Dual Citizenship Allowance and Migration Flow: An Origin Story

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Abstract
What effect does variation in dual citizenship policies of both sending and receiving societies have on bilateral migration flow? Employing a modified gravity model, we use a new dual citizenship database to examine the effects of allowance within 14 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) receiving states and more than 100 sending states between 1980 and 2006. We show that dual-citizenship-allowing sending states experience significantly more migration than dual-citizenship-forbidding sending states. We also find a significant increase in migration flow in receiving states that allow for dual citizenship, consistent with previous research. Finally, interaction effects reveal highest flow between sending and receiving states allowing dual citizenship and lowest flow between forbidding sending states and allowing receiving states. These findings emphasize the importance of citizenship policy contexts of countries of origin in influencing a migrant’s decision to move. They also suggest that migrants are rational and informed, valuing the “goods” of citizenship—from political rights to security of status and mobility—in both origin and destination states.

Keywords
migration, dual citizenship, sending states, origin states

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Introduction

Migration flow has recently soared well above 230 million worldwide, representing more than a 30% increase since 2000 (United Nations, 2013). This epoch of global migration is concentrated in the Global North, with approximately two thirds of international migrants worldwide residing in Europe and Asia. Coupled with this growth is an emerging liberalization of dual citizenship laws worldwide (Faist, Gerdes, & Rieple, 2004; Howard, 2005). This rise in dual citizenship allowance is widely acknowledged as a recent phenomenon (Hammar, 1985a; Howard, 2005; Jones-Correa, 2000; Sejersen, 2008), increasing by more than 30% globally in as little as 50 years (Vink, de Groot, & Luk, 2013). Furthermore, approximately two thirds (68%) of states allowing some form of dual citizenship are located in Europe or Asia, suggesting correspondence between migration and dual citizenship expansion.

Is there a relationship between these two trends? Does state allowance of dual citizenship affect global migration flows? How do dual citizenship policies, especially in origin countries, influence flow? Although the potential for a migrant to possess multiple forms of citizenship theoretically enables higher migration flows through benefits empowering immigrant integration (Hansen & Weil, 2002), presently little research examines what role dual citizenship allowance plays in determining migration flow, either historically or contemporaneously, and particularly from the perspective of the sending state. Among the citizenship literature, dual citizenship is largely examined in terms of what effect it has on political incorporation in receiving societies (Bloemraad, 2004; Dronkers & Vink, 2012), neglecting the policy context of sending societies (and thus perceptions and possibilities of political access more generally). And from the perspective of the migration literature, dual citizenship (or other citizenship policies for that matter) is rarely regarded as consequential in affecting migratory movement,1 with no attention paid to policies of the sending state.

This article bridges these two literatures and fills in gaps by investigating the effect dual citizenship policy—of both sending and receiving states—possesses over global migration flows. Citizenship conveys many “political goods”; it is crucial for obtaining full political rights, security of status, and thus, expansive rights of mobility including entry, exit, and return and—in many societies—a key to unlocking the full potential of the labor market. Moreover, these goods exist in both origin and destination contexts. Thus, we propose that dual citizenship allowance of both sending and receiving states plays a significant role in facilitating a migrant’s decision to move or not. Changes in dual citizenship policy thus are expected to alter the desirability
of both the sending and receiving states, thereby mitigating variation in migratory flow. Specifically, we hypothesize that higher migratory flow occurs where both sending and receiving states allow for dual citizenship, where migrants seek maximum rights with minimal loss, compared with where one or both states forbid it. Moreover, we predict migration to be higher when the sending state allows but the destination forbids, as iterative attempts (i.e., return migration) remain possible and in comparison with a scenario where the origin forbids it but the destination allows it. We support these predictions on the basis that migrants are informed, rational actors seeking increased political goods. Sometimes those rights are to be found in destinations (political rights, security of status), but sometimes, they are defined by context of the sending state (secure mobility allowing for return migration).

We proceed by first examining extant explanations for migratory flow in the migration literature. Second, we engage with the concept of dual citizenship directly, considering the ways in which policy that allows or forbids may facilitate and influence a potential migrant’s decision, thereby altering migration flow globally. Third, we outline our data and describe the specifications of our gravity model. Using merged migration flow and dual citizenship data, we analyze a total of 51,541 observations clustered by country dyad across 184 sending countries and 24 receiving countries between 1981 and 2006.

In our analysis, we find that dual citizenship policy of both sending and receiving states significantly affects migration flow globally. In line with previous literature, we find further confirmatory evidence that allowance of dual citizenship policy in receiving states operates as a significant draw attracting migrants. Uniquely, we additionally find that the allowance of dual citizenship in a sending state (i.e., allowing the retention of origin-country citizenship for émigrés) is also significant in explaining patterns of migration flow. In fact, by taking this dynamic approach that accounts for both sending and receiving states, we observe that interaction effects revealing migration patterns are affected most by origin-country policy. In other words, although destination dual citizenship policies matter in influencing migration flow, they matter more in the context of origin-state policy, that is, when sending states forbid it. The theoretical and empirical implications of these findings underscore a more dynamic approach in re-examining some of the core assumptions of migrant behavior as well as the role of contextual factors in facilitating movement. There are also clear policy implications, whereby receiving states seeking to regulate (i.e., control) migratory flow might look beyond their borders and toward more cooperative, bilateral measures with origin states abroad.
Explaining Migration Flow: Existing Accounts and Lacunae

Why do people move? This is a broad question, and scholars across academic disciplines and political science subfields have examined a number of determinants of migration, including conflict (Castles, 2003; Sassen, 1990; Schmeidl, 1997), economic incentives (Czaika, 2014; Czaika & de Haas, 2012; Freeman, 1986; Hollifield, 1998), and internal dynamics, like self-perpetuation (Castles, 2004; de Haas, 2010; Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002; Stark, 1991) or cultural/historical reasons (Givens & Luedtke, 2005; Groenendijk, 2006; Jerónimo & Vink, 2011). These explanations of flow draw on international determinants, looking to the horizontal plane of interstate behavior and prioritizing explanations of foreign policy and security interests, and/or domestic politics, looking at the vertical factors that range from the role of ethnic lobbies to organized labor to institutional design that facilitates or mitigates populism (for a hybrid, see D. S. FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014). Explanations also vary in terms of agency, varying in terms of whether the immigrant is considered a rational, informed actor (Borjas, 2001; Thomas, 1973) or whether she is victim to a series of externalities, from relative deprivation and market imperfections (Massey, 1990) to policy decisions and administrative procedures (Massey et al., 1993). Given these different perspectives, migration is rightfully acknowledged as a dynamic process, defined by overlapping factors, including economics, political environment of both sending and receiving states, as well as the role of migrant networks and opportunity costs. Thus, explanations for migration flow are also dynamic and layered, requiring an ecumenical, holistic view of economic, geopolitical, and policy factors.

Despite ambitions for “grand theorizing,” accounts of migration flow are largely limited to the mid-range (e.g., Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, & Pellegrino, 1999) and local level (e.g., Collinson, 2009). Across these levels of analysis, as well as academic disciplines, the imagery of “push” and “pull” factors has emerged as a shared terminology. Pull factors relate to a given demand of the receiving state, while push factors are indicative of a given supply or factors within the sending state (Zimmermann, Constant, & Gataullina, 2009) and often carry a negative connotation as penalizing. Examples include not only low wages and labor surplus in sending countries but also high fertility and poor economic conditions (Borjas, 1989). In contrast, pull factors are characterized as incentivizing. These include high wages and a deficit of viable labor (i.e., labor scare) in receiving states (Borjas, 1989), which leads to an increase in production in labor-intensive industries and thus demand (Peters, 2015) in areas of growing economies and declining fertility rates (Hugo, 1998).
Although building on these insights, we dispense with the push-pull metaphor in favor of more neutral language by recognizing origin and destination factors as contexts, that is, as information facilitating the decision-making process. Some origin factors are clearly penalizing, such as war or famine. However, others are more ambiguous. Neutral terminology allows us to recognize origin and destination factors as meaningful context while remaining agnostic about how they influence decision making. This leaves room for the possibility that origin factors can present soft incentives (e.g., facilitating return migration and easy remittance transfers) and destination states can present penalties (e.g., cultural integration requirements).

In addition, we assume instrumental decision making, where the migrant as a rational actor calculates costs and benefits of movement, formulates preferences, and acts in pursuit of those preferences. And just as factors like geographic distance (Clark, Hatton, & Williamson, 2007; Mayda, 2010; Vanderkamp, 1971) and degrading environmental conditions (Afifi, 2011) can alter the calculus of decision making, preference ranking, and the extent to which migrants can act accordingly, so, too, can existing policy arrangements. In other words, this actor-centered, rational choice institutionalism allows for the political–institutional context to shape the incentive structure actors face and alter the benefits of certain courses of action (Immergut, 1998). Yet institutional and domestic policy contexts of origin states play only a limited role in extant explanations of migration. We suspect this is largely on account of existing studies examining the effects of policy on migration flow by looking at rules of intake, such as low-skilled immigration policy rules (Peters, 2015), quotas (Clark et al., 2007; Hatton, 2004; Mayda, 2010), as well as specific labor programs, which have proven to be monumental in amassing migration to Western Europe (Brubaker, 1992; Castles, 2002), the United States (Jones-Correa, 2001), and Southeast Asia (Ruhs, 2013).

J. Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets (2014) expand the scope of policy by examining citizenship rights in receiving states (as well as the prominence of right-wing parties in the receiving state) and find that they play a significant role in “influencing the attractiveness of a particular destination for migrants.” While policies like increased residency requirements disincentive migration, the presence of dual citizenship policies in the receiving state increases labor migration flow (by 68%). However, it remains unclear what role the ability to retain citizenship of sending countries plays, where citizenship is both a proxy of homeland identity and a means for reducing transaction costs associated with return migration. As J. Fitzgerald et al. (2014) only look at receiving-society dynamics of the host country, they miss the potential role of dual citizenship policy of the sending state. We anticipate that this theoretical oversight plays a potentially important role in modeling immigrant choice as,
by definition, migration is a cross-border phenomenon. Dual citizenship allowance in destination states may draw immigration, but, crucially, dual citizenship allowance in sending states may promote movement as well. Both of these scenarios are possible where a migrant is likely to be just as—if not more—informed about origin rules than their new home country. And if one lesson could be delineated from the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis in Europe, it is that political refugees are rational actors aware that certain destinations are more advantageous than others, with shorter wait times, broader social benefits, a more welcoming civic culture, or opportunities for family unification. Given that political refugees are the most constrained migrant category in terms of flexibility of choice, security, and ability to plan, and yet they still demonstrate enough awareness of policy to value certain destinations over others, we can only assume that other migrant groups with more security, that is, less immediacy (e.g., economic migrants, family migration), derive similar value from policy variation as well.

In the next section, we look directly at the potential benefits and costs of dual citizenship of both sending and receiving societies and lay out hypotheses for how this dimension of legal status acquisition affects migration flow.

**The Argument: Dual Citizenship and Its Predicted Impact on Flow**

Dual citizenship is the simultaneous holding of more than one citizenship, whereby a person can claim exclusive rights, protection, and membership from more than one state at a time. Being endowed with dual citizenship, therefore, allows an individual to access political and economic opportunities in two countries. Dual citizenship laws take many forms. States can expressly allow for dual citizenship, turn a blind eye toward it, or require renunciation of a former citizenship. There are dual citizenship rules for citizens (i.e., a citizen of country X seeks to obtain citizenship of country Y) that can differ from rules for immigrants (i.e., a citizen of country Y seeks to obtain citizenship of country X).

These different forms of dual citizenship laws reflect variation in perspectives and interests in member making. From a receiving society, it is a law that can enable the political incorporation of immigrants. From a sending state, it is a retention-of-nationality law, a law that keeps emigrants tied to the national political community, enabling return migration or preserving connections to the diaspora. It can, of course, be both at the same time. Denmark’s recent policy liberalization is case in point. After years of pressure to remove the renunciation requirement, a broad parliamentary majority finally approved dual citizenship in 2014. The new law not only permits foreigners to become
Danish citizens without relinquishing prior citizenship, but it also allows Danes who have emigrated (and previously lost citizenship) to obtain (reclaim) it. Although this change happens to affect both groups, a closer look at intent reveals state priorities. Despite Denmark’s high immigration demand and presence (where 6.7% of the total population in 2013 holds foreign citizenship, an average on par with other major receivers like Germany), the change in law was not a type of liberalization directed toward immigrant inclusion but lobbied for by Danes abroad and motivated by the desire to retain émigré connections to the national political community.

The allowance of dual citizenship has increased significantly in recent years. Where research in just the early 2000s noted continued policy differences (Faist et al., 2004; Hansen & Weil, 2002; Howard, 2005), later studies see more convergence, notably by looking beyond European cases (Sejersen, 2008). The sheer volume and scope of change suggests that the conveyance of citizenship is still meaningful. Allowing dual citizenship can advance political incorporation (Gustafson, 2002; Hammar, 1985b), improve naturalization rates (Bloemraad, 2004; Jones-Correa, 2001), and foment national attachment and identity among immigrants, including protecting identification and loyalty to an immigrant’s country of origin (DeSipio, 1996). Most critical to movement, however, is the security of status it engenders, enabling someone with the right to come, go, and return. There has been much speculation but little systematic testing of whether there is a connection between internal (i.e., citizenship) and external (i.e., migration) mechanisms of control (see Hollifield, 2004).

Alongside these political “goods,” there are some costs associated to allowance. Dual citizenship may undermine a coherent national identity in a nation of immigrants (Renshon, 2001), potentially harm integration efforts (Kivisto & Faist, 2009; Renshon, 2005), or even undermine the importance of national citizenship where legal status is a reflection of national political culture (Heater, 2004). As such, the specter of “dual citizenship, dual loyalties” is never far from the debate, as dual citizens are not only accused of divided or competing allegiances, but they also face real administrative and experiential divisions on their identity, ranging from voting in two places, potentially dual military service obligations, dual taxation, and conflicting diplomatic protection (Hammar, 1985b). Given these trade-offs, the collective body of research on dual citizenship suggests that status can be constricted or enabled at the will of the state and for a variety of reasons. And where dual citizenship allowance promotes migrant naturalization and mobility, and advances political integration, these decisions within the receiving state may subsequently increase both a state’s population and electorate.
Why would sending states care about maintaining expatriate ties? Jones-Correa (2001, p. 1006) identifies three motivations: promoting economic development, encouraging remittances, and cultivating a sympathetic political lobby. Although these reasons seem more appropriate to developing countries, the importance of maintaining attachment is still valued among fully developed states. As the Danish justice minister stated regarding the above-mentioned law change, “Many people today choose to settle in foreign countries, but still retain a strong attachment to their country of origin. We should not force people to choose.” In fact, Vink, Prokic-Breuer, and Dronkers (2013) found that when you do not force a migrant to choose, they are more likely to naturalize, where “being allowed to retain one’s citizenship of origin positively encourages citizenship take-up” in the destination country, at a rate of 40% over the alternative (p. 12). Bloemraad (2004) also highlights how political and cultural transaction costs decrease when origin states allow for dual citizenship for expatriates.

How, then, are dual citizenship arrangements predicted to affect migration flow? As J. Fitzgerald et al. (2014) already establish, dual citizenship allowance in receiving states makes some destinations more attractive than others by providing access to rights, representation, security, jobs, and community without sacrificing home loyalties. In particular, migrating to a state that allows dual citizenship may be a calculated choice if migrants are considering a second migration. These rational migrants, therefore, would be expected to migrate to a receiving state permitting dual citizenship more often than to a receiving state forbidding dual citizenship.

Turning to the neglected dimension of the origin state, dual citizenship allowance may also be a factor encouraging migration (Hollifield, 2004). Forbidding an emigrant to keep origin citizenship if they naturalize elsewhere can lead to a migrant’s loss of valuable rights in the state, including diplomatic protection, inheritance, and property, and thus decrease the proclivity to obtain dual citizenship even if the receiving state allows for it (Hammar, 1985a). The notion of being “un-tethered” from identity may also be a real concern, as most migrants’ preference would be to keep their origin country’s nationality. This is often cited as a rationale for Turks in Germany who qualify for but do not obtain citizenship (Street, 2014, p. 271).

In contrast, migrants with the ability to obtain one’s host citizenship, and are otherwise unimpeded by sending country restrictions, experience higher average employment and economic growths and reductions in welfare use (Mazzolari, 2009). These migrants are also more likely to naturalize, embracing dual citizenship (Bloemraad, 2004), and economically assimilate, further leading to a growth in the receiving states’ polity (Jones-Correa, 2000). Leblang (2015), looking not at flow data but intent, shows that “migrants
from countries offering dual citizenship are 40% more likely than those from countries that do not provide dual citizenship to express an intention to return home” (p. 13). He also shows how the absence of dual citizenship barriers reduces transaction costs enabling greater remittances transfer. Dual citizenship-allowing origin states are thus expected to exhibit greater emigration compared with forbidding origin counterparts.

These findings speak to the de jure impact of dual citizenship policy allowance. However, migrants may also find legal loopholes, ambiguous language, or meaningful practices that create de facto opportunities. Policy still matters in signaling state preferences and perceived barriers, but behavior may diverge from legal stricture. One, migrants may choose to simply ignore the sending state’s regulations on dual citizenship, where some states make it difficult to renounce former citizenship or maintain automatic loss provisions. For example, India historically forbids emigrants from holding dual citizenship, yet Bloemraad (2004) observes approximately 4% of all naturalized Indians in Canada claiming possession of dual citizenship. The United States allows for dual citizenship in practice but “does not encourage it as a matter of policy because of the problems it may cause.”11 Two, migrants may re-claim origin citizenship despite prohibitions of the destination. Germany forbids dual citizenship, yet a legal loophole in the 1990s allowed for thousands of permanent residents of immigrant origin to simply re-claim their origin citizenship after German naturalization. Three, political refugees may not care about sending state policy if they have no intention of ever returning, as exhibited by Iranian emigrants in the 1970s. These situations suggest that a minority of migrants attempt to obtain dual citizenship even when sending states prohibit it or retrieve it when there is an automatic loss provision in place. These differential reactions to dual citizenship also justify the inquiry into both sending and receiving states’ policy effects on migration patterns.

Bridging these literatures together, we summarize by proposing two sets of hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** Dual citizenship allowance in sending countries will increase migration flow.

**Hypothesis 2:** Sending and receiving states’ dual citizenship policies will interact.

**Hypothesis 2a:** Where both sending and receiving countries allow for dual citizenship, migration flow will increase reflecting the highest flow across all combinations of dual citizenship policy.

**Hypothesis 2b:** When only the receiving country allows for dual citizenship, migration flows will be moderate, reflecting unidirectional flow to the receiving country.
Data and Measurement

The dependent variable, migration flow, is derived from J. Fitzgerald et al. (2014) and measured through merging information from three primary data sources to gain the most accurate and expansive figures on global migration: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations, and the International Migration Database (IMD). Each source spans a different period of time warranting their combination to obtain the widest possible range for analysis. The OECD data are available for the 14 OECD countries from 1980 to 1994, the U.N. data from 1985 to 2004, and IMD, collected by the OECD, extends migration data from 1998 to 2011. The combination of these three data sources allows us to examine a breadth of receiving and sending states over a larger period of time.

Specifically, our dependent variable examines migrant stock. This method is consistent with existing approaches that have reconciled comparability and reliability issues for data, as well as validity of stock as a measure for migration flow (J. Fitzgerald et al., 2014). This measure thus includes migrants of a variety of categories, from temporary migrants (seasonal workers, students) to permanent migrants (humanitarian-based, labor, family formation, and reunification). This grouping reflects a difference of status as one of temporality not conceptuality, as temporary migration can easily—and often does—lapse into permanent migration (Castles, 2002; Cornelius & Rosenblum, 2005; Freeman, 2004; Hollifield, 2004). Moreover, J. Fitzgerald et al. (2014, fn. 43) suggest that citizenship opportunities “should matter for a would-be migrant regardless of his or her long-term plans.” Finally, parsing between these categories is more challenging where there is presently no standard legal or formal definition of “temporary” migration (European Migration Network, 2011). As such, distinctions do not easily transfer across cases. Therefore, this wide-lens view of migration allows for the widest understanding of the determinants of migration patterns across states and time (Clark et al., 2007; Howard, 2005), looking specifically at determinants of the initial choice to move.

To examine the effects of the independent variables of interest, dual citizenship policy of both sending and receiving states, we rely on the Global Dual Citizenship Database, compiled by the Maastricht Center for Citizenship, Migration and Development (MACIMIDE; Vink, de Groot, & Luk, 2013). This database codes for dual citizenship allowance or loss provisions between 1960 and 2015 across 200 countries. It is the only citizenship data set that measures whether states allow for their own citizens to retain citizenship or not, as opposed to others (e.g., European Union Democracy Observatory [EUDO] on Citizenship, 2011; J. Fitzgerald et al., 2014; Howard, 2009;
Alarian and Goodman (2010) that measure the extent to which immigrants who wish to become citizens are required to renounce previous or other citizenships. Data are derived from a variety of source materials, including EUDO Citizenship Country profiles, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Laws Concerning Nationality, and the Pacific Islands Legal Information Institute. As such, it is also the only dual citizenship index that extends beyond Europe and recent policy to include more countries and a larger time frame. The coding scheme is devised by three categories: (a) countries that generally do not tolerate dual citizenship, where citizens who voluntarily acquire the citizenship of another country automatically lose the citizenship of the origin country; (b) countries that generally tolerate dual citizenship, in which citizens who voluntarily acquire the citizenship of another country do not automatically lose the citizenship of the origin country and are allowed to renounce their citizenship of origin; and (c) countries that generally tolerate dual citizenship but where citizens cannot renounce their citizenship of origin voluntarily (e.g., Uruguay is a notorious case of this practice).

Combining the MACIMIDE and the migration flow databases, we are able to examine migration trends between 184 sending countries and 24 receiving countries. As seen in Figure 1, there is a clear trend of dual citizenship laws for these countries from 1980 to 2013. In 1980, we witness an average of 39% of the countries forbidding any form of dual citizenship. The trend toward more inclusive dual citizenship policies grows steadily throughout the 20th century, stabilizing around 2006 with more than two thirds of the countries liberalizing to permit some form of dual citizenship (e.g., 126 countries allowing dual citizenship and 57 forbidding dual citizenship). As of 2013, only 30% of countries still forbid any form of dual citizenship within their borders. Furthermore, the number of states with a dual citizenship policy without the possibility for renunciation of one’s origin citizenship is extremely low, reaching only 15 of the 184 states. This warrants an amended coding for our analysis of citizenship policy as 0 for countries that do not tolerate any form of dual citizenship, where citizens who voluntarily acquire the citizenship of another country automatically lose the citizenship of the origin country, and 1 for countries that generally tolerate dual citizenship, in which citizens who voluntarily acquire the citizenship of another country do not automatically lose the citizenship of the origin country and may or may not be able to renounce their citizenship of origin.

Given this clear pattern of dual citizenship allowance, how does this trend affect global migration, namely, the recent uptick in flow? Do migrants value dual citizenship in making the decision to migrate? Alongside interrogating the effects of dual citizenship policy, we address these questions by including...
various control measures as informed by the literature including migrant stock, population size, distance, and cultural similarities to construct a gravity model estimated by ordinary least squares regression (Castles, 2002; Clark et al., 2007; J. Fitzgerald et al., 2014; Mayda, 2006). Measures of migrant stock, population size, and distance between states are derived from data compiled by J. Fitzgerald et al. (2014). As following with previous literature, bilateral migrant stock is included in the model as a proxy for past migratory flows, familiar connections, existing migrant networks, and guest worker arrangements between sending and receiving states. Therefore, the expectation is that bilateral migrant stock and bilateral migrant flow will be positively related representing a pull factor to states with increased existing migrant stock.

Bilateral distance is measured through distance in miles between the capitals of the sending and receiving states and is predicted to be negatively related to migration flow. Common language and colonial origin are dummy coded as 0 not shared and 1 shared and are expected to present a positive relationship with bilateral migration flow. Economic controls of migration flow include the wage differential between the receiving and sending countries (e.g., wage in receiving – wage of sending) and the unemployment level of the receiving state. Following with previous research, unemployment and population size of the receiving state are lagged by 1 year (Clark et al., 2007; Mayda, 2010).
Finally, we include a fixed effect for the sending state to capture any time-invariant effects of the sending country that could affect migration flow not accounted for in this model. Given that regime type (e.g., democracies) did not differ across time or state for the 14 receiving states included in this analysis, fixed effects for the receiving state were irrelevant.19

**Results**

Once merging the various sources of data, our analysis includes 51,541 observations clustered in dyads between 1981 and 2006. The results found in Table 1 represent the coefficients and robust standard errors estimated through ordinary least squares regression. Looking first at our control model, Model 1, we see, as expected, that bilateral migrant stock (β = .565), common official language (β = .570), common colonial origin (β = .149), and income differential (β = .012) are significant and positively predictive of migration flow. These findings indicate that migration flow between sending and receiving states increases when larger existing migrant populations and increased possibilities to increase one’s income are present. Migration flow is moreover significantly higher between those states sharing an official language, as expected. Regarding distance between states, migration flow decreases as the distance between the sending and receiving states grows (β = −.180). Furthermore, destinations with higher unemployment levels expectedly yield lower migration flow than those with lower unemployment rates (β = −.101). Finally, population size of the receiving state is positively related to migration flow (β = .155) indicating migration occurs more often to larger states than smaller ones. Taken together, our control model suggests a migrant behaves rationally, weighing the costs and benefits of various factors including economic mobility, language barriers, and familiar or cultural networks.

As seen in Model 2, our sending only model, dual citizenship policy allowance of a sending country acts as an additional factor considered by migrants. Holding our control variables constant, the relationship between migration flow and sending states allowing dual citizenship is both positive and statistically significant supporting our first hypothesis (β = .554). This is to say that migration flow increases when the sending state allows for some form of dual citizenship. Conversely, migration is less likely to originate from states forbidding dual citizenship. Therefore, in general, global migrants are more likely to originate from states with dual citizenship allowances than those without such provisions.

Comparing our control model (Model 1) with our sending only model (Model 2), dual citizenship allowance significantly explains more variance than the control measures alone.20 Beginning first with the sending only
model (Model 2), both $R^2$ and BIC measures of model comparison demonstrate that including dual citizenship policy of the sending state more acutely explains global migration flow than the control model alone.\textsuperscript{21} These indicators reveal that Model 2 explains significantly more variance than our control model and provides very strong evidence of increased model fit in terms of BIC.\textsuperscript{22}

Comparing across the two models tested thus far, Hypothesis 1, dual citizenship allowance in sending countries will increase migration flow, is well supported. Model 2 demonstrates that policies amenable to dual citizenship encourage emigration. These results thus far, however, have not examined how both sending and receiving policies interact with one another, if at all (Hypothesis 2). As stated above, we expect to find highest predicted migration flow between states allowing for dual citizenship (Hypothesis 2a). We also expect to find varying flow between countries that differ in their dual

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Effects of Dual Citizenship Allowance on Migration Flow.}
\begin{tabular}{llll}
\hline
Migration flow (log) & Model 1 & Model 2 & Model 3 \\
\hline
Independent variables & & & \\
Sending dual citizenship & \multicolumn{3}{c}{.554*** (.045)} \\
Receiving dual citizenship & \multicolumn{3}{c}{.401*** (.032)} \\
Sending $\times$ Receiving dual citizenship & \multicolumn{3}{c}{-.142*** (.037)} \\
Control variables & & & \\
Bilateral migrant stock (log) & .565*** (.006) & .564*** (.006) & .551*** (.006) \\
Bilateral distance (log) & -.180*** (.016) & -.180*** (.016) & -.227*** (.016) \\
Common colonial origin & .149* (.062) & .154* (.062) & .216*** (.062) \\
Common official language & .570*** (.033) & .570*** (.033) & .457*** (.034) \\
Receiving population size & .155*** (.010) & .157*** (.010) & .138*** (.010) \\
Income differential (lagged) & .012*** (.001) & .010*** (.001) & .008*** (.001) \\
Receiving unemployment & -.101*** (.002) & -.101*** (.002) & -.098*** (.002) \\
Constant & -.566*** (.157) & -.874*** (.159) & -.179 (.165) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Values in table represent beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

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citizenship policy (Hypothesis 2b). To examine whether these factors interact with and depend upon one another as expected, we run a third and final regression model.

**Interactions Between Sending and Receiving Dual Citizenship Policies**

As found in Model 3, we find a significant interaction between dual citizenship policies of the sending and the receiving states. This finding suggests that the degree to which state policies are able to affect migration actually depend upon each other. Further supporting the inclusion of the interaction effect are the model comparison statistics establishing Model 3 as a better fit to the migration data through positive BIC differences and explaining significantly more variance than Model 2, which omits this interaction. By incorporating these policy measures together, a more complex understanding of migration patterns is revealed, highlighting the value migrants place on citizenship policy in their decision to migrate. As such, the degree to which dual citizenship policies are able to push citizens from or pull them to a state is bound to both sending and receiving contexts of the individual migrant.

Thus, migration flow is not solely affected by one’s origin or receiving state’s dual citizenship policy but also by the relationship between these two state policies. Individual migration is therefore constrained by the dual citizenship policy of one’s origin and desired location. To determine the direction and effect of the relationship between the sending and receiving states’ dual citizenship policies on migration flow, we probed the interaction term by examining the dummy coefficients of the two variables of interest.

Once centering the variables, the analysis uncovered varied migration flow across dual-citizenship-allowing and -forbidding states. As seen in Figure 2, bilateral migration flow is highest between receiving and sending states allowing some form of dual citizenship, supporting Hypothesis 2a. As expected, migrants who emigrate from a state allowing dual citizenship are most likely to relocate to a state also allowing dual citizenship. Thus, receiving states tolerating dual citizenship policy experience the highest migration flow from states with similar dual citizenship policies. Conversely, average migration flow between two states forbidding dual citizenship is the lowest among the four conditions. Therefore, regarding policy, a receiving state can on average increase its migration flow by nearly 44% from sending dual citizenship-allowing states by allowing migrants to apply for dual citizenship. Sending states, however, can encourage the migration on average of nearly 91% more migrants to receiving states with dual citizenship by allowing dual
citizenship. This finding behooves policy makers to consider the importance dual citizenship plays in both attracting immigration and encouraging emigration.

We further find evidence supporting Hypothesis 2b as migration from dual citizenship-allowing states to receiving-forbidding states is higher than the emigration from sending-forbidding to a receiving-allowing. One possible explanation for this finding may be due to additional policy restraints on migration for those residing in states forbidding dual citizenship, from administrative/procedural conditions to other barriers, including obtaining permanent residence or benefit eligibility criteria. Dronkers and Vink (2012, p. 404), for example, also find that migrants from a dual citizenship-allowing country are also less likely to obtain country of destination citizenship and posit that this pattern is because it requires greater effort to renounce citizenship of origin. These patterns may also reflect migrant intention. For example, émigrés from sending-allowing states to forbidding host societies may not intend on migrating permanently, and, thus, dual citizenship allowance or not in the host society is irrelevant if they intend on returning to their country of origin in time. However, as can be seen in Figure 2, the difference in

Figure 2. Dual citizenship policy interaction with confidence intervals between sending and receiving states.
CI = confidence interval; DC = dual citizenship.
migration is more disparate for sending-forbidding states than sending-allowing states. This further suggests dual citizenship policy is both a significant and relevant predictor of the variation in global migration flow but perhaps is more important to those emigrating from states forbidding dual citizenship.

In conclusion, by considering the policy environment of both receiving and sending societies, we observe not only the significant role it plays in influencing the migration process but also—and perhaps most reflective of the dynamic nature of migration itself—the interaction between sending and receiving-society factors. As such, we not only find that dual citizenship policy allowance in the receiving state affects migration flow, as previous literature suggests, but also that our analysis amends the understanding of the role receiving state policy plays in demonstrating receiving state policy matters most when sending state policy forbids dual citizenship. Therefore, the present analysis represents an important contribution to our understanding of flow by demonstrating the importance of examining not only the sending and receiving states’ dual citizenship policies but also the interaction between the policies of these two states.

**Robustness Checks**

Throughout these analyses and subsequent findings is the assumption that migrants consider the dual citizenship policy of the sending and receiving states at the point of migration and not the states’ previous policies. This assumes that migrants weigh current dual citizenship policy rather than previous state stances on dual citizenship as these policies may not be indicative of the current opportunity to obtain citizenship. For example, migrants are theorized as valuing one’s present ability to obtain dual citizenship when migrating and not what policies dictated previously. However, past policies may more accurately depict migration flows due to possible time constraints on policy application, naturalization, information dissemination of a state’s given policy, or control for path dependence. As such, we conducted a second analysis to assess the role previous dual citizenship policies play in predicting migration flow. This analysis consists of three non-nested models at the current time point ($t_0$), at 3 years in the past ($t_{-3}$), and at 5 years ($t_{-5}$) to gain a richer understanding of the observed relationship between dual citizenship and migration flow (see Table 2).

Across the lagged models, we find that sending and receiving states’ dual citizenship policies significantly predict migration flow in the expected directions. These findings represent a robust relationship between dual citizenship policy and migration, as these relationships exist even when considering the policy 3 and 5 years in the past. Although these models are not directly
Table 2. Effects of Lagged Dual Citizenship Allowance on Migration Flow.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration flow (log)</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending dual citizenship</td>
<td>.550*** (.046)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving dual citizenship</td>
<td>.401*** (.032)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending × Receiving dual citizenship</td>
<td>−.142*** (.037)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending dual citizenship (lagged 3 years)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.405*** (.053)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving dual citizenship (lagged 3 years)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.368*** (.033)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending × Receiving dual citizenship (lagged 3 years)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>−.113** (.041)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending dual citizenship (lagged 5 years)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.297*** (.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving dual citizenship (lagged 5 years)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.154*** (.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending × Receiving dual citizenship (lagged 5 years)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>−.081 (.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral migrant stock (log)</td>
<td>.551*** (.006)</td>
<td>.612*** (.007)</td>
<td>.593*** (.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral distance (log)</td>
<td>−.227*** (.016)</td>
<td>−.215*** (.016)</td>
<td>−.211*** (.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common colonial origin</td>
<td>.216*** (.062)</td>
<td>.310*** (.064)</td>
<td>.328*** (.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common official language</td>
<td>.457*** (.034)</td>
<td>.394*** (.036)</td>
<td>.514*** (.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving population size</td>
<td>.138*** (.010)</td>
<td>.069*** (.011)</td>
<td>.119*** (.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income differential (lagged)</td>
<td>.008*** (.001)</td>
<td>.006*** (.001)</td>
<td>.005*** (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving unemployment</td>
<td>−.098*** (.002)</td>
<td>−.104*** (.002)</td>
<td>−.122*** (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−.179 (.165)</td>
<td>.693*** (.173)</td>
<td>.238 (.169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>51,541</td>
<td>42,665</td>
<td>40,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.569</td>
<td>.593</td>
<td>.608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>218,733.1</td>
<td>179,103.0</td>
<td>168,963.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values in table represent beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
comparable, we interpret the significant coefficients as supporting our initial findings and demonstrating that the previous results are not a function of the time frame considered. However, the interaction between sending and receiving states fails to reach significance when lagged 5 years ($p = .055$). This may depict the potentially waning relationship between dual citizenship policy of the sending and receiving states when considered 5 years in the past. Migrants, in this interpretation, may consider sending and receiving states’ policies in conjunction at the present time and from 3 years prior, but not 5 years ago. This suggests the relative instantaneous nature of this relationship in predicting migration flow, while the main effects of dual citizenship policy remain both at present and in the past.

Another area of concern for the interpretation of our results is the potential for reverse causality. Previous analyses, including the above robustness check, do not rule out the possibility that states, and not migrants, are the driving force in the relationship between dual citizenship policy and flow. In this view, states may be enabling or constricting migration flow by wielding control over migrant opportunities for dual citizenship. This explanation suggests states as strategic actors managing global migration flow through domestic policy rather than a rational migrant-driven model in which dual citizenship preferences shape migration trends. To probe our data for the potential of reverse causality, we utilize a nested models approach including a lead variable. Considering that current migration flows should not be logically related to future dual citizenship policy if migrants are instrumental in this relationship, the lead variable should theoretically yield non-significant results. Our nested models include dual citizenship policy at the current time, lagged 5 years to include the path-dependent role of dual citizenship policy and lead 5 years to assess reverse causality (see Table 3). Furthermore, these variables are included to evaluate the current, path-dependent, and potential reverse causal roles these variables play in predicting global migration flow.

Model 1 yields broadly similar results with our original analysis, with the exception of the interaction between sending and receiving dual citizenship policy. Although this is worth mentioning, it is also important to note the substantial decrease in our sample size by nearly half (i.e., 51,541 to 27,486), which suggests that a necessarily large sample is required to generate the interaction effect. Comparison statistics for Models 1 and 2, our original and path-dependent model, demonstrate an insignificant addition to model fit when adding in the lagged dual citizenship policy effects with only lagged receiving state policy significantly predicting migration flow. This insinuates that migrants value the current policy of their origin state over past dual citizenship policy. In addition, these results depict migrants as prizing both previous state policy as well as current dual citizenship allowances of the
### Table 3. Reverse Causality Check of Dual Citizenship Allowance on Migration Flow.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration flow (log)</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending dual citizenship</td>
<td>0.376*** (0.074)</td>
<td>0.352*** (0.085)</td>
<td>0.326*** (0.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving dual citizenship</td>
<td>0.569*** (0.041)</td>
<td>0.270*** (0.076)</td>
<td>1.00*** (0.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending × Receiving dual citizenship</td>
<td>−0.067 (0.047)</td>
<td>0.394 (0.081)</td>
<td>−0.031 (0.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending dual citizenship (lagged 5 years)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.057 (0.085)</td>
<td>0.092 (0.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving dual citizenship (lagged 5 years)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.378*** (0.071)</td>
<td>0.403*** (0.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending × Receiving dual citizenship (lagged 5 years)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.032 (0.082)</td>
<td>0.023 (0.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending dual citizenship (lead 5 years)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.132 (0.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving dual citizenship (lead 5 years)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>−0.900*** (0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending × Receiving dual citizenship (lead 5 years)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.089 (0.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral migrant stock (log)</td>
<td>0.568*** (0.009)</td>
<td>0.565*** (0.009)</td>
<td>0.574*** (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral distance (log)</td>
<td>−0.191*** (0.020)</td>
<td>−0.208*** (0.020)</td>
<td>−0.194*** (0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common colonial origin</td>
<td>0.063 (0.082)</td>
<td>0.083 (0.082)</td>
<td>0.041 (0.081)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common official language</td>
<td>0.548*** (0.042)</td>
<td>0.507*** (0.043)</td>
<td>0.493*** (0.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving population size</td>
<td>0.095*** (0.013)</td>
<td>0.112*** (0.013)</td>
<td>0.131*** (0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income differential (lagged)</td>
<td>0.025 (0.033)</td>
<td>0.031 (0.033)</td>
<td>0.022 (0.034)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
receiving state. In this case, history matters in addition to the present policy allowances.

Finally, we conducted our reverse causality model incorporating past, present, and future dual citizenship policies to predict migration flow. The lead sending state policy variable fails to significantly predict migration flow, thus aiding in our interpretation of migrants as rational actors evaluating citizenship policy of their country of origin. Dual citizenship policy of the receiving state, conversely, is significant across all three variables. This suggests that states may in fact be taking cues from their population trends and adopting policies to support their migration desires. In comparing the standardized betas of these variables, however, present dual citizenship policy ($\beta = .139$) yields more explanatory power over migration flows than future policy ($\beta = -.134$), indicating that current citizenship policy is 1.04 times more effective at predicting migration flow than the reverse causal effect and suggesting a simultaneity effect in which migrants and states are concurrently directing migration flow. In sum, these robustness findings imply receiving states may evaluate previous migration trends in enacting policy while sending states appear ignorant to these emigration patterns. Rather, migrants appear to be directing the relationship between their origin state’s dual citizenship policy and migration flow. In other words, there is a reverse causal effect for the receiving state only, meaning that the effect is both policy and migrant-driven. This finding is tangential and does not undermine our central claims, that (a) sending state policy matters and (b) flow is migrant—not policy—driven.

In addition to the robustness checks, we conducted two supplemental analyses to probe the interaction effect even further. Due to the legal requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration flow (log)</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Receiving unemployment</td>
<td>-.102*** (.003)</td>
<td>-.103*** (.003)</td>
<td>-.099*** (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.296 (.223)</td>
<td>.178 *** (.226)</td>
<td>-.315 (.230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>27,486</td>
<td>27,486</td>
<td>27,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>.604</td>
<td>.604</td>
<td>.609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$ change</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.005***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>114,826.0</td>
<td>114,811.6</td>
<td>114,349.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC change</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>462.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values in table represent beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. 

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of both sending and receiving states to allow for dual citizenship, the question arises as to why migrants from states forbidding dual citizenship significantly differ in migration destination. One possible explanation is dual citizenship may enable second migration. Migrants from dual citizenship-forbidding states, hence, would be more apt to select a dual citizenship-allowing destination should a second migration be desired. In this sense, migrants may also be actively considering future abilities to retain one’s acquired citizenship status. Here, migrants could be viewed as “collectors of rights” valuing the possibility for citizenship of the current destination and a potential additional state. Although the confines of our available data do not allow for direct testing of this hypothesis, we turn to secondary data sources to probe both the demographics of second and return migration.

To explore second migration of migrants arriving from a dual-citizenship-forbidding state and currently residing in a dual-citizenship-allowing state (i.e., second migration from forbidding states residing in allowing states, hereafter SFRA), we use merged data from the MACIMIDE database and the 2007 and 2008 Eurobarometers. We measure intent for second migration through the Eurobarometer survey item “Do you think that in the next five years you are likely to move.” To identify migrants in the survey database, we included only those who reported possessing a nationality different than the country in which they were surveyed.25 Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer does not provide the exact time or location of previous migration; thus, to estimate these variables, we calculate the probability of dual citizenship allowance of the sending state (i.e., reported nationality) and receiving state (i.e., the country of survey administration) at the median age.26 As our hypothesis is only relevant for those whose first migration occurred to a state allowing dual citizenship, we further constrict our sample to initial destination with at least a probability of 50% for allowing dual citizenship at the time of migration.27

Our sample thus includes 365 “receiving–allowing” migrants residing in 10 European states arriving from a total of 27 European countries (see Appendix B).28 Using a bivariate correlation, we find a negative relationship between intention to move and sending state policy, representing increased intentions to move by those migrants originating from states prohibiting dual citizenship.29 While this statistic is nearing significance, it suggests that SFRA migrants may possess a higher proclivity toward second migration than non-SFRA migrants (see Figure 3). Clearly, the small sample and European focus pose significant limitations to the reliability and generalizability of the analysis. Consequently, this supplemental analysis is used as the first foray into the realm of SFRA migrant intentions rather than a predictive or explanatory model. This analysis can only, however, tap into potential intentions to migrate
and not actual migration behavior. To do such, we turn to the Database on Return Migrants to the Maghreb (DReMM; Migration de Retour au Maghreb [MIREM]—Return Migration and Development Platform, 2015).

The DReMM contains comparable data on return migration for those in Armenia, Mali, and Tunisia (see Appendix C), conducted in 2012 for those migrants who returned for more than 3 months (MIREM-RDP [Return Migration and Development Platform]). If our explanation of SFRA migrants is accurate, we logically would expect lower return migration for these migrants. To test this hypothesis, we compare the dual citizenship policy of the initial sending and receiving state at the point of initial migration and at return. To calculate the year of first migration, we rely on the subject’s response to the question: “When was the first time you left your country of origin to live abroad?” specifying the year and location of their first migration. Once merging this database with MACIMIDE, we find that, as expected, the lowest proportion of the 1,039 included interview participants are SFRA migrants (1% of the total population and 7% of those from dual citizenship-forbidding states) and highest proportion are from mutual sending- and receiving-allowing states (56% of the total population and 67% of those from dual-citizenship-allowing states). Furthermore, chi-square statistics depict a significant relationship between sending and receiving states’ dual citizenship policies among return migrants. Moreover, all but one (88%) of the SFRA migrants returned after the sending state adopted a policy allowing for dual citizenship.

Figure 3. Distribution of sending and receiving dual citizenship policies among return migrants.
These findings of lower than expected SFRA migrants participating in return migration in addition to the possibility of second migration further strengthens the importance of both sending and receiving dual citizenship policy and opens new doors for inquiry into migrant motivations, intentions, and behaviors as a function of one’s past and present dual citizenship policy.

**Conclusion and Implications**

Advanced industrial democracies are frequently depicted by populist politicians as “plagued” by immigrants, overrun by “swarms” of migrants seeking benefits and citizenship. Their solution focuses on external mechanisms of control, like border securitization or visa issuance, as well as nuanced policy adjustments including citizenship policy and welfare access. However, as evidenced by our analysis, sending states play a key role in this story as origin dual citizenship allowance makes migration more likely, regardless of destination practice, than origin dual citizenship forbiddance. In fact, we show that sending and receiving policy matter most when positively matched, that is, an immigrant moving from a dual-citizenship-allowing state to a similarly dispositioned state. For sending states, dual citizenship allowance lowers transaction costs, chiefly to enable return migration by maintaining a security of status. For receiving states, we find dual citizenship allowance facilitates the attraction of potential migrants above and beyond potential economic, logistic, and cultural factors. In our interpretation of these results, an individual acts rationally when migrating, weighing these potential costs and benefits to one’s citizenship in addition to one’s economic well-being. This finding is consistent with previous research but, in adding the significance for sending states, we uniquely move beyond a fixed-effect approach to take into account the policy context of emigration. Furthermore, we find this effect is largely migrant-driven with only the receiving state appearing to take cues from global migration trends to capitalize on their unique power to attract (or dissuade) migration through shifting domestic dual citizenship policy. As such, dual citizenship policy is not merely an incentive in the host state but, as identified here, also a significant migrant-driven factor influencing decision making in the origin state.

These findings—that sending state policy matters and that receiving state policy matters more when examined as part of a dynamic interaction with sending state policy—hold a number of implications. First, we see this study as the first, systematic empirical test of the idea that there is an interaction between external and internal modes of control. The literature has heretofore looked at sending state citizenship policy to examine why immigrants do or do not naturalize in the host state or why immigrants politically participate or
not (looking at, for example, prior experience with democracy), while evidence presented here examines and confirms how origin citizenship significantly affects migration. The strength of our findings suggest that the sending state matters, but it also raises the possibility that dual citizenship allowance is a proxy for other sending state policies. We see this contribution as only the beginning of a discussion that looks more critically at institutional settings of the sending state.

A second implication of this research is to place the rational immigrant more squarely in the center of analysis by recognizing informed agency. Migration as a rational calculus includes the weighing of both one’s current citizenship position and one’s potential citizenship allowance. Those who migrate from these origin states allowing dual citizenship are more empowered to migrate to receiving states with or without dual citizenship allowance. And where origin-allowing migrants choose dual citizenship-allowing destinations (an interaction), they can take full advantage. This strong finding supports the view that migrants are instrumental and informed. Migrants from dual-citizenship-forbidding states, however, migrate more often to states allowing for an increase in their dual citizenship rights. This implies migrants from sending states forbidding dual citizenship may weigh citizenship rights more heavily than those from states already permitting dual citizenship. As such, migrants are not only rational actors seeking citizenship rights but ones who consider both current and future citizenship rights in making the decision to migrate. That said, the question of “How migrants acquire information for rights maximization and mobility?” should be probed further. Migrants relying on informal or family networks versus government agency information could shed light not only on migrant intent and behavior but also on state involvement and interest. It may also be possible that citizenship policy is a proxy variable, in which a migrant knows their current and potential rights but may not necessarily connect it to the formal institution of citizenship or nationality law. Such questions could be addressed through a variety of methodologies, including immigrant surveys, interviews, network mapping, or ethnographies.

Third, there are clear policy implications for states that wish to directly affect migration intake. As shown in the robustness checks, the phenomenon of migrant flow is clearly migrant-driven, specifically in the context of the sending state. In other words, sending state policy facilitates the decision, but policy change has the ability to be reactive. As such, dual citizenship policy can be useful tool in the state’s arsenal to regulate migration—one that only the receiving state appears to currently exploit. Interestingly, we show that “dual citizenship policy” as a migration tool does not affect global migrants uniformly. The interaction effects reveal citizens from dual-citizenship-allowing states migrate
more often to other dual-citizenship-allowing states than those from dual-citizenship-forbidding states. This supports recent research suggesting that states award rights disproportionally as function of the “type” of migrant they wish to receive (Ruhs, 2013). Thus, while receiving states may be able to increase immigration by allowing dual citizenship, they may be also able to indirectly affect where their migrants originate from. It also suggests that savvy destination states seeking to regulate migration think seriously about bilateral strategies with migrant origin states, as sending states (e.g., Mexico) have already begun to act strategically to marry on-the-ground realities of movement with state goals of increasing remittance and easing return flow.

Finally, by highlighting the conditions under which dual citizenship policy is significant in origin and host states, this article suggests a critical reconsideration of the determinants of global migration flow and a state’s ability to “control immigration.” More specifically, it elevates comparative studies into analyses of global phenomenon. This serves to bridge surprisingly disparate literatures, namely that of citizenship studies (typically couched in comparative politics as it focuses on domestic policy and its determinants) and migration studies (which, when not examining immigrant behavior, traditionally draws from international relations or economics in its focus on cross-border movement and global trends). In showing how the domestic can affect the global, it simultaneously suggests that states can make a dent in managing the global through strategic domestic policy settings. Thus, the oft-described “burden” of the “reluctant” immigrant-receiving state is not merely a victim of circumstance but a strategic player in an interactive, global process where policies of sending states matter too. In sum, through dual citizenship policy, we witness a maximal interconnectedness of global migration: Both origin and host states matter, and matter most together.

Appendix A

Migration Flow Sample

Receiving countries:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, The United Kingdom, and The United States.

Sending countries:
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of Congo, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, The Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar (Burma), Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, The Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, The Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, United Republic of Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom, The United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Appendix B

Second Migration Sample

Receiving countries:
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and The United Kingdom

Sending countries:
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, The Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and The United Kingdom.
Appendix C

Return Migration Sample

Receiving countries:
Algeria, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Cote d’Ivoire, China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Guinea, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, The Netherlands, Niger, Oman, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Spain, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Togo, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom, and The United States.

Sending countries:
Armenia, Mali, and Tunisia.

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Notes
2. As a result, business owners push for more inclusive immigration policy. As such, Peters (2015) looks at de jure immigration policy not policy practice, that is, flow data.
3. See Leblang (2015), who describes origin states recognizing expatriate populations as “a source of entrepreneurial and financial capital,” whereupon the “reintegration of these returnees into the home country’s labor market generates positive externalities for the local economy” (p. 2).
5. Contrary to these views, Andres (2000) finds only a symbolic role of immigration policy.
6. Some states allow for more than two citizenships, in which case plural citizenship is practiced.
7. There are all sorts of exceptions. Spain requires formal renunciation but does not require proof of loss. Finally, states like Germany and the Netherlands, who formally require renunciation, maintain practices and exemptions by which an exceptionally large proportion of naturalizing immigrants actually obtain dual citizenship (Goodman, 2010).
9. Dahlin and Hironaka (2008) examine the inverse of the analysis here, showing immigration is not a significant predictor of state recognition of dual citizenship.
12. Individually, these data sources are commonly found and successfully utilized in the literature. For Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) data, see Mayda (2010) and Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008). For United Nations data, see Ozden, Parsons, Schiff, and Walmsley (2011). For a combination with the International Migration Database (IMD), see Ortega and Peri (2013) and J. Fitzgerald et al. (2014). In addition, this method of combining data from these sources also follows the framework of Ortega and Peri (2009).
13. Asylum or refugee migrants may be a more meaningful separation of migrants, yet research suggests asylum seekers are affected by the same factors as temporary and permanent migrants (Neumayer, 2005; Zimmermann, 1996). Furthermore, the percentage of asylum seekers who return home is relatively low (Hammar, 1985a) warranting the pooling across migratory motivation.
14. In the case of Switzerland, we supplemented the Maastricht Center for Citizenship, Migration and Development (MACIMIDE) database with the revised European Union Democracy Observatory’s (EUDO) Citizenship Observatory Country Report for the years 1980 to 1991 (Achermann, Achermann, D’Amato, Kamm, & Von Rutte, 2013).
15. See Appendix A for the list of sending and receiving countries included in this analysis.
16. Some exceptions to this include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Fiji, Lithuania, and Slovakia, which revoked previous dual citizenship provisions in 2000, 1991 (reversed again in 2010), 1992, and 2011, respectively. The Netherlands is another exception, where dual citizenship became fully tolerated only between 1992 and 1997.
17. This tapering off and stabilization of dual citizenship policy in 2006 further justifies our inclusion of data until 2006. Between 2006 and 2013, only six states

18. These 15 states include Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Eritrea, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Qatar, Tunisia, and Uruguay. It is also important to note that states that changed laws (10 of the 15) did so from forbidding any form of dual citizenship to allowing dual citizenship without the possibility of renunciation indicating a change in policy toward dual citizenship allowance.

19. We would anticipate regime type plays a meaningful role in migration flow, both in sending and receiving contexts. However, with almost no variation in type of regime across the periods of examination for receiving states ($\chi^2 = 9.6e + .04$, $p < .001$), we exclude this variable from our analysis.

20. Although these indicators demonstrate a relatively small increase, it is a statistically significant improvement and therefore buttresses the support for including sending state policy predictors.

21. $\Delta R^2 = .001$, $p < .001$; BIC difference = 152, $p < .01$.

22. BIC differences are interpreted as suggested by Raftery (1995).

23. $\Delta R^2 = .002$, $p < .001$; BIC difference = 205.4, $p < .01$.

24. Centering variables operates to reduce possibilities of multi-collinearity as well as enabling the resulting coefficients to be easily interpretable.

25. As we are unable to determine the original sending state for dual citizens, we excluded all surveys reporting more than one nationality.

26. In cases where the country did not exist prior to the median age, probabilities were calculated from the time of state formation. The mode and mean age probabilities were also calculated and produced similar results.

27. Those states coded as receiving-forbidding (i.e., below the 50% threshold) ranged in probability from .0 to .38. The probability of states coded as receiving-allowing (i.e., above the 50% threshold) ranged of .63 to 1.00 and contained approximately 57% of all migrants in the merged sample.

28. Receiving states include Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, Malta, and Slovakia. Sending states include Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

29. $R = -.096$, $p = .067$.

30. Reported receiving countries include 54 countries within Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and North America between 1957 and 2011.

31. $\chi^2 = 242.267$, $p < .001$. $\varphi = .483$.

References


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