Measurement and Interpretation Issues in Civic Integration Studies: A Rejoinder

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Debate

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I thank Ines Michalowski and Ricky van Oers for their reply to my original article (Goodman 2010a). Their response provides helpful descriptive updating to my coding of civic integration policies, acknowledges some of the original and important contributions the article makes to further the study of civic integration and raises the profile of these new, important membership requirements. While a debate on central matters of civic integration is a worthwhile endeavour—specifically regarding measurement and interpretation—certain erroneous elements of their reply need to be addressed.

Michalowski and van Oers raise two main objections. Firstly, the scores in my Civic Integration Policy Index (CIVIX), and the policy configurations they produce to enable understanding of state membership strategies, are not replicable with scores from the Migrant Integration Policy Index III or MIPEX (Migration Policy Group 2011). They attribute this to disparities in measurement error. Secondly, there is limited analytical utility of citizenship policy in understanding why states make civic integration choices. In response to these points, I present the case here that MIPEX and CIVIX indices measure different dimensions of policy and use different scoring rules to do so, and that the authors infer causality between citizenship and civic integration, misconstruing and misrepresenting my original interpretation of policy significance. My hope is that a discussion of these broader issues serves to structure and move forward the comparative study of integration requirements for a wider audience, drawing attention to more-general challenges and trade-offs in comparing integration and pushing beyond discussions otherwise committed to picayune dimensions of policy.
As a point of departure, and by way of summary, it is important to note what the authors accept in my original classification and scoring of civic integration policies. First, I assume a tacit support for my conceptual orientation of civic integration in citizenship studies as an intersecting vector of ‘membership content’ (Goodman 2010a: 757), unlike other eligibility requirements for the formal acquisition of membership through citizenship—like residency duration or renunciation of dual citizenship. To go further into this distinction, integration requirements demand skill acquisition and performance, requiring proactive behaviour as opposed to what Peter Spiro describes as merely ‘being there’ (2008: 37). This is an important conceptual position that I develop; it enables scholars to consider the impact of a wide range of political and institutional conditions on state membership priorities and expectations with regard to immigrants. Also, in developing a measure for these policies with CIVIX for the snapshot year of 2009, I provide a means for scoring and comparing these priorities. This measure was developed because there was no systematic measure available for scholars interested in conducting cross-national examinations of policy. The Migration Policy Index (MIPEX II) from 2007 contained several problems for comparability, not the least of which was their stated goal of presenting data that reflect the ‘real impact on people’s lives’, as opposed to comparing the policy themselves. This is a clear difference of assessing outcome versus output, and one that I will return to in further detail below.

Second, the authors do not contest the indicators I select to represent civic integration (assessment of language and society knowledge through tests, courses and contracts, as well as oaths/ceremonies to demonstrate a commitment to national values), concurring—in their words—that my indicators ‘adequately reflect the existing variance of integration requirements’ (Michalowski and van Oers 2012: 166). The final categories of civic integration policy, where some countries have ‘thick’ articulations of membership through integration requirements (e.g. Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands) and some have ‘thin’ articulations in spite of a tradition of strong national identity (e.g. Italy) is a useful classification scheme for identifying states with robust civic integration policies. Indeed, CIVIX is a practical instrument for capturing the diversity and intensity of integration requirements across both case and time.

That said, I will address Michalowski and van Oers’ issues of measurement and interpretation, respectively.

Distinguishing CIVIX from Concept to Measurement

The critique of external validation is not just a question of appropriate indicators, but of scoring techniques. The core of their critique is that membership policy configurations1 (see Goodman 2010a: 764) are not visible when using MIPEX III data. Before addressing this critique, however, I admit I am puzzled that Michalowski and van Oers anchor their concern of external validation on MIPEX and not on a dataset which Michalowski recently co-created that contains the exact same policies.
In Koopmans et al.’s (2011) scoring of cultural obligations for citizenship rights, they measure civic requirements for migration, settlement and citizenship in 10 European states. Policies are scored inversely to CIVIX, where more-restrictive/difficult policies earn \( -1 \), mid-range policies \( 0 \), and inclusive or a lack of policies \( 1 \). Koopmans et al.’s index for cultural requirements in 2008 and the original CIVIX 2009 scoring strongly correlate at \( r = -.86 \). The omission of this significant external validation of my work to that of one of the authors is surprising, as is the omission of my publication from Koopmans et al.’s list of references.

However, in contrast to these similarities between CIVIX and Koopmans et al., MIPEX measures different policy dimensions with different scoring rules, rendering problematic a number of their claims. Without veering too far into a tangential critique about validity problems with MIPEX, and though it seems rudimentary to point out these differences, this presents a useful opportunity to discuss the concept of civic integration and appropriate measures of it. In essence, one should not expect correlation—and consequently policy cluster replicability—when two indices contain so much difference.

**Concept**

In discussing differences in indicators and scoring, it is appropriate to first consider the concept (Adcock and Collier 2001) of civic integration itself. As I wrote in the original article, ‘Civic integration policies express the idea that successful incorporation into a host society rests ... on individual commitments to characteristics typifying national citizenship’ (Goodman 2010a: 754). In other words, civic integration promotes attributes of membership and, like the root word suggests, the traditional membership category is that of *civitas*, the condition of citizenship. States have moved to define these citizen-like attributes as having skills that enable participation, including language, country/society knowledge, and a set of liberal-democratic values. Christian Joppke (2004) builds on this to juxtapose civic integration—being individual-focused—with group-focused multiculturalism. We can also distinguish the instruments of civic integration, where states use tests, courses, contracts—binding and assessable commitments between an individual and a state—from prior measures of integration, including informal interviews or vague standards to show a ‘willingness to integrate’, in the language of Belgium’s requirement (removed in 2000).

But, while scholars agree that there is ideational convergence across major immigrant-receiving states on the issue of civic integration, they are divided over its meaning. Unlike requirements that determine access to citizenship—where a greater duration of residence is clearly more ‘restrictive’ or ‘exclusive’ than a lower period and the allowance of acquisition through *jus soli* or a toleration of dual citizenship is considered more ‘liberal’ or ‘inclusive’ than limitations would be\(^2\)—there is no similar consensus in civic integration studies about the meaning or intent of requirements (see, for example, Bauböck and Joppke 2010). One side claims that
the new emphasis on civic integration is made through a liberal-universalistic idiom, where policies transcend ‘national models’ of citizenship and immigrant integration and replace it with a liberal or communitarian one (see Joppke 2007, 2010; Müller 2007; Orgad 2010). The flipside of the liberal convergence view sees states adopting mandatory integration requirements not because they are uniformly transcending the importance of national identity, but because they are returning to it. As Dora Kostakopoulou notes, ‘In framing integration as an obligation on the part of the migrant, implicit equivalences—such as indigenous/superior/complete and foreign/inferior/lacking—and ethnocentricity resurface’ (2010: 7).

Given this chasm over the concept of civic integration, measurement of policy needs to be as empirical and non-normative as possible. Intent of policy can and should be interpreted during analysis, but not as a rule for coding. CIVIX was born out of this imperative and with this conceptual tension in mind; in their critique, the authors do not seem to take seriously the potential tautological hazard of using normative coding for social science analysis.

Measurement

This problem directly relates to MIPEX coding and the challenges of comparability. Most fundamental in the difference between CIVIX and MIPEX is the objective of measurement. CIVIX measures what policies are in terms of an immigrant’s time, as well as financial/skill commitment. Countries with high scores are more arduous in terms of commitments from the immigrant—‘thick’ articulations of civic integration—compared to countries with low scores (‘thin’ articulations). Conversely, as I stated in my original article, MIPEX captures ‘the extent to which various requirements enable migrant inclusion’ (Goodman 2010a: 759). Specifically, MIPEX assigns scores to policy based on whether or not it is in compliance with its normative framework of best practices to ‘promote societal integration in practice’, which in turn depends on whether or not requirements ‘facilitate or hinder participation’ and the ‘extent to which all residents are legally entitled to equal rights and responsibilities’ (Migration Policy Group 2011: 6). This translates, for example, into the scoring in MIPEX III of an integration test for citizenship as a 1 (‘furthest from highest standards’), an integration course for citizenship as a 2 (‘halfway to the highest standards’), and no requirement or a voluntary requirement as a 3 (‘highest standards for equal treatment’). In practice, this coding is converted to a scale out of 100: 1 = 0, 2 = 50, 3 = 100.

This strategy for coding can produce some counterintuitive results if a researcher is interested in comparing policy. France and Spain, for example, receive surprisingly low scores for a citizenship requirement (both 17/100), in contrast to states that actually have citizenship tests (Austria: 75; Denmark: 42; Germany: 83; the Netherlands: 42). MIPEX presents the view, and Michalowski and van Oers agree, that the use of interviews in France and Spain reflects an ambiguity of administrative discretion that is more unequal and unfair than testing. Of course, the procedure for
naturalisation is discretionary by law in most states. As a result, there are a number of elements that researchers simply cannot control in assessing whether a requirement is difficult or easy—e.g. an individual’s level of language proficiency, their prior knowledge about the country, their income level, etc. Making an assumption that an interview is more exclusionary than a test when there is no evidence—like high rejection rates—associated with this scoring rule is a problem. As I have done elsewhere, a more neutral representation of requirements is to draw comparisons based on degree of formalisation (see Goodman 2010b: 15–18), recognising that policies may not necessarily or neatly graft onto an inclusive–exclusive scale. CIVIX avoids this issue by treating the obligation to complete an interview as commensurate with completing a test at the stage of citizenship, recognising that preparation for an interview may be less formal but potentially as time-consuming.

There are other assumptions that go into MIPEX coding that make the question of comparison to CIVIX inappropriate. For a second example, I keep with the distinction between tests as the least conducive to inclusion (earning a 0) versus courses (earning a 50). The outcome of these policies has shown the very opposite. In Germany, the pass rate for the citizenship test in 2009 was 98 per cent. Clearly, it is not difficult for the general population of test-takers. And passing the test entitles the immigrant to the greatest degree of inclusion possible: citizenship. In contrast, the integration course, which aims to provide intermediate language ability and basic societal knowledge as a requirement for obtaining a permanent residence permit, yields a far lower success rate. According to data collected by Marina Seveker and Anne Walter, the success rate of course graduates to reach B1 (the required language level) was only 50.9 per cent in 2008 and 66.4 per cent in the first half of 2009 (Seveker and Walter 2010: 45). Once this initial ‘filter’ occurs, the pass rate for the orientation-course test for permanent residence is closer to the citizenship-test rate at 88.7 per cent (2010: 46). Drop-offs from overlapping work commitments, a lack of childcare, general participation, and the loss of entitlement to attend integration (after 2 years’ residence) are significant barriers toward inclusion that MIPEX misses. And because the tests for permanent residence are considered the ‘furthest from standards’ of inclusion, Germany’s final score for long-term residence does not reflect the double commitment of passing the test and taking the course (if language is below B1 level). In fact, these barriers almost get cancelled out altogether because the scoring scheme treats equally the burden to take the test and the benefit of the state paying for that obligation.

Moreover, the view that the authors take in their reply regarding Denmark—that it should not be penalised because its state-run integration ‘course is supposed to prepare for the test and thus facilitates the fulfillment of integration requirements’ (Michalowski and van Oers 2012: 167) is an assumption that the nearly 40 per cent of failed course-takers in Germany would probably not agree with. Courses certainly facilitate integration, but it is misleading to view them as mutually exclusive to restriction. Integration can be an arduous process, and I sincerely worry that normative biases against this fact obfuscate the realities of policy and practice. High values on the MIPEX scale indicate that policy is conducive to full participation, yet
the scoring of requirements that may enable an individual to do so move in the other direction.

CIVIX avoids these distinctions and judgments by scoring policies as they are. The only assumption it asserts into coding is that, over time, language and country knowledge are easier to acquire. This is particularly the case if there are requirements for permanent residence. Therefore, CIVIX maintains a transparent, additive scale representing the ‘most-difficult scenario’ for a migrant, recognising there could be gaps between policy and practice. A civic integration requirement for entry earns 1 point, for residence 1 point (and if there is more than one requirement, then states can be assigned multiple points), and for citizenship half a point. If the immigrant incurs the costs for integration requirements at settlement or the language level is high (over A1), a 0.5-point ‘restrictive weight’ is added. And if the requirement at citizenship is in addition to testing at permanent residence, a half-point ‘restrictive weight’ is also added. This method of scoring avoids the trappings of the liberal-versus-ethnic-convergence debate, as well as the assumptions of whether requirements enable or hinder integration. In fact, this latter question would be a dependent variable in what would be a very interesting study of the effect of civic integration requirements. But it should play no role in scoring.

In sum, the concern over replication is without merit because it is expecting MIPEX scores to perform like CIVIX scores, when there are manifold differences in policy dimensions and scoring. They are different by design. And where there are overlaps in indicators, the measurement is quite different. MIPEX scores produce a sense of whether states provide more or less of an opportunity for immigrants to achieve full inclusion, where integration requirements are one facet among many. CIVIX scores produce a sense of which states have more or fewer civic integration requirements—a different and specific endeavour. CIVIX does not aim to replace the quality work MIPEX does, especially in its breadth and in comparisons in critical policy areas like labour market access and security of status; CIVIX presents different data, differently arranged.

A final point on measurement: moving aside from the authors’ MIPEX-derived critique, they also suggest that, even after taking into account all of their measurement suggestions (like weighing language proficiency levels)—newly revised in Table 1 of this reply—the policy clusters ‘are not so self-evident’ (Michalowski and van Oers 2012: 169). But, as Figure 1 clearly shows, policy clusters remain stable and unambiguous.

Interpretation

The second critique levied by the authors is that, even with these identifiable policy clusters, ‘the analytical capacity of the proposed index analysis seems to be overstretched’ as they find no ‘linear relationship between a country’s citizenship policy and the deeper meaning of its integration regimes’ (Michalowski and van Oers 2012: 169–70). The authors’ interpretation, however, is itself overstretched.
Table 1. Updated scoring of civic integration policy (CIVIX 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Points</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1; (0.5 if limited)</th>
<th>Additional integration requirements?</th>
<th>Family members</th>
<th>Gate 3: Citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language/Integration requirement</td>
<td>Gate 1: Entry</td>
<td>Gate 2: Settlement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5 if language only or complementary to settlement; 1 if additional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUT</td>
<td>N (0)</td>
<td>Language (1)</td>
<td>A2 (0.25)</td>
<td>€ 1000 (0.5)</td>
<td>Language test (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEL</td>
<td>N (0)</td>
<td>Flanders (0.5)</td>
<td>Language (1)</td>
<td>B1 (0.5)</td>
<td>Yes (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEN</td>
<td>Y (1)</td>
<td>Language (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>N (0)</td>
<td>Voluntary (0.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>Y (1)</td>
<td>Language (1)</td>
<td>A1 (0)</td>
<td>Free (0)</td>
<td>Civic class/contract (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER</td>
<td>Y (1)</td>
<td>Language, civic (1)</td>
<td>A2/B1 (0.5)</td>
<td>€1 per hour (0.5)</td>
<td>Test (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRE</td>
<td>N (0)</td>
<td>Language, civic (1)</td>
<td>A2 (0.25)</td>
<td>Yes (0.5)</td>
<td>Test (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRE</td>
<td>N (0)</td>
<td>N (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>N (0)</td>
<td>N (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LUX</td>
<td>N (0)</td>
<td>N (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NET</td>
<td>Y (1)</td>
<td>Language, civic (1)</td>
<td>A1/A2 (0.25)†</td>
<td>Free (0)</td>
<td>Integration test (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POR</td>
<td>N (0)</td>
<td>Voluntary (0.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: * Gate 1: Entry, Gate 2: Settlement, Gate 3: Citizenship.

**Language, class (1)**

†Free (0)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Gate 1: Entry</th>
<th>Gate 2: Settlement</th>
<th>Gate 3: Citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Language/Integration requirement</td>
<td>Language level</td>
<td>Fee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPA</td>
<td>N (0)</td>
<td>Regional (0.5)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWE</td>
<td>N (0)</td>
<td>N (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Y (0.5)*</td>
<td>Language, civic (1) ≤ B1 (0.25)$</td>
<td>Yes (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *This requirement was passed for spouses and partners at the time of original publication, but applies only from November 2010 onward (therefore, outside the cut-point for the full point). †New immigrants have a higher required level of Dutch (A2) than settled migrants (A1). ‡If applicants take the course route to settlement (which includes both language training and civic content), they are not required to obtain English proficiency up to ESOL Entry level 3 (which the test is administered at) but instead progress one level. As a result of this variation, I score it a 0.25. §All states have categories of persons exempt for fees. In Austria, the base fee is €1,000, but vouchers are provided if the test or course is completed by 2 years of immigration. In Denmark, the course is free for refugees, family reunification and participants who have followed the introduction programme. Germany also provides a number of exemptions for the obligatory integration course. In the UK, according to the 'five-year rule', adult education in England is free for residents of five years and EEA residents. Anyone under this residency period must pay. Courses in Scotland and Wales, however, are free. Despite these exemptions, all have formal fee requirements by law and, under the 'most-difficult scenario' of scoring, earn a full half-point. **A full point is assigned here because, in addition to language, applicants have to take three civics classes.
The original article neither claims a linear relationship (note: there are no correlation statistics reported and no lines of best fit drawn), nor presents the argument as they interpret it, which is why they ‘implicitly assume’ (Michalowski and van Oers 2012: 166) instead of providing more-direct citations. In fact, I plainly state in the original article that ‘citizenship inheritance only gives limited explanatory leverage’ (Goodman 2010a: 765).

Citizenship—the formal ‘institutional expression to the state’s prerogative of inclusion and exclusion’ (Hansen and Weil 2001: 1)—and civic integration (a new means for promoting attributes of inclusion) are both independent variables in the study. The nature of their interaction produces, in this sample of the EU-15, four distinct policy clusters. These clusters, or membership strategies, serve as a framework—as the original text states—to assess how new requirements complement or challenge existing citizenship policy (Goodman 2010a: 755). In other words, citizenship rules for access do not determine civic integration requirements; citizen-
ship determines how they matter as part of a state membership strategy. The authors’ criticism, therefore, stems from an inaccurate reading of the original argument.

In the limited space that remains, let me delve further into both the capacity of CIVIX for identifying patterns and puzzles, as well as the strength of membership strategies for identifying nuances of policy. To this end, the UK and Germany serve as illustrative case studies. Germany boasts a historically exclusive citizenship policy, while the UK holds a traditionally liberal citizenship regime (Howard 2009), yet both countries adopted mandatory integration requirements for settlement and citizenship. Their sequence of adoption, however, is quite distinct and revealing of different membership strategies structured by existing citizenship policy.9

In looking at MIPEX III scores on civic integration, there are few commonalities between Germany and the UK that would suggest both undergoing a ‘civic turn’. For settlement, Germany scores 32/100, while the UK scores a 68/100; on requirements for citizenship, Germany scores 45/100 for language and 83/100 for integration, while the UK scores 65/100 and 42/100 respectively. By contrast, CIVIX yields comparatively high scores for both countries: Germany (=6) and the UK (=4.25). While MIPEX III scores show these countries as quite divergent, CIVIX reveals an empirical puzzle: Why do states with the most-different citizenship and integration traditions both adopt civic requirements?

Germany laid down a vague set of principles for language and a declaration of loyalty in the 2000 Citizenship Law—an ‘integration price tag’ (Hartnell 2006: 391) by the centre-right in exchange for expansive liberalisation, like jus soli,10 but ‘thick’ integration requirements did not come about until the Immigration Act of 2005. Mandatory integration, including language and civic orientation courses, as well as tests, squarely targeted long-term residents. It was not until 2007 that policy-makers provided a similar mechanism (the naturalisation test) for citizenship. Moreover, this choice was a reactive one, made to diminish wide differences among state practices (in Baden-Württemberg and Hesse) and avoid ‘naturalisation tourism’ (van Oers 2010: 77). In sum, where most immigrants are prohibited from obtaining full citizenship through policy design, integration and membership concerns lie primarily with permanent residence.

In contrast, the UK first introduced the ‘Life in the UK’ knowledge requirement for citizenship in 2002. It developed two routes to naturalisation, where an applicant with sufficient language skills could take the citizenship test while an applicant with insufficient language skills could proceed through an English-language-learner’s course with citizenship content. Only later were these requirements extended to permanent residence (in 2007). In fact, the Labour government was so committed to promoting a ‘direct progression to British citizenship’ (Ryan 2009: 289), as opposed to lingering in a stage of permanent residence, that the 2009 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act attempted to replace permanent residence altogether, creating instead a stage of ‘probationary citizenship’ that immigrants move out of with ‘active’ and ‘earned’ citizenship.11 The membership strategy, in this case, is distinct from the
German approach by its anchoring of new policy in citizenship as a means to condition the naturalisation process.

This brief comparison reveals how two states which adopted civic integration did so in different institutional contexts and for different reasons. While Germany disincentivises citizenship and ties integration to permanent residence, the UK incentivises citizenship and makes integration a path to it. To that end, these countries are located in the prohibitive and conditional membership clusters, respectively. Membership clusters direct us to consider the conditions and consequences of adopting rigorous membership expectations in the context of different opportunities for formal membership (citizenship).

The authors’ position against this type of interpretation, positing German integration requirements as containing ‘surprisingly liberal results’ (Michalowski and van Oers 2012: 170) that a ‘prohibitive’ cluster label would not suggest, lies primarily in parliamentary debates as evidence of what politicians think and are motivated by, as opposed to indicators of what politicians say and find rhetorically appropriate or popular. Policy-makers may, and often do, use the same discourse for describing the adoption of integration requirements across states: promoting an individual’s integration, making citizenship the ‘first prize’, social participation, female emancipation, etc. However, we can look at empirical trends taking place over both time and legal statuses to show that exclusionary strategies through mandatory integration can develop and need not graft onto an inclusive discourse about it. For example, the ‘gradual intensification of integration policy’ for German citizenship (van Oers 2010: 79) and early discussions to attach legal sanctions to integration for permanent residence, stemming from both social and security concerns (Michalowski 2010: 188), are two such indicators of policy adoption moving perpendicular to an inclusive or communitarian discourse.

In conclusion, the objectives of the original article—to identify, categorise and compare civic integration policies (as indicated by the article’s title)—are strengthened in the updated CIVIX and discussion of methodological choices here. My hope is that this response opens up the study of civic integration and highlights a number of research questions that have yet to be explored. The comparative study of civic integration requirements is still in its early stages. I propose that CIVIX offers a baseline framework for identifying patterns of civic integration policy and that the resulting membership clusters provide an empirically grounded impression for considering how similar civic integration policies may yield varied consequences in the context of different legal opportunities for full membership acquisition in citizenship. This is an important area of research that reflects change in terms not only of new policy (civic integration) but of core concepts of the state (citizenship) as well.

Notes

[1] Referred to in the original article as ‘citizenship strategies’. Indeed, one of the methodological challenges of good concept formation is ‘external differentiation’, which
John Gerring describes as ‘derived from the clarity of its border with a field of similar terms’ (1999: 375–6). Because civic integration promotes citizen attributes beyond citizenship, I have begun employing the term ‘membership strategies’ as a more distinct concept to reflect the interaction of formal acquisition and civic integration.

2 This conceptual agreement allows for the high degree of correlation ($r = .91$) between MIPEX III on the dimension of nationality acquisition and Howard’s (2009) Citizenship Policy Index.

3 Standards that define benchmarks of equal treatment and societal integration are derived from a diversity of sources that include Council of Europe Conventions or European Union Directives. Moreover, ‘where there are only minimum standards, European-wide policy recommendations are used’ (Migration Policy Group 2011: 7).

4 There are a number of differences between MIPEX II and MIPEX III which are worth noting as evidence of the evolution of their own work. In the 2007 sample, countries were penalised if the test was written and based on country history (earning a 1) versus an oral, multiple-choice test only assessing a state’s political system/rights (earning a 3). Not only was content factored in, but there was an explicit bias against written tests over oral ones. This dimension has been dropped entirely in MIPEX III.

5 States that confer citizenship through naturalisation as an entitlement, as opposed to discretionary procedures, include Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Austria and Germany have both discretionary and entitlement procedures. A number of states also reserve entitlement of acquisition for specific categories of immigrant, like spouses or minors. For more, see the Modes of Acquisition data on the EUDO-Citizenship website at eudo-citizenship.eu.

6 ‘Der Einbürgerungstest wird ein Jahr alt’, Die Welt, 1 September 2009.

7 The authors write in their critique that ‘language and knowledge-of-society tests at naturalisation are generally of a much higher level than tests at permanent residence’ (2012: 168). This is not correct. In the example of language, Austria uses A2 level at both stages; Germany: B1; the Netherlands: A2; and the UK: B1 or one-level change (see van Oers et al. 2010). In fact, the similar level of assessment (Denmark is an exception) has led some to combine or ‘double-count’ requirements, where the Netherlands and the UK combine settlement and citizenship tests, and Germany counts language completion for permanent settlement to satisfy the citizenship requirement. There are obvious level differences between entry (see Goodman 2011) and citizenship, but there are also significance periods of residence (France, the Netherlands, the UK: 5 years; Germany: 8 years; Denmark: 9 years; Austria: 10 years) that could sufficiently prepare a migrant for a higher barrier at citizenship, with or without integration course work.

8 In other work (Goodman 2011), I argue that conditions under which integration requirements for immigration are adopted—namely political opportunities created by EU Directives, ambitions to regulate and limit family-based migration, and policy diffusion—differ from those of citizenship and settlement.

9 As I state in the original article, the ‘degree to which a state boasts liberal or restrictive rules for acquiring citizenship equally matters for discussing the ultimate impact of civic requirements’ (Goodman 2010a: 764).

10 Green (2012: in press) provides an interpretation of the adoption of the declaration that also challenges its integration intent, noting that it was strategically included to have legal grounds to exclude ‘those applicants from citizenship where concrete suspicions […] cast doubt on their willingness to conform to Germany’s constitutional order […]—a provision targeted at applicants with extremist political tendencies’.

11 The subsequent Conservative-led coalition government later decided against implementation of these provisions, rejecting them as ‘too complicated, bureaucratic and, in the end,

References


