamber, it imposed truces. In an executive role, it collected revenue, voted appropriations, expended monies, and, along with the upper house, administered public services. Lastly, acting as an audit board, the island assemblies checked their own expenditures" (1970, p. 77–79). Thus, the assembles were the instrument of elites' de jure power.

Parliamentary Process: As mentioned in the introduction, one could envision alternatives to our theoretical setup where either coalition formation (or party politics) is explicitly modeled (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2008), or where some elite members are disinclined to support extraction but their votes can be bought (e.g. Groseclose and Snyder, 1996). As we pointed out, our theory of the connection between elite identity and political outcomes is more general than the specific model of legislative voting that we use to operationalize it. The particular choice of setup is, however, well-motivated by our empirical case study, as we now argue. As a matter of historical plausibility, accounts of politics in the 19th century Caribbean assemblies are inconsistent with the notion of the formation of stable coalitions or anything that resembles party discipline; in fact they tend to emphasize their absence (Heuman, 1981; Holt, 1991; Honychurch, 1984). To what extent all elite members were inherently in favor of extractive policies is more difficult to gauge. On the one hand, this assumption is reasonable because, as we will document, most extractive policies had to do with regressive taxation, and with the provision of public goods that the wealthy preferred to provide to themselves as club goods. On the other hand, it is also plausible that some, particularly of the colored elite members, may well have favored policies that benefited the citizenry at a cost to the elite, and had to be co-opted into supporting extractive policies. We do not take a stance against this notion, but decided against including co-option into the theoretical setup because it yields no new insights and because we have no way of measuring co-option in our data.

Elite Types: The *Colonial Office* drew a distinction between "whites, mostly landed, [...] coloreds, who had been freed earlier and possessed, in many cases, substantial property, and [...] blacks, recently emancipated" (Taylor, 1885, p. 207). This distinction between colored and black was rooted in the fact that non-white Caribbean elites were the mulatto descendants of white slave-owners and slave mistresses, subsequently freed and bequeathed property (see e.g. Lowes,

1995, p.37). The non-white elite in the Caribbean was thus 'colored', and formed a social class distinct from the citizenry which was 'black'. We refer the reader to the excellent social histories on this topic in Carmichael (1833), Smith (1953) and Cox (1984).[24] In characterizing the political relations between the three big racial groups (whites, coloureds and blacks), Baker (1994, p. 129) argues that at the time of Emancipation "the coloured people and the negroes were two entirely separated classes of people," and Henry Taylor, a high-ranking official in the *Colonial Office* at the time, stated that "it was common knowledge that [the colored elite] tended to amalgamate with the whites in their uncharitable disposition toward the [black] peasantry" (Taylor, 1885, p. 216). Craig-James (2000, p. 201) writes of the colored elites that "the most established attended the governor's balls, their wives and daughters were pillars of the Church of England."[25] Holt (1991), Lowes (1994), and Craig-James (2000) offer rich biographical accounts of colored elites on Jamaica, Antigua, and Tobago which all reaffirm the distinctions between the three classes. In terms of their economic interest, however, the colored elite class "was far more heterogeneous than the class it was gradually displacing [...] consisting of merchants, successful estate owners, members of the professions, and an expanding managerial sector" (Meditz and Hanratty, 1987, p.31). Holt (1991, p. 221) writes that "more than a third of the brown representatives who served between 1831 and 1866 were lawyers, and before 1849 their predominance was even greater. Several others were merchants, editors, or public employees, not dependent on agriculture.[26] Unlike the planters, they did not identify the interests of the island exclusively with the success of its plantations." While the two most common elite types in the mid-19th century British Caribbean were $\Theta_i = (L, h)$ and (H, ℓ), i.e. white planters and colored merchants, the correlation between economic and social identities was far from perfect. In particular, while white merchants were always rare, colored planters over time became a common sight.[27] The main reason was that as old British planters sold their estates, it was increasingly the local "men of color who acquired the plantation property," to the extent that by the 1870s in Tobago "coloreds owned or operated 32 of the 73 estates" (Craig-James, 2000, p.200, 296). Craig-James recounts the story of Brutus Murray who was born a slave in

[24] See also Bodenhorn (2015) for a related study of the U.S. South.

[25] Craig-James emphasizes on the same page that there "was little intermarriage between whites and coloreds," so that the latter "must be seen as a distinct segment of the dominant class."

[26] We shall code any elite who is not a planter as a merchant, a group that de facto included many lawyers and professionals. The key point to us is that plantation owners had a much more pronounced interest in a wage-reducing policy than any other elite group.

[27] As noted by Green (1991, p. 199), "the planter oligarchy was, over time, no longer almost exclusively white."

Tobago in 1797, appeared in the public records in 1842 as a sharecropper at Orange Valley Estate, then in 1852 as a manager of Belle Garden Estate, in 1862 as a part-owner of Pembroke Estate, and finally in 1870 as the exclusive owner of Pembroke and Cardiff Estates (Craig-James, 2000, p.165). Stories like Murray's abound in the detailed island histories of Craig-James (2000), Lowes (1994), Holt (1991) and others.

Exogenous Changes in the Composition of the Elite: As we argued, major political transitions in history have often involved exogenous shifts in the composition of the political elite. Accordingly, an important part is played in our theory by the exogenously changing part of the elite's composition, as captured by the separation rate λ_i, specifically by the assumption that $\lambda(L,\vartheta) \geq \lambda(H,\vartheta)$ for $\vartheta \in \{\ell, h\}$ and $\lambda(\theta, h) \geq \lambda(\theta, \ell)$ for $\theta \in \{L, H\}$. Such exogenous shifts were also at play in the mid-19th century British Caribbean, as we now document. In the early years after Emancipation, white planters dominated the assemblies, just as they had done in the previous 200 years: Only "a few merchants, lawyers, and medical practitioners secured seats in the Jamaica Assembly before 1840, but planters dominated colonial government in the thirties and forties. Barbados' merchants petitioned that they were totally unrepresented in their Assembly. In 1837, twenty-two of twenty-five Antigua assemblymen were [white] planters" (Green, 1991, pp.73).[28] However, white British dominance of the assemblies could not last long after Emancipation, for well-understood reasons: The franchise in the Caribbean had always been small, but it had been so not because of tight restrictions such as property requirements, but simply because of the small number of free people. In fact, the actual requirement for the franchise was low, at only 10 acres across the islands. This was requirements was not changed after Emancipation, as "because of pressures from the Colonial Office, a comfortable translation of pre-emancipation legal distinctions into distinctions of skin color was not possible" (Lowes, 1994, ch. 5).[29] As a result, it was inevitable that the black citizenry would gradually obtain the property-based franchise in the post-Emancipation era.[30] As smallholding expanded throughout the Caribbean, so did the num-

[28] In the notation of our model, the elite was almost entirely composed of $\Theta_i = (L, h)$ types. All elites —being planters—had a high payoff from extractive policies ($\vartheta_i = h$), and since they were all white they had low accountability ($\theta_i = L$).

[29] The threat of brute force was not viable for whites in the Caribbean, given their tiny numbers.

[30] Before Emancipation it had been, throughout the Caribbean, "distinctly the exception for a member of the legislature to be returned by more than 10 votes" (Wrong, 1923, p. 69). The property holdings required to vote were in fact quite low, having typically stayed at their original 10-acre threshold from the Caribbean's smallhold days, with practically no variation in this threshold across islands. Higman writes of a "spectacular growth in the extent of smallholding after 1838" (2001), and while smallholding did not generate the wealth required to run for office, it did generate the

ber of enfranchised freed blacks, and it is clear that the vote of the black citizenry went largely to the colored elite, if only for a lack of black legislators.[31] Green (1991, p.296) writes that "in Dominica and Montserrat colored men quickly assumed a dominant role in the legislature. They were a powerful element in Jamaica. [...] Although whites continued to dominate society in most colonies [...] in numbers [the colored elites] constituted the largest segment of the European culture group at the end of the period." In the words of Brizan (1984, p.201–202), "after 1850, the vacuum created by the exodus of white planters was now being filled by the rich coloreds."[32]

Extractive Policies: In the model, the elite votes on a binary extractive policy proposal $x_t \in \{0, 1\}$. In the post-Emancipation Caribbean, extractive policies can be grouped into three categories: (*i*) Policies were passed to depress wages and ensure a steady supply of plantation labor. These included anti-squatting and anti-vagrancy laws.[33] (*ii*) There was political conflict over revenue raising, especially land taxes and customs duties. Plantations favored land-taxes that taxed any land-holdings but had declining marginal tax rates for larger holdings. Black small-scale farmers protested that "parochial land taxes pressed hard on small proprietors" McLewin (1987, p. 184). Import tariffs on foodstuffs were also a bone of contention, since these were primarily bought by plantation owners to feed their workers. Policies in categories (*i*) and (*ii*) had closely related aims: high taxes on small-holds were not only regressive, but also contributed to sustaining a labor pool because failure to pay them led to loss of title (Satchell, 1990, ch. 4). Similarly, import tariffs on foodstuffs were "opposed by the estate interests" not only because they raised the cost of feeding workers but also "since they tended to deplete labor reserves by driv-

wealth required to purchase 10 acres and thus acquire the franchise.

[31] The property or income requirements to run for office were significantly larger than those to vote. Unlike the coloreds, blacks were practically all unfree before Emancipation and none of them could hope to attain any wealth through inheritance. In his investigation of Jamaican post-Emancipation politics, Holt (1991) finds that there were a total of two black assemblymen between 1836–1865, compared to over 30 colored ones.

[32] In our dynamic theory of forward-looking elites, what matters is changes in the anticipated separation rate λ_i. The turning point in the *anticipation* of changes in the elite's composition in the Caribbean was probably 1846, when English Parliament passed the *Sugar Duties Act* which ended preferential tariffs for Caribbean sugar (Dookhan, 1977, p.16). While the preferential tariffs were allowed to continue for some time, 1846 made it clear to the planters that the hey-day of Caribbean sugar was over and that England's priorities had moved on. The process sped up after 1854 with the passing in British Parliament of the *Caribbean Encumbered Estate Act* (EEA). Many of the plantations owned by established British planters families were burdened by 'encumbrances' — regular money obligations to the wider family in England — that had been attached to the plantations during sugar's heyday in the 18th century (Beachey (1978, ch.1), Cust (1859, p.9–13)). The EEA made it easier for encumbrancers and creditors to initiate bankruptcy proceedings, established a clear legal hierarchy of creditor claims, and instituted a specialized court that processed these claims in a timely manner (Cust (1859, p.5-7, 13-15), Sewell (1861, p.82, 89)). According to Lowes (1994), "The act played a key role in the snowballing process of turnover."

[33] According to McLewin (1987, p. 189), "assemblies brought into law an umbrella of coercive acts with the purpose of creating a landless peasantry."

ing workers from plantations to the hinterland, where they grew ground provisions" (Rogers, 1970, 96). (*iii*) A third contentious issue was policies about public-good provision. Freedmen's primary concerns were land redistribution and public-good provision. Elites were disinterested in the expansion of education and health services because they provided these to themselves as club goods rather than as public goods (Sewell 1861, p. 39, Dookhan 1977, Brizan 1984, p. 163).[34] Revenue raising and public good provision were the areas of policy where all elites' incentives were closely aligned, hence $\pi_\ell(1) - \pi_\ell(0) > 0$, whereas policies aimed at securing a steady labor supply and undermining small-scale farming were more critical to the landed gentry, hence in the overall policy bundle $\pi_h(1) - \pi_h(0) > \pi_\ell(1) - \pi_\ell(0) > 0$.

Political Accountability: In the model as well as the data, we focus on differences in *electoral* accountability. Voting in the Caribbean assemblies was by voice vote, and thus publicly observable. Assemblymen were therefore politically accountable for their voting record. However, British white assemblymen were less accountable to the black citizenry than their colored counterparts. A major reason for this difference was that almost all white elites were planters, and that these white planters were returned to the assemblies via long-standing landlord-tenant patronage relations. For the traditional Caribbean British planter-legislator, his "relationship to his constituents had a similarity to the relationship of the classic English patron and his retainers; the core of his political support appeared to come from tenants on his own estates, whose taxes and voter registration fees he paid" (Holt, 1991, p. 293).[35] By contrast, colored plantation owners did not have the same patronage networks, particularly when compared to the 'great attorneys' who were often in charge of twenty or more estates at the same time and who constituted a majority of the white planters in many of the islands (Smith, 1953, p.56).

Even outside the electoral setting, there were a number of factors that made colored elites more accountable, reinforcing the mechanism we focus on. They were connected to the black citizenry by blood and kinship, and as a result may have been more sensitive to potential social stigmatization (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005) and retribution for supporting extractive policies.[36] The threat

[34] Holt (1991, p.196) argues that "Planters generally opposed all measures to expand education. Very likely the idea of spending money primarily for the benefit of the black majority did not appeal to most planters. The wealthier resident planters sent their children to a few select private academies on the island and to England." The same was arguably true for the islands non-planter elites.

[35] Baland and Robinson (2008) describe such relational voting and its pernicious effect on political development in Chile.

[36] In-group altruism, as in Akerlof and Kranton (2000); Shayo (2009); Bramoullé and Goyal (2016), surely also played

of violent uprisings loomed ever-large over Caribbean elites and it was the colored elites who felt most exposed to it, as they could not count on the protection of British Naval garrison and the colonial judicial apparatus to the same extent that British citizens could (Trouillot, 1988, p. 101).[37] An earlier version of this paper studied these non-electoral sources of political accountability, and found similar results to the ones presented here (Carvalho and Dippel, 2016). Reinforcing this was the fact that white elites were often more physically removed from the consequences of policies on the ground. As British citizens, they were in fact frequently absent from the islands, preferring to have their estates managed in their stead by so-called 'attorneys'. Ragatz (1931, p.15) reports that among white planters in Dominica, attorneys outnumbered resident proprietors, qualifying for elected office via their salary or owning "only the minimum amount of fifty acres requisite for election." This account is echoed in Smith (1953, p.56).[38]

The Fragmenting of the Extractive Coalition and the Institutional Response: The early post-Emancipation period saw the islands' colored elites for the first time enter the assemblies. These elites were initially made up of professionals, merchants and lawyers. In the early post-Emancipation period, therefore, the elite was composed of (L, h) and (H, ℓ) types, i.e. white planters and colored merchants/lawyers. Later on, the emergence of colored planters gave rise to the (H, h) types, i.e. colored planters, and this meant increasingly that "whites and coloreds in the dominant class had ties of interests and predicaments" (Craig-James, 2000, p.201). We defer a detailed investigation of the voting behavior of colored elites to Section 4. What seems clear from historical accounts alone is that their emergence did not lead to drastic improvements in policies from the point of the view of the black citizenry. Craton (1988, p. 165) writes how "each major inquiry [by English Parliament] into the British West Indies noted with amazement that nothing had been changed since the last report." Instead of drastic policy change, the period between Emancipation and the mid-1860s culminated in drastic institutional change, as all but one of the assemblies voluntarily dissolved themselves, and invited the Crown to write a new constitution for them with a legislature appointed by the governor, a system referred to as *Crown Rule*. The

some role in shaping colored elites' loyalties towards the citizenry.

[37] Selective protection by British troops in the middle of an uprising was probably not the important point of distinction between white and colored elites. Rather, it was clear that the colonial judicial administration would go hard after anyone who injured or killed a British citizen, while the same could not be said for injuring a local elite member.

[38] Accounts of the relations between absentee planters and attorneys describe the principal-agent problem between planters and their attorneys who were squeezing plantation profits with scant regard for the potential effect on revolts or riots by the peasantry; see Green (1991, p.59) and Craig-James (2000, p.118).

Figure 3: Colored Elites' Share of Assembly Seats



Notes: The figure displays the evolution of the colored elites' share of assembly seats over time. The vertical axis is the percentage of seats accruing to colored elites. On the horizontal axis, the end-point is marked in each island by its Assembly's dissolution, with the exception of Barbados, which never dissolved its Assembly. In Barbados, we set the end-point at the dissolution of the last two Assemblies, Grenada's and Tobago's, in 1876. The share is lowess-smoothed at a bandwidth of 0.3.

Colonial Office described one such change succinctly: "The assembly [...] addressed the Queen that it had passed a bill for its own extinction" (Britain, 1879, p. 188). There is a clear consensus among Caribbean historians that the dissolution of the assemblies was intended to shield the islands' elites from political pressure. Lowes (1995, p.46) suggests that in Antigua "the vote took place in secrecy to forestall any public protest." This is borne out in the *Assembly Minutes* of Nevis, where the meeting of June 14th 1866, when the dissolution of the assembly was voted on, began with the reading of a petition by smallholders to prevent the constitutional changes. There is no consensus, however, on which segment of the elite the dissolution was designed to shield, and from what political pressure. Some scholars of Caribbean history have concluded that the dissolution of the assemblies was a case of white elites trying to shut down the emergent colored elites (Ashdown, 1979; Lowes, 1994).[39] Other scholars' conclusions are closer to our hypothesis by which the assemblies' dissolution may have been supported by white and colored elites alike to shield the elite as a whole from the greater accountability that resulted from their changing composition (Rogers, 1970; Fergus, 1994).[40]

Deferring any discussion of the novel underlying data to Section 4, Figure 3 shows the share of colored elites in each of the ten assemblies over time, from Emancipation to their dissolution.[41] Looking across islands, there is a clear pattern of an increase in colored elites over time in the lead-up to each assembly's dissolution. In Dominica, Montserrat, Grenada, Tobago and Antigua there were narrow colored majorities when the assemblies voted to dissolve themselves. In Jamaica, St Kitts, Nevis, and St Vincent, there were narrow white majorities. Barbados was an outlier in that the dominance of the white landowner elites was never seriously affected by Emancipation.[42] It was also the only island never to dissolve its Assembly. The evidence is thus everywhere con-

[39] Lowes (1994, p.35) concludes that "in the end, the demand of an increasingly restive nonwhite middle class for a voice in island affairs proved the greater fear [than ceding power to the colonial office], and the white elites voted themselves out of office." Ashdown (1979, p.34) argues in a similar vein that "the colonies gave up their elected assemblies voluntarily, for in most cases the white, privileged classes preferred direct imperial government to the government of the colored classes who were slowly obtaining greater representation in the legislative councils."

[40] Rogers argues that "fear of political displacement by the colored middle class was a primary reason for its cooperation in destroying representative government" (1970, p. 316). Similarly, Fergus (1994, p.81) concludes that the point of *Crown Rule* was to alleviate the elite's accountability for an extractive system as it created "a more subtly exclusive system as far as free blacks were concerned. There was only room [in it] for whites and their wealthy colored equivalents."

[41] In some colonies, we begin to observe data later than 1836. Grenada and Tobago were the last two islands to dissolve their assembly, in 1876. Barbados never dissolved its assembly, so we display its time-series to 1876.

[42] This is well known in the Caribbean socio-economic history (Engerman, 1984; Patterson, 2013). Online Appendix D provides a detailed discussion of the reasons for Barbados' special standing.

sistent with our hypothesis that elite members had a common interest in pulling the 'ripcord' of inviting Crown rule because their growing accountability to the citizenry undermined their ability to enact extractive policies.[43] By contrast, it is less consistent with the argument made by Lowes (1994) and Ashdown (1979) that white elites dissolved the assemblies to exclude the emergent colored elites.

4 Empirical Analysis

The following section provides evidence for our theory, by considering a variety of patterns in the political tenures and roll-call voting records of individual elite members as a function of their own two-dimensional type as well as the overall (time-varying) composition of the elite.

Measuring Elite Type: As in our model, we assign each legislator i in our data a two-dimensional type denoted by $\Theta_i = (\theta_i, \vartheta_i)$, consisting of a political accountability type $\theta_i \in \{L, H\}$, where L (H) denotes low (high), and an economic interest type $\vartheta_i \in \{h, \ell\}$, where h (ℓ) indicates a higher (lower) direct benefit from extractive policy. In the post-Emancipation British Caribbean context, these labels had very specific interpretations that we can observe in the data. In this highly racialized context, political accountability to the citizenry was determined by the most salient dimension of elite social identity, namely race. The Caribbean's mono-crop plantation agriculture also meant economic interest could be captured by a simple binary distinction of elites into planters and merchants. British planters were (L, h) types, colored merchants were (H, ℓ) types, and colored planters (H, h) types.[44] To assign each legislator a type, we assembled an extensive list of primary data sources: (*a*) An extensive collection of individual islands' social

[43] As discussed at the end of Section 2, in a model of co-option accountable elites may also eventually choose to pay off colored elites to permanently change electoral institutions. However, the historical narrative of the dissolution of the assemblies is much more consistent with our theory of differential political accountability. Particularly important in this context were increases in the political accountability of colored elites that took the form of an increased threat of revolt. For example, it appears that the outbreak of the 'Bellmana Riots' in April 1876 largely explains the timing of the dissolution of Tobago's assembly (Craig-James 2000, p.237,251). The same is true in Jamaica, where it has long been held that the Assembly's dissolution was a direct response to the Morant Bay Rebelion (Lewis, 2004, p.96). The threat of revolt should be seen as a form of political accountability similar to the electoral accountability we emphasize in our theory. We had investigated the threat of revolt in an earlier version of the paper, before focusing the paper on electoral accountability, and found that colored elites' voting behavior changed differentially around the outbreak of riots (Carvalho and Dippel, 2016), suggesting colored elites were more politically accountable in this sense as well.

[44] There were also some (L, ℓ) types in the assemblies, i.e. British that were not planters. They were few, and they were often British colonial administrators, meaning that their incentives were likely not captured by the logic of our theory. To maintain our focus on political accountability, we group these with the British planters, which does not affect any of the coefficients on being a British planter.

histories helped us establish each legislator's race, our measure of $\theta_i \in \{L, H\}$. These historical accounts are often focused on the issue of race to an extent that would seem strange in other socio-historical contexts. For example, Heuman (1981) and Holt (1991) make explicit mention of every single colored legislator who ever sat in Jamaica's Assembly, and contrast the colored elite's incentives very explicitly with those of the white elite. (*b*) *Slave Ownership Registries* from the pre-Emancipation period and the *Emancipation Compensation Tables* issued in 1835 listed all families who had owned plantations and help us identify the traditional British planter elites. (*c*) For the post-Emancipation period, we found 61 distinct island-specific plantation surveys that help us further validate the economic identity of legislators after Emancipation, which was especially useful to establish whether a colored elite member was a plantation owner. The details of the data sources are discussed in Appendix B. Despite the wealth of information we collected, we still had to make some judgement calls on some individuals in islands where the social histories and records were less extensive and detailed than in Jamaica. Importantly, however, the thrust of our empirical analysis, especially on the key predictions on roll-call voting behavior, is based on Jamaican data. Jamaica, being the biggest and most important of the islands, had the richest records so that there was no ambiguity in measuring elite types. Online Appendix C reports the biographical information we have for assemblymen in Jamaica. Jamaica also had the longest historical records of its assemblymen, and was the only island with a *Hansard* recording its roll-call voting.

Measuring Legislators and Elections: We observe the assembly members of each colony in each year in the so-called *Colonial Blue Books*, annual statistical accounts that were sent to London from each individual colony to report on local conditions. The *Blue Books* were first introduced in the late 1820s and started reporting on local legislatures right around the time of Emancipation. From this data we know the electoral cycles of each colony, the tenure of each assembly member, and the parishes from which they were returned. See Appendix B for more details, including a list of the islands parishes, i.e. the electoral districts from which assemblymen were returned. Jamaica is the only island for which we have a systematic record of assembly membership before Emancipation, stretching all the way back to the founding of its assembly in 1664 (Roby, 1831).

Validating the Model Assumptions on Political Accountability: In applying our theory to

Table 1: Variation in Assembly-Tenure by Social Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
outcome:	Length Representative Career				No. of Parishes Represented					
𝕀(Colored Elite)	1.507***		4.394***		0.089*		0.394***		0.237**	
	[0.000]		[0.000]		[0.065]		[0.000]		[0.048]	
𝕀(Colored Planter)		1.666***		2.217		0.125*		0.413**		0.334*
		[0.003]		[0.221]		[0.073]		[0.047]		[0.098]
𝕀(Colored Merchant)		1.260***		4.746***		0.102*		0.387***		0.216
		[0.008]		[0.001]		[0.086]		[0.002]		[0.120]
First Year in Assembly	-0.184***	-0.182***	-0.170***	-0.166***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.005*	-0.005*
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.098]	[0.100]
Duration Repr. Career									0.036***	0.036***
									[0.002]	[0.002]
colony fixed effects	Y	Y	Jamaica Only		Y	Y	Jamaica Only		Jamaica Only	
Observations	867	867	329	329	867	867	329	329	329	329
R-squared	0.159	0.159	0.225	0.230	0.077	0.078	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.149

Notes: Columns 1–2 and 5–6 report on all assemblymen we observe across the 10 islands and who first appeared in the assemblies after 1836. Columns 3–4 and 7–10 reports on Jamaica only, where we observe all assemblymen from the assembly's inception in 1664. The two data-sets partially overlap, with over 100 Jamaican legislators in the data in columns 1–2. *P-values* for robust standard errors are reported in square brackets, ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance.

the Caribbean case study, we treat white elite members as less politically accountable L types, and colored elite members as H types. We will provide direct evidence that white assemblymen were less likely to be voted out of office for supporting extractive policies, once we have introduced the roll-call voting data. For now, we present evidence that is more indirect but sheds light on the mechanism behind their lower political accountability: As described in Section 3, the older British elites were shielded from political accountability by long-established patronage networks in the parishes from which they were returned. As a result, we expect them to be more closely tied to a single parish than their colored elite counterparts. To verify this, we measure the number of parishes that each assemblyman represented during the time we observe them in the data.

Second, given this treatment of white elites as L types, our comparative statics analysis assumes the exogenous separation rate λ_i for white elites is no less than the separation rate for colored elites. To verify this, we proxy for λ_i by the length of time each assemblyman spent in the assembly. Using this approach, we present evidence that the white separation rate was in fact strictly greater, consistent with the historical narrative in Section 3, along with the paper's opening quotation.

In Table 1 we treat an assemblyman's total tenure as an observation and ask whether colored

elites indeed had longer tenures in the assemblies and were less tied down to a single district. To address truncation at the end of the data, when an assembly was dissolved, we control for the first year an assemblyman entered, a variable that should shorten political careers, and thereby also reduce the number of parishes represented.[45] As a proxy for λ_i, columns 1–4 report the partial correlation between elite types and the total duration of their tenure in their islands' assemblies. Columns 1–2 focus on assemblymen in all 10 islands for the roughly 30 years from Emancipation to the island-specific year an assembly was dissolved. Columns 3–4 alternatively focus on Jamaica only for the 200 years from 1664 to 1865, where we appended Roby's data for 1664–1836 to the *Blue Book* data for Jamaica. As predicted, we find that colored elites had longer tenures. This is true for both types of colored elites (columns 2 and 4). As a proxy for political accountability, i.e. the lack of local patronage networks, columns 5–10 report the partial correlation between the types of assemblymen and the number of distinct parishes they represented during their tenure. Colored elites represented more parishes, consistent with the view that they were less tied to a given local patronage network. Columns 6 and 8 suggest this is not due solely to colored elites being more likely to be merchants, which could be a reason why they were more mobile. Indeed colored planters appear to be just as likely to represent several parishes as colored merchants; they often owned plantations in more than one parish. In the Jamaican data, which spans 200 years, we can separate the two outcomes to show that colored assemblymen's propensity to represent more parishes during their tenure is not explained away by the longer duration of their tenure (columns 9–10).

We would have also liked to verify that expansions in the franchise were associated with the rise of colored assemblymen, something which is strongly suggested by historical accounts. Unfortunately, the Blue Books do not report data on the franchise until the late 1850s and in some colonies the early 1860s. At that time, most of the franchise expansion had already occurred.

Elite Voting Choices: While voting in the Caribbean assemblies was by voice vote, and thus publicly observable, votes were unfortunately not usually recorded in writing. The colonial records contain some rudimentary voting records of the assemblies, but as we discuss in Appendix B, the records were sparse. Only in Barbados, Grenada and Jamaica did the *Assembly Minutes*

[45] To avoid truncation at the beginning of the data, we include only assemblymen who appeared in the first election we observe, which was typically one or two years after Emancipation.

report roll-call voting information regularly enough to allow us to construct voting networks. As an illustration, Figure 4 depicts the network of voting relations between all assemblymen in Jamaica's 1844–1848 legislative session. White nodes are white planters ($\Theta_i = (L, h)$), the dark-grey nodes are colored planters ($\Theta_i = (H, h)$), and black nodes are colored merchants ($\Theta_i = (H, \ell)$). In this visualization, two nodes are connected by an edge if they agreed on more than two-thirds of the bills on which both voted, or not connected if they agreed on less.[46] In short, Figure 4 represents the network-structure of voting relations between individual assemblymen. There is a clearly discernible bloc of white planters on the left, and a distinct bloc of colored merchants on the right. Consistent with the theory, colored planters' voting connections are more spread out. Figure 4 is constructed using all bills that were voted on in Jamaica's 1844–1848 assembly.

While illustrative, this visualization is based on *Assembly Minutes* that did not contain enough information on the actual bills to accurately know what they were about. Many bills in the *Minutes* appear to have been procedural, and for many bills it is very difficult to say exactly what they were about.[47] To more precisely isolate extractive bills, we will in some specifications limit ourselves to Jamaican data where the *Jamaica Vote Book* constituted a publication as close to a proper *Hansard* as could be obtained in Caribbean records.

The theory suggests that colored planters should be less likely than white elites to vote for extractive policies, and colored merchants should be least likely to do so. We can test this hypothesis by estimating equation

$$\mathbb{P}(v_{it} = 1) = \alpha_t + \sum_{\Theta \in \mathcal{I}} \kappa_\Theta \times \mathbb{I}(\Theta_i = \Theta) + \epsilon_{it}, \tag{5}$$

which expresses assemblyman i's support for extractive policies as a function of his identity Θ_i (as well as capturing broad changes in voting behavior with year fixed effects α_t).

We pursue two alternative approaches in dealing with the voting data. In a first approach,

[46] There are also two light-grey nodes (one on the far-left and one on the far-right) representing white merchants ($\Theta_i = (L, \ell)$). The placement of nodes in the graph is determined by these edges, i.e the white planters and the colored merchants appear to be separate blocs because they tended to agree among themselves and disagree with each other. Figure 4 was built in Gephi, using the Yifan Hu visualization algorithm.

[47] A typical record for a purely procedural bill is an October 22nd 1839 bill that read "A bill to prepare an address to the governor for the opening of the legislative session." A typical record where it was impossible to determine a bill's meaning even though the bill may well be important was a June 17th 1864 bill that read "a motion that the house do disagree to the third amendment proposed by the legislative council in their said message to the bill mentioned," with no further explanation on the bill in question.

Figure 4: Voting Network in Jamaica's Parliament, 1844–1848 Session



Notes: White nodes are 'white planters', the six dark-grey nodes are 'colored planters', black nodes are 'colored merchants'. The two light-grey nodes on the far-left and far-right are 'white merchants.' This network visualization has no scale and no axis. Two nodes are connected by an 'edge' if they agreed on more than two-thirds of the bills on which both voted, or not connected if they agreed on less. The placement of nodes in the graph is determined by these edges.

we use assemblyman i's overall voting agreement with the white planters to proxy for $\mathbb{P}(v_{it} = 1)$. Voting agreement is measured as follows: We collapse the entire network of pairwise voting relations from the *Assembly Minutes* measured over all bills for Barbados, Grenada and Jamaica. This approach is visually represented in Figure 4. We aggregate voting relations for a full year to compensate for the fact that we include procedural and ambiguous votes. In this approach we take as given that the white planter bloc is the most supportive of extractive policies, and calculate each assemblyman i's voting agreement with this bloc. We interpret an individual who displays higher average agreement with all white planters in a given year as being more supportive of extractive policies. To be precise, let $I_{ijk} = 1$ if assemblymen i and j agree on bill k, and let K_{ijt} be the set of bills that both i and j voted on in year t. We define their voting overlap as $vo_{ijt} \equiv \frac{1}{|K_{ijt}|} \sum_{K_{ijt}} I_{ijk} \in [0, 1]$. With n_{Θ_i} denoting the number of type Θ_i elites, $\mathbb{P}(v_{it} = 1)$ is measured as assemblyman i's voting agreement with the white planters,[48] defined as

$$\frac{1}{n_{(L,h)}} \sum_{\Theta_j=(L,h)} vo_{ijt}. \tag{6}$$

In a second approach, which we can pursue only in Jamaica, we measure $\mathbb{P}(v_{it} = 1)$ directly.

[48] If i is himself a white planter, he is naturally excluded from this summation.

To do so, we screened all bills for their content in the *Jamaica Vote Book* and then focused on only extractive bills, which are the roughly one quarter of bills that we can assign with high confidence to one or more of the three types of extractive policies described in Section 3.[49] One way to validate our coding of extractive bills is to show that they were more contentious, i.e. were passed (or defeated) with narrower margins. Using the totality of bills, we regressed the vote-margin on an indicator for a bill being classified as extractive and indeed found that such bills had a 6% smaller vote margin, an effect that was highly significant.

Table 2 reports on the results of estimating equation (5). In Panels A and B, the outcome is as defined in (6). Panel A, for Jamaica, presents results for eight specifications. Across columns 1–4, the data suggest colored elites were on average about ten percentage points less likely to vote with white planters over all bills. Column 1 reports results of a univariate regression on only an indicator that i is a colored elite member (in the model, a high-accountability social type $\theta_i = H$). The omitted category is white planters. Colored legislators agreed eight percentage points less with white planters than white planters agreed among themselves.[50] Column 2 includes year fixed effects to allow for broad trends in the composition of bills (extractive vs non-extractive) tabled for vote. Columns 3–4 weight the regressions by the number of bills over which each observation was averaged, since legislative sessions with more voting should arguably receive higher weight. This sharpens the results. Columns 5–8 repeat 1–4 but further partition colored elites by their economic identity, i.e. being a planter or a merchant (or, in the model, a $\vartheta_i = h$ or a $\vartheta_i = \ell$ type). Columns 5–8 show that colored planters indeed display much closer voting overlap with white planters than colored merchants. Panel B shows only the un-weighted specifications for the two other islands for which we have a sufficient number of bills, Barbados and Grenada. The results are very similar to those for Jamaica in Panel A, although the distinction between colored planters and merchants is less sharp in Grenada than in Jamaica and Barbados. In summary, across the three islands, colored planters are less likely than white elites to vote for extractive policies, and colored merchants are least likely to do so, as hypothesized.

We now hone in more precisely on the extractive content of the bills, focusing on Jamaica

[49] These were (*i*) policies to depress wages and ensure a steady supply of plantation labor, (*ii*) extractive policies of revenue raising, i.e. regressive land taxes and *lower* import duties on foodstuffs, (*iii*) policies aimed at lowering or stalling public-good provision.

[50] White planter agreed with all other white planters on about 65% of bills in a given year.

Table 2: Voting for Extraction by Group

Panel A. *Voting Overlap* with the White Planters: Jamaica

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
𝕀(Colored Elite)	-7.810***	-8.903***	-10.089***	-11.028***				
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]				
𝕀(Colored Planter)					-2.077	-3.075**	-3.009*	-3.696*
					[0.132]	[0.028]	[0.096]	[0.053]
𝕀(Colored Merchant)					-9.101***	-10.158***	-11.374***	-12.293***
					[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
weighted			Y	Y			Y	Y
p-val [Col. Pl.= Col.Mer.]					0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
year FE		Y		Y		Y		Y
Observations	999	999	999	999	999	999	999	999
R-squared	0.092	0.193	0.160	0.243	0.110	0.211	0.184	0.268

Panel B. *Voting Overlap* with the White Planters: Barbados & Grenada

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
𝕀(Colored Elite)	-3.788***	-3.645***			-4.300***	-4.049***		
	[0.001]	[0.001]			[0.003]	[0.007]		
𝕀(Colored Planter)			-2.816	-1.610			-3.722**	-3.528**
			[0.202]	[0.449]			[0.035]	[0.039]
𝕀(Colored Merchant)			-4.319***	-4.744***			-4.609***	-4.456**
			[0.001]	[0.000]			[0.005]	[0.012]
island:	Barbados				Grenada			
p-val [Col. Pl.= Col.Mer.]			0.202	0.202			0.609	0.609
year FE		Y		Y		Y		Y
Observations	1,064	1,064	1,064	1,064	733	733	733	733
R-squared	0.009	0.156	0.010	0.158	0.011	0.097	0.012	0.098

Panel C. Voting for Extractive Bills: Jamaica

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
𝕀(Colored Elite)	-3.503**	-3.547**	-0.304	0.084				
	[0.031]	[0.033]	[0.652]	[0.903]				
𝕀(Colored Planter)					-0.262	0.255	-0.796	-0.520
					[0.933]	[0.935]	[0.532]	[0.685]
𝕀(Colored Merchant)					-4.223**	-4.400**	-0.195	0.220
					[0.014]	[0.013]	[0.785]	[0.763]
Bills:	Extractive				Extractive			
p-val [Col. Pl.= Col.Mer.]					0.219	0.149	0.649	0.577
year FE		Y		Y		Y		Y
Observations	3,848	3,848	22,249	22,249	3,848	3,848	22,249	22,249
R-squared	0.001	0.023	0.000	0.007	0.002	0.024	0.000	0.007

Notes: (*a*) In Panel A and B, the outcome is an assemblyman's average voting overlap with all white planters in a given year. Panel A shows eight specifications. Panel B shows the 4 core specifications for each of Barbados and Grenada. 999, 1064, and 733 are the number of assemblyman-year observations in each island. Data in panels A and C are for Jamaica only. In Panel C, we organize the data by bill, and the outcome is simply an indicator for whether an assemblyman supported a bill, separately considering extractive and non-extractive bills. We can only reliably glean the bills' content in Jamaica, where the data comes from a *Hansard*. The number of observations is thus the product of bills and legislators voting on them. (*b*) The omitted category in all regressions is white planter, i.e. the $\Theta_i = (L, h)$ type. (*c*) *p-values* for robust standard errors are reported in square brackets, ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance.

where good information on bills exists. The data is organized by bill, and the outcome is simply an indicator for whether an assemblyman supported a bill. Panel C columns 1–2 and 5–6 focus on bills that we coded as extractive in the sense described in footnote 49.[51] As a placebo test, columns 3–4 and 7–8 contrast that to the majority of other bills that were either procedural or had no relation or an ambiguous relation to extractive policies. Column 1 again reports on a univariate regression of only an indicator (scaled to be 0 or 100) for supporting an extractive bill on an indicator that i is a colored elite member. Column 2 adds year fixed effects. Unlike in panel A, year controls do not matter since we have already isolated bills that are extractive. In columns 1 and 2, colored elites are 3.5 percentage points less likely than white elites to support an extractive bill. Columns 5–6 again break down the colored elite by economic identity. As before, colored planters are closer to whites than colored merchants. In panel C they in fact do not vote differently from white elites. It is only colored merchants who are about four percentage points less likely than white elites to support an extractive bill. Indeed, columns 3–4 and 7–8 do not exhibit the difference in voting by elite identity seen in the rest of panels A and B.

Table 2 provides evidence that differences in voting are driven by differences in identity. Nevertheless, because an individual's identity is fixed, we cannot rule out identity-based motivations for voting other than political accountability (e.g. in-group altruism) based on this evidence alone. To isolate the effect of political accountability, we now examine whether individual voting behavior changes with the composition of the elite, as suggested by our theory.

Stepping Up: Proposition 4 of the theory postulates that when less accountable (L, ϑ) types are replaced with more accountable (H, ϑ) types, individual elite members 'step up', i.e. become more likely to support extractive policies. The same prediction is made when when more economically invested elite types (θ, h) are replaced with less economically invested (θ, ℓ) types. An empirical prediction that arises from this in our context is that the exodus of white planters should have led colored elites to step up voting for extractive policies.[52] We can test this directly by interacting individual elites' support for extractive bills with the time-varying share $\frac{n_{(L,h)}}{n}$ of white

[51] If a bill was for a policy against extraction, e.g., a progressive land tax, then votes were inverted so that after inversion a 'yes' vote always meant supporting an extractive policy.

[52] In the theory this may be partly offset by the fact that this exodus would likely be associated with a higher λ_i for the remaining white planters, making them more supportive of extraction. However, this is likely to be second order.

planters in the assembly

$$\mathbb{P}(v_{it} = 1) = \alpha_i + \sum_{\Theta \in \mathcal{I}} \beta_\Theta \times \mathbb{I}(\Theta_i = \Theta) \times \frac{n_{(L,h)}}{n}_t + \epsilon_{it}. \tag{7}$$

Because this share $\frac{n_{(L,h)}}{n}_t$ varies by electoral cycle, and individual legislators held their seats across electoral cycles, equation (7) allows us to study changes in voting behavior conditional on individual preference fixed effects α_i, i.e. controlling for i's baseline likelihood of supporting extractive policies. If the stepping-up prediction holds in the data we should see a differential effect for (H, h) types (colored planters) and (H, ℓ) types (colored merchants) relative to the omitted category of (L, h) types (white planters) in our data. In estimating equation (7), we treat the colony-level variation in $\frac{n_{(L,h)}}{n}_t$ as econometrically exogenous to the individual assemblyman. Furthermore, inspection of the top-left panel in Figure 3 (i.e. Jamaica) makes it clear that the primary source of identifying variation in $\frac{n_{(L,h)}}{n}_t$ is a secular decline in the share of white planters over time.

Columns 1–2 of Table 3 report on the results of estimating equation (7). Indeed we see that colored elites increase voting for extractive policies when the white planter bloc shrinks, i.e. when $\frac{n_{(L,h)}}{n}_t$ falls. Column 2 shows that this interaction is more pronounced for colored planters than merchants. While the theory does not deliver a clear prediction on this difference, the patterns makes sense because colored planters have a larger economic payoff than colored merchants from stepping up. It also matches the empirical observation (Panel C of Table 2, columns 5–6) that colored planters were on average much more likely than colored merchants to support extractive bills. The variable $\frac{n_{(L,h)}}{n}_t$ is scaled to lie between 0 and 100; the indicator $\mathbb{P}(v_{it} = 1)$ is scaled to take values 0 or 100. Therefore, the estimated coefficient -0.965 implies that a one percentage point decrease in the white planter bloc increased a colored planter's likelihood to support an extractive bill by one percentage point.

With the voting data in hand, we can now test a basic premise of both the theory and the narrative case study in Section 3, that is the assumption that colored elites were more politically accountable than white elites, (H, ϑ) types. Specifically, we ask if an elite member's re-election probability was more negatively effected by supporting extraction if he was an H type:

$$\mathbb{P}(reelect_{it} = 1) = \alpha_t + \sum_{\Theta \in \mathcal{I}} \gamma_\Theta \times \mathbb{I}(\Theta_i = \Theta) \times \mathbb{I}(v_{it} = 1) + \epsilon_t. \tag{8}$$

Table 3: Evidence for 'Stepping Up' & for H-types' higher Accountability

		(1)	(2)			(3)	(4)
𝕀(White Elite)	x $n(L,h)/n$	-0.253	-0.164		𝕀 (v_{it}=1)	0.196	0.166
		[0.192]	[0.292]			[0.215]	[0.304]
𝕀(Colored Elite)	x $n(L,h)/n$	-0.550***		𝕀(Colored Elite)	x 𝕀 (v_{it}=1)	-0.879***	
		[0.009]				[0.006]	
𝕀(Colored Planter)	x $n(L,h)/n$		-0.965***	𝕀(Colored Planter)	x 𝕀 (v_{it}=1)		-1.156**
			[0.000]				[0.034]
𝕀(Colored Merchant)	x $n(L,h)/n$		-0.373**	𝕀(Colored Merchant)	x 𝕀 (v_{it}=1)		-0.653*
			[0.030]				[0.071]
fixed effects:		individual				election	
Observations		3,848	3,848		Observations	204	204
R-squared		0.066	0.067		R-squared	0.160	0.134

Notes: (*a*) In columns 1–2 we investigate whether individual support for extractive policy depends on the composition of the legislature. 'Stepping up' predicts an increase in support for extraction among colored elites when $\frac{n(L,h)}{n}$ falls, i.e. a negative coefficient. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level for over 100 Jamaican legislators from 1838–1865, *p-values* are reported in square brackets. (*b*) In columns 3–4 we investigate whether an individual's re-election penalty for supporting extractive policy depended on his social identity, as assumed in the model; *p-values* for robust standard errors are reported in square brackets. (*c*) All data in this table are for Jamaica only; ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance.

If our basic premise is true we should see a differential effect for (H, h) types (colored planters) and (H, ℓ) types (colored merchants) relative to the omitted category of (L, h) types (white planters) in our data. Since the question is defined on electoral cycles, we can include electoral cycle fixed effects α_t to control for any time-variation in re-election probabilities. Columns 3–4 of Table 3 report on estimations of equation (8). As postulated, colored elites incurred a pronounced re-election penalty for supporting extraction. By contrast, the traditional British elites incurred no re-election penalty for the same.

In combination, the results in Table 3 provide evidence of two of the key insights of our model. 'Stepping up' means that individuals elites will adjust their behavior to compensate for compositional changes towards more accountable types. This buttresses support for extractive policies and counteracts increases in elites' overall accountability. However, there are limits to this compensating mechanism. When the compositional changes towards more accountable types are sufficiently pronounced, 'stepping up' is not enough and the equilibrium that sustains extractive policies fractures. In our theory, elites may then, as a last resort, pull the ripcord of changing the formal institutions that govern accountability. This may take many forms, some of which we discuss around Proposition 8 in Section 2. In the Caribbean context we study, it meant that local elites switched to 'Crown Rule', as shown in Figure 3. As we argued, switches to Crown Rule should be interpreted

as a move to cede de jure power to an outside entity, knowing that a significant amount of de facto power will be preserved locally.[53]

5 Discussion & Conclusion

In this paper, we study how political outcomes are shaped by elite identity, i.e. traits such as race, religion and nationality that affect the relationship between the elite and non-elite citizenry. More specifically, we examine a political accountability channel, in which some elite groups are subject to greater discipline by the citizenry for supporting extractive policies. We study interactions between elite groups that have a strong economic interest in extractive policies and low accountability ('white planters'), an equally strong economic interest in extractive policies but greater accountability ('colored planters'), and a weaker economic interest in extractive policies and are in addition held accountable for supporting them (the 'colored merchants'). We find that increasing the political accountability of individual elite members does not necessarily aggregate to greater accountability of the political system as a whole. In fact, political outcomes can worsen. Our theoretical predictions are supported by data on locally elected assemblies in ten British Caribbean sugar colonies in the 19th century, where we can get an unusually complete picture of the identities and voting behavior of local elites, and where the economic incentives and social identities of each elite group are clearly identifiable, being anchored in the islands' historical context.

[53] Such a rationale is not unique to our empirical case study: Many past military coups and foreign interventions were clearly invited or encouraged by a local elite trying to preserve its own power; examples in Online Appendix E.

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Appendix A Mathematical Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Consider an arbitrary time T. By hypothesis $d_T^* \geq 0$.

Consider the subcase in which $p^* < \bar{p}$. In a voting equilibrium, $v_{iT} = 1$ for exactly $\lceil \frac{1}{2}n \rceil$ agents such that $d_{it} \geq 0$. Consider such an i.

In equilibrium, the expected payoff to i in state (z_T, p_T) is

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_{\vartheta_i}(1) + \sum_{t=T+1}^{\infty} \delta^{t-T} \pi_{\vartheta_i}(0) + [\pi_{\vartheta_i}(1) - \pi_{\vartheta_i}(0)] \sum_{t=T+1}^{\infty} \delta^{t-T} \sum_{z \in Z} \mathbb{P}(z_t = z | z_T) \mathbb{P}(D_t^* \geq 0 | z_t = z) \\ + r + p_{iT} r \delta (1 - \lambda_i) \sum_{t=T+1}^{\infty} \delta^{t-T-1} \prod_{\tau=T+1}^{t} \mathbb{P}(i \in N_\tau | i \in N_{\tau-1}),\end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

where $\mathbb{P}(i \in N_\tau | i \in N_{\tau-1})$ is the expected likelihood that $i \in N_{\tau-1}$ remains a member of the legislature in period τ.

Because i is pivotal, a one-shot deviation to $v_{it} = 0$ yields

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_{\vartheta_i}(0) + \sum_{t=T+1}^{\infty} \delta^{t-T} \pi_{\vartheta_i}(0) + [\pi_{\vartheta_i}(1) - \pi_{\vartheta_i}(0)] \sum_{t=T+1}^{\infty} \delta^{t-T} \sum_{z \in Z} \mathbb{P}(z_t = z | z_T) \mathbb{P}(D_t^* \geq 0 | z_t = z) \\ + r + \bar{p} r \delta (1 - \lambda_i) \sum_{t=T+1}^{\infty} \delta^{t-T-1} \prod_{\tau=T+1}^{t} \mathbb{P}(i \in N_\tau | i \in N_{\tau-1}),\end{aligned} \tag{10}$$

Comparing (9) to (10), i does not have a profitable one-shot deviation if and only if

$$\pi_{\vartheta_i}(1) - \pi_{\vartheta_i}(0) - (\bar{p} - p_{iT})\, r \delta (1 - \lambda_i) \sum_{t=T+1}^{\infty} \delta^{t-T-1} \prod_{\tau=T+1}^{t} \mathbb{P}(i \in N_\tau | i \in N_{\tau-1}) \ \geq 0. \tag{11}$$

As $p_{it} \in (0, \bar{p})$, $(1 - \lambda_i)\bar{p}$ is an upper bound on $\mathbb{P}(i \in N_\tau | i \in N_{\tau-1})$. Therefore, (11) holds if

$$\pi_{\vartheta_i}(1) - \pi_{\vartheta_i}(0) - (\bar{p} - p_{iT})\, r \delta (1 - \lambda_i) \sum_{t=T+1}^{\infty} [\delta(1 - \lambda_i)\bar{p}]^{t-T-1} \ \geq \ 0 \tag{12}$$

$$\pi_{\vartheta_i}(1) - \pi_{\vartheta_i}(0) - \frac{\delta(1 - \lambda_i)}{1 - \delta(1 - \lambda_i)\bar{p}} (\bar{p} - p_{iT})\, r \ \geq \ 0 \tag{13}$$

$$d_{iT} \ \geq \ 0. \tag{14}$$

This holds since $d_{iT} = d^* \geq 0$ by hypothesis.

Now consider i such that in equilibrium $v_{iT} = 0$. His equilibrium expected payoff is

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_{\vartheta_i}(1) + \sum_{t=T+1}^{\infty} \delta^{t-T} \pi_{\vartheta_i}(0) + [\pi_{\vartheta_i}(1) - \pi_{\vartheta_i}(0)] \sum_{t=T+1}^{\infty} \delta^{t-T} \sum_{z \in Z} \mathbb{P}(z_t = z | z_T) \mathbb{P}(D_t^* \geq 0 | z_t) \\ + \bar{p} r \sum_{t=T+1}^{\infty} [\delta(1 - \lambda_i)]^{t-T} \prod_{\tau=T+1}^{t} \mathbb{P}(i \in N_\tau).\end{aligned} \tag{15}$$

Because such an agent is not pivotal, his expected payoff from a one-shot deviation to $v_{iT} = 1$ is given by (9) which is no greater than (15) because $\bar{p} \geq p_{iT}$.

Now consider the second subcase of (i): $p^* = \bar{p}$. If $p_{iT} = \bar{p}$, then $v_{iT} = 1$ is a weakly dominant strategy [see (11)]. Hence no such i has a profitable one-shot deviation. By hypothesis, the number of such players exceeds $\lceil \frac{1}{2}n \rceil$. Hence no j for which $p_{jT} < \bar{p}$ is pivotal. Therefore, there is no profitable deviation from $v_{jT} = 0$ for j such that $p_{jT} < \bar{p}$ [again comparing (9) and (15)]. This completes case (i).

(ii) In equilibrium, $v_{iT} = 0$ and the expected payoff equals (10) for all $i \in N_T$. A one-shot deviation yields

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_{\vartheta_i}(0) + \sum_{t=T+1}^{\infty} \delta^{t-T} \pi_{\vartheta_i}(0) + [\pi_{\vartheta_i}(1) - \pi_{\vartheta_i}(0)] \sum_{t=T+1}^{\infty} \delta^{t-T} \sum_{z \in Z} \mathbb{P}(z_t = z | z_T) \mathbb{P}(D_t^* \geq 0 | z_t) \\ + p_{iT} r \sum_{t=T+1}^{\infty} [\delta(1-\lambda_i)]^{t-T} \prod_{\tau=T+1}^{t} \mathbb{P}(i \in N_\tau), \end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

which is no greater than (10) because $\bar{p} \geq p_{iT}$. □

Proof of Proposition 2. Suppress time notation. By Proposition 1, extractive policy is passed if and only if $d^* \geq 0$. Hence the likelihood that extractive policy is passed is $\mathbb{P}(D^* \geq 0)$.

Let $\gamma(N, k)$ denote the set of k-subsets of N. Define

$$\Gamma\big(N, K\big) \equiv \bigcup_{k=K}^{n} \gamma(N, k),$$

with typical member A. Then

$$\mathbb{P}(D^* \geq 0) = \sum_{A \in \Gamma\left(N, \left\lceil \frac{1}{2}n \right\rceil\right)} \Pi_{j \in A} \mathbb{P}(D_j \geq 0) \Pi_{j' \notin A} \mathbb{P}(D_{j'} < 0). \tag{17}$$

Note that the following statements are equivalent:

$$\begin{aligned} D_j &\geq 0 \\ \pi_{\vartheta_j}(1) - \pi_{\vartheta_j}(0) - \frac{\delta(1-\lambda_j)}{1-\delta(1-\lambda_j)\bar{p}} (\bar{p} - P_j) r &\geq 0 \\ \bar{p} - \frac{1-\delta(1-\lambda_j)\bar{p}}{\delta(1-\lambda_j) r} \frac{\pi_{\vartheta_j}(1) - \pi_{\vartheta_j}(0)}{r} &\leq P_j. \end{aligned} \tag{18}$$

Define

$$\Delta_j \equiv \bar{p} - \tfrac{1-\delta(1-\lambda_j)\bar{p}}{\delta(1-\lambda_j) r} \frac{\pi_{\vartheta_j}(1) - \pi_{\vartheta_j}(0)}{r}, \tag{19}$$

which is less than $\bar{p}$ and positive due to Assumption 1. Hence $\mathbb{P}(D_j \geq 0) = 1 - F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j) \in (0, 1)$. (17) can then be reexpressed as

$$\mathbb{P}(D^* \geq 0) = \sum_{A \in \Gamma\left(N, \left\lceil \frac{1}{2}n \right\rceil\right)} \Pi_{j \in A}\left[1 - F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j)\right] \Pi_{j \in N-A} F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j) \tag{20}$$

$$= \sum_{A \in \Gamma\left(N-\{i\}, \left\lceil \frac{1}{2}n \right\rceil - 1\right)} \left[1 - F_{\theta_i}(\Delta_i)\right] \Pi_{j \in A}\left[1 - F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j)\right] \Pi_{j \in N-A} F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j)$$

$$+ \sum_{A' \in \Gamma\left(N-\{i\}, \left\lceil \frac{1}{2}n \right\rceil\right)} F_{\theta_i}(\Delta_i) \Pi_{j \in A'}\left[1 - F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j)\right] \Pi_{j \in N-A'} F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j) \tag{21}$$

$$= -F_{\theta_i}(\Delta_i) \sum_{A \in \gamma\left(N-\{i\}, \left\lceil \frac{1}{2}n \right\rceil - 1\right)} \Pi_{j \in A}\left[1 - F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j)\right] \Pi_{j \in N-A} F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j)$$

$$+ \sum_{A' \in \Gamma\left(N-\{i\}, \left\lceil \frac{1}{2}n \right\rceil - 1\right)} \Pi_{j \in A'}\left[1 - F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j)\right] \Pi_{j \in N-A'} F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j). \tag{22}$$

Now replace i with i' such that $\theta_i = L$, $\theta_{i'} = H$ and $\vartheta_i = \vartheta_{i'}$ as hypothesized. The difference in probabilities is

$$\mathbb{P}(D^* \geq 0 | \theta_i = L) - \mathbb{P}(D^* \geq 0 | \theta_{i'} = H) \propto F_L(\Delta_i) - F_H(\Delta_{i'}). \tag{23}$$

Recall $\lambda_{i'} \leq \lambda_i$ by assumption (because i is an L type and i' an H type). Hence $\Delta_{i'} \geq \Delta_i$. In addition, $F_H(\Delta) > F_L(\Delta)$ for all $\Delta \in (0, \bar{p})$ by assumption. Taken together, these facts imply (23) is negative.

Similarly replacing i with i' such that $\vartheta_i = h$, $\vartheta_{i'} = \ell$ and $\theta_i = \theta_{i'}$ as hypothesized yields

$$\mathbb{P}(D^* \geq 0; \vartheta_i = \ell) - \mathbb{P}(D^* \geq 0; \vartheta_{i'} = h) \propto F_{\theta_i}(\Delta_i) - F_{\theta_i}(\Delta_{i'}). \tag{24}$$

$\Delta_i' > \Delta_i$ because $\pi_h(1) - \pi_h(0) > \pi_\ell(1) - \pi_\ell(0)$ and $\lambda_{i'} \leq \lambda_i$ by assumption (because i is an h type and i' an ℓ type). Hence (24) is negative as F is strictly increasing.

Iterating this procedure establishes the proposition. □

We prove Proposition 4, before returning to Proposition 3.

Proof of Proposition 4. For convenience, suppress time notation.

By hypothesis, j's type switches from L to H and/or from h to ℓ. For all $i \neq j$, we need to establish:

$$\mathbb{P}(v_i = 1 \,|\, z) - \mathbb{P}(v_i = 1 \,|\, z') < \mathbb{P}(x = 1 \,|\, z) - \mathbb{P}(x = 1 \,|\, z') < \mathbb{P}(v_j = 1 \,|\, z) - \mathbb{P}(v_j = 1 \,|\, z').$$

For agents other than j, consider a realized distribution $d_{-j} = (d_1, d_2, \ldots d_{j-1}, d_{j+1}, \ldots)$. There are three cases, which are exhaustive, and each occur with positive probability.

Case 1: $d_i \geq 0$ for exactly $\left\lceil \frac{1}{2}n \right\rceil - 1$ agents other than j.

Denote the $\left\lceil \frac{1}{2}n \right\rceil$th largest value in d_{-j} by $\hat{d}$.

In this case, $\mathbb{P}(x = 1 | d_{-j}) = \mathbb{P}(v_j = 1 | d_{-j}) = 1 - F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j)$. In addition, for all i such that $d_i \geq \hat{d}$

$\mathbb{P}(v_i = 1|d_{-j}) = \mathbb{P}(x = 1|d_{-j}) = 1 - F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j)$. For all other $i \neq j$, $\mathbb{P}(v_i = 1|d_{-j}) = 0$.

Therefore, in case 1:

$$\mathbb{P}(v_j = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z) - \mathbb{P}(v_j = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z') \;=\; \mathbb{P}(x = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z) - \mathbb{P}(x = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z') \;= 1 - F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j) - \left(1 - F_{\theta'_j}(\Delta'_j)\right).$$

In addition,

$$\mathbb{P}(v_i = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z) - \mathbb{P}(v_i = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z') = 1 - F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j) - \left(1 - F_{\theta'_j}(\Delta'_j)\right)$$

for all i such that $d_i \geq \hat{d}$ and for all other $i \neq j$

$$\mathbb{P}(v_i = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}) - \mathbb{P}(v_i = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}) = 0.$$

Case 2: $d_i \geq 0$ for at least $\left\lceil \frac{1}{2}n \right\rceil$ agents other than j.

Note the following statements are equivalent:

$$\begin{aligned} D_i &> \hat{d} \\ \pi_{\vartheta_i}(1) - \pi_{\vartheta_i}(0) - \frac{\delta(1-\lambda_i)}{1-\delta(1-\lambda_i)\bar{p}}\,(\bar{p} - P_i)\,r &> \hat{d} \\ \hat{\Delta}_i \;\equiv\; \bar{p} - \frac{1-\delta(1-\lambda_i)\bar{p}}{\delta(1-\lambda_i)\,r}\left[\pi_{\vartheta_i}(1) - \pi_{\vartheta_i}(0) - \hat{d}\right] &\leq P_i. \end{aligned} \tag{25}$$

Hence in case 2, $\mathbb{P}(x = 1|d_{-j}) = 1$ and $\mathbb{P}(v_j = 1|d_{-j}) = 1 - F_{\theta_j}(\hat{\Delta}_j)$. Note that $F_{\theta_j}(\hat{\Delta}_j) > 0$ under Assumption 1.

Case 2a: $F_{\theta'_j}(\hat{\Delta}'_j) = 1$.

Then:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}(v_i = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z) - \mathbb{P}(v_i = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z') &= \mathbb{P}(x = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z) - \mathbb{P}(x = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z') \\ &= \mathbb{P}(v_j = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z) - \mathbb{P}(v_j = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z') \\ &= 0. \end{aligned} \tag{26}$$

Case 2b: $F_{\theta'_j}(\hat{\Delta}'_j) < 1$. Then:

$$\mathbb{P}(x = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z) - \mathbb{P}(x = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z') = 0 \tag{27}$$

$$\mathbb{P}(v_j = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z) - \mathbb{P}(v_j = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z') = 1 - F_{\theta_j}(\hat{\Delta}_j) - \left(1 - F_{\theta'_j}(\hat{\Delta}'_j)\right) \tag{28}$$

$$\mathbb{P}(v_i = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z) - \mathbb{P}(v_i = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z') = F_{\theta_j}(\hat{\Delta}_j) - F_{\theta'_j}(\hat{\Delta}'_j), \tag{29}$$

for i such that $d_i = \hat{d}$ and $\mathbb{P}(v_i = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z) - \mathbb{P}(v_i = 1 \,|\, d_{-j}, z') = 0$ otherwise.

Case 3: $d_i \geq 0$ for no more than $\left\lceil \frac{1}{2}n \right\rceil - 2$ agents other than j.

In this case, $\mathbb{P}(v_i = 1|d_{-j}) = \mathbb{P}(x = 1|d_{-j}) = \mathbb{P}(v_j = 1|d_{-j}) = 0$.

Over all cases, the following statements are equivalent:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}(x=1|z)-\mathbb{P}(x=1|z') &< \mathbb{P}(v_j=1|z)-\mathbb{P}(v_j=1|z') \\ \mathbb{P}(\text{Case 2b})\left[1-F_{\theta_j}(\hat{\Delta}_j)-\left(1-F_{\theta'_j}(\hat{\Delta}'_j)\right)\right] &> 0 \\ F_{\theta'_j}(\hat{\Delta}'_j) &> F_{\theta_j}(\hat{\Delta}_j). \end{aligned} \tag{30}$$

This is satisfied because j switches from L to H and/or from h to ℓ, so that $\lambda_{j'} \leq \lambda_j$ and in addition one of the following applies:

- $\Delta'_j > \Delta_j$ because $\pi_h(1)-\pi_h(0) > \pi_\ell(1)-\pi_\ell(0)$ (if j switches from an h to an ℓ type),
- $F_{\theta'_j}(\Delta) > F_{\theta_j}(\Delta)$ for all $\Delta \in (0,\bar{p})$ (if j switches from an L to an H type).

Likewise

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}(x=1|z)-\mathbb{P}(x=1|z') &> \mathbb{P}(v_i=1|z)-\mathbb{P}(v_i=1|z') \\ \mathbb{P}(\text{Case 1}\wedge d_i\leq\hat{d})\left[F_{\theta'_j}(\Delta'_j)-F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j)\right] &> \mathbb{P}(\text{Case 2b}\wedge d_i=\hat{d})\left[F_{\theta_j}(\hat{\Delta}_j)-F_{\theta'_j}(\hat{\Delta}'_j)\right] \\ F_{\theta'_j}(\hat{\Delta}'_j)+F_{\theta'_j}(\Delta'_j) &> F_{\theta_j}(\hat{\Delta}_j)+F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j). \end{aligned} \tag{31}$$

By the argument above, $F_{\theta'_j}(\Delta'_j) \geq F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j)$. This establishes the proposition. □

Proof of Proposition 3. Switch i's type from (L,ϑ) to (H,ϑ). Let j's type be (H,ϑ). We know from Proposition 4:

$$\mathbb{P}(v_j=1|z)-\mathbb{P}(v_j=1|z') < \mathbb{P}(v_i=1|z)-\mathbb{P}(v_i=1|z'). \tag{32}$$

The equilibrium is type-symmetric, so

$$\mathbb{P}(v_j=1|z') = \mathbb{P}(v_i=1|z'). \tag{33}$$

Combining (32) and (33),

$$\mathbb{P}(v_j=1|z) < \mathbb{P}(v_i=1|z). \tag{34}$$

This establishes part (i).

To establish part (ii), switch i's type from (θ,h) to (θ,ℓ), let j's type be (θ,ℓ), and repeat the procedure in part (i). □

We prove Proposition 6, before returning to Proposition 5.

Proof of Proposition 6. (i) Pick one L type i and raise i's replacement rate from λ_i to λ'_i. By inspection of (19), $\Delta'_i < \Delta_i$. By (22) then, $\mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 \,|\, z, \lambda'_i) > \mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 \,|\, z, \lambda_i)$. Part (i) of the proposition follows by induction.

(ii) Recall that

$$\overline{\mathbb{P}}(x_t = 1\,|z_T, \hat{T}, \lambda) \;=\; \sum_{s \in Z^{\hat{T}-T+1}} \mathbb{P}(s\,|\,z_T, \lambda)\; \tfrac{1}{\hat{T}-T+1} \sum_{t=T}^{\hat{T}} \mathbb{P}\left(x_t = 1\,|\,z_t = s_t, \lambda\right). \tag{35}$$

As $\min_{\vartheta \in \{\ell, h\}}\; q\left((L,\vartheta)|(L,\vartheta)\right)$ goes to one, $\mathbb{P}(s|z_T, \lambda') \to \mathbb{P}(s|z_T, \lambda)$ for all s.
Hence $\overline{\mathbb{P}}(x_t = 1\,|z_T, \hat{T}, \lambda') > \overline{\mathbb{P}}(x_t = 1\,|z_T, \hat{T}, \lambda)$ if

$$\sum_{s \in Z^{\hat{T}-T+1}} \mathbb{P}(s\,|\,z_T, \lambda)\; \tfrac{1}{\hat{T}-T+1} \sum_{t=T}^{\hat{T}} \left[\mathbb{P}\left(x_t = 1\,|\,z_t = s_t, \lambda'\right) - \mathbb{P}\left(x_t = 1\,|\,z_t = s_t, \lambda\right)\right] \;>\; 0. \tag{36}$$

(36) is satisfied by part (i) of the proposition. □

Proof of Proposition 5. (i) By Proposition 6(i), $\mathbb{P}(x_t = 1\,|\,z, \lambda') > \mathbb{P}(x_t = 1\,|\,z, \lambda)$ for all $z \in Z$ such that $n(L,\ell) + n(L,h) > 0$. Hence

$$\mathbb{P}(v_i = 1\,|\,z, \lambda') > \mathbb{P}(v_i = 1\,|\,z, \lambda) \tag{37}$$

for at least one $i \in N_t$.

In addition, $\mathbb{P}(v_i = 1\,|\,z, \lambda) = \mathbb{P}(v_j = 1\,|\,z, \lambda)$ in equilibrium for all (i,j) such that $\Theta_i = \Theta_j$.

Taken together, this means (37) is satisfied for all agents of at least one type $\Theta \in \{(L,\ell),(L,h)\}$. This establishes part (i) and the proposition.

(ii) Denote the set of L type legislators by N_L. Label members from 1 to $|N_L| = n_L$. First, increase λ_1 from λ to λ'. Label this move λ^1. Then increase λ_2 from λ to λ'. Label this move λ^2. And so forth up to λ^{n_L}.

Consider $j \notin N_L$. By the argument used in Proposition 4,

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{P}\left(v_1 = 1\,|\lambda^1\right) - \mathbb{P}\left(v_1 = 1\,|\lambda^0\right) \;&>\; \mathbb{P}\left(v_j = 1\,|\lambda^1\right) - \mathbb{P}\left(v_j = 1\,|\lambda^0\right) \\
\mathbb{P}\left(v_2 = 1\,|\lambda^2\right) - \mathbb{P}\left(v_2 = 1\,|\lambda^1\right) \;&>\; \mathbb{P}\left(v_j = 1\,|\lambda^2\right) - \mathbb{P}\left(v_j = 1\,|\lambda^1\right) \\
&\cdots \qquad\quad \cdots \\
\mathbb{P}\left(v_{n_L} = 1\,|\lambda^{n_L}\right) - \mathbb{P}\left(v_{n_L} = 1\,|\lambda^{n_L-1}\right) \;&>\; \mathbb{P}\left(v_j = 1\,|\lambda^{n_L}\right) - \mathbb{P}\left(v_j = 1\,|\lambda^{n_L-1}\right).
\end{aligned}$$

Adding these inequalities:

$$\mathbb{P}\left(v_{n_L} = 1\,|\lambda^{n_L}\right) - \mathbb{P}\left(v_1 = 1\,|\lambda^0\right) > \mathbb{P}\left(v_j = 1\,|\lambda^{n_L}\right) - \mathbb{P}\left(v_j = 1\,|\lambda^0\right). \tag{38}$$

Because the equilibrium is type symmetric, for all $i \in N_L$:

$$\mathbb{P}\left(v_i = 1\,|\lambda^{n_L}\right) - \mathbb{P}\left(v_i = 1\,|\lambda^0\right) \;>\; \mathbb{P}\left(v_j = 1\,|\lambda^{n_L}\right) - \mathbb{P}\left(v_j = 1\,|\lambda^0\right) \tag{39}$$

$$\mathbb{P}\left(v_i = 1\,|\lambda^{n_L}\right) - \mathbb{P}\left(v_j = 1\,|\lambda^{n_L}\right) \;>\; \mathbb{P}\left(v_i = 1\,|\lambda^0\right) - \mathbb{P}\left(v_j = 1\,|\lambda^0\right). \tag{40}$$

This establishes the proposition. □

Proof of Proposition 7. Write the Markov transition matrix $\mathbf{Q}(q) = (Q_{zz'}(q))$ as a function of q, where $Q_{zz'}(q)$ is the likelihood of transiting in one period from state z to z' under type transition probability q.

Consider a shift in type transition probabilities from q to q'. By hypothesis: (a) $q((L,\vartheta)|\Theta) \geq q'((L,\vartheta)|\Theta)$ for all $\vartheta \in \{\ell, h\}$ and $\Theta \in \mathcal{I}$, and (b) $q((\theta,h)|\Theta) \geq q'((\theta,h)|\Theta)$ for all $\theta \in \{L, H\}$ and $\Theta \in \mathcal{I}$, with at least one inequality strict.

Clearly, $Q_{zz'}(q') > Q_{zz'}(q)$ for all states z and z' such that $n'(H,\vartheta) \geq n(H,\vartheta)$ for $\vartheta = \ell, h$ and $n'(\theta,\ell) \geq n(\theta,\ell)$ for $\theta = L, H$, with at least one inequality strict.

Recall the stationary distribution $\mu(q)$ solves $\mu(q)\mathbf{Q}(q) = \mu(q)$. Therefore, $\mu_{z'}(q')/\mu_z(q') > \mu_{z'}(q)/\mu_z(q)$.

By Proposition 2, $\mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 \,|\, z') < \mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 \,|\, z)$. Both are independent of q.

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{z\in Z} \mu_z(q)\,\mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 \,|\, z) &> \sum_{z\in Z} \mu_z(q')\,\mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 \,|\, z) \\ \mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 \,|\, \mu(q)) &> \mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 \,|\, \mu(q')). \end{aligned} \tag{41}$$

□

Proof of Proposition 8. The sum of expected discounted payoffs in state z under elections over all legislators N is

$$\sum_{i\in N} \left\{ \mathbb{P}(x=1|z)\pi_{\vartheta_i}(1) + \left[1 - \mathbb{P}(x=1|z)\right]\pi_{\vartheta_i}(0) + \delta V_i(z) \right\}, \tag{42}$$

where $V_i(z)$ is i's continuation payoff in state z.

The expected discounted payoff to i in state z when permanently abolishing elections is $\left[\pi_{\vartheta_i}(1) + r\right]/(1-\delta)$. Hence, to abolish elections in state z, the legislature as whole would be willing to pay up to

$$B(z) = \sum_{i\in N} \left\{ \mathbb{P}(x=1|z)\pi_{\vartheta_i}(1) + \left[1 - \mathbb{P}(x=1|z)\right]\pi_{\vartheta_i}(0) + \delta V_i(z) \right\} - n\frac{\pi_{\vartheta_i}(1) + r}{1-\delta}. \tag{43}$$

Consider two states z and z' such that (i) $n'(H,\vartheta) \geq n(H,\vartheta)$ for $\vartheta = \ell, h$, with at least one inequality strict, and (ii) $n'(H,\vartheta) + n'(L,\vartheta) = n(H,\vartheta) + n(L,\vartheta)$ for $\vartheta = \ell, h$. Because of condition (ii), i.e. holding economic composition fixed, the following holds:

$$\sum_{i\in N'} \pi_{\vartheta_i}(x) = \sum_{i\in N} \pi_{\vartheta_i}(x) \tag{44}$$

for $x = 0, 1$. Hence

$$B(z') - B(z) = \left[\mathbb{P}(x = 1|z') - \mathbb{P}(x = 1|z)\right] \sum_{i \in N} \left[\pi_{\vartheta_i}(1) - \pi_{\vartheta_i}(0)\right] + \sum_{i \in N'} \delta V_i(z') - \sum_{i \in N} \delta V_i(z). \quad (45)$$

Due to conditions (i) and (ii), $\sum_{i \in N'} V_i(z') \geq \sum_{i \in N} V_i(z)$. In addition, $\mathbb{P}(x = 1|z') \geq \mathbb{P}(x = 1|z)$ by Proposition 2. This establishes the proposition. □

Appendix B Data Appendix

Appendix B.1 Legislator and Voting Data

The *Records of the Colonial Office*, housed at *The National Archives* in London, maintain 6 data-series for each former colony: (i) *Original correspondence*, (ii) *Entry Books*, (iii) *Acts*, (iv) *Sessional Papers*, (v) *Gazettes*, and (vi) *Miscellenea*. The bulk of the *Miscellenea* series is made up of the *Colonial Blue Books*, annual statistical accounts that were sent to London from each individual colony to report on local conditions.[54] Starting from around 1836, sometimes earlier, sometimes later, the *Blue Books*' *Councils and Assemblies* section reported the names of all elected assemblymen, related election dates and the parishes they represented. Online Appendix B lists the parishes that returned the assemblymen in our data. Colonies recorded the proceedings of their legislative and executive councils as part of the (iv) *Sessional Papers*. If the legislative body was locally elected, as in the case of our ten islands, these proceedings were titled the *Assembly Minutes*. We photographed the *Assembly Minutes* of each of the ten islands, and assembled the scattered roll-call vote information in them. Only Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat and Tobago ever reported any roll-call data in the *Minutes*, but even this data was (*i*) exceedingly scattered and (*ii*) revealed very little information on the content of each proposal. Much time and effort was spent canvassing the *Assembly Minutes*, but unfortunately the data was often (*i*) exceedingly scattered and (*ii*) revealed very little information on the content of each proposal. In Dominica, Montserrat and Tobago very few bills had any roll-call information attached to them at all. In Barbados, and Grenada, roll-call information was very regularly attached to the bills, but the bills' content was almost always unclear. The final conclusion was that we had enough roll-call information in Barbados and Grenada to study the network of voting blocs in these islands, but that we could not know enough about the bills to investigate voting for individual bills. We could only do this in Jamaica, because Jamaica kept a proper and separate *Hansard*, the so-called *Jamaica Vote Book* which was unrelated to the *Assembly Minutes*. The *Jamaica Vote Book* had before us already been used in parts by Holt (1991).[55]

[54] For years before the 1890s, only (at most) two copies exist of each *Blue Book*, one in the issuing colony's archives and one in the British National Archives, in London, where this data was hand-collected.

[55] We owe a debt to Tom Holt who had saved the *Jamaica Vote Book* on a magnetic tape recording when he was working on his 1992 book, and generously sent this tape recording to us. Unfortunately, it had not withstood the test of time so that we had to scan and digitize the hardcopies of the books anew.

Appendix B.2 Economic and Social Identity

To assign each legislator one of the four group labels, our starting point were plantation ownership records. Before emancipation, there were no colored planters. In a first step, we therefore coded legislators that belonged to families that were pre-Emancipation plantation owners as 'white planters.' Before Emancipation, plantation owners were recorded in the *Slave Registries* in the 1820s and then again in the *Emancipation Compensation Tables* in 1835.[56]

Most families that appeared in the assemblies before 1838 were also recorded as plantation owners, but if they were not we coded them as white merchants. For legislators whose families first appeared after Emancipation we consulted post-Emancipation plantation surveys to establish if they were planters or merchants, and we consulted an extensive list of island-specific social and political histories to establish whether they were white or colored. Given the salience of race as a feature of Caribbean history, these island-specific accounts are usually quite explicit in this regard. For example, Heuman (1981) and Holt (1991) make explicit mention of every colored legislator who ever sat in Jamaica's Assembly. The historical accounts almost never contradicted the coding based on pre-Emancipation plantation ownership records, except in rare cases of shared last names. They were essential for establishing the social type of legislators whose families' names had not appeared anywhere before Emancipation, particularly because there was a substantial number of white planters in the data that first appeared after Emancipation, apparently mostly 'estate attorneys' that managed the plantations of older established planter families. To avoid clogging the paper's references with citations of island-specific source materials, these sources are listed in Online Appendix A instead of here. Table 4 lists all island-years for which we have records, as well as their sources.

[56] From 1813 on, the Crown required colonies to register all slaves. Most colonies have three iterations of the *slave registries*, but each new iteration simply updated the previous for births and deaths. When England abolished slavery, it set aside money to compensate slave owners for their loss. The disbursal of that money was recorded in the *Compensation Tables*. We digitized the *Slave Registries* ourselves, while the *Compensation Tables* data had been digitized by a research project at University College London; all 30,308 claimants can be viewed on consecutive url's running from `http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/claim/view/1` to `.../30308`.

Table 4: Data Sources for Plantation Surveys

Antigua	1817	Slave Registries - Antigua	Montserrat	1835	Compensation Tables
Antigua	1829	Johnson (1830), A Descriptive Account of Antigua	Montserrat	1848	House of Commons Papers 1847-48 (399), p.116-118 [e]
Antigua	1835	Compensation Tables	Montserrat	1858	House of Commons Papers 1857-58 [2403], p.99-101 [c]
Antigua	1843	Hart, the 1843 Antigua Almanac & Registry	Nevis	1817	Slave Registries
Antigua	1851	The 1852 Antigua Almanac	Nevis	1835	Compensation Tables
Antigua	1858	House of Commons Papers 1857-58 [2403], p.74-77 [c]	Nevis	1878	The 1879 Leeward Islands Almanac
Antigua	1878	The 1879 Leeward Islands Almanac	Nevis	1897	House of Commons Papers 1898 [C.8669], p.229-232 [b]
Antigua	1891	Hall (1971), Five of the Leewards, Appendix A	St. Lucia	1852	The 1852 St. Lucia Almanac
Barbados	1817	Slave Registries - Barbados	St. Lucia	1897	House of Commons Papers 1898 [C.8669], p.56-57 [b]
Barbados	1835	Compensation Tables	St. Kitts	1835	Compensation Tables
Barbados	1848	Barbados Almanac for 1848	St. Kitts	1847	House of Commons Papers 1847-48 (245), p.121-124 [d]
Barbados	1854	Barbados Almanac for 1854	St. Kitts	1850	The 1850 St. Christophers Almanac
Barbados	1861	Barbados Almanac for 1861	St. Kitts	1878	The 1879 Leeward Islands Almanac
Barbados	1865	Barbados Almanac for 1865	St. Kitts	1897	House of Commons Papers 1898 [C.8669], p.229-232 [b]
Barbados	1870	Barbados Almanac for 1870	St. Vincent	1817	Slave Registries - St. Vincent
Barbados	1898	Barbados Almanac for 1898	St. Vincent	1827	Shephard (1831), Historical Account of St.Vincent, T.6
Dominica	1817	Slave Registries - Dominica	St. Vincent	1831	Slave Registries - St. Vincent
Dominica	1835	Compensation Tables	St. Vincent	1835	Compensation Tables
Dominica	1878	The 1879 Leeward Islands Almanac	Tobago	1819	Slave Registries - Tobago
Grenada	1817	Slave Registries - Grenada	Tobago	1832	Woodcock (1867), A History of Tobago, Appendix
Grenada	1835	Compensation Tables	Tobago	1835	Compensation Tables
Grenada	1849	House of Commons Papers 1849 [1126], p.180-181 [g]	Tobago	1847	House of Commons Papers 1847 [869], p.32-33 [a]
Grenada	1867	The 1867 Grenada Almanack	Tobago	1862	Woodcock (1867), A History of Tobago, Appendix
Guyana	1833	House of Commons Papers 1833 (700), p.4-11 [f]	Tobago	1881	Craig-James (2008), Tables 5.9-5.11
Guyana	1838	House of Commons Papers 1847 [869], p.94-98 [a]	Tobago	1894	The Trinidad Almanack 1894
Guyana	1846	House of Commons Papers 1847 [869], p.94-98 [a]	Trinidad	1813	Slave Registries - Trinidad
Guyana	1860	The Guyana Almanack 1860	Trinidad	1835	Compensation Tables
Guyana	1879	The Guyana Almanack 1879	Trinidad	1882	The Trinidad Almanack 1882
Jamaica	1829	The 1829 Jamaica Almanac	Trinidad	1888	The Trinidad Almanack 1888
Jamaica	1835	Compensation Tables	Trinidad	1894	The Trinidad Almanack 1894
Jamaica	1840	The 1840 Jamaica Almanac			

Notes: House of Commons Parliamentary Papers: (*a*) "1847 [869] The reports made for the year 1846 to the Secretary of State having the Department of the Colonies. Transmitted with the blue books for the year 1846." (*b*) "1898 [C.8669] West India Royal commission. Report of the West India Royal commission. Appendix C., vol. III., containing parts VI. to XIII. Proceedings, evidence, and documents relating to the Windward Islands, the Leeward Islands, and Jamaica." (*c*) "1857-58 [2403] The reports made for the year 1856 to the Secretary of State having the Department of the Colonies. Transmitted with the blue books for the year 1856." (*d*) "1847-48 (245) Seventh report from the Select Committee on Sugar and Coffee Planting; together with the minutes of evidence, and appendix." (*e*) "1847-48 (399) West India colonies and Mauritius. Returns to two addresses of the Honourable the House of Commons, dated respectively 8 & 31 May 1848." (*f*) "1833 (700) Slave population. (Slave registries.) Return to an address to His Majesty, dated 29 July 1833." (*g*) "1849 [1126] The reports made for the year 1848 to the Secretary of State having the Department of the Colonies. Transmitted with the blue books for the year 1848."

Online Appendix

to

"Elite Identity, Political Accountability and Institutions: A Tale of Ten Islands"

Online Appendix A Sources for Group Coding

The secondary sources that we consulted extensively were:

1. for Jamaica: Heuman (1981) and Holt (1991)
2. for Antigua: Oliver (1896), Lowes (1994), Lowes (1995), Dyde (2000) and Lightfoot (2007)
3. for Barbados: Schomburgk (1848), Hoyos (1978) and Beckles (2006)
4. for Dominica: Trouillot (1988), Honychurch (1984) and Baker (1994)
5. for Grenada: Brizan (1984) and Cox (2007)
6. for Montserrat: Davy (1854), Fergus (1994), and Berleant-Schiller (1995)
7. for St. Kitts: Britain (1840, p.94-96), Hall (1971) and Dyde (2005)
8. for Nevis: Iles (1871), Hall (1971) and Olwig (2005)
9. for St. Vincent: Sheppard (1831), West Indies Royal Comission (1884, p.101-126), Smith (2009) and Smith and Forster (2013)
10. for Tobago: Craig-James (2000)

Online Appendix B The Parishes in the Ten Islands

Online Appendix Table 1: The Parishes in the Ten Islands

Jamaica	***Antigua***	***Barbados***	***St. Kitts***
Clarendon	Belfast	Bridgetown	Anguilla
Hanover	Dickensons Bay	Christ Church	Christ Church
Kingston	Five Islands	St Andrew	St Anne
Manchester	New North Sound	St George	St George
Metcalfe	Nonsuch	St James	St John Capisterre
Port Royal	Old North Sound	St John	St Mary
Portland	Old Road	St Joseph	St Paul
St Andrew	Popeshead	St Lucy	St Peter
St Anne	Rendezvous Bay	St Michael	St Thomas
St Catherine	St John	St Peter	Trinity
St David	Town of St John	St Philip	
St Dorothy	Willoughby Bay	St Thomas	***Tobago***
St Elizabeth	Town of Parham		
St George	Towns of Falmouth	***Montserrat***	St Andrew
St James	& English Harbor		St David
St John		St George	St George
St Mary	***Dominica***	St Patrick	St John
St Thomas East		St Peter	St Mary
St Thomas in Vale	St Andrew	Plymouth & Kinsale	St Patrick
Trelawny	St David	St Anthony	St Paul
Vere	St George		Town of Plymouth
Westmoreland	St John	***St. Vincent***	Town of Scarborough
	St Joseph		
Nevis	St Luke	Charlotte	***Grenada***
	St Mark	Grenadines	
St George	St Patrick	Kingstown	Carriacou
St James	St Paul	St Andrew	St Andrew & St David
St John	St Peter	St David	St George & St John
St Paul	Town of Portsmouth	St George	St Mark & St Patrick
St Thomas	Town of Roseau	St Patrick	

Notes: This table simply lists the the islands' parishes, i.e. the electoral districts returning assemblymen.

Online Appendix C Individual Biographies

Here we list the assemblymen in Jamaica.

Allwood (Robert) *Time in Assembly: 1836-1837; White Planter (http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/person/view/22058); Associated Plantations: 1826: Harding Hall (Hanover) , 1826: Old Shafston (Westmoreland) , 1829: Harding Hall (Hanover) , 1829: Providence 11 (Westmoreland) , 1835: Old Shafston (Westmoreland) , 1835: Fairfield 1 (Manchester) , 1835: Harding Hall (Hanover) , 1835: Providence 11 (Westmoreland).* •

Anderson (Wellwood W.M.) *Time in Assembly: 1845-1849; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1840: Leighfield (St George) , 1844: Preston , 1844: Ginger Hall , 1844: Middleton , 1844: Oxford.* •

Anderson (William H.) *Time in Assembly: 1839-1848; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1840: White Hall 2 (St Elizabeth) , 1840: Hope Hill 1 (St James) , 1844: Cooper Hill.* •

Anderson (William W.) *Time in Assembly: 1837-1849; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1835: Craig Mill (St George) , 1835: Strathnaver (St George) , 1835: Sue River (St Mary) , 1835: Spring Vale 1 (St Elizabeth) , 1840: Cottage 1 (St Andrew).* •

Aris (John) *Time in Assembly: 1841-1849; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1840: Enfield 4 (St Thomas in Vale) , 1840: Lime Walk (St John).* •

Barclay (Alexander) *Time in Assembly: 1836-1847; Active 'Planter-Party' Member (Holt, 1991, p.444 fn.9) ; Associated Plantations: 1829: Fairfield 6 (St Thomas East) , 1835: Plantain Garden River (St Thomas East) , 1835: Bellfield 4 (St Mary) , 1835: Bath 2 (St Thomas East) , 1835: Hermitage 11 (St Thomas East) , 1835: Lime Walk (St John) , 1835: Fairfield 6 (St Thomas East) , 1840: Bellfield 4 (St Mary) , 1840: Fairfield 6 (St Thomas East) , 1844: East Prospect.* •

Barnett (Samuel B.) *Time in Assembly: 1836-1843; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1835: Tripoli (St Anne) , 1835: Moore Park 3 (Trelawny).* •

Barrett (George) *Time in Assembly: 1849-1853; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1835: Anchovy Bottom (St James) , 1844: etc..* •

Barrett (Richard) *Time in Assembly: 1837-1838; White Planter (Holt, 1991, p.223); Associated Plantations: 1826: Greenwood 1 (St James) , 1826: Barrett Hall (St James) , 1829: Greenwood 1 (St James) , 1829: Lamb's River (Westmoreland) , 1829: Barrett Hall (St James) , 1835: Retirement 6 (St Anne) , 1835: Barrett Hall (St James) , 1835: Richmond Hill 2 (St James) , 1835: Dunns Hole Wharf (St James) , 1840: Barrett Hall (St James) , 1840: Ramble,&C.&C. (St Mary) , 1840: Harding Hall (Hanover) , 1844: Unexpected.* •

Barrett (Samuel G.) *Time in Assembly: 1838-1866; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Thatchfield 2 (St Anne) , 1826: Spring 4 (St James) , 1826: Schawfield (Trelawny) , 1829: Thatchfield 2 (St Anne) , 1829: Spring 4 (St James) , 1829: Schawfield (Trelawny) , 1835: Cinnamon Hill (St James) , 1840: Lebanon 1 (St Mary) , 1840: Spring 4 (St James) , 1840: Schawfield (Trelawny) , 1840: Greenwood 1 (St James) , 1840: Dixon,&C. (St Mary) , 1844: Spring , 1844: Harding Hall , 1844: Thatchfield Pen.* •

Bell (Samuel) *Time in Assembly: 1849-1852; Colored Carpenter (Heuman, 1981, p.62); .* •

Blagrove (Henry John) *Time in Assembly: 1847-1850; White Planter (Holt, 1991, p.193) ; .* •

Bonitto (Simon) *Time in Assembly: 1854-1859; White Merchant; .* •

Bourke (Wellesley) *Time in Assembly: 1851-1866; Colored Clerk of the Peace (Heuman, 1981, p.62); .* •

Bowerbank (Lewis) *Time in Assembly: 1860-1865; Clergyman (http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/person/view/18434); .* •

Brandon (David) *Time in Assembly: 1850-1861; White Merchant; .* •

Branker (Alex) *Time in Assembly: 1855-1859; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1840: Villa Pen 1 (St Andrew).* •

Bristowe (John) *Time in Assembly: 1848-1853; White Lawyer (Heuman, 1981, p.145); .* •

Brockett (Henry) *Time in Assembly: 1849-1850; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1840:*

Farm 1 (Hanover) , 1844: Axe and Adze. •

Brown (Hamilton) *Time in Assembly: 1836-1842; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Minard (St Anne) , 1826: Antrim (St Anne) , 1826: Colliston (St Anne) , 1826: Grier-Park (St Anne) , 1829: Beverley 3 (St Anne) , 1829: Minard (St Anne) , 1829: Antrim (St Anne) , 1829: Grier-Park (St Anne) , 1829: Colliston (St Anne) , 1835: Egypt (St Anne) , 1835: Haddon (St Anne) , 1835: Mount Helicon (St Anne) , 1835: Culloden 2 (St Anne) , 1835: Rose Hill 6 (St Anne) , 1835: Antrim (St Anne) , 1835: Bridge-Water (St Anne) , 1835: Devon 3 (St Anne) , 1835: Fullerton Park (St Anne) , 1835: Nightingale Grove 6 (Trelawny) , 1835: Content 6 (St Anne) , 1835: Colchis (Trelawny) , 1840: Antrim (St Mary) , 1844: Happy Valley.* •

Brown (John Samuel) *Time in Assembly: 1837-1850; Colored Secretary (Heuman, 1981, p.60); Associated Plantations: 1826: Cottage 1 (St Andrew) , 1826: Springfield 4 (St George) , 1826: Sportsman's Hall (Trelawny) , 1829: Springfield 4 (St George) , 1829: Sportsman's Hall (Trelawny) , 1829: Cottage 1 (St Andrew) , 1840: Springfield 4 (St George) , 1840: Hail Weston (Hanover).* •

Bruce (Robert) *Time in Assembly: 1846-1848; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1844: land at Hall and Lionel Town.* •

Brydon (James) *Time in Assembly: 1836-1836; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Mount Clear (St David) , 1826: Mount George 3 (St David) , 1826: Loudon-Hill (St David) , 1829: Mount Clear (St David) , 1829: Cotton Tree (St Thomas East) , 1829: Loudon-Hill (St David) , 1829: Mount George 3 (St David) , 1829: Castle-Hill (St Thomas East) , 1835: Cotton Tree (St Thomas East) , 1835: Seamore's Garden (St David) , 1835: Cocoa Walk 3 (St David) , 1835: Mount George 3 (St David) , 1835: Burlington (Portland) , 1835: Ultimatum (St David) , 1835: Smithfield 3 (St George) , 1835: Easington (St David) , 1835: Dunrobin 2 (St Thomas East) , 1835: Grampian (St Thomas East) , 1840: Cotton Tree (St Thomas East).* •

Burke (S.C.) *Time in Assembly: 1863-1866; Colored Lawyer (Heuman, 1981, p.63); .* •

Campbell (John) *Time in Assembly: 1836-1841; Colored Planter (Holt, 1991, p.218) ; Associated Plantations: 1826: Union-Lodge (St John) , 1826: Rock Spring 1 (Hanover) , 1826: Breadalbane (Westmoreland) , 1826: Gibraltar 9 (Trelawny) , 1826: Belgar (St Thomas in Vale) , 1826: Barmaddy (St Thomas in Vale) , 1826: Gland Big (St Elizabeth) , 1826: New Grove (Hanover) , 1829: New Grove (Hanover) , 1829: Rock Spring 1 (Hanover) , 1835: Belle Isle (Westmoreland) , 1835: Frome (Westmoreland) , 1835: Belgar (St Thomas in Vale) , 1835: Hope 4 (St Andrew) , 1840: Rock Spring 1 (Hanover) , 1840: Gibraltar 9 (Trelawny) , 1840: New River (St Andrew) , 1840: Burnt Ground 2 (St Elizabeth) , 1840: Belgar (St Thomas in Vale).* •

Castello (John) *Time in Assembly: 1853-1859; Colored Editor of The Falmouth Post (Heuman, 1981, p.62); .* •

Castle (Fred. L.) *Time in Assembly: 1860-1860; Colored Merchant; .* •

Chisholm (Colin) *Time in Assembly: 1849-1859; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Hampton Court 2 (St Andrew) , 1826: Mount Lebanon 2 (St Andrew) , 1829: Mount Lebanon 2 (St Andrew) , 1829: Hampton Court 2 (St Andrew) , 1835: Mount Lebanon 2 (St Andrew) , 1840: Hampton Court 2 (St Andrew) , 1840: Mount Lebanon 2 (St Andrew) , 1844: Mount Lebanon& Hampton Court.* •

Clachar (John S.) *Time in Assembly: 1838-1843; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Newport 1 (Portland) , 1826: Content 13 (St Thomas East) , 1829: Content 13 (St Thomas East) , 1829: Newport 1 (Portland) , 1835: Newport 1 (Portland).* •

Clarke (Francis) *Time in Assembly: 1866-1866; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1844: Hertford Land.* •

Collman (William) *Time in Assembly: 1836-1847; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Cliffords (St John) , 1826: Constitution Hill 2 (St John) , 1826: Longville Crawle (St John) , 1835: Diamond (St John) , 1835: Clifford's (St John) , 1835: Longville Crawle (St John) , 1835: Constitution Hill 2 (St John) , 1840: Constitution Hill 2 (St John) , 1840: Crawle 3 (St John) , 1840: Cliffords (St John) , 1844: Breadnut Bottom and Clifford's Rest , 1844: Inverness , 1844: Deamond and Unity.* •

Constantine (Robert L.) *Time in Assembly: 1854-1859; Colored Store Proprietor (Heuman, 1981, p.62); .* •

Cox (Henry) *Time in Assembly: 1836-1837;*

White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Industry 13 (St Mary) , 1826: Friendship 7 (St Anne) , 1826: Epping 2 (St Mary) , 1826: Spring Garden 6 (St Mary) , 1829: Spring Garden 6 (St Mary) , 1829: Friendship 7 (St Anne) , 1829: Fontabelle 1 (St Mary) , 1829: Industry 13 (St Mary) , 1829: Epping 2 (St Mary) , 1840: Spring Garden 6 (St Mary). •

Cunningham (George) *Time in Assembly: 1856-1865; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Green-Side 2 (Trelawny) , 1826: Mayfield 4 (Trelawny) , 1835: Mayfield 4 (Trelawny) , 1835: Paradise 6 (St James) , 1835: Greenside (Trelawny) , 1835: Ramble Pen (St James) , 1840: Greenside (Trelawny) , 1844: Greenside.* •

Dallas (Samuel Jackson) *Time in Assembly: 1836-1855; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1835: Silver Hill 1 (St Andrew) , 1840: Ellerslie Cottage (St Andrew).* •

Danvers (John F. G.) *Time in Assembly: 1857-1859; White Merchant; .* •

Darling (Charles Henry) *Time in Assembly: 1838-1846; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1844: Darling Lodge , 1844: Muirtown , 1844: .* •

Davidson *(James) Time in Assembly: 1846-1852; White Planter (Holt, 1991, p.229 fn.31) ; .* •

Davis *(Anthony) Time in Assembly: 1836-1836; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Mahogany Vale (Port Royal) , 1835: Saxham 1 (Hanover) , 1835: Norfolk (St Elizabeth) , 1835: Sherwood Forest 4 (Manchester) , 1835: Arnotto Bay (St George) , 1835: Gibraltar 6 (St George) , 1835: The Pinnacle (St Catherine) , 1835: Molynes (St Andrew) , 1835: Charlottenburg 2 (St Mary) , 1840: Langley (St Mary) , 1840: Sherwood Forest 4 (Manchester) , 1840: Molynes (St Andrew) , 1840: Saxham 1 (Hanover) , 1844: Pinnacle , 1844: Molynes , 1844: Norfolk , 1844: Langley estate , 1844: Sherwood Forest , 1844: Saxham.* •

Davis *(Foster) Time in Assembly: 1849-1862; Colored Lawyer (Heuman, 1981, p.63); Associated Plantations: 1844: Whitehall.* •

Deleon *(John) Time in Assembly: 1836-1836; Colored (Holt, 1991, p.218 fn.8); Associated Plantations: 1835: Flower Hill 5 (Westmoreland) , 1844: Phoenix Park.* •

Derbyshire *(James) Time in Assembly: 1856-1859; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1840: Town 1 (St Catherine) , 1840: Spencer's Pen (St Catherine) , 1840: Burnett's (St Catherine) , 1844: Young.* •

Dunstone *(James) Time in Assembly: 1839-1852; White Planter (Holt, 1991, p.245 fn.84); Associated Plantations: 1835: Greenwich 3 (St Anne) , 1840: Belmont 6 (St James) , 1844: Orange Hill , 1844: York.* •

Edwards *(Bryan) Time in Assembly: 1836-1837; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Dove Hall (St Thomas in Vale) , 1826: Eltham 2 (St Catherine) , 1840: Dover Hall (St Thomas in Vale) , 1844: Dove Hall.* •

Espeut *(Peter A.) Time in Assembly: 1852-1866; Colored Sugar Estate Owner (Holt, 1991, p.252); Associated Plantations: 1844: Sabina Park.* •

Ewart *(John) Time in Assembly: 1838-1843; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1835: Mullock (St Thomas in Vale) , 1840: Cremona (St Catherine) , 1840: Easthams (St James) , 1840: Vale Park (St Thomas in Vale) , 1840: Bridge (St Catherine) , 1840: Worcester 2 (St Catherine) , 1840: Mullock (St Thomas in Vale) , 1840: Charlton (St Thomas in Vale) , 1840: River Head 2 (St Thomas in Vale) , 1844: River Head , 1844: Airy Mount , 1844: Riverhead , 1844: Boozy Ridge.* •

Fairweather *(Robert) Time in Assembly: 1837-1841; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Industry 13 (St Mary) , 1835: Industry 13 (St Mary) , 1835: Cave River 2 (St Anne) , 1840: Golden Grove 4 (St George) , 1840: Wakefield 4 (St John) , 1840: Lawrencefield (St Catherine) , 1840: Industry 13 (St Mary) , 1840: Smallwood (St Catherine) , 1840: Sabina Park (St Andrew).* •

Farquharson *(Charles M.) Time in Assembly: 1837-1849; Colored Planter (Holt, 1991, p.230 fn.36); Associated Plantations: 1826: Spring Vale 1 (St Elizabeth) , 1840: Spring Vale 1 (St Elizabeth) , 1844: Spring Vale.* •

Finlay *(Alexander) Time in Assembly: 1847-1849; White Planter (Holt, 1991, p. 245 fn.84) ; Associated Plantations: 1840: Twickenham Park 2 (St Catherine) , 1844: Kent pen , 1844: Salthill , 1844: Ardoch Pen , 1844: Penhill , 1844: Twickenham Park.* •

Forbes *(Alexander) Time in Assembly: 1844-1844; Colored (Heuman, 1981, p.61); Associated*

Plantations: 1840: Mount Airy (St Andrew) , 1840: Mammee Hill (St George) , 1840: Cottage 4 (St George) , 1840: Amorengo Park (St Andrew) , 1840: Knowsley (St Andrew) , 1840: Westminster Cottage (St Andrew) , 1844: Mahogany Vale , 1844: Mammee Hill , 1844: Peter's Rock , 1844: Maringa Park. •

Fowles *(John) Time in Assembly: 1842-1853; White Planter (Holt, 1991, p.256 fn.106) ; Associated Plantations: 1826: Macksfield Park (St Andrew) , 1826: Spring Hill 3 (St George) , 1829: Spring Hill 3 (St George) , 1829: Macksfield Park (St Andrew) , 1835: Bybrook 2 (St George) , 1835: Spring Hill 3 (St George) , 1835: Rural Vale 1 (St Thomas East) , 1835: Newport 1 (Portland) , 1835: Stirling Castle 2 (St Thomas in Vale) , 1835: Peter's Rock (St Andrew) , 1835: Macksfield Park (St Andrew) , 1840: Spring Hill 3 (St George) , 1840: Macksfield Park (St Andrew).* •

Franklin *(Henry) Time in Assembly: 1844-1856; Colored (Heuman, 1981, p.61) ; Associated Plantations: 1840: Alignumvit Grove (St Andrew).* •

Frater *(William) Time in Assembly: 1836-1838; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Ulster Spring (Trelawny) , 1835: Spring Garden 8 (Trelawny) , 1835: Endeavour 3 (St Anne) , 1835: Dover Castle 4 (Trelawny) , 1835: Gibraltar 4 (St Anne) , 1835: Mount Pleasant 13 (St John) , 1835: Industry 7 (St Anne) , 1835: Lysworney (Trelawny) , 1835: Ulster Spring (Trelawny) , 1840: Ulster Spring (Trelawny) , 1844: estate of Lysmoney , 1844: Maida.* •

Garrigues *(Henry) Time in Assembly: 1838-1843; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Yarmouth (Vere) , 1829: Yarmouth (Vere) , 1835: Belle Plain (Clarendon) , 1835: Yarmouth (Vere) , 1835: Farm 2 (Manchester) , 1835: Belmont 4 (St Anne) , 1835: Stretton Hall (Vere) , 1835: Frankfield (Clarendon) , 1835: Crawl River (Clarendon) , 1835: Coffee Grove 1 (Clarendon) , 1835: Hampton Court 1 (Clarendon) , 1835: Gordon's Store (Clarendon) , 1835: Friendship 15 (St Thomas East) , 1840: Farm 2 (Manchester) , 1844: Farm , 1844: Betty's Hope , 1844: Creighton Hall.* •

Gayleard *(J.) Time in Assembly: 1866-1866; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1835: Bernard Lodge (St Catherine).* •

Geddes *(Alexander) Time in Assembly: 1843-1846; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1840: Chesterfield 1 (St Anne) , 1840: Gray's Inn 1 (St George) , 1844: Blair's pen , 1844: Elgin , 1844: Eden Bower.* •

Gibb *(James M.) Time in Assembly: 1866-1866; Colored Planter (Heuman, 1981, p.63); .* •

Girod *(William) Time in Assembly: 1849-1855; White Merchant; Associated Plantations: 1844: Castle Comfort.* •

Good *(Christopher) Time in Assembly: 1836-1841; White Planter (Holt, 1991, p.444 fn.9); Associated Plantations: 1840: Rose Hill 4 (Manchester).* •

Gordon *(Joseph) Time in Assembly: 1836-1865; A powerful planter-attorney. In 1832 one of only four attorneys who had control over more than 20 properties on the island. (http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/person/view/20354); Associated Plantations: 1826: Newland's Pen (St Andrew) , 1829: Cherry Garden 2 (St Andrew) , 1835: Washington (St David) , 1835: Salisbury Plain 1 (St Andrew) , 1835: Essex 2 (Port Royal) , 1835: Redington (St George) , 1835: Spring 3 (St Andrew) , 1835: Hermitage 3 (St Andrew) , 1835: Shortwood (St Andrew) , 1835: Hibernia 1 (St David) , 1835: Old England 3 (St David) , 1835: ? (St Andrew) , 1835: Mount Faraway 1 (Port Royal) , 1840: Gordon Castle 2 (Port Royal) , 1840: Farm 5 (St Catherine) , 1840: Shortwood (St Andrew) , 1840: Richmond Vale (St David) , 1840: Birnam Wood (St George) , 1840: Prospect 4 (St Andrew) , 1840: Cow-Park (St Catherine) , 1840: Epsom 1 (St Catherine) , 1844: Waterloo.* •

Grant *(Charles Edward) Time in Assembly: 1846-1848; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Tydixton-Park (St John) , 1826: Hopewell 8 (St Mary) , 1826: Mount Mansfield (St Andrew) , 1840: Hopewell 8 (St Mary) , 1844: Graham's pen , 1844: New Hall , 1844: Tulloch , 1844: Lewisberg.* •

Grosett *(John Rock) Time in Assembly: 1836-1843; Colored Merchant; .* •

Groves *(Henry) Time in Assembly: 1861-1866; White Planter (Holt, 1991, p.229 fn.31) ; Associated Plantations: 1844: Lodge.* •

Guy *(Edward) Time in Assembly: 1836-1848; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Pen 2 (St Catherine) , 1835: Guy's Pen (St Catherine)*

, 1840: Ireland (St Catherine) , 1844: Guy's pen , 1844: Camberwall. •

Hamilton *(George William) Time in Assembly: 1836-1841; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Grantsfield Pen (St Thomas East) , 1826: Providence 9 (St Thomas East) , 1826: Windsor Castle 5 (St Thomas East) , 1835: Grierfield (St Anne) , 1835: Wellen's Pen (St Catherine) , 1835: Dunkley's (Vere) , 1835: Palm (St Thomas in Vale) , 1840: Graham's Pen (St Catherine) , 1844: Dunkley's.* •

Harrison *(Peter) Time in Assembly: 1844-1848; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1840: Apropos (Manchester).* •

Hart *(Daniel) Time in Assembly: 1836-1851; White Planter (Holt, 1991, p.444 fn.9); Associated Plantations: 1840: Harvey's Bog (St John) , 1840: Bowden (St Thomas East) , 1844: Hartland.* •

Harvey *(James) Time in Assembly: 1860-1865; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1844: Rocky Hill , 1844: Belmont.* •

Henry *(James) Time in Assembly: 1842-1842; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1844: Comfort Hall , 1844: Prospect Hall , 1844: Content.* •

Heslop *(Alex) Time in Assembly: 1849-1859; Colored Barrister (Heuman, 1981, p.61); .* •

Hill *(Richard) Time in Assembly: 1837-1837; Colored Magistrate (Heuman, 1981, p.59) ; Associated Plantations: 1844: Part of Mount James , 1844: Part of Kensington.* •

Hinshelwood *(John) Time in Assembly: 1840-1843; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Providence 4 (Portland) , 1829: Providence 4 (Portland) , 1835: Providence 4 (Portland).* •

Hitchins *(Richard) Time in Assembly: 1845-1848; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1840: Mount Patience 1 (St Andrew).* •

Hodgson *(Abraham) Time in Assembly: 1836-1836; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Huddersfield (St Mary) , 1826: Halifax 2 (St Mary) , 1826: Tower Hill (St Mary) , 1835: Halifax 2 (St Mary) , 1835: Juan Fernandez (St Mary) , 1835: Mount Edgecombe 1 (St Anne) , 1835: Pleasant Valley 1 (St Andrew) , 1835: Huddersfield (St Mary) , 1835: Rio Nueva Bay (St Mary) , 1835: Green Park 3 (St Anne) , 1835: Halifax Crawle (St Anne) , 1835: Mammee Ridge (St Anne) , 1835: Saltrum (St Mary) , 1835: Friendship 7 (St Anne) , 1835: Epping 2 (St Mary) , 1835: Industry 13 (St Mary) , 1835: Tower Hill (St Mary) , 1835: Spring Garden 6 (St Mary) , 1835: Mason Hill (St Mary).* •

Hollingsworth *(John) Time in Assembly: 1849-1866; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1835: Highgate Hall (Manchester) , 1840: Retrieve 2 (Manchester) , 1844: Bloomfield.* •

Hosack *(William) Time in Assembly: 1854-1866; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1835: Buff Bay River (St George) , 1840: Buff Bay River (St George).* •

Hutchings *(Henry) Time in Assembly: 1856-1859; White Merchant; .* •

Hylton *(Samuel B.) Time in Assembly: 1836-1843; White Planter and Lawyer (Holt, 1991, p.223 fn.21); Associated Plantations: 1835: Waterloo 1 (Manchester) , 1844: Twickenham , 1844: Fruit Hill.* •

Hyslop *(Wellwood) Time in Assembly: 1836-1844; Colored Planter; .* •

Israel *(Rowland) Time in Assembly: 1836-1836; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Palmeto Pen (Clarendon) , 1829: Palmeto Pen (Clarendon) , 1835: Crawl River (Clarendon) , 1835: Gordon's Store (Clarendon) , 1835: Frankfield (Clarendon).* •

Jackson *(Charles H.) Time in Assembly: 1845-1866; Colored Clerk of the Peace (Heuman, 1981, p.60) ; .* •

Johnson *(Robert A.) Time in Assembly: 1861-1866; Colored (Heuman, 1981, p.63); Associated Plantations: 1844: ? , 1844: Content , 1844: More beside Rock.* •

Johnstone *(Andrew G.) Time in Assembly: 1844-1847; Colored Planter (Holt, 1991, p.445 fn.21) ; .* •

Jordon *(Edward) Time in Assembly: 1836-1865; Colored (Heuman, 1981, p.58) ; Associated Plantations: 1826: Heart's Ease 3 (St John) , 1840: Good Air (St Andrew) , 1844: Bull Park , 1844: Good Air.* •

Kemble *(William) Time in Assembly: 1864-1866; Colored Merchant; .* •

King *(John Lewis) Time in Assembly: 1836-1836; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1835: Kingswood (Westmoreland) , 1840: Bybrook 2 (St George) , 1840: Stoney-Hill 1 (St Andrew).* •

King *(William Brooks) Time in Assembly:*

1836-1836; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Retreat 3 (Manchester) , 1829: Retreat 3 (Manchester) , 1835: Egg Hill (Portland) , 1835: Union Hill 1 (St Andrew) , 1835: Charlottenburg 1 (St Andrew) , 1840: Charlottenburg 1 (St Andrew) , 1844: Union Hill. •

Lake *(Charles) Time in Assembly: 1837-1848; Colored Merchant/Magistrate (Heuman, 1981, p.60); .* •

Leslie *(Hugh Fraser) Time in Assembly: 1836-1846; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Castile Fort Pen (Port Royal) , 1829: Castile Fort Pen (Port Royal) , 1835: Stone's Hope (Manchester) , 1835: Easington (St David) , 1835: Bell Clare (St David) , 1835: Minto (St David) , 1840: Bell Clare (St David) , 1844: Belle Clare.* •

Lindo *(A.J.) Time in Assembly: 1849-1866; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1835: Riotto Pen (St Anne) , 1840: Colling's Green Pen (St Andrew) , 1844: Colling's Green.* •

Loane *(Marcus Walpole) Time in Assembly: 1836-1836; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Spring Mount 3 (St John) , 1835: Spring Mount 3 (St John) , 1835: Retreat 13 (St John).* •

Lowndes *(Henry) Time in Assembly: 1836-1843; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1840: Blackburn's House (St Catherine) , 1840: Angel's (St Catherine) , 1844: Angel's pen , 1844: Knollis Mountain.* •

Lunan *(James) Time in Assembly: 1844-1848; White Planter and Lawyer (Heuman, 1981, p.145) ; Associated Plantations: 1840: Pen 1 (St Andrew).* •

Lynch *(F.R.) Time in Assembly: 1850-1866; White Lawyer (Holt, 1991, p.223 fn.21) ; .* •

Magnus *(Samuel) Time in Assembly: 1844-1849; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1835: Falmouth (Trelawny) , 1844: Somerset.* •

Mais *(Stephen W.) Time in Assembly: 1850-1866; Colored Road Commissioner (Heuman, 1981, p.63) ; .* •

Manderson *(John) Time in Assembly: 1836-1841; Colored Planter (Holt, 1991, p.218 fn.8); Associated Plantations: 1835: ? (St James) , 1835: Chesterfield 6 (St James) , 1840: Chatham 1 (St James) , 1844: Paradise.* •

March *(Foster H.) Time in Assembly: 1851-1861; Colored Alderman (Heuman, 1981, p.61) ; .* •

March *(William Thomas) Time in Assembly: 1837-1864; Colored Attorney (Heuman, 1981, p.60) ; Associated Plantations: 1826: Hill Side 4 (St Mary) , 1826: Pittfield (St Mary) , 1826: Content 7 (St Catherine) , 1844: Government pen.* •

Mason *(David) Time in Assembly: 1851-1860; White Planter (Holt, 1991, p.246 fn.87); Associated Plantations: 1826: Villa 3 (Westmoreland) , 1835: Nightingale Grove 6 (Trelawny) , 1835: Greenwich 1 (Hanover) , 1835: Raderney (Westmoreland) , 1844: Villa.* •

Mason *(Thomas) Time in Assembly: 1849-1853; White Planter (Holt, 1991, p.246 fn.87); Associated Plantations: 1826: Fellowship 1 (St Elizabeth) , 1829: Southampton 3 (St George) , 1835: Southampton 1 (St Elizabeth) , 1835: Success 3 (St Elizabeth) , 1835: Wilderness 2 (Manchester) , 1835: Hopeton 3 (Manchester) , 1840: Southampton 1 (St Elizabeth) , 1840: Hopeton 3 (Manchester).* •

McComack *(Thomas) Time in Assembly: 1842-1843; Colored Merchant; .* •

McCook *(Francis) Time in Assembly: 1838-1848; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1844: Bridge Pen , 1844: Bridge pen and Jones's.* •

McPherson *(Robert John) Time in Assembly: 1849-1849; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1844: Kew.* •

Mitchell *(Hector) Time in Assembly: 1836-1841; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1835: Harbour Head 2 (St Thomas East) , 1835: Mount Industry 1 (St Andrew) , 1835: Galloway (St George) , 1835: Grierfield (St Anne) , 1835: Air Mount (St Thomas East) , 1835: Christiana (Manchester) , 1835: Concord (St Anne).* •

Moncrieff *(Peter) Time in Assembly: 1842-1848; Colored Barrister (Heuman, 1981, p.61); .* •

Moore *(Alexander) Time in Assembly: 1841-1842; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1829: Alligator Pond (Manchester) , 1840: George's Valley 1 (St Elizabeth) , 1844: George's Valley.* •

Morgan *(Patrick) Time in Assembly: 1852-1853; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1840: Clifton 7 (St Mary).* •

Moris *(Stephen) Time in Assembly: 1861-1861; White Merchant; .* •

Mowat *(Edward Charles) Time in Assembly: 1844-1853; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1840: Unity Park Pen (St Andrew) , 1840:*

Boucher's Pen (St Andrew). •

Muirhead *(Michael) Time in Assembly: 1863-1866; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1829: Skiddaw (Manchester) , 1835: Pimento Hill 3 (Manchester) , 1840: Ward's Bay (Manchester) , 1844: Ward's Bay.* •

Murchison *(Alexander) Time in Assembly: 1836-1837; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Springfield 14 (Vere) , 1829: Springfield 14 (Vere) , 1835: Springfield 14 (Vere) , 1835: Grimmett (Vere) , 1840: Springfield 14 (Vere) , 1840: Grimmett (Vere).* •

Murphy *(Thomas) Time in Assembly: 1864-1866; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1844: Seffry Town.* •

Nathan *(D.P.) Time in Assembly: 1863-1866; Colored Lawyer (Heuman, 1981, p.63) ; .* •

Nickells *(Charles) Time in Assembly: 1848-1848; Colored Merchant; .* •

Orsett *(George) Time in Assembly: 1842-1844; White Merchant; Associated Plantations: 1840: Harbour Head 1 (Port Royal) , 1840: Windsor Farm Pen (St Andrew) , 1844: Harbour Head.* •

Osborn *(Robert) Time in Assembly: 1836-1866; Colored (Heuman, 1981, p.59) ; Associated Plantations: 1829: Wheeler's Valley (St Andrew) , 1835: Prospect 4 (St Andrew) , 1840: Little Prospect 1 (St Andrew) , 1840: Farm Pen (St Andrew).* •

Panton *(Edward John Wilson) Time in Assembly: 1836-1841; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1835: Elmwood (St Thomas East).* •

Paterson *(Robert) Time in Assembly: 1851-1855; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1835: New Monkland (St Thomas East) , 1835: Old Monkland (St Thomas East) , 1835: Cedar Valley 4 (St David) , 1840: Cedar Valley 4 (St David) , 1844: Monklands.* •

Pearson *(Robert) Time in Assembly: 1848-1862; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1844: Epping Forest , 1844: Golden Grove , 1844: Palmetto Valley , 1844: Blue Mountain.* •

Phillips *(George L.) Time in Assembly: 1844-1860; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Try-See 1 (St Anne).* •

Pillon *(John A.) Time in Assembly: 1860-1862; Colored Inspector of Weights (Heuman, 1981, p.63) ; .* •

Porteous *(James) Time in Assembly: 1845-1851; White Planter (Holt, 1991, p.223 fn.31) ; .* •

Price *(George) Time in Assembly: 1849-1862; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1844: Mickleton , 1844: Worthy Park.* •

Purrier *(John Vincent) Time in Assembly: 1843-1847; White Planter and Banker (Heuman, 1981, p.122) ; Associated Plantations: 1826: Welcome 1 (Hanover) , 1826: Fairy Hill 1 (Portland) , 1826: Haddington (Hanover) , 1829: Welcome 1 (Hanover) , 1829: Fairy Hill 1 (Portland) , 1829: Haddington (Hanover) , 1835: Fairy Hill 1 (Portland) , 1835: Palmeto Grove (St Mary) , 1835: Adelphi (St James) , 1835: Welcome 1 (Hanover) , 1835: Haddington (Hanover) , 1840: Welcome 1 (Hanover) , 1840: Haddington (Hanover) , 1840: Palmeto Grove (St Mary) , 1844: Haddington , 1844: Fairy Hill , 1844: Maryfield.* •

Robertson *(Duncan) Time in Assembly: 1836-1836; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Friendship 10 (St Elizabeth) , 1826: Arthur's Seat 1 (St Elizabeth) , 1829: Gilnock Hall (St George) , 1829: Friendship 11 (St George) , 1835: Evergreen (Manchester) , 1835: Southampton 1 (St Elizabeth) , 1835: Caenwood 1 (Manchester) , 1835: Cabbage Valley (St Elizabeth) , 1835: Knockpatrick (Manchester) , 1835: New Hall 1 (Manchester) , 1835: Struan Castle 2 (Manchester) , 1835: Oxford 2 (Manchester) , 1835: Reading 1 (St Elizabeth) , 1835: Dean's Valley Dry Works (Westmoreland) , 1835: Grosmond (St Elizabeth) , 1835: Friendship 10 (St Elizabeth) , 1835: Northampton (St Elizabeth) , 1835: Oxford 2 (St Elizabeth) , 1835: Gilnock Hall (St Elizabeth) , 1835: Grove Place (Manchester) , 1840: Gilnock Hall (St Elizabeth) , 1840: Friendship 10 (St Elizabeth) , 1840: Berkshire (Manchester) , 1844: Rock Heath.* •

Rose *(William) Time in Assembly: 1847-1861; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Flemington 2 (Clarendon) , 1826: Rose-Valley (Clarendon) , 1826: Croshie Pen (St Andrew) , 1829: Croshie Pen (St Andrew) , 1829: Blackwood's (Clarendon) , 1829: Mount Content (St Andrew) , 1835: Drummond Castle (Port Royal) , 1835: Rose Hill 5 (St Andrew) , 1835: Mount Content (St Andrew) , 1835: Blackwood's (Clarendon) , 1840: Blackwood's (Clarendon) , 1844: Bog Hole , 1844: Mears.* •

Royes *(Charles) Time in Assembly: 1854-1861; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1844: Holland Hill and Amity Hall , 1844: Hoghole.* •

Russell *(Robert) Time in Assembly: 1837-1859; Colored (Heuman, 1981, p.60); Associated Plantations: 1844: Shaddock Grove& Down Hall , 1844: Content , 1844: Russell's Retreat.* •

Salom *(Aaron) Time in Assembly: 1849-1866; Colored Merchant (Holt, 1991, p.230 fn.36) ; .* •

Sanguinetti *(Jacob) Time in Assembly: 1837-1866; White Planter (Holt, 1991, p.444 fn.9); Associated Plantations: 1835: ? [None Given In T71/857] (St Anne) , 1844: Logwood Tavern , 1844: six Properties.* •

Savire *(Roger) Time in Assembly: 1860-1861; White Merchant; .* •

Scott *(A. R.) Time in Assembly: 1842-1843; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1835: Epping Farm (St David) , 1835: Whitfield Hall (St David) , 1835: Trelawny (Trelawny) , 1840: A (St Andrew) , 1840: Epping Farm (St David) , 1844: Whitfield Hall , 1844: Belle Vue , 1844: McConnel , 1844: Epping Farm.* •

Shand *(William) Time in Assembly: 1836-1836; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Hopewell 5 (St Anne) , 1829: St. Toolie's (Clarendon) , 1829: Belmont 7 (St John) , 1829: Mammee Gully Pen (Clarendon) , 1829: Kellett's (Clarendon) , 1829: The Burn (Clarendon) , 1835: Belmont 7 (St John) , 1835: Kellett's (Clarendon) , 1835: The Burn (Clarendon) , 1835: Mammee Gully Pen (Clarendon) , 1840: Kellett's (Clarendon) , 1844: Hopewell Pen , 1844: Burn.* •

Shirley *(H. H.) Time in Assembly: 1854-1855; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Hyde Hall (Trelawny) , 1826: Glamorgan (Trelawny) , 1826: Etingdon (Trelawny) , 1829: Etingdon (Trelawny) , 1829: Glamorgan (Trelawny) , 1829: Hyde Hall (Trelawny) , 1840: Hyde Hall (Trelawny) , 1840: Glamorgan (Trelawny) , 1840: Etingdon (Trelawny).* •

Smith *(David) Time in Assembly: 1863-1866; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Culloden 1 (Clarendon) , 1829: Culloden 1 (Clarendon).* •

Smith *(Edward) Time in Assembly: 1836-1836; White Planter (Holt, 1991, p.444 fn.9); Associated Plantations: 1826: Haughton (St Elizabeth) , 1826: Mount Sion 1 (St Andrew) , 1826: Bull Park (St David) , 1829: Breadnut Valley 3 (St George) , 1829: Mount Sion 1 (St Andrew) , 1829: Haughton (St George) , 1835: Breadnut Valley 2 (St Elizabeth) , 1835: Haughton (St Elizabeth) , 1840: Breadnut Valley 2 (St Elizabeth).* •

Smith *(James) Time in Assembly: 1837-1843; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Prospect Hall (St Andrew) , 1826: Belle Vue 1 (St Andrew) , 1829: Belle Vue 1 (St Andrew) , 1829: Prospect Hall (St Andrew) , 1840: Amphitheatre (St David) , 1840: Prospect Hall (St Andrew) , 1840: Little Prospect 2 (Manchester) , 1840: Retreat 8 (St David) , 1840: Dunsinane 1 (St Andrew) , 1840: Vineyard Pen (St Andrew).* •

Smith *(Raynes W.) Time in Assembly: 1843-1866; White Planter (Holt, 1991, p.245 fn.84) ; Associated Plantations: 1844: Haughton , 1844: Bryan's Hill.* •

Smith *(William) Time in Assembly: 1850-1851; White Planter and Railroad Executive (Holt, 1991, p.232); Associated Plantations: 1826: Maxwell Valley (St James) , 1826: Pleasant Hill 7 (St John) , 1829: Trowel Hill (Portland) , 1829: Pleasant Hill 7 (St John) , 1829: Maxwell Valley (St James) , 1835: Clifton 3 (St James) , 1835: Bossue (Manchester) , 1835: Woodstock 1 (St Anne) , 1840: Clifton 3 (St James) , 1840: Bossue (Manchester) , 1844: Runhard , 1844: Pleasant Hill , 1844: Smithfield , 1844: Prospect , 1844: Clifton , 1844: Maxwell Valley.* •

Solomon *(George) Time in Assembly: 1860-1866; Colored Planter (Holt, 1991, p.445 fn.21); Associated Plantations: 1844: Wakefield.* •

Spalding *(Hinton) Time in Assembly: 1842-1851; White Planter (Holt, 1991, p.256 fn.106) ; Associated Plantations: 1826: Grove 2 (Manchester) , 1829: Grove 2 (Manchester) , 1835: Hermitage 7 (St George) , 1835: Hopewell 5 (St Anne) , 1835: Hatfield Plantation (St Mary) , 1835: St Toolie's (Clarendon) , 1835: Montpelier 1 (St Andrew) , 1835: Grove 2 (Manchester) , 1835: West Prospect 1 (St Andrew) , 1840: Lancaster 2 (Manchester) , 1840: Montpelier 1 (St Andrew) , 1840: Platfield (St Mary) , 1840: Good Hope 1 (St George) , 1844: Toolie's Estate.* •

Stamp *(John Jacob) Time in Assembly: 1838-1841; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Mount Holstein (St George) , 1840: Dowan's Castle*

(St George). •

Stanford *(Edward) Time in Assembly: 1855-1856; White Merchant; .* •

Stennett *(George) Time in Assembly: 1851-1852; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1835: Liberty Hall 1 (St Anne) , 1844: Liberty Hill.* •

Swire *(Roger) Time in Assembly: 1862-1866; Colored Planter; Associated Plantations: 1840: Fort Stewart (St George) , 1840: Belle Vue 9 (St George).* •

Taylor *(James) Time in Assembly: 1836-1860; Colored (Heuman, 1981, p.59) ; Associated Plantations: 1826: White River 1 (St Anne) , 1840: Hagley Park (St Andrew).* •

Thompson *(Edward) Time in Assembly: 1837-1859; White Planter (Holt, 1991, p.444 fn.9) ; Associated Plantations: 1835: Cool Spring 1 (Clarendon) , 1835: Lemon Hall (St John).* •

Thompson *(John) Time in Assembly: 1846-1847; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: May Day (Manchester) , 1826: Lancaster 1 (St George) , 1826: Glasgow 2 (Manchester) , 1826: Eden 1 (St George) , 1826: Woodside 2 (Manchester) , 1829: Glasgow 2 (Manchester) , 1835: Salt Hill (Port Royal) , 1835: Lancaster 1 (St George) , 1840: Lancaster 1 (St George) , 1840: Retreat 6 (St Andrew).* •

Titley *(William) Time in Assembly: 1849-1850; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Sabina Park (St Andrew) , 1835: Rentcomb (St Thomas in Vale) , 1835: Belmont 4 (St Anne) , 1835: Parchment (St Elizabeth) , 1840: Round Hill 2 (Port Royal) , 1840: Mahogany Vale (Port Royal) , 1844: Mount Industry and Fitzmorris Land , 1844: Hayley Park , 1844: Southfield.* •

Townshend *(George Harrison) Time in Assembly: 1836-1845; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Main Savanna (Clarendon) , 1829: Main Savanna (Clarendon) , 1829: Ramble 1 (Clarendon) , 1835: Main Savanna (Clarendon) , 1840: Main Savanna (Clarendon).* •

Vickars *(Edward) Time in Assembly: 1848-1859; Colored Alderman and Magistrate (Heuman, 1981, p.62) ; .* •

Vidal *(John J.) Time in Assembly: 1864-1866; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Belle-Air 3 (St John) , 1826: St. Jago Park (St Catherine) , 1835: Keith Hall 2 (St Catherine) , 1835: Concord (St Anne) , 1835: St Jago De La Vega (St Catherine) , 1835: Fair Prospect 3 (St John) , 1835: Golgotha (St Catherine) , 1835: Shenton (St Thomas in Vale) , 1840: Keith Hall 2 (St Catherine) , 1840: Town 1 (St Catherine) , 1840: Woodfield (St Anne) , 1844: Grierfield , 1844: Jago Park.* •

Walcott *(J. L.) Time in Assembly: 1842-1842; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Ashley Hall 2 (Trelawny) , 1829: Ashley Hall 2 (Trelawny) , 1835: Ashley Hall 2 (Trelawny) , 1844: Baron Hill.* •

Walters *(Christopher) Time in Assembly: 1850-1864; Colored Cobbler (Heuman, 1981, p.62) ; .* •

Watkis *(Price) Time in Assembly: 1865-1865; Colored (Holt, 1991, p.218 fn.8) ; Associated Plantations: 1835: Greenwich Park 1 (St Anne).* •

Watt *(Robert) Time in Assembly: 1836-1840; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Friendship 10 (St Elizabeth) , 1826: Lacovia (St Elizabeth) , 1826: East Middlesex (St Elizabeth) , 1829: Friendship 11 (St George) , 1829: East Middlesex (St George) , 1829: Lacovia (St George) , 1835: Prospect 13 (Westmoreland) , 1835: Lacovia (St Elizabeth) , 1835: Middlesex 1 (St Elizabeth) , 1835: Friendship 10 (St Elizabeth) , 1840: Friendship 10 (St Elizabeth) , 1840: Belmore Castle (St Elizabeth) , 1840: Middlesex 1 (St Elizabeth) , 1844: George's Plain , 1844: Friendship , 1844: Belmore Castle.* •

Westmoreland *(H. Henry) Time in Assembly: 1849-1866; Colored Planter; Associated Plantations: 1844: Richmond , 1844: Kildare , 1844: Gibraltar , 1844: Prospect.* •

Whealle *(Thomas) Time in Assembly: 1839-1841; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Twickenham 2 (St Elizabeth) , 1835: Ramble 4 (Manchester) , 1835: Arden Forest (Manchester) , 1840: Balbeck (St Elizabeth) , 1840: Arden Forest (Manchester) , 1840: Pan's Lodge (Manchester) , 1840: Ayr (Manchester).* •

Whitelock *(Hugh Anthony) Time in Assembly: 1838-1866; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1844: Bullstrode.* •

Whittaker *(Benjamin) Time in Assembly: 1836-1838; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Montpelier 9 (St John) , 1829: Montpelier 9 (St John).* •

Williams *(Joseph S.) Time in Assembly: 1858-*

1866; White Planter and Lawyer (Holt, 1991, p.223 fn.21) ; Associated Plantations: 1826: Carawina (Westmoreland) , 1826: Anglesea (Westmoreland) , 1826: Cairn Currain (Westmoreland) , 1835: Carawina (Westmoreland) , 1835: Anglesea (Westmoreland) , 1835: Cairn Currain (Westmoreland). •

Wright *(George) Time in Assembly: 1837-1845; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1829: Greenwall (St David) , 1829: White Hall 1 (St Andrew) , 1835: Golden Grove 7 (St Thomas in Vale) , 1835: Greenwall (St David) , 1835: Friendship Valley (St Thomas East) , 1835: Aeolus Valley (St David) , 1835: Easington (St David) , 1835: Peartree Grove (St Thomas in Vale) , 1840: Mount Charles 2 (Port Royal) , 1840: Peartree Grove (St Thomas in Vale) , 1840: Greenwall (St David) , 1840: Kensington Garden (St David) , 1844: Friendship Valley , 1844: Island Head , 1844: Tryall , 1844: Mount Charles , 1844: Greenwall and Palmyra , 1844: Chiswick , 1844:&c..* •

Wright *(William) Time in Assembly: 1852-1853; White Planter; Associated Plantations: 1826: Lloyd's 1 (St John) , 1826: Enfield 1 (Manchester) , 1826: Juan De Bolas (St John) , 1826: New-Barnesfield (St Andrew) , 1826: Aylmer's (St John) , 1829: Aylmer's (St John) , 1829: Lloyd's 1 (St John) , 1829: Juan De Bolas (St John) , 1829: Enfield 1 (Manchester) , 1835: Lloyd's 1 (St John) , 1835: Lloyd's Pen (St Dorothy) , 1835: Juan De Bolas (St John) , 1844: Tryall , 1844: Grenock.* •

Online Appendix D Barbados's Geography

Barbados was an outlier among the Caribbean slave societies in its geography. While all Caribbean islands shared their climatic conditions, there was large variation in geographic characteristics like elevation and soil. The typical Caribbean sugar colony was characterized by sugar-suitable coastal plains and a rugged interior that lay fallow during slavery. Barbados was the only Caribbean sugar island that combined the advantages of limestone rather than volcanic soil with a high enough elevation to protect sugar from saltwater and storm surges.The Caribbean is divided into three island chains: The Greater Antilles are large islands with mountainous interiors and coastal plains. Of these, only Jamaica was a British colony, the others are Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Most British Caribbean colonies–Dominica, the British Virgin Islands, Grenada, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent–belonged to the inner chain of the Lesser Antilles, which is volcanic and mountainous. The outer chain of Lesser Antilles–Anguilla, Bahamas, Barbados, Turks and Caicos–consists of flat limestone. This limestone was more suitable for sugar cultivation because it retained water better than the volcanic land on the inner chain (Richardson, 1997, p. 147) and because sugar does not like high elevations. In Barbados, the *entire* land area was highly sugar-suitable land, and over 95% of its land was under cultivation on the eve of emancipation, compared to under 50% elsewhere in the Caribbean (Martin, 1839, p.32–102). While Barbados was not particularly unique during slavery, it was unique *after* emancipation its ability to offer extremely low wages for lack of any other options to the citizenry. Consequently, a merchant class catering to local markets did not develop, and emancipated blacks did not obtain the franchise for a lack of available land for purchase.

Online Appendix E Examples of Related Institutional Changes

In this paper we theoretically explore the idea that an elite may pay an outside force for protection against popular pressure. This necessarily took a very specific form in the British Caribbean, but we view the mechanism as more general, and therefore provide here some illustrative examples of related events.

In the 1967 coup d'état in Greece, for example, politicians of the incumbent Conservative Party openly invited a military coup, fearing that the left-leaning Center Union Party would gain a parliamentary majority in the upcoming election (Kassimeris, 2006). Similarly, the 1971 military coup in Turkey was apparently supported by conservative parliamentary elements fearing increasing influence of both left- and right-wing parties and trade unions (Feroz, 2002). In Sierra Leone, when the incumbent prime minister, Albert Margai, narrowly lost the 1967 election to Siaka Stevens, he had planned ahead for this contingency and had the latter deposed by a military coup within hours after taking office (Cartwright, 1970). Thailand's military coup in May 2014 has been described as "the culmination of months of maneuvering by the Bangkok establishment seeking to suspend democracy, at least in the short term, as it struggled to unseat a party it has been unable to defeat at the polls" (Fuller, 2014).

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