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Letter from the President

As promised in the previous letter, let me start with a perhaps somewhat controversial claim: over the long term, our Section's contribution to the discipline of political science will be about citizenship at least as much as, and quite possibly more than, migration. Thus I wince when I hear about "APSA's new migration section." (The same response I'd have if people talked about "APSA's new citizenship section," without mentioning migration.) One of the distinctive strengths of our new section is that it brings together scholars of migration, scholars of citizenship and, probably the largest group, scholars who combine them. An important reason migration matters politically is because of the citizenship-related questions it raises, so citizenship should never be an afterthought.

Of course, headline-grabbing developments about migration, coupled with the migration-related predilections of funding agencies and groups, help drive some of our scholarship. I don't mean to devalue policy-focused studies of contemporary migration or to introduce artificial distinctions between 'migration' and 'citizenship' scholarship. Indeed, my point is that we should not lose sight of the more general phenomenon: what makes migration interesting for political scientists, what makes it more than a purely demographic description of the movement of people, are its inherently political aspects, the central concerns of citizenship.

Immigration and emigration policies and laws; border and security studies relating to migration control; causes and consequences of different forms of migration; attitudes of and towards different categories of migrants; immigrant integration and incorporation. These are all, also, questions of membership and political community; in other words, questions of citizenship. Conversely, I'd argue that many questions of citizenship are illuminated by considering migration, the realization that no political community is isolated from others and that individuals and groups questioning and crossing boundaries create and re-create the political world.

In a world in which sub-, supra-, trans-, non-, and international moral and political obligations gain in importance and individuals claim membership and participate in multiple political communities, the view that territorially bounded sovereign states are the only source of citizenship may become untenable. Migration helps place in question dominant assumptions about citizenship because, by its very nature, migration upsets the balance between insiders and outsiders as newcomers seek to enter the political community.

Politics is not simply about who gets what, when, and how; an essentially distributive conception of the political. It is first about whose voice matters, who counts, within what community. (The distinction between insiders and outsiders, usually a spectrum of rights and duties rather than a pure binary.) Decisions about which individuals should be considered citizens, and what that should mean, are prior to others. Studying such questions is what scholars of citizenship contribute to political science, and they are also central to political science studies of migration.
For Aristotle, “the first thing that must be sought [in the study of politics] is the citizen; for the city [polis] is a certain multitude of citizens. Thus who ought to be called a citizen and what the citizen is must be investigated.” Let us remain proud of our joint focus: we are the Section on Migration and Citizenship.

As 2013 annual meeting Section program co-chairs Joe Carens and Jim Hollifield explain elsewhere in this newsletter, the excitement of our Section’s launch resulted in a flood of proposals, but this ran into the APSA policy in which all new Sections are allocated only three panel slots: far too many good proposals had to be rejected due to lack of space. Thankfully, the resulting low acceptance rate – panel allocation depends on several things including attendance (please attend the Section’s panels in Chicago!) but especially the previous year’s acceptance rate – means that we’ll be allocated many more panels for the 2014 annual meeting, in Washington DC, so that our acceptance rate will be about average rather than by far the worst. So please submit your panel and paper proposals through the Section, so we can continue to grow.

Section membership is healthy: we’re over 350 strong. But we still have work to do. For example, of the fifteen nominees for best dissertation award, it seems only one is a Section member. So here also we still have lots of room to grow.

In the first letter, I thanked the other members of the Executive Committee and others who have already been serving the Section. Without repeating everyone’s name, let me say that it’s been a pleasure to serve with Els and the rest of the team; the Section will continue in good hands. Let me close my second (and final) letter in the same way as the first: let’s celebrate the launch of the Section on Migration and Citizenship; long may it continue to grow and thrive.

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Letter from the Editor

In this issue, we focus on recent methodological developments in the study of migration. While the field has been traditionally dominated by the use of small-n case studies, over the past decade or so we have seen a trend toward the quantification of data for the purpose of index building. The Symposium, organized by Marc Helbling, features articles by an interdisciplinary team of 19 (!) migration and citizenship scholars from across Europe, the U.S., and Australia who collectively grapple with the question of how to conceptualize and measure immigration.
policies. In addition to engaging with critical methodological debates in the field, these articles provide us with a comparative overview of existing policy indexes – some designed for cross-national comparison, others for subnational or cross-temporal comparison – and an appraisal of their relative strengths and weaknesses. Because citizenship scholars started out on the road of index-building well before migration scholars did, the symposium concludes with a discussion of how experiences with citizenship index building can inform immigration index projects.

For our Teacher’s Corner, Margaret Commins writes about best pedagogical practices, highlighting the importance of interdisciplinary and problem-focused, as well as service- and experiential-based learning. In the Policy Brief, Alexandra Filindra draws our attention to Greece and argues that the rise of the fascist Golden Dawn party is best understood as a reflection of a larger crisis of welfare capitalism. I am excited that we have been able to add to these regular sections a Mentorship Corner for our graduate student members. In this issue, Hillary Mellinger is calling on all graduate student readers to participate in a brief survey in order to help identify issues to be discussed in upcoming newsletters. Please take a few minutes to help set the agenda!

This issue’s Research Institute Profile features the Deportation Research Clinic at Northwestern University. Our news section features information on the latest book and journal publications, member news, and an overview of Migration and Citizenship co-sponsored events at the upcoming ASPA annual meeting in Chicago. We are also re-printing the letter sent out by the two program co-chairs, Joe Carens and Jim Hollifield, detailing the procedures used for panel and paper selection. The number of submissions to Migration and Citizenship was unusually high for a new section – 15 panels and an additional 207 papers - which in itself is wonderful news but, paired with the small quota of panel allocations given to new sections, led to an exceptionally low acceptance rate of 3.3% (compared to a 21% APSA median). Next year, we will have significantly more panel allocations so please keep submitting your proposals to Migration and Citizenship. Most importantly, we can further raise this number of allocations by high turnouts on section-sponsored panels. Please attend as many co-sponsored panels as possible.

We are deeply saddened about the death of Ary Zolberg this April. As one of the intellectual giants of the study of international migration, his impact on the field will continue to live on. Thank you to Phil Triadafilopoulos for putting together this issue’s Tribute.

A very big thank you to everyone who contributed to this issue! As you read through this

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Introduction:
How to Measure Immigration Policies
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In the last issue of this newsletter Hollifield and Wong (2013, 3) showed how “over the past several decades the study of migration has slowly entrenched itself in the mainstream of political science.” Developments in the field of immigration policy research are a very good example of this trend: after a long period in which studies that analyzed single cases or a small number of countries predominated, more and more researchers have started to compare a relatively large range of cases. This has led to a quantification of the data under study and policy index building. By doing so migration scholars have followed a trend that has already taken place in other domains of political science such as democracy (Coppedge et al. 2011), state-church relationship (Traunmüller 2012), citizenship (Helbling 2013), rule of law regulations (Skaaning 2010), and electoral systems (Teorell and Lindstedt 2010).
Table 1 gives an overview of existing databases and indices that measure immigration policies (Bjerre et al. 2013). Although a large number of important studies have already been published, several challenges are yet to be overcome in immigration policy index building. As shown in Table 1, with the exception of Timmer and Williams (1998), scholars only started to build policy indices a decade ago. Moreover, many of them investigate specific fields like labor migration or asylum policies rather than overall immigration policies. Regarding the temporal and spatial scope of the indices, it is evident that there is a trade-off between the span of time and the number of countries that are covered. This is one of the major reasons why data on immigration policies are still rather scarce: collecting data across both a large number of countries and a long time period requires a lot of resources.

![](https://example.com/table1.png)

Despite these shortcomings, all these studies have provided innovative approaches to measuring immigration policies and have laid the foundations for a new research area. The goal of this

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1 By “index” we understand a measurement that operationalizes a social phenomenon in a quantitative way and represents an aggregate of data.
symposium is to take up this development, to give an overview of the ongoing debates and to discuss how to conceptualize and measure immigration policies. Scholars who are currently working in this field will be brought together for the first time, and these researchers will not only include political scientists but also economists, sociologists and lawyers in the US, Europe and Australia. This shows how interdisciplinary the field has become.

To be clear from the very outset, the aim of this symposium is not to promote index building and large-N analyses at the expense of other methods and approaches. Qualitative case studies and comparisons of a small number of countries are crucial to understanding how nation-states admit immigrants, as Triadafilopoulos (2013) argued in the last issue of this newsletter. There is, however, a series of research questions about causes and effects of migration policies (also identified by Hollifield and Wong 2013, 4-7) that can only be answered if we compare a large number of countries and investigate developments across time.

In the first contribution to this symposium, Helbling et al. will present their Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) project and discuss in detail how the index has been conceptualized. It will become clear that it is crucial to differentiate between policy outputs and outcomes, between neighboring policy fields (integration and citizenship), and between subpolicy fields, as well as between various dimensions of immigration policies.

Michel Beine et al. will present their International Migration Law and Policy Analysis (IMPALA) database. The contribution articulates the methodological orientation, strengths and weaknesses of their approach, and illustrates its power using data from the project’s pilot phase on immigration-policy complexity and stringency in eight countries between 1999 and 2008.

While the IMPIC and IMPALA projects aim to cover all relevant immigration policy fields, Martin Ruhs’s index focuses on labor migration. He discusses the methodological challenges in measuring and analyzing the relationship between different countries’ openness to admitting migrant workers and the rights that migrant workers are granted after admission.

In Huyen Pham and Pham Hoang Van’s project, the phenomenon of subfederal immigration regulation is studied. They will present an index that measures the climate that subfederal governments have created for immigrants in the United States, on a state-by-state basis. Their Immigrants’ Climate Index (ICI) considers laws enacted at both the state and local levels and accounts for regulations that benefit as well as negatively impact immigrants.

Most of these studies aim to collect data for a longer time period. None of the contributing authors, however, go as far back as Margaret E. Peters, who also included regulations in the 19th century. Covering such a long time period leads to particular methodological challenges, as countries used very different policies to regulate immigration in the 19th and early 20th century than they have more recently. Peters discusses how to compare regulations that emphasize different acceptance criteria, as well as how to deal with policies that did not exist in earlier periods. In doing so she creates a measure of immigration policy for low-skill immigrants from the 19th through the 21st century.
Finally, Hein de Haas and Mathias Czaika focus their contribution on research conducted in the DEMIG (The Determinants of International Migration) project, which studies the roles of receiving and sending states and the effects of their migration policies. They are particularly interested in methodological and conceptual challenges to investigating the effectiveness of policies, and thus the possibility to control migration flows.

To conclude this symposium we have invited a citizenship scholar to bring in some outside views from a field in which policy index building is more advanced than in the immigration literature (see Helbling 2013). Sara Wallace Goodman will discuss the individual contributions of this symposium in the light of the current developments in the citizenship literature.

References


The Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) Index: The Importance of a Sound Conceptualization
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Introduction
Systematic comparative research on immigration policy has gained ground within the last decades and has lead to a quantification of data as well as policy index building. However, the field of immigration policy index building is still in its infancy and even though many innovative ideas have been brought forward in the construction of existing indices, several challenges are yet to be overcome. As stated by Munck and Verkuilen (2002), conceptualization is the first and most essential step of index building. Nevertheless, a systematic assessment of existing indices has shown that immigration policies have rarely been defined and conceptualized in a systematic and rigorous manner (Bjerre et al. 2013). This is a crucial problem for quantitative research on immigration policies since “what is badly defined is likely to be badly measured” (Nardo et al. 2005, 12). In response to this problem, this paper presents the conceptualization of immigration policies used in the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) project.

The IMPIC project collected data on immigration policies for 33 OECD countries from 1980 to 2010. This large dataset allows us to tackle a broad range of research questions on the causes and effects of immigration policies. First, focusing on OECD countries allows us to hold some socio-economic and political factors constant. All countries are relatively rich, politically stable, and can be considered liberal democracies in which immigration policies are the output of democratic decision-making processes. Second, it allows us to retain cases that have had very different immigration experiences in the past.

A precise and comprehensive conceptualization of immigration policy based on four steps was the basis for the IMPIC data collection. These four steps are also presented in Helbling (2010) and

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1 The following discussion expands on aspects that are presented in Helbling (2010) and in the first part of Bjerre et al. (2013).

2 Exceptions are Hatton (2004, 19-20), Givens and Luedtke (2005, 3-6), Cerna (2008, 11) and Oxford Analytica (2008, 17-18) who specify the policy fields that are included in their indices. However, delimiting the policy fields constitutes only one among many aspects that need to be accounted for in order to conceptualize immigration policies.

3 In this paper we focus on the conceptualization of the IMPIC index. For space reasons the method of the data collection and construction of the index will be discussed in further publications.
Bjerre et al. (2013) and will be elaborated in the following sections. Firstly, in order to conceptualize immigration policies, a distinction between policy outputs and outcomes needs to be made. Secondly, immigration policies need to be distinguished from neighboring fields such as integration and naturalization policies. Since there are different reasons why states accept migrants, in the third step we need to differentiate between specific immigration policies that target different groups, namely labor migrants, family members, asylum seekers, and co-ethnics. Finally, we need to account for the various dimensions of immigration policies. For the first dimension, which we call “modus operandi,” we differentiate between regulations and control mechanisms. By regulations we understand the binding legal provisions that create or constrain rights; controls are measures set up to make sure that these regulations are upheld. For the second dimension, which we call “locus operandi,” we account for the fact that immigration is regulated and controlled both at the borders and inside national borders. Lastly, within regulations we differentiate between eligibility requirements and conditions, how secure an immigrant's status is, and which rights are associated with a specific status.

Policy outputs versus policy outcomes
Easton (1965, 351) defines “outputs” as “binding decisions, their implementing actions and […] certain associated kinds of behavior,” while outcomes are “all the consequences that flow from […] the outputs of the system” (for the immigration literature see Hollifield 1986, 114-115). In other words, the formal regulations on immigration are the policy outputs while immigration rates can be considered as policy outcomes (Helbling 2010; Bjerre et al. 2013). It is crucial to clearly distinguish these two terms, as they constitute two separate phases of a policy cycle (Helbling 2013). While some researchers focus on policy outcomes (Money 1999), the IMPIC index covers policy outputs.

Money (1999, 22) is certainly right in pointing out that the output is not necessarily related to the outcome and that investigating formal regulations does not tell us anything about how laws are controlled, interpreted and implemented, and thus does not tell us about the consequences of formal regulations: in this case, the actual numbers of admitted immigrants. Rather than dismissing output indices we suggest that both aspects need to be measured and studied separately (Helbling 2010; Bjerre et al. 2013). Otherwise, it would not be possible to investigate, for example, the effects of formal regulations on outcomes (e.g., migration inflow numbers). In order to make such comparisons, it is crucial not to include both outcome and output measures in the same index, as some indices have done in the field of citizenship (Koopmans 2005; Howard 2009) and immigration (Thielemann 2004).

Immigration versus integration and citizenship policies
Messina (2007, 23-24, citing Hammar 1985) provides the following definition of an immigrant: a person who migrates to a host country, and who theoretically possesses and practically exercises the right to settle indefinitely in the host country. This definition, however, is too narrow, since it would exclude a category to which an increasing number of immigrants belong, namely those who only get temporary residence and work permits. Accordingly, we define immigration as the movement of people from one nation state to another and thereby take up residence in the destination country. By "residence in the destination country" we mean the process by which persons change their place of residence or relocate their home for a specific period of time or permanently to a country other than their country of citizenship. Thus, we exclude commuting and
tourism, but consider labor migrants who might move to another country once or several times in their life for a specific period (e.g., guest workers etc.) as immigrants.4

If immigration is about people crossing borders of nation states and settlement, we can distinguish policies according to whether they aim to regulate the former or the latter. These two policy fields can be perceived as reflecting two modes of social closure of nation states: at the territorial border and inside the territorial border (see Weber 1946: 78; Brubaker 1992: ch.1). For Money (1999) immigration control and immigrant integration follow very different political logics and therefore should be studied as two separate policy areas (see Givens and Luedtke 2005: 2). While immigration control policies address the question of who is granted access to the territory of a state, immigrant integration policies are directed at those people that have already crossed the national borders (Helbling 2013; Bjerre et al. 2013). In other words, immigration policies can be understood as “the rules and procedures governing the selection, admission and deportation of foreign citizens” (Brochmann 1999a, 9; see also Meyers 2000: 1246; Andreas 2003, 78).

Hammar (1990, 21) subdivides immigrant integration policies into two, regulation of the status of denizens and of citizens, thereby differentiating between the three following gates: entry, settlement and full membership. While “entry” concerns immigration policies, “settlement” refers to regulations of status of denizens, which Hammar (1990, 13) defines as foreign residents that have gained a secure residence status without, however, becoming naturalized citizens. Settlement regulations stipulate the expectations and conditions immigrants have to meet in order to stay in a country and become a part of the society, as well as the rights they are granted. One of the main differences between “settlement” and “full membership” is that only the latter grants the right to become a naturalized citizen with full political rights.

While the separation into three entrance gates provides a useful analytical instrument for comparing neighboring policy fields, we should not forget that the respective regulations often overlap. Integration regulations (settlement) might attract or deter immigrants and compensate for restrictive or liberal access regulations (entry). On the other hand, immigration laws (entry) could be considered the most efficient means of integration (settlement); selecting migrants upon entry might make it easier to integrate them later.

Policy fields

Immigration policies can be subdivided into four fields, reflecting the main reasons why a state may accept immigrants (Helbling 2010; Bjerre et al. 2013) (see Table 1): labor migration, family reunification, asylum/refugees, and co-ethnicity (see also Givens and Luedtke 2005, 3).

First, states may accept non-nationals for economic reasons, for example in case of labor shortages in one or several sectors of the economy (Freeman 1978; 1979; Hollifield 1992; 1998). Accordingly, labor migration policies regulate the admission of immigrants for work purposes. Second, humanitarian reasons may play a role. A state may decide to offer shelter to persons being

4 We prefer not to refer to a specific time span in our definition as nowadays, especially in the labor sector, there exists a large variety of different programs. More important is the fact that an immigrant relocates his or her home for a specific period or permanently.
persecuted for political or other reasons, or people fleeing from war or famine. Asylum and refugee admission policies concern asylum seekers, recognized refugees, and the protection of people who are not recognized refugees (subsidary/humanitarian protection). Third, social aspects may be important, especially when immigrants who already settled down in a country are accorded social rights, such as being with their family members (Cholewinski 2002; Honohan 2009). Family reunification policies regulate how citizens or foreign residents can bring in their family members. Fourth, cultural and ethnic criteria may become relevant when, for example, a state accepts individuals from the same ethnic group who do not possess citizenship before immigration (Groenendijk 2006; Jerónimo and Vink 2011). This group of people can be called co-ethnics. They do not possess citizenship, but are entitled by immigration law to easier access to immigration and/or citizenship because of cultural or historical affiliations to the nation-state. Germany and Israel, who define themselves as national homelands of their diasporas abroad and grant diaspora members the right of return, are cases in point in this regard (Joppke 2005).

### Table 1: The IMPIC Conceptualization of Immigration Policy

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<th>Policy dimensions</th>
<th>Policy fields</th>
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<td>Modus Operandi</td>
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<td>Regulation</td>
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<td>Control</td>
<td>External</td>
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<td>Internal</td>
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#### Policy dimensions

To further differentiate between different aspects of immigration policies, we make a first distinction between regulations and control mechanisms (modus operandi; see Table 1) (Helbling 2010; Bjerre et al. 2013). Dreher (2002) defines regulations as binding legal provisions that create or constrain rights. Restricting access rights to very few people is a crucial aspect. However, such regulations are not enough if there are no mechanisms to control the inflows of immigrants or the status of immigrants that are in the country. Control mechanisms include, for example, information-sharing systems between countries, carrier liability rules for transporting undocumented migrants, the surveillance of admitted refugees or sanctions against employers that have hired irregular migrants.

Most legislation on irregular immigrants falls under the subcategory of control mechanisms as some of these mechanisms aim at controlling regular immigrants, most often with the aim of preventing

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5 Demographic reasons and the practicalities of “replacement migration” are sometimes also discussed as a means of counteracting the trend toward natural population decline in industrialized countries (Coleman 2002; Brochmann 1999b, 299). They, however, concern all immigration groups and so far there are hardly any signs that policies have been strongly shaped by such considerations (Brochmann 1999b, 299).
them from becoming irregular. Requirements for registration or identification documents, for example, constitute control mechanisms for regular immigrants that are intended to keep them from overstaying their working or residence permits. On the other hand, sanctions for forged documents, schooling rights for children of irregular migrants, or carrier sanctions are control mechanisms that concern irregular migrants more specifically. Thus, we also integrate legislation on irregular immigration in our framework, but not as a separate policy field.

We define irregular immigrants as “all immigrants that have not been admitted for economic, humanitarian, social, or cultural reasons, but nonetheless cross national borders, or did not leave the country when their residence or work permits had expired (i.e. overstayers)” (Bjerre et al. 2013). It has been argued that flows of irregular migrants increase relative to legal flows when controls mount (Zolberg 1990). In other words, if the “main gates” close the “back doors” become more important.

We also need to take into account that states regulate and control immigration both at their borders and within their territories (locus operandi, Table 1) (Helbling 2010; Bjerre et al. 2013). Accordingly, we need to take into account, first, how difficult it is to cross national borders (external) and, second, how secure the status of immigrants already in the country is, and what rights are associated with a specific status (internal) (see Brochmann and Hammar 1999; Doomernik and Jandl 2008).

Finally, we distinguish between several subdimensions within the regulations. Following the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (MPG 2006; Niessen et al. 2007), we distinguish within external regulations between eligibility requirements and conditions that need to be fulfilled. Eligibility and conditions belong to the external dimension because they regulate who is given access in the first place. More specifically, eligibility requirements classify types of applicants that are granted access (which nationalities, which kind of refugees, which family members etc.). The conditions in turn define requirements that need to be met by those groups (economic and cultural requirements, formal application procedures etc.). The internal dimension of regulations is composed of the two subdimensions, namely security of status and the rights associated with the respective status. While the former concerns the duration of residence and the possibilities to renew permits, the latter includes aspects that go beyond the rights of a special status: for example, vocational training rights for labor migrants or labor rights for refugees.

Especially in regard to immigrant rights it becomes clear that the distinction between immigration and integration policies is not as clear as one might think, but that the two in fact overlap to some extent. Extensive rights might not only attract more immigrants, compensate for restrictive eligibility criteria or conditions and thus make immigration policies less restrictive, they might also be considered a crucial factor in integrating immigrants. Nevertheless, the two policy fields can still be differentiated insofar as rights related to an immigrant status constitute only one specific aspect of integration policies. As we have argued (Bjerre et al 2013), integration policies focus more on rights that are related to immigrant groups (instead of individual status) as well as requirements for long-term or permanent residence.
Outlook

The comprehensive definition of the IMPIC index allows us to measure immigration policies in a more thorough way and to tackle a variety of research questions. The differentiation between output and outcome measures enables us to investigate how these two phases of the policy cycle are related to each other. We will analyze how formal immigration regulations affect immigration rates and thus to what extent nation states are capable of controlling immigration. Do more restrictive policies lead to lower immigration rates? And how important are the effects of policies in regard to socio-economic factors that might attract immigrants or prevent them from coming? Since we collected data across time, we are also able to test the inverse effects: How do nation states respond to increasing immigration? Do higher immigration rates lead to more restrictive policies?

The differentiation between different entry gates allows us to investigate how policies influence each other and whether they can be explained by the same factors. On the one hand, we can analyze how integration policies compensate for restrictive or liberal access regulations and how selective immigration laws affect immigrant integration. On the other hand, we will also investigate how these social closure mechanisms follow different logics. Immigration policies are not only about setting factual and figurative limits to national membership and cultural belonging; they also reflect vital and tangible economic and political interests—especially when labour migration is at stake (Freeman 1978, 1979). On the other hand, integration and citizenship policies might be more directly shaped by cultural considerations as they are focused much more on the question of who belongs to the national community.

Differentiating between policy fields and dimensions provides further important research opportunities. The causes and effects across the four policy fields can be compared. We will explore to what extent these fields follow different logics. Since the four fields address different immigration groups, nation states might pursue different goals in the four fields. It might, however, also be the case that the overall objectives of a nation state have an equal impact in all four fields. Also, we will investigate how regulations in one field affect regulations for other fields. Is it possible that the closing of doors in one field leads to higher inflows in another?

Not only the effectiveness of individual policies, but also those of different policy dimensions can be compared. Are nation states similarly restrictive or generous outside and inside their borders or is it possible, for example, that generous rights attributed to immigrants compensate for a high number of conditions that need to be fulfilled before one can cross the borders? And which aspects have a higher impact on preventing immigrants from emigrating to another country: restrictive border controls or the security of the immigrant status?

This is only a selection of research questions that can be tackled with the new dataset. As it appears, a clear conceptual framework allows us, on the one hand, to formulate detailed research questions and hypotheses. On the other hand, it gives the reader a better idea of whether the data are valid and appropriate to answering certain research questions.

References


Dilemmas in Measuring Immigration Policies and the IMPALA Database

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This research note very briefly lays out the challenges of measuring immigration policy data, and then sketches an ongoing project striving to overcome these challenges: the “International Migration Law and Policy Analysis” (IMPALA) project, compiling a new database of immigration regulations. It involves collaborative, interdisciplinary research to classify and measure the character of the major categories of immigration policy, including economic migration, family reunification, asylum and humanitarian migration, student migration and acquisition of
citizenship. A country’s detailed laws and regulations are coded annually with respect to many dozens of common questions about the character of such regulations, with all coding decisions based on transparent citations of written laws and regulations. The resulting data provide comparable, valid and reliable measures of immigration regulation, capturing important details of legal treatment and estimating restrictiveness at the level of the country, year, and aspect of migration and migration law.

**Problems with measuring immigration policies**
Some studies have developed multi-faceted indices of immigration policy, generating valuable and contrasting information on which countries, in which time periods, have implemented more or less restrictive immigration, integration and citizenship regulations. However, existing studies have important measurement limitations that hamper systematic and broad comparison of immigration policy and law over time and space. Two problems are particularly important, and together create what amounts to a difficult methodological dilemma.

First and obviously, most measurement efforts are very compartmentalized in their focus – using disparate methodologies to gauge what happens across countries or time, and across (aspects of) asylum, economic, family-reunification or other legal categories. This hinders comparison across broad kinds of laws. It is important to understand, for instance, whether the treatment of child migration is different or less stringent with respect to family reintegration than with respect to student or asylum or economic-related immigration. Measuring across such domains is crucial to gauging possible (conscious or subconscious) selection and “track-shopping.” More obviously, most studies are limited in their coverage with respect to space and/or time, focusing on small cross-sections of countries or on circumscribed, widely-spaced time periods. This is a problem for those wanting to understand longer-term developments within a reception setting, but also for those looking to make broad international comparisons – comparisons relevant to big questions about how different reception contexts treat child migrants, but also relevant to the actual practice and choices of such migrants.

Second, many use coding methods that lack transparency and may suffer from unreliability or bias. The questions or aspects of regulations being coded in many measures tend to be highly aggregated, combining and smoothing-over many disparate features of regulation in ways that ignore crucial information (Coppedge et.al.2011). Many questions or dimensions also require complex judgments about rules and the mixing of *de jure* law and *de facto* implementation, and require judgments about categories that are themselves highly ambiguous and contentious, such as distinctions between “skilled” and “unskilled” immigrants. Finally, particular aggregation and weighting across component-questions to generate stringency indices are usually developed without transparent review, even though slightly different choices could yield much different bottom-lines. These problems significantly compromise internal and external measurement validity and reliability. They make it difficult to judge differences and developments in immigration law and regulation, including differences in particular tracks of immigration entry; and/or periods of time; and/or across countries. Precisely because of such problems of aggregation and judgment of sub-dimensions of a policy, some approaches seek simpler, more focused proxies for important aspects of policies, such as key features of law, or the density of rules (Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti 2009). But this corrective then raises the first problem of incomplete coverage, since
any one feature of regulation might inadequately capture or stand in as a proxy for other or broader combinations of regulatory standards. We have, hence, a genuine measurement dilemma.

This dilemma makes it extremely difficult to develop systematic, valid measures of immigration laws that are comparable across time and (legal or territorial) space. This, in turn, complicates assessment of many debates about immigration – about the effects of immigration policy for actual migration, for social development, or for political stability. In short, the lack of comprehensive, cross-nationally comparable and transparent data on immigration policies or systematic methods for gauging restrictions hinders debate about the nature, origins and implications of immigration policies.

The IMPALA Database as a tool to address these problems

The IMPALA Database project seeks to develop and analyze precisely such comprehensive, comparable data on immigration policy to help address fundamental controversies about the nature, origins, and effects of immigration policies and laws. IMPALA compiles systematic, detailed information about immigration policy and laws that is comparable across nations, immigration issues, and time. Given the complexity of such information, the dataset is being developed by economists, lawyers, sociologists and political scientists at five universities: Universities of Amsterdam, Luxembourg, and Sydney, LSE, and Harvard (co-PIs who are authors of this note).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Relevant IMPALA Categories</th>
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<tr>
<td>Economic migration</td>
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<td>Migration group targeted</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tracks per country (in 2008)</td>
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<td>Questions per track</td>
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The dataset focuses on formal and explicit immigration laws and regulations – de jure rules, not de facto implementation or case law. The laws and regulations to be coded include the most important categories of immigration entry, which we divide into distinct legal tracks that cluster into five categories: (1) economic migration; (2) family reunification; (3) asylum and refugee immigration; (4) students and other temporary migration; and (5) acquisition (and loss) of citizenship. Within these categories, the number of tracks varies substantially over time and across countries. Table One overviews these categories and tracks. Based on countries-years already coded, the number of tracks per category ranges between 4 and 47 tracks, with countries in a given year having from 40 to more than 80 tracks. For any given track, coders examine national legislation, tracing statutes and regulations over time to identify rules in effect in each year. Primary text legislation is checked
against each country’s annotated texts and electronic resources for legal professionals. Additional sources include government legal communiqués, international conventions, reports from international organizations, and regional and bilateral agreements (that confer preferential treatment by the destination country to migrants coming from a particular origin-country).

Using such sources, coders identify the statutes and regulations that affect numbers and types of immigrants that can enter a country, the conditions under which immigrants live and work, and their legal rights. In many cases the questions and associated codes indicate the presence or absence of specific restrictions (e.g. whether asylum seekers are detained while applications are pending). Other questions and coding involve quantitative variables such as group quotas, admissions allowed each year per-applicant, permitted duration-of-stay, waiting periods, financial fees, and prison sentences for illegal activities involving undocumented immigrants. Key to the IMPALA coding system is that particular coding questions vary by track and broad category, allowing users of the data to construct track-specific measures best suited to their research questions. And fundamental to the IMPALA coding is that every decision about every coded question with respect to any given track, within any given category, within any given country-year, makes explicit reference to the particular legal sources and sentences on which it is based. This citing of the relevant legal sentences and documents is written into the coding and user interface and available to all users wanting to check coding decisions. As the last column of Table One summarizes, the coding questions number in the hundreds for a given track and year.

The resulting data involve systematic cross-nationally and temporally comparable but nuanced information on hundreds of features of law relevant to any given track within any given category of immigration. The explicit legal-regulatory referencing of the coding ensures that the data will be transparent and easy to replicate. These features of the IMPALA methodology should help ensure that the coding of detailed provisions provide reliable and valid measures of immigration law, policy, and regulation.

Such information can, in raw form, be consulted by scholars interested in any specific aspect of immigration or country-year. Such raw detail is intrinsically interesting for many scholars, such as those interested in development of a particular area of law. But the IMPALA database can also undergird systematic measures of stringency or restrictiveness with respect to entry or citizenship across tracks and categories coded. It can gauge how laws favor or discourage some economic or demographic (or other) groupings over others. Devising such measures of stringency and bias in immigration policy is very difficult, however, given the amount of coded information and countless choices possible for aggregating and weighting to create measures of stringency or bias. The IMPALA project consciously allows and encourages users to develop their own approaches to such aggregation and interpretation.

However, the IMPALA project will develop and make available methods and measures of stringency and bias. The methods developed will take account the detailed information coded within specific tracks and categories of immigration policy. The method is facilitated by scaling answers to questions relevant to stringency as taking-on higher values for higher stringency. For instance, binary yes-no questions are, where relevant to restrictiveness, scaled as 1 for higher stringency and 0 for less. The simplest measure of stringency, hence, could be to sum the values in a given track-
country-year – ignoring quantitative or qualitative information whose implications for stringency are less obvious, and without weighting of aspects of law by relevance to stringency. Such an approach, of course, is only the simplest, not most accurate method of aggregation and weighting to judge stringency. The IMPALA project will, hence, develop a range of algorithms for such aggregation and weighting, but again in a way that will be a transparent addition to the core IMPALA data.

The planned national coverage of IMPALA encompasses all countries in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), except those with net emigration over the past two decades. This leaves 26 countries, receiving the most migrants (60 percent of the 191 million in 2005): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In addition, the IMPALA project will code European Union regulations parallel to national laws of member states. The planned temporal coverage, finally, spans all years from 1960 to the present, but we will prioritize coding between 1980 and 2010.

As of this writing, we are completing the pilot phase of the IMPALA project. That phase has involved the development and synchronization of tracks, questions and coding, and the development of methods of international, inter-coder storage, communication and dissemination of coded laws and regulations. The pilot coding has focused on economic, family, and humanitarian migration in Australia, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States, and the years between 1999 and 2008. In the coming year, we hope to complete and make available the coding for these pilot countries, years, and tracks, and will continue expanding the database in the coming years - subject to funding constraints.

Even the pilot data, however, clarify immigration regulations across countries with very different legal systems, and over a period of time (the last decade) that has been particularly salient and turbulent for such regulations. The variation is too detailed and policy, country and time specific to be highlighted fully here. We can, however, offer two simple snapshots of cross-national and temporal variation captured by the IMPALA pilot to hint at policy developments relevant to the stringency of immigration laws.

First and most broadly, the IMPALA data captures the substantial variation across countries in the number of distinct legal tracks regulating migration in each nation’s legal and policy system, as summarized in Figure One below. Such a density of tracks offers a measure of regulatory complexity and may capture the selectivity of a nation’s migration laws with respect to a given category. And to the extent that such complexity can increase the transaction costs of navigating a country’s migration law and legal system, it can also be seen as a rough measure of restrictiveness. The Figure shows how the number of tracks has gone up in most countries and categories between 1999 and 2008. The horizontal axis of the Figure measures the number of distinct tracks in each country-category of migration in 1999, with the scale ranging from 0 to 50 tracks of entry. The vertical axis measures the same, on the same scale, for 2008. The diagonal line thus captures the parity of regulatory complexity in the two years of comparison. As is clear from the Figure, the number of tracks has increased in this modest ten-year period for virtually all country-categories.
The most substantial increase appears to have taken place with respect to family migration tracks in Luxembourg. The number of tracks remained the same in only a couple of country-categories, captured by cases on the diagonal line. In no case do we see a decline in regulatory complexity, so measured.

Second, the many binary and qualitative questions coded with respect to any given track and within any given category can be used to judge the stringency of policies beyond simple regulatory complexity or density metrics. An example of this can be seen by considering a modest sub-selection of characteristics relevant to developing such a judgment with respect to one particular track, on asylum (within the humanitarian category of tracks). Figure Two summarizes the 1999 and 2008 coding on a mere 10 of the 150+ questions or characteristics, focusing on a small sample of the simple binary (yes or no, 0 or 1) characteristics, ignoring for now the extensive qualitative information with respect to levels of quotas, fees, income and educational requirements. Despite the incompleteness and roughness of the snapshot, these questions capture information relevant to restrictiveness, such as the existence of identification and age tests, language testing, mandatory detention, and restrictions on past possible criminality. Each characteristic can be taken as relevant, as can their combination. Which combination is most important, however, is a priori unclear, leaving the appropriate method of aggregation uncertain. As discussed above, IMPALA invites users to implement their own aggregation-algorithms suitable to their specific analytical interests. But simply adding the un-weighted answers to these questions is also meaningful, as all ten questions underlying Figure Two broadly coincide with more rather than less stringency. And even such simple measures suggest substantial cross-national variation, broadly in line with that suggested by the regulatory complexity.
When comparing European and non-European destination countries for asylum seekers, detention policies constitute the most fundamental policy difference. No European country operates mandatory detention policy for asylum seekers, while this is standard practice in the US and Australia. Mandatory detention has long been a cornerstone of Australia's attempts to deter asylum-seekers arriving by boat (Crock 1993), with policy makers arguing that detention is a crucial selection device for those arriving in Australia without prior permission, who might otherwise exploit relatively loose asylum procedures. European countries, in contrast, have never had any significant resettlement programs and have abstained from mandatory detention, as the arrival of asylum seekers has been regarded as relatively more legitimate by policy-makers.

The over-time differences are equally important, since the European Union has sought to harmonize member-state regulations and laws on issues of asylum. Figure Two captures such differences, based on the same 10-point measure detailed in Table Four but comparing 1999 with 2008 (where we have both years of data). Based on this measure, the differences between countries in 2008 are no smaller than they were in 1999, and we see a strong trend towards more restrictive regulation in most sample countries (except Germany and the United States). This pattern is consistent with trends identified in earlier data, such as Thielemann's asylum deterrence index for the period 1985-2000 (see Thielemann 2006: 460, figure 17.2). Also noteworthy in Figure Two is that the increased restrictiveness between 1999 and 2008 is particularly strong in Australia. This gap between Australian and European policies is likely to persist and possibly widen, as EU Member States now operate under common EU minimum standards that were introduced between 2003 and 2008. While these new EU policies allow Member States to offer higher standards through national policy measures, they provide a bottom line of protection standards below which no Member States can unilaterally drop.

**Conclusion**

This note has highlighted the methodological dilemma of measuring reception contexts with respect to immigration policies and law with valid, replicable transparency, but also with policy, national and temporal coverage. And it has sketched the IMPALA project designed to do so. The portrait of immigration policies painted by pilot information from that project is only suggestive of the promise of IMPALA to measure variation in immigration regulations over time and space. But we consider that promise to be a substantial supplement to other approaches to measuring immigration law and regulations – of keen interest to political science and other social sciences.
Introduction
The phenomenon of subfederal immigration regulation, in which state and local governments enact laws regulating immigrants within their jurisdictions, has become an enduring part of the American legal landscape. Though still the subject of occasional legal challenges, the focus of the national conversation has shifted from whether to have subfederal immigration regulation, to what form that regulation should take. States have taken widely varying approaches to immigration regulation; some like Arizona and Alabama have enacted restrictive, negative laws, while other states like Illinois and California have enacted laws to benefit the immigrants within their jurisdictions. Thus, in order to understand the immigrant experience in the United States, it is crucial to understand the climate created in individual states, by both state and local governments.

Using seven years of empirical data (2005-2012), our study constructs an index to measure the immigration climate that sub-federal governments have created, on a state-by-state basis. By climate, we refer to the regulatory environment that immigrants experience in their everyday lives, as a result of the laws enacted by individual states to either benefit or restrict the immigrants within their jurisdiction. This Immigrants’ Climate Index (ICI) assigns a number, either positive or negative, to each immigration regulation enacted within a state; a state's ICI score is the sum of those numbers. The purpose of the ICI is to express, in quantitative terms, the regulatory climate that immigrants face, allowing comparison among states and over a multiple year timeline.

Building the Legal Database
In collecting data, we used a broader definition of subfederal regulation, including laws that are often ignored in the policy debates. Specifically, we include immigration regulations enacted by cities and counties (“local” laws) as well as by states, and immigration regulations that benefit immigrants as well as those that are restrictive. For state laws, we turned to the National Conference of State Legislatures, a bipartisan organization that tracks state laws and has, since 2005, compiled immigration-related laws enacted at the state level.
Building our collection of local immigration laws was more complex because there is no centralized organization like the NCSL at the local level. We started our local data collection with databases of laws collected by advocacy groups like the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund and the National Day Laborer Organizing Network. We then combined these databases with information from government websites like the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, which list local governmental agencies cooperating with federal immigration law enforcement. Finally, we supplemented these sources with our own searches through news databases on Westlaw (an online legal research service used by lawyers and other legal professionals). From these different sources, we created a master list and then contacted each local governmental entity to confirm that it had enacted the law; wherever possible, we obtained a written copy of the law. Once confirmed, the local law was entered into our legal database for analysis. This confirmation process was essential to ensuring accuracy; during our data collection, we occasionally found that laws were described as enacted (by news reports or advocacy organizations) when, in fact, the laws had only been proposed or were later tabled for various reasons.

**Scope of subfederal regulation**

The laws used to calculate ICI scores can be divided into six broad categories. The government benefits category is broadly defined to include access to welfare programs, workers’ compensation, healthcare, public housing, naturalization and refugee assistance, and education programs. By enacting a law, a subfederal government can choose to limit that access (for example, by limiting the benefit to U.S. citizens or those who can prove legal status) or to enhance that access (for example, by funding medical clinics for migrant workers or granting in-state tuition rates to unauthorized college students). A second category consists of laws controlling access to employment or employment benefits based on immigration status. For example, some laws require that employers verify the lawful immigration status of all their employees or face state and local penalties. Other laws place restrictions on the workers, requiring, for example, that applicants for a specific professional license (like a Certified Public Accountant license) prove legal immigration status before obtaining the license.

The third category, law enforcement, includes laws that enhance or restrict a police department’s authority to enforce immigration laws or laws that change a defendant’s treatment in the criminal justice system, based on immigration status. These laws have received a lot of media attention, including Arizona’s SB 1070 law that, among other provisions, requires state police to determine the immigration status of a person who is stopped, detained, or arrested, when there is reasonable suspicion that the person is in the United States illegally (Archibold, 2010). There are also smaller categories for housing (affecting the ability of immigrants to obtain private housing), voting (making it easier or more difficult for immigrants to vote), and legal services (typically laws that regulate the legal market to prevent immigrants from being defrauded).

Though many states have enacted human trafficking laws, we did not include them in our analysis because their net effect would likely be neutral. At first glance, human trafficking laws would seem

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1. Colorado’s human trafficking law, enacted in 2009, is typical of the trafficking laws enacted by states: it revises the criminal offense of involuntary servitude to include the act of withholding or threatening to destroy a person’s immigration documents and the act of threatening to notify federal immigration
to benefit immigrants because the laws offer protection from the abuses of trafficking. But by clamping down on trafficking, the laws also limit a channel that immigrants use to reach the United States. Others who have studied subfederal regulation have taken opposite views about the effects of trafficking laws on immigrants (PSN 2008) (Chavez and Provine 2009, 84), reinforcing our decision to exclude them from our analysis.

Because we are interested in measuring the climate for immigrants, we also excluded laws that do not have a concrete effect on immigrants’ lives. For example, we excluded resolutions, through which a subfederal government expresses an opinion about an immigration policy, like Illinois’ HR 913, adopted in 2006, urging Congress to enact the DREAM Act (Watanabe 2010) and Richmond, California’s 2006 resolution, asking Congress to adopt comprehensive immigration reform. Though resolutions may reflect local opinion about immigration issues (either positive or negative), they do not take any policy action and therefore do not concretely affect immigrants’ lives.

We excluded laws that have only a de minimis effect, for similar reasons. For example, Wyoming’s HB 144, enacted in 2006, allows a foreign passport or green card to be used as identification to rent a keg of beer; while this law may benefit immigrants in Wyoming, the benefit is so minimal that it does not have a concrete effect on their lives. Another example is Indiana’s HB 1182, a 2009 law that details health care reimbursement rates for prisoners without private health care coverage, a group that also includes unauthorized prisoners; the effect on immigrants is solely administrative and therefore de minimis.

We started our data collection in 2005, the year that subfederal immigration regulation began in earnest. Certainly, there was some subfederal enforcement before 2005, but these laws were largely isolated in nature. One prominent pre-2005 example was California’s Prop 187, a 1994 voter initiative that prohibited unauthorized immigrants in California from receiving health care, public education, or other state services; however, this initiative was never enforced because of legal challenges (Nieves 1999). The National Conference of State Legislatures, a bipartisan organization that tracks state legislation, did not compile immigration-related laws until 2005 and estimates that from 1999-2004, only 50-100 such laws were introduced by state legislatures (Ann Morse, pers. comm.). Our tracking of local regulations shows a similar pattern.

**Calculating ICI scores**

In calculating a state’s ICI score and thus its climate for immigrants, we recognize that different types of immigration laws will have different effects on immigrants’ lives. So rather than simply count the number of laws enacted within a state, we assigned a weight to individual laws, based on

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authorities of a person’s illegal immigration status. **C O L O. R E V. S T A T § 1 8 - 3 - 5 0 3 ( 2 0 0 9)** (revoked and replaced § 1 8 - 1 3 - 1 2 9 but kept immigration related provision.).

2. **H. R. 9 1 3 , 9 4 t h G e n . A s s e m . , R e g . S e s s . ( I l l . 2 0 0 6 )**. The DREAM Act would offer a pathway to citizenship for undocumented young people who attend college or serve in the military.

3. Richmond, Cal., Resolution 11-07 (Feb. 6, 2007).

4. **W Y O . S T A T . A N N . § 1 2 - 2 - 5 0 3 ( 2 0 0 6 )** (amended 2013).

5. **I N D . C O D E § 1 1 - 1 0 - 3 - 6 ( 2 0 0 9 )**.

6. The pattern for local laws is very similar: 2005 (20 enacted), 2006 (65 enacted), 2007 (85 enacted), 2008 (49 enacted), and 2009 (19 enacted).
the law’s type, whether it provides a benefit or a restriction, and its geographic reach. Regarding type of law, we divided the laws, state and local, into the following four tiers:

**Tier 4:**
**Definition:** laws that affect many aspects of life for immigrants, laws that will have the most impact on climate
**Examples:** laws related to law enforcement, including laws that authorize or prohibit subfederal police from enforcing federal immigration laws
**Score:** ± 4 points

**Tier 3:**
**Definition:** laws that affect a crucial aspect of life for immigrants, an aspect that is difficult to avoid or replace
**Examples:** laws that make it harder or easier for immigrants to obtain private housing (as contrasted with government-provided housing), identification (like driver’s licenses), or any kind of employment
**Score:** ± 3 points

**Tier 2:**
**Definition:** laws that affect an important but not crucial aspect of life for immigrants, an aspect that can be replaced with alternatives (albeit, not easily)
**Examples:** laws that make it harder or easier for immigrants to obtain specific jobs (including work as day laborers), specific work licenses, or access to social welfare benefits like education and healthcare
**Score:** ± 2 points

**Tier 1:**
**Definition:** laws that affect a practical aspect of immigrants’ lives but in a less important or less significant way
**Examples:** English only laws, laws that make it harder or easier for immigrants to vote, or legal services laws
**Score:** ± 1 point

We also differentiated between state and local laws in assigning weights, recognizing that local laws will have more limited effect, as compared with state laws. A local law may be in the same tier as a statewide law (e.g., Tier 3), but its impact on the climate for that state will be limited to its particular jurisdiction. Accordingly, we weighted a local law to reflect that more limited impact, by multiplying its tier points with the fraction local jurisdiction population ÷ state population.

As a concrete example, Cobb County, Georgia has signed a 287(g) with the Department of Justice, in which the county allows its police to enforce various aspects of federal immigration law. The negative four points that the law receives under the tier system described above is weighted to reflect the county’s smaller population, as compared with the larger population of the state.

\[
\frac{688,756 \text{ (population of Cobb County)}}{9,687,653 \text{ (population of Georgia)}} \times -4 \text{ tier points} = -0.28 \text{ points}
\]
When calculating Georgia’s ICI score, this 287(g) agreement will contribute -0.28 points to the state’s total score. Thus the laws of larger local governments (like Los Angeles County) will have a more significant effect on their states’ ICI scores than will the laws of smaller local governments.

**Results and future work**
The following are ICI scores (calculated using data from 2005-2009):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>ICI Score</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>ICI Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</table>
We are using the ICI index to track the evolution of states on immigration issues and to study the interaction between these laws and economic growth, demographic movement, and other outcomes. Specifically, we observe that states have created widely divergent climates for immigrants with subfederal regulations. Arizona has the most negative score (-#), Illinois has the most positive score (#), and the remaining 48 states’ scores fall in between. Thus, the climate that an immigrant experiences in the United States very much depends on which of the 50 states s/he lives in. What accounts for this divergence? In our current project, we explore different explanations for these widely divergent climates.

In analyzing subfederal immigration laws, media reports have focused on the incoming immigrant community, linking the prevalence of the laws to, for example, the size of the state’s Hispanic population or the size of the unauthorized immigrant population. We propose to shift the focus to the characteristics of the non-immigrant population: specifically, we look at the characteristics of a state’s “domestic” migrants (migrants moving to a state from another state). Our preliminary findings suggest that states’ ICI scores reflect the immigration preferences of their domestic migrants’ home states. For example, there is a strong positive correlation between a state’s ICI and the ICI of the states from which recent domestic migrants come. This correlation may result from two dynamics: domestic migrants are attracted to states with immigration climates that reflect their preferences or domestic migrants affect the immigration climate of their new home states. Moreover, states with domestic migrants coming from states with higher fractions of the white population tend to also have more negative ICI scores. These latter two effects are stronger when the receiving states have larger Mexican populations, suggesting that there may be a conflict between these populations.

These results suggest that subfederal immigration regulation is not only a reaction of the “native” population to the inflows of foreign immigrants. Rather, climate scores are strongly correlated, positively or negatively, with the scores that domestic migrants bring with them. Our preliminary results add an important dimension to the oft-told story of conflict between immigrant and receiving communities.

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The Challenges of Comparing Immigration Policies Across Three Centuries
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While there has been an explosion in the international political economy literature on migration recently, most scholars have focused on single country or small-n case studies in the post-World War II era. In contrast, most economic historians have focused on the pre-World War II era. Few studies examine both periods together. One of the reasons for the lack of long longitudinal studies has been a lack of data with which to compare periods.

This lack of data is not trivial. Most importantly, scholars have argued about basic descriptive statistics about these eras and how to compare them. For example, Freeman (1995) stated that current immigration policy is very open while Hatton and Williamson (2007) have argued that policy is restricted today in comparison to the 19th century. How do we reconcile these viewpoints if we do not have a measure that can compare pre- and post-World War II policies? And how do we judge our arguments about what causes variation in or the effects of immigration policy without understanding how states’ policies have changed over time?

To address this lacuna, I created a new measure of immigration policy for low-skill immigrants from the 19th through the 21st century for 19 states, including many of the settler states, European powers and states in East Asia and the Persian Gulf (Peters 2011; Peters 2013). From this data, I show that Hatton and Williamson (2007) are correct that states had more open immigration policies in the 19th century, but also that Freeman (1995) is correct that liberal democracies tend to have more open policies than autocracies.

In this note, I discuss some of the problems I encountered when creating this measure and explain how I address them. There are two major problems with creating a measure of immigration policy across three centuries. First, the language and norms around acceptable regulations have changed over the last three centuries. Given these changes, how do we compare modern regulations against past regulations? Here I will focus on two major regulations, nationality and skill entry criteria, and discuss how they can be aggregated in a single measure. Second, how do we deal with “new” groups of migrants? While there have been refugees, asylum seekers and family migrants throughout history, policies addressing these classes of migrants only came into existence in the Interwar Period and were not widely adopted until after World War II. How should we code policies towards these groups prior to the adoption of ones specifically meant to address them?

1 See for example (see for example Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007; Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013; Peters 2012)
2 See for example (Goldin 1994; Hatton and Williamson 1998; Timmer and Williamson 1998)
3 Peters (2011, 2013) are exceptions.
4 I begin the data set after 1800 for most states because there is little data on their immigration policy prior to the late 1700s. States included are the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
5 For a more complete description of the coding, see Appendix B of Peters (2012; 2013), available on my website: http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/mepeters/
The changing norms and language of immigration regulations
As with the creation of any measure, there is first the question of what, exactly, is the concept that we want to measure. Because most migrants or potential migrants, those who would move if legally able to, are low-skill (Hatton and Williamson 2005; United Nations Development Program 2009) and low-skill migration is more politicized than high-skill immigration (Goldstein and Peters 2012; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010), the measure I created examines openness to low-skill immigration.

To operationalize this concept, I examined how other scholars who study openness to trade and capital measure these concepts as well as how scholars have previously coded migration policies (Mayda 2004; Money 1999; Timmer and Williamson 1998). In the trade literature, scholars often use both de facto measures, such as trade flows, and de jure measures such as the tariff policy (Clemens and Williamson 2004) and/or non-tariff barriers (Sachs and Warner 1995). Similarly, scholars who study capital policy use capital flows (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004) or measures that capture de jure barriers to capital (Chinn and Ito 2008; Quinn and Toyoda 2008).

Unfortunately, unlike trade or capital flow data, we simply do not have the same quantity or quality of data to use flow data as a measure over a long time period. Few states collect comparable statistics on migration today, let alone in the past. Additionally, unlike trade where states have often used tariffs, there has been no single measure that a majority of states have used the majority of the time. Therefore in my research, I examine a range of de jure policies across several dimensions including who is allowed entry to the state, what rights immigrants have once they have entered and how the law is enforced.

One of the major changes in the implementation of immigration policy over the last 200 years has been the change from restrictions based on nationality to restrictions based on skill. If we are interested in low-skill migration, how do nationality regulations map onto a skill dimension? Below I will argue that nationality regulations and skill regulations are often interchangeable.

Restrictions based on nationality were the norm in many countries throughout 19th and into the mid-20th century. For example, nationality restrictions were the major means of controlling immigration by the United States starting with the infamous Chinese Exclusion Act and culminating in the 1921 and 1924 Quota Acts. These laws were aimed at those with (perceived) low levels of skill (Higham 1963). In this way, nationality restrictions were used in the same manner as skill restrictions.

Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa tried to follow the U.S.’s lead with their own prohibitions against Asian migrants. However, due to protests from the Indian government, the British Colonial office did not agree to these blanket prohibitions (Brawley 1993; Jupp 2002; Kelley and Trebilco 1998). Instead, the British Dominions were allowed to pass literacy exams. The language the exam was given in, however, was up to the discretion of the border control agent. The agent generally gave an easy passage in English to Western European immigrants while given a

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6 Even (Willcox et al. 1969) does not have the longitudinal data that we would need to use flows over this time period.
hard passage in some third language to non-Western immigrants. In this way, a skill restriction was used in the same way as the explicit nationality restrictions.

After World War II, nationality restrictions were delegitimized in liberal democracies, as were other policies that allowed discrimination based on race or ethnicity, such as Jim Crow Laws. In their place, many countries adopted skill restrictions, including points systems that heavily favored the entry of high-skill migrants. In Australia, Canada and New Zealand these points systems were created explicitly to restrict non-Western Europeans, especially Asians, as nationality restrictions had done (Brawley 1993; Jupp 2002; Kelley and Trebilcock 1998).

Skill restrictions were supposed to restrict the same groups as nationality restrictions because skill level and nationality are highly correlated - immigrants from less developed states often have lower levels of education and training - and it was assumed by policymakers that these groups would remain relatively low-skill.

Thus, if we are interested in immigration policy openness, especially towards low-skill migrants, we can aggregate these two policy areas into a single measure of restrictiveness. Nevertheless, given that many states use both skill and nationality policies, for ease of coding I coded these two policies separately and then aggregated them into a single measure.

Other policy innovations for economic migrants can be examined in the same light. For example, many states have recently created quotas for how many immigrant workers can work in a given industry or firm. These restrictions act in a manner similar to non-tariff barriers, such as health standards. They do not restrict immigration per se, but restrict the ability to earn a living and, thus, decrease the desire to move. If we are interested in low-skill (high-skill) immigration, we should code these by how much they are likely to restrict low-skill (high-skill) immigration.

“New” immigrant groups
More difficult policy areas to code over this lengthy period are policies towards non-economic migrants, including refugees, asylum seekers and family migrants. I include refugees, asylum seekers and family migrants in my measure because these migrants often come from developing nations with relatively few skills - thus most of these migrants are also relatively low-skill - and

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7 Autocracies have continued to use nationality-based restrictions; for example, Singapore has often restricted migration to its “traditional source countries” of Malaysia, India and China.
8 See Feliciano (2005) and Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) for data on the correlation of skill level and nationality.
9 While the policies of Canada, Australia and New Zealand were unsuccessful at restricting Asian immigration, they did succeed in restricting low-skill immigration (Brawley 1993; Jupp 2002; Kelley and Trebilcock 1998). Further, as migrants from the formerly restricted countries increased in skill level so did their stature. Recent survey data shows that, at least in the US, there is much greater support for Asian immigrants due to their perceived skill level than for the more culturally similar, but lower-skilled, Mexican immigrants (Goldstein and Peters 2012).
10 As in Peters (2013), I define a refugee as a person fleeing from his/her country of origin and who is outside the country they are trying to enter. An asylum seeker (or asylee) is someone who is at or inside the receiving state’s borders who wants to claim refugee status. Family migrants are the family members of citizens and permanent residents.
many of them end up in the workforce. Firms often see refugee and asylum seekers as a way to increase the labor supply if they cannot obtain immigrant labor through other channels. For example, after World War II, Congressional Lobbying Reports show that the American Farm Bureau lobbied for the Displaced Persons Act in hopes of receiving agricultural labor. Further, many opponents of open immigration have argued that these migrants are economic migrants in disguise (Kay and Miles 1988; Kaye 1994), making policies towards non-economic migrants a focus of anti-immigrant sentiment and further restrictions.

Policies toward non-economic migrants are difficult to code across time because, for the most part, the category of non-economic migrant did not exist prior to World War I. Many migrants fled persecution or hoped to join family members; yet, they were usually able to enter most receiving countries under the same laws as economic migrants. There were, however, a few exceptions. When the US Federal government began to regulate immigration in 1875, those fleeing political persecution were exempted from most regulations. Similarly, in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Netherlands and Switzerland also gave asylum to those who were persecuted for political offenses, allowing them to circumvent the existing rules such as income requirements for entry.

The advent of modern refugee policies was the aftermath of World War II when the Allies created United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), which eventually became the UN High Commission for Refugees. While many New World states took in European (but not Asian) refugees after World War II, it was not until the Vietnamese refugee crisis that some states created formal refugee programs.

In the aftermath of World War II, many states also created asylum policies. These asylum policies became contentious after many of these states restricted employment-based immigration in the 1960s and 1970s. At this point, the political discourse on immigration shifted to asylum seekers who were seen as economic migrants in disguise (Kay and Miles 1988; Kaye 1994). Many states began enacting safe-third country restrictions, quicker determination of asylum cases, and safe country of origin determinations. They also started restricting asylees' access to the social welfare system.

Similar to refugees and asylees, family immigration was not separated from other forms of immigration in most states until the 20th century. Since then, most states have allowed at least some family reunification, usually allowing spouses fiancés and children of citizens and immigrants entrance to the state. Many autocracies including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Singapore, however, only allow the families of wealthy immigrants entrance.

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11 The League of National also had a High Commission for Refugees, but this organization was relatively powerless.
12 Safe third country restrictions allow the asylum claim to be automatically classified as manifestly unfounded if the asylee travelled through a country that the receiving state has deemed as “safe.” Safe countries of origin are states that are deemed by the government to be safe and therefore, asylum claims are found to be unfounded without a hearing.
Given that states did not exclude or regulate these non-economic migrants prior to at least the early 20th century, how should we code changes in policies towards them? On the one hand, most non-economic migrants could enter the settler states and other European countries as economic migrants prior to draconian restrictions of the Interwar and Great Depression period. Does it make sense to code the state as not having a refugee, asylee or family migration policy if migrants can enter legally through other channels? On the other hand, less draconian restrictions began to impede refugee and asylum seekers and, potentially, family migrants to some extent before World War I. For example, many states required landing money or assurances against becoming a public charge, which refugees were unlikely to possess. If we code states as having an open refugee policy prior to an enactment of laws that would restrict non-economic migrants, how do we know when to code the policy as changing from open to restrictive?

I chose to code these policies both ways. First, I coded all years before a policy was enacted - regardless of whether non-economic migrants could enter under another category - as if the state had a very restrictive policy towards this group. Once a policy towards the group was enacted, I coded it according to my coding rules. I then aggregated these policies with the other migration policies I was studying.13 Second, I coded all years when non-economic migrants could enter a state as an economic migrant as a very open policy. Once there was a policy in place that would restrict these groups - such as landing money or prohibitions against public charges - I coded those years as very restrictive policy. Again, once a policy towards that group was enacted, I coded it according to my coding rules. I then aggregated this new measure with my other measures of immigration policy. The two overall immigration measure correlated quite highly (at 0.9), in part because my measure places relatively less weight on policies towards non-economic migrants than on policies on economic migrants.

In the end, I decided to use the first measure - where refugee, asylum and family migration policies are treated as a restrictive until a formal policy is in place - as my main measure mostly because it relies less on making judgment calls about which laws would impede the entry of non-economic migrants, which reduces the subjectivity and chance for coding errors. Researchers interested in non-economic migrants may prefer the second coding depending on their question. For example, if a researcher is interested in why certain countries adopted formal refugee or asylum policies, the first measure would be appropriate. However, if a researcher is interested in how difficult it has been for refugees to flee their homeland, the second measure would be more appropriate.

Conclusion
Policymakers have used many different tools to open or restrict immigration: sometimes explicitly restricting certain nationalities or skill levels; sometimes restricting what occupations immigrants can work in; sometimes increasing or decreasing enforcement and sometimes making asylum seeking or family migration easier or harder. When aggregating these different tools into one measure, the researcher must have a clear understanding of the concept s/he wishes to measure.

13 Following Chinn and Ito (2008), I used principal components analysis to combine these different dimensions of immigration policy. See Peters (2013) for more details.
My coding measures how open or restrictive immigration policy is towards low-skill immigrants. As such, it can help scholars test existing theories in the literature as well as new hypotheses about both the sources of variation in and the effects of immigration policy. For example, many scholars have posited that there is a path dependent effect of prior immigration policies - especially the policies of the 19th and early 20th century - on today's immigration policies (see for example Freeman 1995). To test these theories we need a measure that encompasses this time period, which this measure provides. Similarly, another set of scholars have argued that increase in the franchise (Hatton and Williamson 2005), the rise of the welfare state (Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007) or the rise of unions has lead to immigration restrictions (Briggs 2001; Goldin 1994). Most authors have tested these theories on pre-World War II or post-World War II data. Examining only pre-World War II data leaves open the question of whether these theories still hold today. Examining only post-World War II data leaves open the question of reverse causality: immigration policy may have affected democratization, the rise of the welfare state and the rise of unions before World War II. Therefore, to gain a better understanding of the politics of immigration policy, we should examine both periods together.

References
While no country is in complete control over immigration, the migration (and other) policies of nation states play a key role in influencing the scale, composition and effects of international migration. To give the most obvious example, restrictive immigration policies are a major reason why only a relatively small share of people who wish to migrate to other countries are able to do so in practice, and why international migrants constitute only three percent of the global population.

While the role of the state in international migration was, somewhat curiously, understudied for a long time (see, for example, the reviews in Hollifield 2000; Zolberg 1999), there is now considerable research literature, within political science but also other related disciplines, that aims to theorize and analyze the processes, determinants and effects of immigration policies. While much of this literature over the past twenty years has taken the form of single or comparative case studies, this symposium reflects the growing interest in ‘large n’ studies of the key features, variations, determinants and effects of immigration policies across countries and over time. The key obstacle to this research is the absence of a comprehensive set of international comparative measures and indicators of migration policies.

Measuring Labor Immigration Policies: Openness, Skills, and Rights

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While no country is in complete control over immigration, the migration (and other) policies of nation states play a key role in influencing the scale, composition and effects of international migration. To give the most obvious example, restrictive immigration policies are a major reason why only a relatively small share of people who wish to migrate to other countries are able to do so in practice, and why international migrants constitute only three percent of the global population.
This article discusses selected issues in the measurement and analysis of labor immigration policies. It draws and reflects on the empirical analysis in my forthcoming book on 'The Price of Rights. Regulating International Labor Migration' (Princeton University Press, Aug 2013). My research for this book included the creation of two separate indexes that measure: the openness of labor immigration programs in forty-six high- and middle-income countries to admitting migrant workers; and the legal rights (civil and political, economic, social, residency, and family reunion rights) granted to migrant workers admitted under these programmes.

The discussion below highlights selected issues that have informed my approach and methodology as well as a few lessons that I learnt while doing this research. The discussion is selective rather than comprehensive. The development of labour immigration policy indexes is still in its infancy, so this note is meant to contribute to the ongoing debate about how to deal with the various challenges of conceptualisation, measurement and analysis.

**Labor immigration policy involves simultaneous decisions on openness, skills and rights**

Given that the regulation of labor immigration can involve a large number of different types of policy tools, how shall we conceptualize and define labor immigration policy? At its core, the design of a labor immigration policy requires simultaneous policy decisions on three fundamental issues: how to regulate openness i.e. the number of migrants to be admitted (e.g., through quotas or points-based systems); how to select migrants (e.g., by skill and/or nationality); and what rights to grant migrants after admission (e.g., temporary or permanent residence; access to welfare benefits; and limited or unlimited rights to employment).

The first two decisions on ‘openness’ and ‘selection’ regulate the admission of migrant workers, while the third decision – on ‘rights’ – relates to the treatment of migrants after admission. The inclusion of rights as an instrument of labor immigration policy is, in my view, of fundamental importance to the analysis of overall labor immigration policies. This is because, in addition to their *intrinsic* value, the rights of migrant workers (“migrant rights”) play an important *instrumental* role in shaping the effects of international labor migration for receiving countries, migrants, and their countries of origin.

For example, whether or not migrants enjoy the right to free choice of employment and other employment-related rights in the receiving country’s labor market is likely to affect their productivity and earnings, remittances, and competition with local workers. The fiscal effects of immigration critically depend on whether and how migrants’ social rights (including access to public services and welfare benefits) are restricted. Migrants’ incentives and behavior in and beyond the labor market—for instance, the extent to which they acquire language and other skills relevant to employment and life in the host country—will be influenced by whether or not they have—or are on a path to acquiring—the rights to permanent residence and citizenship.

Because rights shape the effects of labor immigration, restrictions on migrant rights are in practice a core component of nation-states’ labor immigration policies. The important implication is that analysis of labor immigration policy must study both admission (openness and selection) and the rights that migrant workers are granted after admission. Put differently, admissions policies cannot be understood in isolation from migrant rights, both in terms of positive and normative analysis. To
understand why, when, and how countries restrict the admission of migrant workers, and to explore what admission policies we should advocate, we need to consider how particular admission policies are related to restrictions of migrants’ rights after admission. Conversely, restrictions of migrant rights cannot be understood without paying attention to admission policies. Of course, admission and rights require separate measures but they are – and therefore need to be analyzed as – integral parts of nation states’ labor immigration policies.

**Most countries operate different policies for admitting migrants with different skills**

With very few exceptions (including, for example, Sweden), most countries operate different labour immigration policies for admitting and employing migrants in low-, medium- and high-skilled jobs. Policies for different skill groups of workers are typically associated with different sets of admissions criteria and rights for migrant workers. This means that the initial ‘unit of analysis’ needs to be specific labour immigration programmes (i.e. policies for admitting a particular type of workers) rather than overall policies of countries as a whole. Second, the analysis needs to be able to take account of the skill levels targeted by the various labour immigration programmes.

My analysis in Ruhs (2013) includes 104 labor immigration programs in 46 high- and middle-income countries, or an average of 2.3 programs per country. This average masks considerable variation. Some countries, such as Sweden and Belgium, only operate one major labor immigration program. In contrast, the United States has six different programs for admitting migrant workers, while Canada and Australia each have four (the analysis refers to policies in 2009).

To explore the potential variation of openness and rights across labor immigration programs that aim to admit migrants with different skills levels, each of the programs included in my analysis was assigned one or more ‘targeted skill levels’. The targeted skill level of a labor immigration program reflects the skills required in the (specific or range of) jobs that migrants are admitted to fill. It also allows for the common phenomenon of skilled migrant workers taking low-skilled jobs abroad. Just because a particular labor immigration program aims to attract low-skilled migrant workers (for low-skilled jobs) does not necessarily mean that in practice, higher-skilled migrants will not apply and be admitted to fill the jobs. There is considerable evidence showing that skilled migrants often do lower-skilled work in high-income countries. This particularly applies to new (i.e., recently arrived) migrants, who sometimes view their first job abroad as a stepping-stone to a better job that more closely corresponds to their skills.

My analysis distinguishes between four broad skill levels: low-skilled (LS), defined as migrant workers with less than high school education and no vocational skills; medium-skilled (MS), defined as migrants with high school, vocational training, or trades qualifications, such as electricians, plumbers, and so on; high-skilled (HS1), defined as migrants with a first degree from a university or the equivalent tertiary training; and very high-skilled (HS2), defined as migrants with second- or third-level university degrees, or equivalent qualifications. It is important to stress that these distinctions are necessarily artificial and not always directly applicable, as immigration policies may define skills in terms of education, occupation, work experience, and/or pay of the job in the host country. There is no universal measure of ‘skill’ which can take on various different meanings in different contexts. Many jobs that are considered highly skilled, e.g. ballet dancers or sports professionals, do not require high levels of formal education. Similarly, many successful
entrepreneurs and managers do not have college degrees. Clearly, some flexibility and judgment is required when assessing what types of skill levels specific programs are designed to target – a difficult but not impossible job.

**Measuring openness requires a parsimonious yet flexible set of indicators that can be measured in practice (given the resources available)**

A first key question in the construction of any index is how to conceptualize precisely what is being measured. I have opted to choose the most basic conceptualization possible, which is simply to measure the "openness" of a labor immigration policy to admitting migrant workers. A program with a high (low) degree of openness is characterized by few (many) restrictions on the legal immigration and employment of migrant workers. The indicators of my index thus aim to capture the presence and, whenever relevant, relative strength of particular restrictions.

A second key issue relates to the choice of indicators for measuring openness. In principle, it is desirable to aim for a relatively small and parsimonious set of indicators. At the same time, it is important to identify a set of indicators that is broad enough to allow for different "modes of immigration control"—that is, different types of policies that regulate the admission of migrant workers. Different countries with different welfare states, production structures, and industrial relations systems can be expected to operate different types of restrictions on labor immigration. The set of indicators must be broad and flexible enough to capture this variation.

To conceptualize and identify the relevant indicators of openness, I distinguished between three types of restrictions: quotas; criteria that employers in the host country need to meet to legally employ migrant workers ("demand restrictions"); and criteria that potential migrant workers need to meet to be admitted to the host country ("supply restrictions"). This distinction is obviously somewhat artificial as some restrictions may, for example, affect both demand and supply. Nevertheless, it is a useful general approach to identifying the relevant indicators. My overall openness index comprises a total of twelve indicators: existence, types and strength of quota; demand restrictions including the requirement of job offer; strength of labour market tests; restrictions of wages and conditions; occupational/sectoral restrictions; economic fees for employing migrants; and the degree of trade union involvement; supply restrictions including nationality and age restrictions; gender and marital status restrictions; specific skills requirements; language requirement; and self-sufficiency requirements.

The restrictions captured in my indicators could be implemented by laws and/or administrative regulations. This is a key point with important implications for the practicalities of measurement and analysis. There is significant variation across countries in the extent to which restrictions of immigration, and changes to immigration policies, require changes in law (and approval of parliament). In some countries such as the US most key aspects of immigration policy are written into law which means major changes require approval by Congress. In other countries quite important changes to immigration policy are possible without parliamentary approval and changes to the law, e.g. in the UK the government has recently changed the cap on non-EU labour immigration as well as the criteria in its points-based system for regulating labour immigration without requiring a change in law.
The implication is that measuring openness to labour immigration cannot rely on analysis of legal text and regulations alone but must also take account of administrative changes that are not captured by law. This can make it very hard to carry out a detailed analysis of past policies. Some specific policy regulations may not always be formally recorded and can therefore be hard to find and verify going back in time. My own research was carried out in early 2009 and focused on labour immigration policies in the year 2009 but my research team also scored the indicators for 2008 to check for any potential changes due to the economic downturn. Going back in time just one year was already more difficult than expected.

**Measuring migrant rights**

Despite the increasing interest in measuring human rights, there are also few studies that systematically measure the scope and variation of the legal rights of different types of migrants across high-income countries. Notable exceptions include Harald Waltrauch’s (2001) work, which constructs a “legal index” that measures the integration of migrants in six European countries, and the more recent Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which uses a mix of legal and outcome indicators to measure policies for integrating migrants in EU member states and three non-EU countries (British Council and Migration Policy Group 2011). Specifically, MIPEX measures the extent to which each country’s policies conform to European directives and European standards of best practice in six areas: labor market access, family reunion, long-term residence, political participation, access to nationality, and antidiscrimination. The migration policy indexes developed by Lowell (2005), Cerna (2008), and Jeni Klugman and Medalho Pereira (2009) also include an evaluation of a small number of migrant rights.

My indicators of migrant rights include a mix of different types of rights including five civil and political rights, five economic rights, five social rights, five residency rights, and three rights related to family reunion. I focus on rights that are granted upon admission under the 104 labour immigration programmes that I have analysed. Importantly, my indicators are focused on measuring rights in laws and regulations rather than in practice. Rights can be measured as laws and regulations and/or as rights outcomes in practice (for a discussion, see for example Landmann 2004). Migrants can be denied some rights that exist in law (e.g., if there is no effective state protection and enforcement of the existing legal right to a minimum wage) and/or enjoy rights that do not exist in law (e.g., medical doctors may in practice treat patients without the legal rights to health care). Clearly, one would ideally like to measure rights in law (or principle) and practice, but the latter is much more complex and potentially more dependent on subjective judgements.

A key challenge in the construction of any comparative migrant rights index is that, while the rights of migrant workers are typically more restricted than those of citizens, the legal rights of citizens can and do vary across countries. We may expect many/most liberal democracies to respect the civil and political rights stipulated in international human rights law, yet we are likely to find significant variation in economic and social rights across liberal democracies. Furthermore, high-income countries that are not liberal democracies may not provide their citizens (let alone migrants) all the civil and political rights stipulated by the human rights treaties. It is thus possible, for example, that neither citizens nor migrants have the right to join trade unions. When constructing and interpreting the scores of the index for a particular right it is obviously important to also consider whether citizens enjoy that right.
A second and related challenge pertains to the meaning as well as nature of different types of rights along with the implications for measurement. The meaning, freedoms, and benefits of some rights are relatively clear and consistent across countries and time, thereby lending themselves to consistent measurement. For instance, the right to free choice of employment generally means that people are free to apply for any job in the country (although the range and quality of jobs available can of course vary significantly across countries). Yet there are other rights—mainly economic and social rights—that primarily relate to equality of treatment rather than to some absolute and universal standard, which makes them more difficult to measure and compare across countries. The right to equal access to public health services is a good case in point. The range and quality of public health services obviously varies significantly across countries. Migrants with the right to equal access to public health care in Argentina and Sweden enjoy the same legal right, but the value of their rights—understood in terms of the actual benefits that the right conveys—differs dramatically across the two countries.

**Some research findings and the case for mixed methods in the analysis of labor immigration policy**

There is an urgent need to create systematic indicators of labor immigration policies that allow us to identify and analyze key features, patterns, determinants and effects of labor immigration policies across countries and over time. My own empirical research (Ruhs 2013), which is a first step in that direction, identifies a number of important patterns and relationships in high-income countries’ labor immigration policies. Some of my findings confirm what we already ‘knew’ from existing research, while others raise new questions. For example, my analysis suggests that both openness and some migrant rights are positively related to the skill level targeted by the labor immigration program (i.e. programs designed to admit and employ higher-skilled migrants are more open and grant more rights than programs targeting lower-skilled migrants). For upper high-income countries, my research also finds evidence of a trade-off (i.e. a negative relationship) between openness and certain specific migrant rights (i.e. programs that are more open to admitting migrant workers also impose greater restrictions on specific migrant rights). The latter finding suggests that insisting on equality of rights can come at the price of more restrictive admission policies – a key theme explored through quantitative, qualitative and normative analysis in my book.

While I am convinced about the need and usefulness of more and better quantitative policy indicators, there will always be strong limitations and caveats that need to be kept in mind. Clearly, immigration policy and migrant rights are complex issues that do not easily lend themselves to the kind of simplification and rigid description associated with an index. The obvious implication is that it is important to be as open and transparent as possible about the methodology along with its limitations, and carefully explain all the assumptions and decisions made at various stages of the analysis.

There is, in my view, a very strong case for a mixed method approach to analyzing immigration policies. More quantitative approaches can be helpful in suggesting systematic patterns and potential relationships, but qualitative and in-depth analyses of policy processes need to remain central to research in this area.
Measuring Migration Policies: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections

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Introduction

The effectiveness of migration policies has been widely contested in the face of their oft perceived failure to control the movement of people. Because migration is driven by economic, demographic and political processes in origin and destination societies that are far beyond the scope of migration policies, the argument goes that policy restrictions only have a limited effect on inflows, and have several unintended, counter-productive effects such as encouraging irregular migration, discouraging return and pushing migrants into permanent settlement (Castles 2004; Cornelius et al. 2004; de Haas 2011; Massey et al. 1998). Furthermore, migrant networks and migration system dynamics are known to lower the costs and risks of

1 The research leading to these results is part of the DEMIG (The determinants of international migration: A theoretical and empirical assessment of policy, origin and destination effects) project and has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant Agreement 240940. See www.imi.ox.ac.uk/research-projects/demig. The authors would like to thank Liv Bjerre, Marc Helbling, Katharina Natter, Edo Mahendra, María Villares-Varela and Simona Vezzoli for useful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
migration. This can give migration processes their own momentum, for instance through continuing family migration (Castles and Miller 2009; de Haas 2010; Massey 1990; Massey et al. 1998). This has led some to state that ‘borders are beyond control’ (cf. Bhagwati 2003).

However, other scholars have countered the idea that there is a general migration control crisis and have argued that the capacity of states to control migration has actually increased (Brochmann and Hammar 1999; Broeders and Engbersen 2007). Several empirical studies seem to indicate that policies do have a significant effect on migration (Hatton 2009; Ortega and Peri 2013). One can also argue that there is certain bias in policy debates towards irregular and other forms of ‘unwanted’ migration, for instance the large number of Mexican undocumented migrants living in the US. This may obscure the fact that the large majority of migration takes place in a regular fashion and that most migrants abide by the rules by applying for visa, work and residence permits or by registering upon arrival. This would indicate that migration policy regimes are generally effective.

However, as a result of several conceptual and methodological problems, evidence has remained inconclusive. While migration researchers usually blame this on the lack of reliable migration and policy data, this is also related to a considerable degree of conceptual confusion about the very meaning of policy effectiveness, limitations and flaws in the ways migration policies are operationalized, and sometimes rather arbitrary specifications of quantitative empirical models. Even with infallible migration and policy data, these conceptual questions will not go away by ignoring them, and will thus continue to haunt us unless they receive more attention. This observation holds more generally for migration studies, which is a largely data-driven, but under-theorized field of social inquiry.

In this article, we will reflect on some of the major theoretical and methodological challenges in measuring migration policies. This will be based on the research conducted in the context of the DEMIG (The Determinants of International Migration) project at the International Migration Institute (IMI) of the University of Oxford, which aims to generate new conceptual and empirical insights into the role of receiving and sending states and the effects of their migration policies on the size, direction, timing and composition of international migration (cf. de Haas 2011, see also www.imi.ox.ac.uk/research-projects/demig).

**Conceptual considerations**

A first conceptual problem is that there is confusion on what policy effectiveness actually entails. In a recent paper, we have argued that, to a considerable extent, the public and academic controversy about this issue is spurious because of fuzzy definitions of policy effectiveness. This partly stems from a common confusion between (1) policy discourses, (2) policies on paper, (3) policy implementation, and (4) policy impacts. Although policies on paper and implemented policies seem to be the correct yardstick to factually assess policy effectiveness, in practice, the (generally more pronounced) discourses or stated policies are often used as an implicit benchmark in the migration policy literature to assess policy effectiveness (Czaika and de Haas 2011).

This ‘discursive bias’ can easily lead to an overestimation of ‘policy failure’. For instance, if public declarations of politicians to drastically curtail immigration are not matched by actual policies, it should come as no surprise that immigration continues at high rates. In such cases, we can talk
about *perceived* policy failure. We therefore distinguished three immigration policy gaps: (1) The *discursive gap* (the discrepancy between public discourses and policies on paper); (2) the *implementation gap* (the disparity between policies on paper and their implementation); and (3) the *efficacy gap* (the extent to which implemented policies actually affect migration, controlling for the effects of other origin and destination country migration determinants) (Czaika and de Haas 2011).

The bias of much research towards discourses and stated (instead of written) policies also explains the common assumption that immigration policies have become generally more restrictive on the whole, an assumption which recent evidence has questioned (cf. Ortega and Peri 2009).

The extent to which policies are implemented varies widely, and depends on factors such as the availability of financial and human resources, competing policy priorities and the discretion of civil servants and other state agents (Boswell 2007; Czaika and de Haas 2011). However, it is notoriously difficult to assess the ‘street-level’ implementation of policies, and this requires detailed qualitative field research (cf. Brachet 2005; Infantino 2010). It seems unrealistic that implementation can be quantitatively measured for a range of immigration policies in various countries over extended periods of time.

The quantitative measurement of immigration policies seems only realistically possible at the level of policies on paper (Czaika and de Haas 2011), and even under imaginary circumstances of ‘perfect’ data and empirical models, we would not be able to disentangle implementation and efficacy gaps. Although this does not mean that we should not aim at measuring policies’ effects, it does imply that researchers involved in quantitative assessments of policy impacts should have a thorough awareness of the qualitative literature on policy implementation and, more generally, the political and social context in which policies are implemented. This will increase the capacity to interpret results from quantitative analyses and, hence, to make more reliable assessments of policy effects.

In particular, the specification and interpretative power of quantitative models could be significantly improved by a better awareness of the context in which migration policies have evolved. Some of the best studies in the migration policy impact literature, such as by Hatton (2009), and, more generally, in the migration determinants literature (cf. Hatton and Williamson 1998) show a deep awareness of the broader historical, economic, demographic, social and political context – and are therefore able to specify the role of states and migration policies with more authority and precision.

Likewise, and notwithstanding the sophistication and quality of this debate, the literature on the political economy of migration policies sometimes has the tendency to become detached from implementation and migratory realities on the ground. Their very focus on political processes can leave the question of implementation and effectiveness largely unanswered. Indeed, the literature on the post-Schengen ‘externalization’ (or ‘outsourcing’) of EU migration policies towards non-EU countries such as Morocco and Turkey pays extensive attention to the formation of such policies, but often does not address the extent to which such policies are actually implemented.

**Research gaps**

This brief review points to a considerable research gap: there is not only a clear need for a better measurement of migration policies and their implementation as such, but also for empirical studies to improve (1) our knowledge of the nature and evolution of immigration *and* emigration policies;
(2) the extent to which stated migration policies are actually implemented on paper (discursive gap) and in practice (implementation gap); and (3) the effects of such policies on long-term migration patterns and trends.

With regard to the measurement of policy effectiveness, it seems important to broaden our view, away from the one-sided focus on short-term effects of policies on inflows of the targeted migration category (e.g., asylum seekers, which is the best studied category more generally). This is particularly important because attempts of specific policies to influence targeted migration categories can have knock-on effects on other migration flows. In another paper, de Haas (2011) hypothesized four ‘substitution effects’ which can limit the effectiveness of immigration restrictions: 1) spatial substitution through the diversion of migration to other countries; 2) categorical substitution through a reorientation towards other legal or illegal channels; 3) inter-temporal substitution affecting the timing of migration such as ‘now or never migration’ in the expectation of future tightening of policies; and 4) reverse flow substitution if immigration restrictions also reduce return migration and make the effect on net migration fundamentally ambiguous (de Haas 2011).

Drawing on project-generated migration policy and bilateral flow databases, the DEMIG project aims to analyse these substitution effects using double comparative analysis which simultaneously studies the migration of multiple origin groups to and from multiple destination countries (de Haas 2011). The existence of substitution effects also demonstrates the need to look at the ‘externalities’ of specific policy measures that often go beyond the (short-term) effects on targeted (e.g., asylum, family) migration categories by considering (short and long-term) effects of specific migration policies on other, untargeted immigration and emigration flows. This emphasizes the need to look at the broader picture by embedding the study of particular policy effects in the broader context of long-term migration system dynamics. This shows the importance of combining quantitative tests of migration determinants with qualitative studies to improve our understanding of the context in which policies are formulated and implemented (Czaika and de Haas 2011).

**Approaches to measure immigration policies**

The complex and multi-faceted nature of immigration policies poses significant dilemmas in terms of methodological choices. Scholars have used a range of methodological approaches to measure migration policies. A standardized approach seems almost illusory given the highly diverse nature of migration policies, with some countries using particular instruments (e.g., quotas or citizenship tests) which other countries do not use at all (see also Ruhs 2011). Other policy instruments (e.g., visas, residence permits, naturalization) are more universal, but there is large variation in the practical formulation and implementation of such policies. Major overhauls in immigration policies can also imply a change in policy instruments (e.g., the introduction of a point system in the UK in 2008) which can complicate consistency of measurement over time.

It is possible to make a distinction between three basic techniques that researchers have used to measure migration policies: (1) policy dummies, (2) the tracking of major policy changes within each country and (3) comprehensive policy indices, which generally assess the ‘absolute’ level of restrictiveness (for an overview, see Czaika and de Haas 2011). In the first type of study, researchers capture the effect of one or particular policy changes on immigration by including dummy variables in empirical models (e.g. Karemera et al. (2000) for the US and Canada; Vogler and
Rotte (2000) for Germany). Other studies use dummies to capture the effects of regional integration processes (see e.g. Hatton (2005) for the EU enlargements in 1986 and 1995, Beine, Docquier and Özden (2011) and Ortega and Peri (2009) for the effect of the Schengen agreement or the Maastricht Treaty on European migration).

A second method to measure migration policy change is used by Mayda (2010) to track major migration policy changes. She captured changes in migration policies over time in 14 OECD countries between 1980 and 1995 using an ordinal scale of increasing or decreasing restrictiveness. Mayda coded each policy change as a step towards either more or less restrictive immigration regulations, resulting in a one point increase or decrease of her index. Ortega and Peri (2009) extended Mayda’s index to cover a longer time period (1980–2005) and including data on social policies. In the DEMIG project, building upon Mayda’s original approach, we are currently elaborating an extended migration policy database, which tracks policy changes in immigration and (the oft-ignored) emigration policies for most OECD and some non-OECD countries.

A third approach consists of the construction of immigration policy indices. In their studies on the effects of policies on asylum migration, Hatton (2004) and Thielemann (2004) measured changes over time for a limited number of key policy indicators, which they combined in indices of policy restrictiveness. Ruhs (2011) constructed two separate indices that measure the (1) openness of 46 high- and middle-income countries to admitting migrant workers of various skill levels as well as the (2) legal rights (civil and political, economic, social, residency, and family reunion rights) granted to migrant workers after admission. The MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index) uses 148 policy indicators to measure the extent to which migrants are guaranteed equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities. MIPEX currently covers 31 European and North American Western countries for the years 2007 and 2010 (www.mipex.eu, see also Niessen and Huddleston 2009).

The use of policy dummies, policy change tracking and comprehensive policy indices have each proven their value in empirical studies. In fact, the choice for an optimal methodology largely depends on the specific research question at hand, so ‘more’ is not automatically ‘better’, particularly if we take into account the resource-intensive and time-consuming nature of generating reliable policy data. Policy dummies can be a useful and efficient method to study the effects of particular policy changes, but the obvious drawback is that it obscures the role of other policy changes that often happen concurrently. The policy change tracking approach seems useful for time-series analyses that aim to measure the effect of changes towards more or less restrictiveness within each country. Because the scale of these immigration policy change indices is ordinal, the scale points only capture the direction of change in either a more or less restrictive direction, not the relative importance of a policy change or the absolute level of restrictiveness. This seems to render this approach unsuitable to compare policies, for instance levels of restrictiveness, between countries.

Comprehensive policy indices aim to capture an absolute level of policy making. This seems to make them more suitable for cross-country analyses and to take stock of the entire immigration policy regime instead of the focus on (potentially relatively marginal) effects of policy changes over time. Inter alia, the study by Ruhs (2011) has shown the usefulness of this approach, for instance for
studying the relation between entry restrictiveness and migrants’ access to rights across a large range of countries. The main practical drawback is the laborious nature of collecting and coding detailed policy data from a range of countries, and most existing indices are only available for one or a limited number of years. Therefore, indices seem more useful for cross-sectional analyses.

However, this seems ready to change in the future thanks to new initiatives. The IMPALA project (see Beine et al. in this newsletter and www.impaladatabase.org), is currently gathering comparable and comprehensive data on immigration and integration law and policy in over 25 countries between 1960 and 2010. The IMPIC project is building an immigration policy index which covers 33 OECD countries for the years 1980-2010 (see Helbling et al. in this newsletter). Once available, these databases will dramatically increase the capacity to construct longitudinal indices which are suitable for the analyses of panel datasets covering a range of countries over a large number of years.

Together with the DEMIG Policy Database, the DEMIG project is currently compiling a Travel Visa Database, containing bilateral information on travel visas for both entry and exit regulations. This database compiles information for 45 countries on visa issuance between 1973 and 2013 and is being extended to for all countries in the world. Visas are one of the main migration policy instruments and will be used as proxy variable to assess bilateral migration restrictiveness.

**Methodological dilemmas**

The increasing availability of policy and bilateral migration data promises to significantly increase the capacity for generating improved insights into the nature and effects of immigration (and increasingly also of emigration) policies. However, it is important to stress that, in themselves, data improvements do not solve conceptual and methodological problems. This particularly applies to the validity and usefulness of constructing policy indices. First, the complex, fragmented and often incoherent nature of most immigration policies raises the question whether it is valid to speak in terms of *general* restrictiveness (or permissiveness) of immigration policies. Immigration policies often aim at affecting the selection of immigrants rather than overall levels. Immigration policies are typically a ‘mixed’ bag of contradictory laws, measures and regulations aiming at decreasing (or stimulating) migration of particular national, ethnic, class, skill, age and gender groups (cf. Czaika and de Haas 2011). This raises the question whether it is methodologically justifiable to lump such very different types of policies with regards to issues such as entry, employment, settlement, and exit together in one index. This may make it difficult to speak of ‘general levels’ of restrictiveness, particularly if we talk about the entire policy regime instead of a policy targeted towards a particular migrant group (e.g., asylum seekers).

A second fundamental problem is related to the weighing of different policy indicators within an index. Apart from the question what policy indicators to include (e.g. are integration policies part of immigration policies? Where do we draw the boundary between migration and non-migration policies? The attribution of weights to particular policy indicators is a delicate and partly subjective affair, as there is no objective yardstick to assess the relative importance of a policy component *a priori* (see Czaika and de Haas 2011). After all, the very purpose of empirical analyses in this field is to determine the relative importance of the effects of particular policies. However, in assigning weights, we already build in assumptions on the relative importance of particular policies in the
index before we start the actual analysis. Because the relative importance of policy components cannot be objectively established \textit{a priori}, weighing thus inevitably involves a degree of subjective assessment. Again, this shows the importance of a strong theoretical embedding of empirical models and in making decisions on the construction and weighing of indices.

**Conclusion: The importance of theory and methodological openness**

The above analysis showed that the different methodologies to measure migration policies all have their own value. It showed the continued relevance of policy dummies and qualitative field and case studies in order to determine the real effects of particular policies. It also shows that there is a certain elegance in the use of ordinal scales by policy change tracking indices, because this methodology implicitly acknowledges the conceptual impossibility of providing an \textit{a priori} assessment of the relative importance of a particular policy change.

Even if we possess the ‘whole grail’ in terms of ‘perfect’ migration and policy data, this does not solve fundamental methodological problems such as weighting and the conceptual validity of policy indices. More in general, there is a danger in seeing more data as the only or main solution. Even if we have data, we still face the problem that we can only assess the relative effectiveness of migration policies if we develop empirical models that correctly specify and incorporate other theoretically relevant migration determinants in both sending and receiving countries.

This exemplifies the continued importance of good theory and contextual insight to inform methodological choices. All too often, migration determinants research tends to be based on obsolete push-pull and gravity models which ignore recent developments in migration theory and therefore omit crucial migration determinants such as non-economic factors as well as relevant origin country migration determinants and emigration policies (de Haas and Vezzoli 2011).

There has been a recent surge in interest for the measurement of migration policies and their effects. This has created the potential to radically improve our insight into the nature, evolution and determinants of migration policies, and, more generally, into the role of states and policies in migration processes. However, it is important not to see better data as a panacea, but instead to work to better embed our empirical models in existing theory as well as to adopt an interdisciplinary attitude and an open, eclectic approach in terms of methodologies - one in which the choice of methodology is guided by the specific research question at hand. Often, trade-offs have to be made between the laborious comprehensiveness of policy indices and the efficiency and deeper insights that can be achieved by focusing on the implementation and effects of some particular policies. Each methodology has its advantages and drawbacks, and each has its place, as long as it does not claim to be the only correct one.

**References**


The comparative study of citizenship policy has come a long way. What started out as a vestige of the nationalism literature – in which understandings of and policies for conferring citizenship were defined as mirror images of either ethnic or civic concepts of nationhood (see Brubaker 1992) – has expanded considerably to include dynamic measures and analyses of policy. This is reflected in an array of increasingly sophisticated indicators and multi-method studies. Many would point out that the near-frenzied interest in identifying and analyzing citizenship policy by scholars is matched only by the activity of policymakers themselves, where the past twenty years have seen more changes to nationality laws than the past fifty combined.

Indeed, the 2000s has been a boon decade for the development of citizenship policy indicators. Today, there are (at least) four major independent, comprehensive, multi-country indices for measuring citizenship policy: the Migrant Integration Policy Index (“MIPEX”) produced by the British Council and the Migration Policy Group (2010), Marc Morjé Howard’s Citizenship Policy Index (“CPI”) (2009), Ruud Koopmans et al.’s Indicators for Citizenship Rights of Immigrants (“ICRI”) (2005; 2012), and EUDO-Citizenship’s new Citizenship Law Indicators (CITLAW) (2013).1 As the contributions in this newsletter show, there are also a number of attempts to do similar classificatory work with immigration policy. Much can be learned from the citizenship indicator experience, where the entrepreneurial spirit of developing unique indicators has unfortunately outpaced a concurrent conversation on methodology.2 I primarily emphasize the importance of concept validity and differentiation, operationalization, and scoring.

Concept validity
The agenda to identify, code and compare citizenship policy began with Harald Waldrauch and Eric Hofinger’s “Index of Legal Obstacles to Integration” (LOI) (1997). Access to citizenship – specifically through rules on residence, naturalization and the legal status of the second generation – is presented as an obstacle to integration alongside access to the labor market and family reunification. Fast forward to today – fifteen years later – and we see a division in the citizenship literature between examining citizenship on its own versus in the context of immigrant integration policies. Howard, for example, codes naturalization policies, dual citizenship, and jus soli provisions to build a “citizenship policy index” while Koopmans et al.’s most recent project includes a variety of policies – citizenship being but one of them — but labels their index as “citizenship rights for immigrants.”3 This conceptual ambiguity partly results from the interdisciplinary nature of the

1 Also see Thomas Janoski’s Barriers to Naturalization Index (“BNI”) (2010) and Edward Koning’s unnamed index (2012).
2 The only exceptions are Waldrauch and Hofinger (1997) and Goodman (2012).
3 It should be said that the label itself exacerbates the problem of concept validity. Immigrants and citizens are distinct categories: Not all immigrants are citizens, so why would immigrants have citizenship rights? In this case, a word to differentiate “citizenship rights” from citizenship would be more appropriate. A similar conceptual problem results from the earlier version of this index, presented in Koopmans et al.’s book, Contested Citizenship (2005).
citizenship subfield: political scientists define citizenship as a legal category and examine policies that confer or block the acquisition of status to produce citizenship policy indices, whereas sociologists define citizenship as a series of rights (drawing more directly on the tradition of T.H. Marshall) to produce citizenship rights indices (or, to establish better differentiation, integration indices)\(^4\). But, in both disciplines, citizenship acquisition is one type of integration (legal integration), and sits laterally to other kinds of integration-promoting policies, including access to the labor market (economic integration), opportunities for political participation (political integration), etc. Therefore, we can interpret citizenship policy indices as fitting into integration policy indices as a subset category. The problem is not one of parallel enterprise – each index group measures different concepts – but of concept stretching and incongruence between concept and measurement.

The following table (Table 1) maps out some of the major “citizenship” indices to date to illustrate overlaps in themes of policy coverage.\(^5\) Note that this table identifies themes of policy coverage and not specific policies (e.g., dual citizenship) within each theme, where we may see more variation between indices.

### Table 1. Themes of Policy Coverage in Contemporaneous Citizenship Policy Indices

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<td>Access to citizenship (second generation)</td>
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<td>Conditions for Settlement</td>
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<td>Cultural and religious rights</td>
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\(^4\) Joppke (2010), of course, shows us that citizenship can be both at the same time.

\(^5\) For more on indices, see Table 2 in Helbling (2013).
Citizenship policy is a subcategory in some of the more expansive integration policy indices, while it remains the exclusive focus for Howard’s CPI, Thomas Janoski’s Barriers to Naturalization Index (“BNI”) (2010), CITLAW, and Koning. My own index, the Civic Integration Policy Index (CIVIX) (2010) serves as an example here of even further sub-categorization, covering only a subset of material conditions (language, country knowledge, and values) for citizenship. Given the reality that incentive structures in academia reward innovation of new indicators instead of cross-collaboration and improvement of existing ones, it is instead incumbent upon the researcher to carefully select which indicator most accurately represents the concept they aim to test.

**Operationalization**
Tests of compatibility between indices inevitably involve sifting through the policy dimensions of each respective index in order to accurately match like dimensions. Table 2 presents a correlation table that examines relationships between citizenship law indicators in the most recent year of policy measurement. But even when reliability tests show a positive correlation between citizenship indices, like between CPI and CITLAW and citizenship sub-indices of integration policy indices, and as between the “access to nationality” dimension of MIPEX and the nationality acquisition dimension of ICRI, it raises the perennial question of “how many definitional characteristics of citizenship policy are appropriate or necessary?”

| Table 2. Correlations between Citizenship Policy Indices  |
| (Year of policy measurement—not publication—next to index name) |
| CPI | Koning | MIPEX_Nat | ICRI_Nat | CITLAW |
| CPI 2008  (As reported) |  | -0.85 (N=20) | 0.78 (N=27) | 0.95 (N=8) | 0.75 (N=27) |
| Koning 1998-2007 Average (As reported) |  |  | 0.93 (N=10) | 0.54 (N=22) |
| MIPEX_Nationality 2010 (Reported Average) |  |  | 0.94 (N=10) | 0.92 (N=29) |
| ICRI_Nationality 2011 (Reported Average) |  |  |  | 0.87 (N=10) |
| CITLAW 2011 (Calculated Average of ASAN, ASOL, ANATORD) |  |  |  |  |

(Note: Janoski’s BNI is excluded because it does not measure policy in a proximate year, the most recent measure having been taken in 2000).

Citizenship – to appropriate Walt Whitman – “contains multitudes.” First, there are different modes of acquisition: inheritance at birth through parentage, through place of birth, ordinary naturalization based on residence, spousal-based acquisition, etc. Second, there are any number of material and procedural conditions per mode. MIPEX, for example, is the only index to include either cost of application or wait time from application to decision. Moreover, there is significant variation across modes; for instance, duration of residence for an immigrant often varies from that of their spouse or compared to a refugee. Finally, as there is no authoritative, comparative source for national citizenship policy, researchers must rely on interpretation of national law. Some studies...

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6 For a comprehensive list of 27 different modes of acquisition, see EUDO Citizenship at eudo-citizenship.eu
have relied on immigration scholars in each country (MIPEX) while others have relied on expert surveys by legal scholars (CITLAW, CPI) or individual interpretation and secondary material (ICRI, BNI, Koning). Some interpretations are understandably more nuanced than others and some national law is clearer than others.

As all citizenship policy indicators are significantly correlated, an efficiency-based argument could be made to adopt the most parsimonious index. This is a particularly compelling argument if any of these indices were to expand significantly outside of Europe. For example, Leblang et al. (2009) employ a modified version of Howard’s coding rules to score non-European OECD countries. However, because citizenship policy is multidimensional, a case could also be made that more measurements can produce more fine-grained differentiation and, therefore, more fine-grained analysis when used in quantitative studies. Selecting the number of definitional characteristics to a concept is thus a balancing act, where “maximalist definitions tend to be so overburdened as to be of little analytical use” and minimalist definitions “run the risk of omitting relevant attributes in the definition of a concept” (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 9).

**Measurement and aggregation**

A final concern among citizenship indicators is scoring. Measurements of qualitative data typically yield ordinal variables, and indices are either additive or averaged representations of an amalgam of policy components. Both choices have their shortcomings: averaged representations smooth over real differences in policy by assigning each policy dimension equal weight while additive scales create false intervals between values. The choices that go into scoring rules can also be problematic. For example, MIPEX’s “access to nationality” dimension scores 21 different policies using a trichotomous scale (0 = least conducive to integration, 50 = midway, 100 = highest standards to promoting immigrant integration). To wit, high scores are considered “immigrant friendly” policy. However, great assumptions are made about policy difficulty, when an oral language test in Spain is scored as equivalently unfavorable to immigrant integration as a written citizenship exam in Germany. Endogeneity issues would soon arise were researchers to use this index as an independent variable to study whether policies affect immigrant integration outcomes. ICRI and CITLAW, on the other hand, both use an ordinal scoring scale to compare relative difficulty of policy (e.g., CITLAW codes between 1 for “no language skill condition” to 0 for “certification or formal test” at a high level with writing, to which Spain’s oral language test is scored at .5 while Germany’s test receives a 0). Again, the greatest problem lies not in the endeavor but in potential misinterpretations and misapplications of indices. The abundance of choice between indices requires careful navigation.

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7 Koning (2011) is an exception, though his index seeks to measure the character of policy (ethnic or civic) of policy and not inclusion or restriction per se.
8 Some exceptions include MIPEX, which also covers the settler countries (Australia, Canada, and the US), Koning (Australia, Canada, the US, New Zealand), Janoski, who includes Japan, and CITLAW, which includes Turkey.
9 These problems can be avoided by sticking to dichotomous scoring, but then a researcher loses the fine-grained detail and nuance of policy that the index enterprise seeks to capture. For example, dichotomous scoring is suitable for reflecting whether a country allows for dual citizenship or not, but it insufficiently represents a policy like citizenship fees, and requires establishing an arbitrary cut point based on clustering.
10 For an expanded discussion, see Goodman (2012, 178-78).
Applying citizenship lessons to immigration policy index project

Given these experiences, how can citizenship index projects inform the immigration index enterprise? A number of the contributions here demonstrate significant overlap with one another, particularly IMPALA, IMPIC and portions of Ruhs’ and Peters’ coding, though Peters’ longitudinal and global coverage and Pham and Van’s subfederal focus offer unique additions. In Table 3, we not only see overlaps in immigration policy but also with existing citizenship and integration indices. Note that this table also identifies themes of policy coverage, and not specific policies within each theme where we may see more variation.

| Table 3. Themes of Policy Coverage in Contemporaneous Immigration Policy Indices |
|---------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
|                                 | Peters   | IMPALA   | ICI      | IMPIC1   | Ruhs     |
| Immigration Policy              |          |          |          |          |          |
| Border regulation (intake rules)| X        | X        | X        |          | X        |
| By Category:                    |          |          |          |          |          |
| Labor                          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Low skill                      |          |          |          |          |          |
| X                              |          |          |          |          |          |
| Humanitarian                   |          |          |          |          |          |
| X                              |          |          |          |          |          |
| Family                         |          |          |          |          |          |
| X                              |          |          |          |          |          |
| Other                          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Students                       |          |          |          |          |          |
| co-ethnics                     |          |          |          |          |          |
| Demand restrictions            | X        | X        | X        |          | X        |
| Enforcement (deportation)      | X        | X        |          |          | X        |
| Immigrant Policy               |          |          |          |          |          |
| Immigrant rights and assistance| X        | X        | X        | X        | X        |
| Citizenship                    | X        | X        |          |          |          |
| Immigration enforcement and limitations |          |          | X        | X        |          |

Indeed, these overlaps with citizenship and integration further the potential for concept stretching. Tomas Hammar distinguishes between immigration policies as rules that deal with conditions for entry while immigrant policies deal with conditions after entry, specifically that which concerns inclusion or exclusion and rights and benefits (1985, 10). Ruhs and Peters similarly create separations between immigration policy and rights of immigrants (though Peters combines them into a single index), and Helbling et al. refer to this distinction as external versus internal. Moreover, Pham and Van’s innovative index would all be considered “immigrant policy,” as their index examines rules that enable or hinder climate in an immigrant’s respective place of residence while federal law – which is outside their scope of analysis – dictates movement into United States territory. For the sake of project completeness and continuity, the overlaps between immigration,
citizenship, and integration indices are understandable but given the wealth of indices already in circulation, a more methodological justification should be provided.

Space limitations prohibit a more thorough comparison of these projects, but the concurrent production of indices that examine stringency/restrictiveness of all immigrant categories (IMPALA, IMPIC) as well as those that examine openness of specific subcategories (Ruhs looks at all labor migration and Peters at low-skilled migration, including refugees that may have migrated before rules were in place) present both opportunities and challenges to the immigration literature at large. Dichotomous coding such as that undertaken by Peters and the IMPALA project avoid some of the aforementioned problems with citizenship indices, but overlaps in the subjects of analysis and methods of data collection raise new ones. In fact, identifying differences between IMPALA and IMPIC is a challenge in of itself. Both cover the same time period (1980-2010), though IMPALA will eventually extend to 1960. IMPALA—the older of the two studies—enlists legal professionals to employ standardized rules for coding data, which is culled from all available legal sources (from primary legal text and statute to case law). IMPIC also uses mainly legal experts and also uses a standardized coding system. There are insufficient details on the latter project to make more systematic comparisons, but it will be interesting to see how—or, indeed, whether—the end product of these studies will correlate. Finally, individual coding schemes (Peters, Ruhs) inevitably and unfortunately cannot capture the same scope and runs a potentially greater risk of data omission.

In the end, while these indicators compete and overlap, they all offer unique contributions. A “low-skilled migration index” (Peters) is conceptually distinct to a “labor migration index” (Ruhs), which is further distinct from indices for immigration policy writ large (IMPALA, IMPIC), even if the first two are subsets of the second two. Each of these projects enriches our understanding of immigration policy around the world by creating usable indicators to quantitatively examine the causes and effects of such policies. To maintain a productive direction, the challenge for the researcher is definitional discipline, while the challenge for the user is appropriate selection.

References
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I recently sampled undergraduate course catalogs from a variety of colleges and universities in the southeastern United States to determine how frequently and in which disciplines undergraduate courses about immigration are taught. Surprisingly, the findings show that such courses are relatively rare (in half of the states sampled undergraduate immigration courses per institution averaged less than two; in no state did that average exceed five) and over half of the courses are taught within just two disciplines – history and sociology. Political science was the third most likely discipline to house an undergraduate immigration course, but the total number of courses was only about half of that in either history or sociology. It appears that the explosion of scholarship about migration in our discipline is not being carried into the undergraduate classroom, at least not in the region in which I teach. This is a missed opportunity.

Teaching undergraduate courses about immigration is beneficial for a number of reasons, but I will focus here on some pedagogical ones. Immigration courses are well suited to employing pedagogical practices widely recognized as critical to student success: an interdisciplinary approach, problem-based learning, service and experiential learning, and faculty-student research (Rhoten, Boix Mansilla, Chun, and Klein 2006; Gale 2007; Elder and Paul 2008; Kantor and Schneider 2013). Indeed, courses that help students understand the complexity of immigration can support higher education’s mission to promote strong intellectual and practical skills as well as a sense of social responsibility (AAC&U 2012). In an era in which the value of undergraduate education is questioned, both in terms of the lack of measurable learning on the part of college graduates (Arum and Roksa 2011), and by politicians who don’t see the “real world application” of...
some undergraduate education, we should be intentional about designing courses that challenge students to think deeply and creatively, and to learn research skills that can be applied broadly. Since migration is a phenomenon unfolding outside our classrooms, there are multiple opportunities to narrow the perceived divide between the academic world and the “real world.” The following is a brief outline of these pedagogical best practices, together with some general ideas about how to integrate each into undergraduate courses on immigration.

1) **An interdisciplinary, problem-based approach:** Interdisciplinary courses promote understanding that reflects “the capacity to integrate knowledge and modes of thinking in two or more disciplines to produce a cognitive advancement” (Boix Mansilla 2005, 15). With an interdisciplinary structure, students are forced to think about how to approach learning, rather than just to learn answers (Sill 1996; Bain 2004). This approach is particularly helpful when asking politically-charged questions. Since the emphasis is on the process of learning rather than a particular conclusion, students feel less manipulated, and more open to exploring multiple perspectives (Elder and Paul 2008). Lattuca, Voigt, and Fath (2004) argue that immigration is an “ill-structured problem” – one with considerable ambiguity because the data necessary to understand it are incomplete, the “right” solutions are uncertain, more than one solution is possible, and the problem requires analysis from multiple frames of reference. We should exploit this ambiguity to promote better inquiry and learning. Even seemingly simple inquiries like “how many undocumented migrants live in the United States?” yield a variety of questions that can become effective vehicles for both intellectual rigor and skill development: how is data about unauthorized migration collected? What can we “know,” and what is essentially a guess? What about other data used to understand the current situation? How do we assess the impact of a large unauthorized population on wages, educational systems, public services? These questions demand insights and methodologies from various disciplines – economics, sociology, demography, etc. For some questions, students can be asked to design their own research projects – what questions would they ask? What type of data would they collect? How would they analyze it?

2) **Service- and experiential-learning, and faculty-student research:** Interdisciplinary learning is most effective when it is combined with “integrative learning,” a broader concept (Klein 2005). Integrative learning seeks to foster the ability of students to integrate learning over time and across disciplinary boundaries (interdisciplinary), but also between academic, personal, and community life (integrative) (AAC&U 2004). Integrative learning pedagogies take students outside the classroom, including experiential and service-learning, as well as undergraduate research. When required to go outside the classroom to work and study in the community, students make essential connections between their academic work and life outside their campuses. Research shows that these connections promote students’ intellectual and practical skills, and encourage them to be more civically involved (Finley 2012; Kantor and Schneider 2013).

When I teach my course on the politics of immigration reform, I include a requirement to work in a local church’s bilingual preschool. The school provides low-cost, bilingual preschool education for the Latino community in Charlotte, a community with few formal options to prepare children for kindergarten. My students work with the preschool teachers and students on a project called “*Contando mi historia, Telling my story.*” The project starts with the preschoolers working with their parents to answer questions like “what do you want to be when you grow up?” and “what
brought your family to Charlotte? What do you like most/least about living here?” Once the answers are submitted, my students help the preschoolers create poster boards that “tell” each child’s “story.”

The experience is transformative for my students’ understanding of the challenges faced by immigrant children and families in Charlotte. Last year, one preschooler said what he liked least about Charlotte was driving to school each day because he feared that a police officer would pull over his mother and take her away. Others talked about grandparents they could never visit, parents who worked in other states or back in their home country, and dreams that they feared they could never achieve. My students read sociological studies about the challenges of being low-income, unauthorized, or both. They learn about “Secure Communities” and the 287(g) program, both of which the city of Charlotte adopted. But, until they hear these children tell their stories, my students do not understand the nature or effects of these programs from the perspective of the community most affected by them. In the classroom it is difficult to get them to consider the more subtle effects of programs that involve racial profiling and reinforce stereotypes about immigrant communities. On end of course evaluations, this service project is mentioned consistently as a turning point in the students’ comprehension of the potential and real effects of immigration policy in our society, and as something that heightened students’ desire to continue learning about immigration politics and potential immigration policy reform.

This is a simple exercise, and the primary value lies in challenging the way students think about the effects of immigration policy. But, there are course-based opportunities for students to develop more robust research skills and projects as well. Working with community partners, students can learn about the local immigration community and the effects of immigration and social service policies. From the relatively simple projects that require few skills, to the more complex ones that integrate social science methodologies, these course requirements enhance students’ analytical and practical skills. They expand students’ knowledge and often convince them of the importance of being civically engaged. As such, they are essential components of an undergraduate education.

References


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Political science has a long history of being surprised by patterns in European extremism (Inglehart, 1977; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967), even though psychology and sociology have given us the tools to predict the likely emergence of extreme nationalism and identify the conditions under which nativism becomes mainstream political discourse (Allport, 1954). Studies of inter-group conflict have shown that interactions between groups (e.g., natives and migrants) can be fraught with tension. Especially when the economic and political context within which these interactions take place creates feelings of vulnerability and anxiety, dominant groups are likely to feel threatened by minorities (Bobo, 1983; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Filindra & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2013; Quillian, 1995). This feeling of threat is often expressed as support for an exclusionary, nativist philosophy of the nation which paints natives as “deserving” and foreigners as “interlopers.”

In the past, political scientists were surprised to see that Europe’s social cleavages were not frozen to their early 20th century configurations (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) and that extremism does not originate only on the post-materialist Left (Inglehart, 1977). As European societies became more diverse following World War II, nationalism and nativism re-emerged in a variety of expressions. Yet, the emergence of the Golden Dawn party in Greece - a party which received 7 percent of the vote in 2012 - produced shock waves in international public opinion and in academic circles alike. The Golden Dawn is a fascist party that uses emblems and symbols that evoke the Swastika, opposes the Enlightenment, modernity, globalization and European integration and promotes a narrow and exclusionary ethnic, chauvinist ideology replete with xenophobia. It started as a small radical right-wing faction in the 1980s. The organization received some attention from the press in the early 1990s when it became embroiled in instances of political violence against the Left. However, it remained politically marginal until it won almost 6 percent of the vote and a seat in the Athens city council in the 2010 elections. The history of the Golden Dawn through 2010 is inconsistent with scholarly conclusions that Greece had not developed a noteworthy extreme right
movement in the post-WWII era (Norris, 2005). If Greece does not have a history of extreme right politics, where did the Golden Dawn come from?

**It is the economy, stupid**
Commentators have been quick to blame the party's rise to Greece's severe economic recession. By 2011, the debt had reached 165 percent of GDP and the budget deficit stood at 9 percent. Harsh austerity measures imposed by the IMF and the European Union drove the official unemployment rate to 22.6 percent in March 2012. Many have argued that the party's populist, anti-establishment, and anti-EU rhetoric has resonated with Greeks who have seen their wages and pensions vanish along with the country's social safety net and state healthcare services. Yet, this is not the first major recession that Greece has experienced in the post-war era. During the period between 1973 and 1995, the country's economy grew at a paltry 1.5% on average, unemployment was stubbornly high, and inflation ate away any real economic gains. Although the Golden Dawn was founded in the 1980s, it took the party thirty years to reach Parliament. This suggests that the economy alone cannot explain its meteoric rise.

**“We are ready to turn on the ovens”**
The popularity of the Golden Dawn has increased in tandem with the rise in migration into Greece, as predicted by inter-group threat theories. Up until the early 1990s, Greece was a largely homogeneous country with few immigrants. However, the collapse of the Soviet block and the liberalization of population movements from Asia and Africa have made Greece a destination for thousands of migrants. The 2001 census registered 762,000 noncitizens, about 7 percent of the total population while projections for the 2011 census estimate migrants at about 10 percent. In a country that has cultivated a strong exclusionary, ethno-nationalist identity for decades and where tolerance and multiculturalism are not part of the national curriculum, the presence of so many racial and ethnic “others” became a source of social anxiety.

At close inspection, one can see that the rise of the extreme right in Greece coincides with the rise in immigration. The Popular Orthodox Rally which emerged in 2000 was the first party to make national identity and immigration central to its program. The absence of strong norms of tolerance (despite efforts on the Left to introduce more inclusive discourses) has allowed the extreme right to disseminate hateful messages with impunity. It took a documentary that captures Golden Dawn leaders threatening to “turn on the ovens”-a clear Nazi reference- as the solution to irregular migration, to initiate a government inquiry into the party's practices. Does this mean that if irregular migration subsides, the Golden Dawn will be a thing of the past? Probably not: much like the Golden Dawn, immigration is here to stay. And that's not all: the party's novel model of politics is likely to diffuse to other countries as well.

**Just another fascist party?**
Many are quick to dismiss the Golden Dawn as just another fascist party whose fortunes will decline as the economy improves and irregular migration slows. They may soon be surprised by the party's resilience. A closer look at the Greek economy suggests that the problems it faces are not just related to the business cycle. The recession and the EU-imposed austerity measures have put severe strain on the country's welfare system. Not only are pensions and benefits cut, but basic
social services have been undermined. Hospitals are running out of supplies, police stations cannot fuel cars, and schools and universities lack basics. For the first time since WWII, hunger is an issue.

The Golden Dawn is another manifestation of the deep crisis of welfare capitalism. In the context of a crumbling welfare state, the party has developed a new model for doing politics and generating support, one closer to the practices of Hamas and the Islamic Brotherhood or to machine politics of the 19th century than to professionalized contemporary European parties. These organizations have developed strong support within civil society by combining direct social service with political activism and violence (Roy, 2011). Over the past two years, the Golden Dawn has become increasingly socially active in poor, crime-ridden neighborhoods of Athens and other major cities, in essence replacing the state where service provision has diminished severely (or has been perceived to have diminished by residents). Its members provide direct social services and “protection” to poor Greeks in the inner-city, often with popular applaud. In many neighborhoods, Golden Dawn gangs operate with police tolerance as “protectors” of local residents and shopkeepers, guarding them from criminal gangs and drug traffickers, or forcefully evicting squatter-immigrants from apartments (Kakisissis, 2011). In the first half of 2012, Golden Dawn organized blood drives and food drives “from Greeks for Greeks” using party funds (GR Reporter, 2012). These efforts do little to alleviate social need but they are symbolically important because they demonstrate that the Golden Dawn cares about Greek people. In the eyes of many Greek voters, Golden Dawn’s violence has a social purpose and media have extolled it as “social service” (Le Nouvel Observateur, 2012). The party has initiated plans to open offices in Germany, Australia and the United States1, countries with large Greek diaspora populations, to elicit support for its programs and its political agenda.

Greek exceptionalism?
Scholars should also refrain from attributing the Golden Dawn phenomenon to Greek exceptionalism. It is not the depth of the crisis, nor the rate of growth of immigration, nor the pathologies of the Greeks and their elites that sustain the Golden Dawn. What fuels support for the Golden Dawn are the growing cracks in Europe’s social contract which are currently deeper in Greece but are visible everywhere. It is only a matter of time until the Golden Dawn finds imitators in other European countries. The party has already started to develop ties to the European extreme right. Hungary and Bulgaria could be the first test cases for the diffusion of this new model of fascism and from there it can quickly spread.

The economic crisis has been met with a fanatical adherence to neoliberal principles as the only way out of the recession. Austerity and severe cut backs to the welfare state are advocated as the only option. However, in a continent that is more socially diverse than it has been for at least a century and where immigration has introduced many new challenges (and opportunities), the changes in Europe’s social contract are likely to introduce even more competitors on the right with new strategies for capturing political power. It should not be a surprise.

1 A first attempt to open an office in Astoria, NY was thwarted when hackers from the online movement known as “Anonymous”, hacked the party’s computers, destroying its website and jamming its phone lines.
References

Research Institute Profile:
The Deportation Research Clinic, Buffett Center for International Comparative Studies, Northwestern University
http://www.cics.northwestern.edu/programs/deportationresearch/

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Investigations by the Deportation Research Clinic are designed to produce a body of knowledge for intervening in a problem well-documented by several generations of social scientists: unlawful misconduct in deportation proceedings by local, state, and federal law enforcement officials. The Clinic Director’s research has been reported in The New York Times, The New Yorker, The Christian Science Monitor, The Nation, the Associated Press and McClatchy wire services, CNN and NPR, as well as dozens of local daily and weekly newspapers.
**Why a Deportation Research "Clinic"?**

The Deportation Research Clinic is an experiment in using the research skills and resources of academia to investigate and make transparent egregious abuses occurring daily during the forced removal from the United States of long-time residents. None of us are attorneys. The model of inquiry and interventions relies more on paradigms of medical clinics pursuing public health goals than those of the typical legal aid clinic. That is, we draw on information from close study of individual cases to develop an understanding of structural patterns of abuse, and then use the lessons learned from prior cases to develop research, analyses and reporting to prevent or ameliorate future harms. The Clinic’s primary objective is to develop "best practices" for investigating, publicizing, and eliminating systemic law enforcement misconduct in deportation proceedings.

At present we are working with respondents, their families, and attorneys in Arizona, California, Illinois, Jamaica, Minnesota, New York, and Tennessee. The Clinic has consulted at no cost with attorneys on dozens of cases across the country. We have filed over 50 requests for documents under the Freedom of Information Act. In October, 2012, a lawsuit based on documents brought to the attention of the American Civil Liberties Union was settled on behalf of Mark Daniel Lyttle. Lyttle was born in Rowan County, North Carolina and deported to Mexico over his protests that he was a U.S. citizen, had no relatives in Mexico, and spoke no Spanish. Also in October, 2012 attorneys on behalf of Robert Dominquez used documents obtained by the Clinic to file a $12 million complaint for damages incurred when Robert, born in Lawrence, Massachusetts, was unlawfully deported to the Dominican Republic and unable to return for 10 years.

In addition to providing research and analyses to respondents, their families, and attorneys, Clinic Director Jacqueline Stevens has three active lawsuits against the federal government. Stevens v. Office of the Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security (filed May 6, 2013) requests records maintained by the OIG concerning DHS agents who stole from and then unlawfully deported a U.S. legal resident to Nigeria. Stevens v. Executive Office of Immigration Review, Department of Justice requests hearing records for a detained respondent who was denied the right to hire an attorney to represent him. Stevens v. Holder et al. is a lawsuit against nine federal defendants who conspired to obstruct her access to immigration courts in Atlanta, Georgia. (The original complaint was filed pro se on April 18, 2012 and has survived some but not all of the government’s motions to dismiss; the motion for an amended complaint was filed by Federal Hasson on March 29, 2013 and we are waiting for the judge’s order on this. We will be appealing the grant of sovereign immunity to William Cassidy, the adjudicator who deported Mark Lyttle.)

In the cases above and in others the Clinic is collaborating with Andrew Free, attorney, Ozment Law, Nashville, Tennessee; Ray Lerer, attorney, Federal Hasson, Atlanta, Georgia; Malcolm Rich, Executive Director, Chicago Council of Lawyers; Fredric Tulsky, Director, Watchdog/Accountability Initiative, Medill Journalism School, Northwestern, as well as many others.

The Clinic also is pursuing two major research projects. “Remembered Intimacies and the Bona Fide Marriage,” funded by the Sexualities Project at Northwestern, 2012-13, received IRB approval. Investigators will obtain privacy waivers for 50 recorded spousal "green card" interviews and compare the character and rate of nonmatching answers with responses on “The Newlywed Game”
television show. We are also in the planning stages for a long-term study of misconduct in deportation proceedings, with site visits to immigration courts and detention facilities nation-wide. This project is in collaboration with Northwestern Political Science and Legal Studies Professor Wes Skogan and TRAC at Syracuse University.

Students working for the Clinic include Program Assistant, Charles Clarke (graduate student, political science department and Northwestern law school); Anjolie Kulkarni (Northwestern sophomore, database manager); Sam Niiro (Northwestern freshman, drafted the two FOIA lawsuits); Kendall Todd (Northwestern junior, correspondence and marriage study); and Mitchell Troup (marriage study). Additional students volunteer on an ad hoc basis.

Mentorship Corner:
A New Section for our Graduate Student Members

Dear Graduate Student Members,

My name is Hillary Mellinger, and I am a graduate student member of the Migration and Citizenship section's Executive Council. The creation of the Migration and Citizenship section of APSA underscores the importance of ongoing research and debate within this field. As graduate students who are members of this section, we have the unique opportunity to learn from our fellow section members, many whom are distinguished professors and practitioners.

It is to this end that the Migration and Citizenship section is excited to announce the launching of our “Mentorship Corner.” We hope that this corner will provide a forum in which students, professors, and practitioners can engage in dialogue over specific topics of interest. It is particularly critical that we, as graduate students, are active participants in this discussion. The Mentorship Corner will provide us with the opportunity to receive guidance and direction from the many scholars within this burgeoning field.

In order to get a better sense of what contributions to solicit for our Membership Corner, we would appreciate your feedback in this brief five-minute survey: http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/63NHBBX.

We will use the survey responses to select topics for the mentorship corner for future newsletters and to identify areas in which our graduate student members would like to receive additional information. Please provide your feedback by August 1, 2013.

Thank you in advance for your contribution!
Hillary Mellinger
Graduate Student Member, Executive Council
Introduction

Phil Triadafilopoulos, triadaf@utsc.utoronto.ca

My teacher, Ary Zolberg, passed away this past April. I had the good fortune of seeing him and his wife Vera in February, enjoying a good meal and wonderful conversation. Ary had just been released from hospital and was quite weak. Despite this he and Vera were keen to hear of the experiences my family and I had enjoyed during our stay in Berlin the previous semester and of my feelings of life “after tenure.” When I admitted that I was a bit disoriented by my new professional status, Ary provided simple but very helpful advice, drawing on his own experiences. My teacher continued to teach important lessons.

He continues to do so through his work and example. My thinking on matters related to international migration and the politics of membership has been indelibly marked by Ary’s contributions, as have my ideas about teaching, especially for graduate students. Not a day goes by without my referring to some lesson Ary taught me. He was my intellectual father and I am saddened that, like my father, I can no longer see him, shake his hand, and hear his voice.

I am very grateful for the essays provided by the contributors to this symposium. Together they quite brilliantly demonstrate the many outstanding qualities that drew so many of us to Ary as a mentor, colleague, and friend. Those who knew Ary will hopefully have cause to recall their own special memories. I trust that those who did not have the good fortune to meet Ary and are not yet familiar with his work will be inspired to read his books and articles and form their own relationship to his work. I will certainly continue to go back to Ary’s contributions, always learning something new from my teacher.

Phil Triadafilopoulos is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto. He completed his PhD at the New School for Social Research in 2004. He is the author of Becoming Multicultural: Immigration and the Politics of Membership in Canada and Germany (University of British Columbia Press, 2012).
Remembering Ary Zolberg

Richard Alba, ralba@gc.cuny.edu

Ary Zolberg was the sort of scholar who made everyone around him better – not just by elevating the level of academic discourse, which he certainly did, but also by infusing it with what deserves to be called “wisdom,” the realm of insight where both knowledge and moral concern are in play. He inspired respect, admiration and deep affection.

I came to know Ary during his time at the New School and through the intellectual circles in New York that centered on immigration studies. Though I cannot claim to be among those closest to him, I feel privileged to have been in his orbit.

Most striking about him was his profound humanism, which was expressed, among other ways, in his capacity as a scholar for recognizing similarities in a wide range of social contexts and human behavior. This humanism seemed connected to the way he had comprehended his extraordinary personal history, as a Jewish hidden child in Belgium during the early 1940s. I know only bits and pieces of his personal story, which he was always willing to talk about but did not call attention to.

Born in Brussels to immigrants from Poland, Ary’s life was turned upside down by the Nazi conquest of Belgium and the seizure of his father on the street by Jew hunters. He was then hidden and spent some time in a Catholic institution, where he embraced the religious identity that was also his disguise, so much so that, in later life, he described himself as “a lapsed Catholic of Jewish descent.” He also, as he once told me, lived for a time with a working-class family that was forced at the same time to provide quarters to a German soldier, with whom he established a relationship of sorts. After the war, he came to the United States to live with cousins; and entering Columbia University at the age of 16, his academic trajectory began.

It’s not hard to see the influence of this experience in Ary’s scholarship. The early part of his career was devoted to research in Africa, on terrain ravaged by colonialism and racism and where research, according to a published interview with Ary, was about “making a normative statement of solidarity and resistance, and of the triumph over imperialism.” But if solidarity provided the impetus for the research, it didn’t dictate the research process, which avoided fashionable grand theories for on-the-ground reconnoitering, nor the results, which were about the fragmentation wrought by ethnicity and class.

His subsequent transition to a scholar of migration also began under the flag of solidarity with the oppressed and powerless, as an investigation into refugee migrations in Africa. But it morphed, perhaps inevitably, into a much larger project on what Ary subsequently described as “the management of cultural diversity.” Critical for this project was his social-science cosmopolitanism, which gracefully transcended disciplinary boundaries without somehow causing him to lose his footing in specific bodies of knowledge, and his comfort in multiple languages and different cultural and national contexts. He was as capable of giving an impromptu sketch of the major currents in
French sociology over hors d’oeuvres as he was of discussing the merits of operatic tenors (I recall the time when I was working on my French so that I could carry out research in Paris and proudly boasted to him about the mystery novels I was reading in that language; and he nodded approvingly and then pulled from his briefcase the mystery in Dutch that then occupied his free time).

In the immigration-centered circles of New York, he was very much the voice of wisdom, pulling us away from the immediacy of the issues of the day with analogies harvested from his knowledge of history and of other national experiences. His magnum opus, *A Nation by Design*, was focused on the centrality of immigration policy in building the United States and argued against the prevailing view that immigration was ruled by a laissez-faire principle until the late 19th century, the era of the Chinese Exclusion Act.

But I think that his intellectual leadership was, more profoundly, the consequence of the comparative institutionalist lens he brought to the study of immigrant-group incorporation in the wealthy societies of the west. In this respect, he was a trailblazer, who opened up new perspectives with his famous essay, written with Long Litt Woon, “Why Islam Is Like Spanish.” The arresting paradox of the title calls attention to the novelty of the argument, which develops the similarities by which seemingly disparate immigrant populations are constructed in seemingly different societal contexts as threatening outsiders. As important for the paradigmatic status of the essay was its grounding in Ary’s historically rooted understanding of the consequences of institutions and identities for societal cleavages and its deployment of social boundary concepts, which have since that essay become central to the theoretical analysis of immigrant-group integration.

Ary’s leadership in immigration scholarship and his championing of the comparative lens were not simply a matter of intellectual contribution. He was very active, the first to my knowledge, in organizing international networks of immigration researchers. He introduced many of us on this side of the Atlantic to a couple of generations of rising immigration scholars in Europe through the workshops and conferences he organized as the head of ICMEC, the New School’s International Center for Migration, Ethnicity and Citizenship. These events brought home to us that we were not going to be able to understand immigration in the U.S. as something *sui generis*, that only through historically informed comparison would we ultimately succeed.

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1 University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf7-01659-001, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library
Ary also provoked with his uncommon, against-the-grain insights. I remember with gratitude one of these interventions, which came to my aid. As someone self conscious of coming from a working-class ethnic Catholic background and of having few peers in the academic environment, I was uncomfortably making the argument at a talk that religion – not just race as the contemporary whiteness literature would have it – was a fundamental social cleavage in the U.S. prior to the post-WW II period; consequently, any account of the assimilation of the descendants of southern and eastern European immigrants had to account for the fading of religious lines of division, which previously excluded from the mainstream Catholics as well as Jews. Challenged in the discussion, I was relieved when Ary not only came to my support but developed a point that was new to me: namely, that the protective carapace of the Catholic school system was matched at mid-century by the panoply of Catholic professional organizations that then played a central role in the civic life of middle-class adherents. These had lost significance as the mass assimilation of the post-war era progressed.

Ary was a unique figure. He was one the last of a heroic generation that, personally as well as intellectually, confronted the worst horrors that the 20th century had to offer and distilled from that experience a humanism capable of animating, as well as informing, rigorous scholarship. I have little hope of seeing his like again.

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Ary Zolberg’s Three Arguments about Freedom of Movement

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My first encounter with Ary Zolberg was in March 1993 when I was assistant professor at the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) in Vienna. I had previously been involved in empirical projects on labor migrants in Austria and had just completed a political theory book manuscript on transnational citizenship. At the IHS I could invite international guest professors to teach block seminars on topics that covered important fields for future research. It was not difficult to identify Aristide Zolberg as the scholar to invite for a seminar on immigration policy. Ary then taught a course on “an archeology of immigration regulations”. It was an eye-opener for me and the small group of postgrad students who attended the seminar. Ary was a teacher whose natural curiosity was absolutely infectious. He cared about the questions as much as about the students who asked them. And he did not care about disciplinary boundaries and quarrels between methodological schools that had divided the social sciences during the time of my university education. In the particular case of Austrian sociology and political science, these academic boundary disputes had become even
more stultifying due to an endemic provincialism that looked at this small state as if it were a self-contained society that could only be understood from the inside.

I had already tried to escape by retraining myself as a normative theorist. While migration studies at the time were mostly concerned with how immigrants adapt to receiving societies, a group of anthropologists around Nina Glick Schiller had just introduced a transnational perspective focusing on migrants’ relations to countries of origin and claiming that these transcended traditional conceptions of territorial nationhood. I attempted to apply a similar perspective to theories of rights and democracy by asking how migration impacts on liberal conceptions of citizenship and democratic boundaries. At that time, such normative questions were anathema in Austrian political science, which was dominated by American behavioralist approaches, by post-Marxist critical theory and by a lingering tradition of legal positivism, which previously had held a firm grip on state theory.

Ary was not a normative theorist, but he wanted to understand the link between migration and politics from both sides and thought that this was impossible without deep contextual historical knowledge and a broadly comparative perspective. I intuitively felt that this is what had been missing in my own approach. I do not claim that I have been able to fill this gap since, but my ambition to combine normative and comparative analyses on migration and citizenship and my confidence that this endeavor is meaningful has been greatly strengthened by meeting Ary and engaging with him.

Ary was also important for me in quite another way. As a lucky survivor of the Holocaust, who was hidden as a Jewish boy by Catholic monks in Belgium and later went to America to become an international scholar, I came to see in him the kind of intellectual father figure I had been missing during my university years. The rich academic culture of interwar Vienna had been drained of its lifeblood during the Nazi years and there were hardly any attempts to revive it in the long postwar period of denial and Austrian self-victimization that ended pitifully in the Waldheim affair of 1986. Ary’s lifelong companion Vera had herself grown up in Vienna before the Anschluss. Towards the end of his IHS seminar, Ary confessed to me that Vera had had strong reservations about his accepting my invitation to teach in Vienna. They had once been back on a visit in the 1960s and the experience must have been very unpleasant. So I am truly grateful to Vera for not objecting in the end and to Ary for giving it another try.

In 1995 I organized a workshop in Jerusalem with Ary and Agnes Heller as keynote speakers, which resulted in a co-edited volume on “The Challenge of Diversity”. The topic and title of my next edited volume on “Blurred Boundaries” was largely inspired by an exchange with Ary on boundary crossing, shifting and blurring phenomena. While I was primarily interested in the conceptual distinction and how it could be interpreted for theoretical purposes, Ary made much fuller use of it in a big view comparative analysis, co-authored with Long Litt Woon, of the cultural incorporation patterns of immigrant incorporation in the US and Europe that has become one of his most widely cited essays.²

Ary's main interest was to understand why and how states attempt to control emigration and immigration. I still remember how he stood up at a 1996 SSRC conference in Florida to criticize migration sociologists who claimed that states’ attempts of control did not make much difference to migration flows that they were anyhow incapable of regulating. In the field of migration studies, Ary was probably the most influential historical institutionalist who “brought the state back in.” His interest was not only in highlighting the impact of migration control and the instruments used for this purpose, but a much broader puzzle about how states had come to acquire a fundamental interest in controlling migration in the first place. Since the 1980s, political theorists, such as Michael Walzer and Joseph Carens, have been engaged in debates about whether the asymmetry between free emigration and controlled immigration is morally justifiable. What Ary contributed to these discussions is a deep historical analysis of the conditions under which this asymmetry could eventually be taken for granted. As he showed in an essay on the “exit revolution,” free emigration and controlled immigration is not at all a natural state of affairs but has emerged only since the French and American Revolution in response to changing ideas about the economy, but even more importantly triggered by political processes of nation-state building and transitions to democracy.

A few years ago, I revisited my own position in the political theory debate on the legitimacy of immigration control. The result was an article in which I argued that concerns about global justice, individual autonomy, democratic self-government, and citizenship appear to support contrasting views with regard to free movement, but can be regarded as partly overlapping if democratic citizenship provides not only reasons for closure but entails also for mobility rights. When reading the concluding chapter of Ary’s opus magnum “A Nation by Design” in search for some fresh historical insights, I found there on a single page succinct statements of all three arguments that I had been trying to reconcile. Here are the three arguments in Ary’s versions. First, the global injustice argument: “[B]orders are a sine qua non for maintaining affluence and privilege.” It seems to follow from this argument that borders need to be open for the sake of rectifying global injustice, but that it is also impossible to do so as long as states are committed to creating and protecting specific advantages for their own citizens. Second, the freedom argument: “[T]he cosmopolitan position would be significantly bolstered if it could be demonstrated that freedom of movement contributes to the achievement of freedom among the various political communities that constitute the international system” (ibid). Here, Ary makes an interesting move. Instead of regarding free movement only as an expression of individual autonomy or as collectively beneficial from a utilitarian economic view, he points out that freedom of movement may also have positive consequences for political freedom and thus contribute to sustaining an international system of democratic states. Third, the democratic citizenship argument: “[I]n addition, borders are necessary to establish and preserve distinctive communities, notably self-governing democracies” (ibid.). The tension between the freedom (including of freedom of movement) that democratic citizenship is

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meant to provide and the need to preserve the distinctiveness of communities that are free in the sense of governing themselves cannot be fully resolved. Still, as Ary’s second argument points out, these two conceptions of freedom may eventually be seen as mutually supportive in a cosmopolitan view. Unlike in the first argument, what immigration control is necessary for according to Ary’s third argument is not undeserved privilege but the very conditions for democratic citizenship. A cosmopolitan perspective that freedom of movement is beneficial for democracy supports a gradual opening of borders may not fully respond to the global injustice argument for open borders here and now for the sake of redistributing the privileges of birthright citizenship, but it does go some way towards reconciling the apparently conflicting normative implications.

I would have loved to further explore the three arguments together with Ary and I will miss him as an inspiring teacher and dear friend.

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Big Questions, Real World Puzzles, and Enduring Challenges: A Tribute to Aristide R. Zolberg

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Ary’s work has shaped the thinking of an entire generation of scholars who study international migration, across all fields of the social sciences. In the first graduate seminar I took with Ary back in the late 1980s, he quipped: “There are those scholars who pose excellent questions relating to the big picture, and there are those who only ask narrow and sometimes insignificant questions and devote their time to doing sophisticated empirical work.” This remark struck me and has continuously puzzled me over the course of my own academic career. Needless to say, Ary’s remark was made tongue in cheek. While Ary loved big questions and huge comparisons, he paid attention to empirical detail to engage with big questions. I learned from him to look very closely at specific cases, identify patterns, but be careful about unwarranted generalizations. I cherished Ary’s ability to observe such apparently mundane social practices like
alternate-side-of-the-street parking rules in New York City – and yet connect them to larger features of political systems. He was an acute and astute observer of political and social processes. Ary insisted on grounding his big questions in what he called “real world” puzzles. This style of asking questions has been an enduring challenge to my work although or perhaps because I have engaged in different ways of approaching international migration – mostly from a transnational angle. It is in this spirit that I have come back to big questions, real world puzzles, and methodology in three ways – comparative work on states in global perspective, the role of the national state in cross-border transactions, and the relevance of diversity for inequalities.

First, Ary’s example has encouraged me not only to ask big questions but also to engage in close-up empirical analysis. As the author of “How many Exceptionalisms?” (1986), he was certainly averse to simplistic structuralism – perhaps a response to the dominant paradigms of the 1950s. One of the reasons I thoroughly enjoyed my time at The Graduate Faculty as a graduate student was the excitement of a new beginning with those scholars who engaged in historical sociology and politics and history. All of them worked in various ways on state and society in global context. Ary always encouraged me to keep on asking about the contemporary relevance of T.H. Marshall’s concept of “social citizenship” – especially important considering that I was interested in how heterogeneities other than social class, such as migration experience and gender, play a role in accessing social rights and determining corresponding outcomes. My specific approach while writing my first book was to trace the social mechanisms of how the “political” shapes social outcomes, mostly in how welfare states in North America and Europe deal with immigration. Engaging in comparative analysis in global perspective was also important in my later work on dual citizenship, when I began to understand how comparative political analysis can fruitfully be used to follow a seminal and global trend – in this case the increasing tolerance of states toward dual citizenship around the world, and the different trajectories national states in Europe have taken in this corridor. More recently, I have pursued this concern with world society comparisons in my work on the transnational social question, that is, why – given the huge inequalities around the globe – there is less social protest than one might expect. Again, this is an extension of Marshall’s question about social citizenship, posing it this time about heterogeneities intersecting national states.

Second, Ary’s question about how states manage migration engaged my thinking from a range of perspectives. Already in the late 1970s he had connected the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’, namely points of origin and destination of international migration. Early on, he went beyond the well-entrenched division of labor between “international migration” and “assimilation.” He insisted that people, migrants and non-migrants alike, are socio-moral actors: They come from somewhere not just geographically but also culturally, and they enact their own history – albeit not necessarily of their own making. Oddly enough, my work on transnationalization (the cross-border social process), transnationality (the degree of cross-border transactions a person engages in), and transnational social spaces (cross-border social formations) was fed by the recognition that national states are inextricable institutions of cross-border transactions. It has often been remarked facetiously by critics of the ‘transnational turn’ that proponents have missed the importance of the national state. Yet this criticism was always superficial. Quite to the contrary, scholars of the transnational in migration have insisted from its beginnings in the late 1980s on the pivotal role of the national state in a global political-economic sense.
The challenge extended by Ary’s work for my own has continuously been to clarify that role – for example, by connecting transnational life worlds with institutions regulating membership in communities, organizations, locales, and states. In the felicitous phrase of Max Weber, for example, what is the elective affinity between cross-border societal formations, on the one hand, and overlapping national institutions such as multiple citizenship, on the other? To answer such a question has meant for my work that a perspective on state involvement in border controls in terms of their (allegedly) positive or negative impacts on welfare states, or on the working class in the North, is too narrow. To clarify, normative questions about the relevance of borders in an unequal world have rightly gained prominence in debates on international migration. In addition, there are interesting empirical puzzles about the correlation between types of welfare states and the degree of immigration restrictions, to which I have also contributed. However, this normative debate is not at the core of a transnational approach in migration studies. Instead, it is the transnational pattern of social life which has formed a point of departure. In Germany (2010), for example, not only about 80 percent of migrants but also about 30 percent of non-migrants entertain cross-border transactions, such as sending goods or money, staying abroad for long spells, or having friends or relatives in places outside the country of residence. This also means that transnationality is not only a characteristic (heterogeneity) of migrants but that non-migrants are also transnational in significant ways. Methodologically, the point of departure from a transnational lens is a borderless world, in which boundaries of all sorts – among them state borders but also access to institutions – intervene. Above all, a transnational perspective takes account of the (re)production of state borders as a specific type of boundary and of the function such borders take. This methodological stance is not to be confused with the normative presupposition of the desirability of borders, or the contrary – a borderless world. Yet it is to insist on the empirical fact that social life is not neatly confined by national containers. Needless to say, national states are crucial institutions of regulating borders and (re)distributing resources and status. But to analyze cross-border transactions meaningfully from a social science perspective, we need to ask how national borders have become a social fact that is reproduced and is taken for granted so that the apparent social constitution becomes invisible by institutionalization. In the end, the regulation of cross-border social life necessitates the study of the institutionalization of various boundaries among which national borders and national institutions such as citizenship play a key role. Only then are we in a position to study international migration as a specific instance of cross-border transactions that is part of and/or may result in dense social formations across borders, so-called transnational social spaces or even world society. This stance has been central to the agenda of methodological transnationalism that I have been part of developing. Though Ary would not have agreed with such a perspective, his insistence on the crucial role of national states in international migration has been a keen reminder that certain institutions matter more than others in shaping spatial mobility and cross-border connections of mobile and sedentary agents alike. Ary’s macro-comparative insights need to be heeded by scholars working in a transnational vein because there is always the danger of forgetting about the endurance and flexibility of national institutions in a global world. To neglect the seminal role of national states in boundary formation, as Ary observed, is, for obvious reasons, probably more widespread among sociologists than among political scientists.

Third, all through his work from the 1960s onward, Ary insisted on the importance of taking account of the production and regulation of diversity in its manifold forms—especially in its linguistic and religious forms. This concern ran through his work continuously, starting with his
studies on the party system in West Africa in the 1960s through his work on the linguistic divisions in Belgium in the 1970s and 1980s and culminating in his famous article, "Why Islam is like Spanish?" in the late 1990s, co-authored with Long Litt Woon. Ary never fell prey to reducing accounts and explanations to one of the most overrated concepts in the social sciences, ethnicity. Instead, his starting question was how to deal with various forms of diversity. This question has lately inspired my interest in the causal mechanisms which connect various heterogeneities – among them ethnicity, gender, and class, but also transnationality – to unequal outcomes and life chances, namely social inequalities. For example, is it true that cross-border transactions significantly improve life chances, or is the reverse true, namely, that it is a dead end, which contributes to the segregation of migrants? Often, in both politics and academic research, so-called highly qualified migrants are seen as an instance of the former while labor migrants are seen as an instance of the latter. In other words, in the case of global elites transnationality enhances careers – the higher the income, the better the level of education, and the broader the network the more opportunities a person has. Quite the contrary is true in the case of labor migrants where it is usually held that transnationality furthers segregation – the lower the income, the lower the level of education, and the smaller the network the more marginalized a person is. As my colleagues and I at Bielefeld University in the Collaborative Research Centre “From “Heterogeneities to Inequalities” have found in empirical studies in European contexts, the picture is not in fact so polarized – there is no such dichotomy. There is both a continuum of transnational engagement on the part of migrants and non-migrants, and transnationality per se is associated neither with economic or social success nor with social, political, or economic marginality. Instead, all the empirical (quantitative) evidence suggests that there is a good deal of “middling transnationality,” that is, transnationality as a characteristic also of persons occupying middle positions in social income and status hierarchies. Transnationality is an uncommon and new heterogeneity. Yet even in this case it becomes evident that binary categorizations – along the lines of the highly qualified as characterized by “good” transnationality and labor migrants embodying “bad” transnationality – are the result of processes of categorizations which rank groups of people and are thus the stuff that produces and reproduces inequalities, in this case resulting in the categories of “desirable” and “undesirable” migrants. The social mechanisms by which this occurs are not simply socio-economic ones, such as exploitation and opportunity hoarding, but also semantic and symbolic ones in which Ary was also interested when writing about cultural diversity, that is, cultural heterogeneity. Comparing the US and Europe, he alerted us to the outcomes involved in boundary making, such as the blurring, crossing, and shifting of boundaries. It is a task for further research to specify the specific mechanisms involved in boundary making and develop a taxonomy of the general and specific mechanisms involved.

To conclude, in his own inimitable way Ary dealt with the paradox of dividing the world into different categories, especially ethnicities. I vividly remember the following anecdote, conveyed to me by Ruben Rumbaut: When asked which ethnic category he would check in the census, Ary simply responded: “Human.” After all, Ary was not only a towering master in posing academic puzzles but also a quite practical and effective lateral thinker who spoke against well-entrenched presuppositions which have persistently made assumptions regarding diversity by dividing people into allegedly distinctive categories. Ary’s enduring contribution to international migration studies and beyond suggests that big questions and fundamental issues in the social sciences gain their relevance from very concrete puzzles.
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Aristide Zolberg: A Dangerous Intellectual

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It is expected I think, in such an essay, to point out the many admirable qualities of the individual we wish to memorialize. And, Aristide Zolberg had many admirable qualities; so this would not be a difficult task. Indeed, it was not always easy to be a student of Ary’s. As a graduate student, one expects to be out-classed academically by your mentor. The trouble with Ary is that he also dressed better, listened to better music, hung out in cooler places, and was generally more hip than his students. But, let me leave those observations aside, because, in my view, Ary’s most admirable quality as a mentor, as an intellectual, was this simple fact that he was a dangerous scholar.

The word ‘danger’ can have many meanings, so let me be clear: Aristide Zolberg’s intellectual work threatened, and continues to threaten, to undermine some fundamental precepts in the profession. It is no exaggeration to say that his work made the continuation of business as usual in our field much more difficult. Allow me to briefly lay out my case in the form of three observations about Ary and his tremendous – but clearly transgressive – contributions to the social sciences.

My first point is rather straightforward: Ary Zolberg was guilty of actions that might be called disorderly conduct as a scholar. We have made the delineation of proper order central to our field. Over the past several decades, the social sciences, like the academy more generally, has moved progressively toward greater specialization, following a path blazed by business and industry. The field of migration studies has not been as deeply infected with this trend, you might argue; but neither has it been entirely spared. We increasingly divide our interests and analysis into discrete topics – the study of cultural incorporation, economic push factors, immigration policymaking, or labor market inclusion, each having their separate sets of literature and distinct debates.

The underlying logic, of course, is that this specialization allows each scholar to exploit a certain comparative advantage, adding depth and detail to our understanding of the social world through a more meticulous examination of a specific set of social dynamics. In the end, this arrangement appears to allow greater ‘efficiency’ (hence the motive for this trend in industry). And the trend toward specialization is reinforced by the incorporation of new scholars. Under pressure to produce
an original insight or unique contribution to the profession, newly minted PhD’s choose the clearest path to this aim by delving deeper into a more precise example of a specific type of social dynamic, moving us ever closer to a more fully compartmentalized and segmented academy.

And so, for example, those who study race rarely speak to those that study nationalism. And those that look at labor markets don’t really read the work of those that are interested in language use. As a result, there is often a curious disjuncture in our scholarship between the world as we know and experience it and the world as we describe and explain it. Ary had a particular penchant for bridging these gaps.

In fact, Zolberg repeatedly and unabashedly rejected these divisions with work that underscores the fact that such organizational segregation of our research leads to impoverished insight. Here I am speaking not merely to the interdisciplinary nature of his work. I am speaking to his very defiance of categorization. He insisted on being at once a political scientist, sociologist, historian, and even an investigative reporter of sorts. His work is defined not simply through the borrowing of certain tools and insights from a neighboring discipline, but through the rejection of these disciplinary boundaries as irrelevant and burdensome. In short, he exhibited a sort of transdisciplinary scholarship that is dangerous to organizational predispositions that divide us and impoverish our analysis.

Of course, this was not the limit of Zolberg’s transgressions. For Ary was guilty of no less a charge than (dare I say it?) heresy. Zolberg had – on far more than one occasion – rejected established doctrine and suggested that we should not feel so comfortable with the ‘social facts’ we believe we know to be true. Indeed, he began his career with an examination of politics and society in Africa that clearly challenged the ‘systems theory’ that dominated the field of comparative analysis at the time. Instead, he offered a more nuanced, careful, and rich account of African governance. So compelling was his work that it is still – forty years after it was published – being used as a core text for courses on Africa.

His challenge to the Academy did not end there, of course (is there such a thing as serial heresy?). Over the course of his career, he would reject simple behavioralist accounts for the development of lines of difference in European society, he would challenge notions of African Tribalism, problematize narrow conceptions of a World System, cause us to reconsider simple notions of state formation . . . I could go on, and on. But let me cut to the chase, so to speak: Ary made our lives harder. Social scientists work long hours with great effort to clearly identify and sharply define the lines of acceptable claims and established debate in the field. These entrenched analytical cleavages are then reinscribed by graduate students who take on the mantles of their mentors and rehearse their pedantic battles. As a result, at times it seems as though a major preoccupation of social scientists is the reduction of complex social outcomes into contending monocausal claims. Our analytical models become more complex, our vocabulary more elaborate; but our vision of the world nevertheless remains narrow, as do our debates. We sometimes seem trapped in a methodological endgame, volleying causation back and forth between imaginary categories— attempts to vindicate institutionalism, resuscitate behavioralism, assert rationalism, and so on. These debates over methodological syntax estrange us from the real world and threaten to make our work less relevant. Ary’s work, on the other hand, has never been more relevant.
Indeed, over the past four decades, his work rejected these debates and set the terms for a clearer understanding. He reminded us, for example, that there are moments in history – ‘Moments of madness’ – in which deliberative agency and constraining structure are overwhelmed by historical fervor, confusion, or chance, leading to an outcome that no one planned, but is nonetheless not entirely beyond understanding. With similar disregard for the existing and entrenched lines of debate, he has argued that the underdevelopment of Africa is the result of both colonial machinations and the mistakes and corruptions of African leaders, much to the chagrin of experts on both side of the debate. Likewise, at a time when migration specialists dismissed the state as a bit player in the shaping of migratory patterns, convinced that the push and pull of labor markets answered all relevant questions, Zolberg reminded us sharply that immigration policies don’t just matter, they are central to defining how migration patterns take shape.

In short, his understanding of the world seemed to be every bit as complex as the world itself; and as a result, his analysis repeatedly undercut the simplified (should I say facile?) explanations we are tempted to construct to complete the task of description and more clearly define our ‘turf’ in our arcane debates.

If Zolberg’s accounts rejected established causal claims in favor of a simple catalogue of the factors at play without explanatory alternatives, he would have perhaps been limited to annoying to the established structure, rather than truly dangerous. However, Zolberg was acutely skilled at drawing out general observations and conclusions that enriched our understanding of social change without compromising historical contingency or uniqueness. Social research, it often seems to be believed, must sacrifice nuance and complexity for generalizable coherence. However, Ary repeatedly demonstrated that – in the immortal words of Ira Gershwin -- ‘it ain’t necessarily so’. He had a knack for simultaneously uncovering the particular complexities of historical cases while drawing out generalizable observations that enriched our conceptual understanding of social change.

And here is my hypothesis on this: I believe it is precisely the breadth of his interest and analysis that made him so damn good at this. Ary was an insightful Africanist because he was not only an Africanist, his work on nationalist movements and language in Europe holds up because he was not merely a scholar of nationalism, and his work on migration and American immigration was particularly comprehensive and rich precisely because he brought to it the understanding of these other fields and interests. In a review of A Nation by Design, Kristofer Allerfeldt speculated that perhaps so few academics attempt the sort of overarching interpretation offered by Ary because of a “lack of specialist knowledge”. I would argue that the opposite is the case. It is the creative breadth of Ary’s interest that so clearly informed this text and makes his insights so penetrating. And, I would argue, so few attempt such important work now because we are increasingly becoming a profession of specialized technicians.

If I have not convinced you that Zolberg was a danger to the current course of our profession, allow me to turn to my third and last charge: He was opinionated. He clearly had a notion of what a more just world would look like, and his research was clearly aimed at helping us get there. I do not mean simply that he was a ‘critical’ scholar – we all knew Ary to be a social democrat with a radical streak. I mean that his research actually spoke to key issues, engaged in real world conditions and policies.
He was, in short, not afraid to be relevant. And this question of our relevance is very much at stake. In Political Science, for example, more than two decades ago Theodore Lowi concluded, after an extensive evaluation of the state of discipline, that political science had become a “dismal science,” without passion, unable to attract the interest of policymakers, and failing to identify crucial shifts in the American regime. There was and is an effort to address this failing, of course; but, nonetheless the study of governance seems to have made itself irrelevant to those who govern.

But, once again, the body of Zolberg’s work points to an antidote. Nowhere is this clearer than in his most recent work. As immigration emerges forcefully on the public agenda, Ary offered a definitive examination of the patterns of US immigration that cannot help but shape the public dialogue and inform our understanding. It is not simply the case that a less-dangerous scholar would have ended his most recent book a chapter earlier, leaving off his discussion of the ethical implications of his analysis, but it is also true that the entirety of the book was informed by – but not limited by – a commitment to a particular liberal version of social democracy. He was not content to offer merely observations on what sort of nation we have become, he directly addressed the equally crucial question: what sort of nation should we strive to be? And he shifted the very basis of questions that inform the debate from “whom should we allow entry” to “when are we justified in restricting access?” or as Ary has it: “Why not the Whole World?”

Zolberg’s work, in my view, connects ethics and public policy in a way that too many of us seem hesitant to do; he undertook a scholarship that has the potential to not only inform the academy but engage policymaking and shape public opinion. His perspective may or may not gain traction in the public arena, but no one can say it is not relevant.

Ary pointed out that our world is divided into clusters of epistemic communities that rarely speak to each other and rarely speak the same language. Policymakers talk about one thing, academics another; immigration is talked about very differently South of the Border than it is in Texas or Washington DC, not to mention the hallowed halls of the academy. Zolberg may not have found a common vernacular – that would be too much to ask from one work – but one of his aims was clearly to bridge this gap, to draw out lessons that can connect these perspectives with a common story.

So, as a student of Ary’s (and I will forever remain his student) here is how I understand the ‘dangers’ of his lessons: First, disciplinary boundaries are professional constructions not analytical tools. The world is not divided neatly into social, political, and economic factors, nor is it sharply divided between past and present – we must not allow our research to be so divided either. Second, our debates are neither comprehensive nor definitive of the social world. We must not allow our research to descend into doctrinaire deliberations that serve our discursive penchants but ignore real world exigencies. Third, our work should and must matter. Simply put: it is part of our proper role to help catalyze and shape a more just social order.

These lessons are particularly pertinent in migration studies. The very origin and nature of the field is interdisciplinary. But the field is not immune from the pressures that compartmentalize understanding and segregate researchers in other fields. And, in a field where a comprehensive understanding is so necessary, such divisive trends would have grave consequences. More critically,
as Ary’s work reminds us, in a time during which political debates are invested with such emotion, the work of careful, informed, and ethically-engaged scholars is essential.

But, for me, the most vital lesson I take from Ary is at once more encompassing and more personal. Simply put: the best scholarship is driven by passion. We must not allow Social Science to become an abstracted, sterilized profession or technocratic exercise. Our task is to find interesting and meaningful puzzles and work them through, discover unanswered questions and attempt to answer them, and above all allow ourselves to explore with ethical intent.

Thinking about the scope of Ary’s work in preparing this essay reignited in me thoughts of what C. Wright Mills once called the Sociological Imagination – to understand and explore the nexus of experience, institutions, and history. In other words, and here I’ll borrow from words Ary used at our first meeting some fifteen years ago: We must strive to be Intellectuals, in the best sense of the word, to be interested in a great many things and curious about things in which we have no interest. And, we might strive to be just a little more dangerous.

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Aristide Zolberg was Himself an Institution

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I first met Ary in 1984 in a workshop in Paris, at Sciences Po. I had just finished my Ph.D. thesis in sociology at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales on “the effect of space on migrants’ integration in two cities in France.” When I met Ary I had received a Lecturer position at Harvard, in Social Studies. We talked about migration studies in France and the United States and the questions and challenges they raise in the two countries. I was fascinated to hear about American social sciences and of some of the influential books that I read all those years ago. This discussion was very important for me; it was a very valuable invitation to (re)think my thesis in terms of a more systematic comparison between France and the United States. Our discussions enriched my understanding of migration, integration and pluralism in the United States and the relation between the United States and France and other European countries. I was better armed for my American experience.

Years later, at a conference, Ary told me he had helped to introduce a political approach to the study of migration in France in the early 1980s. Migration studies at that time were focused on a Marxist approach, with migrants seen as a part of the labor force. Besides the history of the newcomers (mainly from former colonies), such theories cast migrants’ motivations as mainly economic and held that declared and undeclared state policies premised on the reconstruction of Europe after
WWII confirmed the primarily economic role of migrants in France. As for sociological studies on
the issue, they were mainly inspired by the Chicago School, with the paradigms of “acclimatization”
and "assimilation." Ary pushed students and scholars to think of migrants as political actors – this
was new! And his message had a lot of resonance, influencing the orientation of many research
projects in France. He would say afterwards that “migration studies were not a priority at Sciences
Po. I kept telling them how important migration was and very soon they will have to realize it.” He
was right.

His fame and work was not limited in Europe to France, but also spread to Belgium (his native
country, of course), Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands; Ary’s name has been featured in
prestigious institutions in these countries, and he was a force at conferences, and a presence in the
tables of contents of influential journals and edited volume. We never collaborated on common
projects, seminars or teaching program but often crossed paths at conferences and workshops all
over the world, sometimes serving on the same panel, sometimes just being in the same room. Ary’s
comments always brought alternatives views, arguments, and perspectives to the fore; challenging
scholars on many different issues was one of his characteristics – he was the discussant “par
excellence.” His remarks, critiques and suggestions would be always stimulating, raising new
questions and a basis for further discussion. At the end of panels and conferences I would follow
him, with other colleagues, to continue our discussions for hours, in restaurants, cafés, and
museums. Our conversations would mix the personal experiences of border crossing and our
minority experiences in very different parts of the world – highlighting the boundaries between
religion and ethnicity, nationalities and identities in different settings.

We had the opportunity to discuss local symbols that didn’t have much in common besides their
affective and superstitious properties. I think often of when Ary was in the hospital in Paris after his
stroke and I brought him an “eye” from Turkey to protect him from the “evil eye,” since he was
doing so incredibly well. I remember a whole conversation with Ary and Vera on the
anthropological interpretations and symbolic meanings of this little object in Africa and Turkey. It
was a symbol that meant so much in the quite different environments in which we had lived. Not so
exceptional after all!

I remember also that one of the conferences we both attended at the American Academy in Berlin
coincided with the construction of the Jewish Museum. We were one of the first visitors to the
museum that was as yet still not officially open. Its impressive architecture was even more imposing
in its emptiness. We visited the museum in silence, in harmony with history and the emptiness of
the Museum. When years later again in Paris he wanted to visit the Jewish museum where there was
an exhibition on the Dutch Jews and Spinoza, Ary stopped in front of one of the pictures and
documents. It was the picture of a classmate of his in Belgium, where he was born. The father of the
men in the picture was a policeman who saved his life during the war. He told me afterwards that he
wrote the person and received an answer. He was very happy that the men remembered him as
well. That was exceptional

Aristide Zolberg, the cosmopolitan Africanist, Europeanist, Americanist. He didn't have any choice
but to compare. Comparisons – spontaneous and reflexive – have been the basis of his thoughts and
writings. Even though his last book, A Nation by Design, is about immigration in the United States, it
is impossible not to think of other contexts, and he himself questioned whether the American nation is not after all “a nation like others.” Comparisons led him to develop global visions before the age of globalization in social sciences: already in 1995 he wrote of “global flows, global walls, global movements, and a global system.”

Ary had multiple disciplinary identities in the social science as well. He was a historian, a sociologist, a political theorist – Ary Zolberg thought, discussed, and wrote about all aspects related to the arrival, settlement, integration and assimilation of migrant, including ethnicity, citizenship, multiculturalism, and transnationalism. He created ICMEC, (International Center for Migration, Ethnicity, and Citizenship) at the New School, a nexus joining scholars from the New York area and all over the world. Fortunately Alexandra Delano, Assistant Professor at the New School is very active on the revival of the center with very interesting activities including visual aspects of migration and border crossing. Obviously Ary had a great influence over the next generation.

Ary and I became colleagues at the New School in the years from 2005-2011, when I was a Visiting Professor in the same department with an office next to his in both the old and new buildings. I would see Ary and Vera very often – they were like my New York family, inviting me over for dinners where one always met very interesting people and, most importantly, where Ary would be proud of his cuisine – a world cuisine. I would see them at every event I was invited to, at conferences in the city, receptions, and talks. They were in a large part my New York.

At the New School, I was asked to introduce Ary at a talk that the graduate students of the department organized for him. Of course I was honored. While I was thinking of how to introduce such a scholar, friend and colleague it occurred to me that Ary might not require any introduction at all. I realized that Ary Zoberg is himself an institution.

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Thinking Slow with Ary Zolberg

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In his book *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, Daniel Kahneman describes how he used to take long walks in the Californian hills – four miles every morning – when he was a visiting professor at Stanford. The steady pace of walking, he claimed, was conducive to Thinking Slow, which of course in Kahneman's schema was the most difficult and creative form of thinking.

Working with Aristide Zolberg involved a lot of walking as well. The habit started with walks through the woods in Woodstock, where Ary had organized a small writers’ workshop. It must have been in the early 1980s. We had discovered our joint interest in refugee issues, but at the time our attention was quite differently focused. Ary was thinking about the Horn of Africa, particularly Ethiopia and Eritrea, and I was working on Afghanistan. What could we learn and develop from these two very different cases? As we walked through the autumnal woods of upstate New York, we must have come up with something, because we were later invited by Myron Weiner to present the findings at a seminar series Myron was running at MIT.

The paper was the first result of our decade-long collaboration, and the precursor to the book *Escape from Violence* that Ary took the lead in developing. As we worked on the book, joined by our colleague in Mexico, Sergio Aguayo, there were more long walks. Informal writing sessions in Ary and Vera’s apartment in Soho started with daily, long walks down Lafayette Street, often to the very tip of Manhattan, and back up past Wall Street for coffee. The morning walks were Thinking Slow. Ary would carry a small notepad, otherwise we would just walk and talk – about what we had written the previous day(s), about a stray thought that seemed to be nagging one of us, about unusual patterns and connections, about unasked questions that needed to be asked, or about anything remotely related to the book that was taking shape. The title of the book itself was conceived by Ary in Central Park as we rested on the grass, halfway through a walk. It was duly entered into his notepad.

We also walked when doing field research. In southern Mexico, we walked to a clandestine refugee settlement located in the dense forest along the Guatemalan border. It was a stifling hot day – so hot I was knocked out by a heat stroke – but Ary seemed unaffected by either the heat or the narrow path through the forest. Sporting a Mexican straw hat with a smart cut, he marched on with his characteristic determination and good humour.

So what was the essence of Ary’s Thinking Slow about refugee issues? He wanted to understand why there are refugees – why they occur in some places and times, and not others, why they sometimes come in a flow and sometimes a trickle, and why they sometimes return and at other times not. The answers to these questions he found in the larger historical processes of state formation and social change. One of his early, influential contributions found refugee flows from Spain at the end of the 15th century – the expulsion of Jews and Muslims – as integral to the process of state formation.
Similarly, refugee flows in the Horn of Africa he understood as a product of what he called competitive state formation. Examining later refugee flows through the centuries, he located also these in broader processes of social change and conflict. The nature and direction of flows, consequently, had to be understood quite concretely in their specific historical context.

The perspective was in effect a *braudelisation* of refugee analysis, as Ary introduced our work at a seminar in Paris in the mid-1980s. At the time, Fernand Braudel's monumental 3-volume history, *Capitalism and Material Life, 15th-18th Century*, was much discussed. To understand refugee movements, Ary was essentially adopting a braudelian approach by lifting the analysis from a legal framework – which was still dominant in refugee studies - and giving it a socio-economic and political cloth. That meant above all distinguishing the refugee as a legal *persona* from the refugee as a social category, that is, as individuals or groups fleeing their homes for a variety of reasons, and who may, or may not, be accorded legal recognition and protection as refugees. Formulated this way, the question then became under what historical conditions people have fled their homes, and why some of them, but not all, have been recognized as refugees.

Now, in 2013, this distinction and the questions it gives rise to seem obvious. That it does, is in no small measure due to Ary's pioneering work during the 1980s. Initially presented in several papers and articles, the analysis was fully developed over a period of several years and presented in the book entitled *Escape from Violence. Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*, published in 1990.

Ary was not only concerned to understand why refugee flows occur, but to explore the political and moral implications of a situation where demand for refugee settlement greatly exceeds supply. How could the parameters of a triage system be established to maximize justice? The parameters we eventually developed were based on identification of sociological types of refugees. The tree main types we constructed - the activist, the target, and the victim – had equal moral claim to protection, we argued. At the time, this position was not reflected in the application of legal instruments in North America and Europe. Only the first two types were in practice most likely to be recognized as refugees. With the Balkan wars in the mid-1990s, however, European countries adopted less restrictive rules for ‘victims’ who, while not necessarily persecuted in the strict sense of the Refugee Convention, were given ‘temporary protection’ that mostly turned into permanent settlement. In retrospect, it was a victory for the fundamentally liberal views championed by Ary.

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In Memoriam: Aristide R. Zolberg

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Ary Zolberg changed my life. I was working on a book about the history of passports which, although addressing migration issues was not my primary purpose, forced me to learn something about migration. I knew nothing about the topic at the time, so I cast about for some guidance in the literature. A book called Human Migration: Patterns and Policies, and edited by the distinguished world historian William McNeill, seemed like a good place to start. I read a few of the papers in the volume, feeling relatively unmoved until I read the 45 pages under the name Aristide Zolberg, of whom I had then never heard. It was a tour de force, unlike anything I had read in a long time: enormously erudite, gracefully written, immensely illuminating. I quickly sought out other writings of his, which often were buried in edited volumes and not necessarily easy to find. They were all like the first paper I had read – clear, insightful, powerful.

To my mind, what was most striking about Ary’s writing was his very unusual ability to adopt a perspective that had no obvious national or “local” bias. He seemed to have attained the supposedly unattainable “Archimedean” perspective – an omniscient stance, located nowhere and seeing the world as a “biosocial unity,” as I seem to recall him putting it. I soon found myself following up his references – historians like McNeill (the National Book Award-winning The Rise of the West), Geoffrey Barraclough (An Introduction to Contemporary History) and Garrett Mattingly (Renaissance Diplomacy) – to try to acquire this cosmopolitan sensibility. But this sort of erudition is not so easily acquired, and requires immersion in the history of the whole world -- not an endeavor generally encouraged by the contemporary social sciences. The fact is that the University of Chicago had marked out a niche in what would come to be known as “world history,” anticipating by a good generation the contemporary preoccupation with “globalization.” In sociology, the main outlet for thinking of this global sort was “world systems theory,” created by Ary’s fellow Africanist Immanuel Wallerstein. Ary was sympathetic with the general project, but not satisfied with the economistic Marxist framework that Wallerstein employed. Ary’s critiques, which instead stressed the importance of military and political factors in explaining the rise of the modern world order, can now be found in How Many Exceptionalisms?: Explorations in Comparative Macroanalysis – a volume that I prevailed upon him to publish in my series with Temple University Press in the interest of making better known some of his trenchant essays that had sometimes originally appeared in more out-of-the-way places.

Then, as fate would have it, I did have the good fortune to get to know him – in a two-installment, transatlantic seminar that spread over two years in the mid-1990s. He led the seminars with great charm and wisdom. But then there were the parties. Here was this, well, not young guy wearing unbelievably cool African print shirts, dancing with the girls, and telling great stories. My favorite was this: Ary came to the United States shortly after World War II and promptly went into the army. He was shipped off to El Paso, Texas, where he had a lot of time on his hands as a resident of the base. So, he thought to himself, “I’m in the military. It’s time to read War and Peace.” So he did,
carrying it around the base with him to take up in spare moments. "But most of the guys with whom I was in the service," he said, "had never seen any book that big that wasn't the Bible. So they called me 'the Preacher'."

That was especially funny to me because, soon after we first met, he had described himself as my "co-religionist" (I was raised Catholic). And I'm thinking: How could this guy, who just had to be Jewish, be my fellow Catholic? Well, that's a longer story, about being a "hidden child" (from the Nazis, of course) in Belgium during World War II. As part of his "cover," he would indeed eventually be confirmed in the Catholic Church – along the way learning English by reading *National Geographic* with the German soldier billeted in the town where he was "hiding." Did the German soldier know? Ary thought he did. Far from a hardened Nazi, the guy had been living in the United States and only conscripted as a result of an ill-fated return to Germany during the war. Another great story, full of the strange twists and turns of history and fate. Ary understood – from hard-won personal experience and from a lifetime of learning -- that history was like that.

Indeed, given his personal history, it's hard to see how his scholarly work and his life can really be separated. He was personally insulted by racial discrimination and animus, but also had a more level-headed view about what to do about them than many people preoccupied with the problem. He was always a source of wisdom, whatever the topic. He was a humane, wise, generous scholar, the like of which we do not see much anymore. I will miss him, but I will certainly not forget him.


**Aristide R. Zolberg: Beginnings of a Biography**

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On September 5, 1944, Father Pierre Goossens, the principal of the Institut Notre-Dame de Cureghem, a Catholic high school in Brussels, celebrated mass to mark the city's liberation from the Germans by the British 2nd Army the previous day. But father Goossens also had an announcement to make to the staff and 500 students of the Institut: Henri Van den Berghe, who had enrolled in the
school’s Greek-Latin section a year earlier, was not who he appeared to be – a Catholic Fleming who had commuted from Schepdaal, just outside of Brussels, until January, when he became a boarder. Henri Van den Berghe, Father Goossens said, was really Aristide Zolberg and had been forced to hide “for being a member of the same race as Our Lord Jesus Christ.”

After liberation, Aristide moved back in with his mother, who had been in hiding in Brussels, learned that his father, just like close to half of Belgium’s Jews, had been deported (and murdered in Auschwitz), and continued – over his mother’s objections – attending the Catholic Institut as a day student until March 1948. At that point, at the age of 16 and a few months shy of graduation, he departed for the United States, where he would live with Orthodox relatives in Brooklyn while finishing high school. After college at Columbia University, a master’s degree from Boston University, and his army service, he went to the University of Chicago to pursue a PhD.

Aristide’s wartime experience is remarkable, but it is not unique. Luc Dequeker, an eminent Judaist from the Dutch-language Catholic University of Leuven, puts at 2,000 the number of Jewish children and adolescents in Belgium who survived the war because they had been sheltered by Catholic families or institutions; an unknown number among them, substantial enough to cause some anxiety in Belgium’s Jewish community, were baptized during that period, as was Aristide. In fact, while the Comité de Défense des Juifs – the main Jewish resistance organization – reassured its members that the number of known cases of baptized Jewish children was small, it was big enough for some of the CDJ’s Zionist members to worry about the children and warn of the danger of conversion.1

Aristide was baptized on February 27, 1943, when some hope was still alive that baptized Jews might escape arrest and the deportations that had begun the previous summer (all such illusions were shattered soon afterwards, on 1 September 1943, when the order went out to deport all Jews in Belgium). This might explain the remarkable fact that Aristide was baptized under his real name rather than as Henri Van den Berghe, and that his parents’ names – Samuel Zolberg and Sabina Fiszhaut – were also entered in the baptism register. But this also suggests that the exercise was more than purely instrumental, more than simply a put-on to escape persecution.

Onderpastoor (curate) Jozef De Bondt, who administered the baptism early one morning, before the 7:00 AM mass, without bothering to inform the parish priest, his superior, must have been aware at least of the general circumstances of Aristide’s presence in the village, given the obviously Jewish names of his parents and the fact of his baptism at such a late stage. Given that baptism, the most fundamental of the Christian sacraments, is a matter of utmost importance for Catholics, it is difficult to imagine that De Bondt would have undertaken it lightly; he would have either believed that it would save Aristide from a terrible fate that was becoming more certain by the day, or trusted the sincerity of his conversion (or both).

While we cannot know for certain how the two sides involved – a boy of eleven years and the Catholic Church, in this instance represented by Onderpastoor De Bondt – may have felt about it, the

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adult Ary Zolberg, in his unpublished memoirs on which this piece is based, writes that he wanted to be baptized both because he hoped that Jesus would protect him against the Nazis and because, should they kill him because of his Jewish ancestry, “they would be fooled because, as the good Catholic I intended to become, I was assured of salvation.”

It is perhaps indicative of the depth of Aristide's transformation into Henri Van den Bergh that in Schepdaal he excelled in the two subjects that were emblematic for his new identity: catechism and the Dutch language. Having had just three years of Dutch in school in Brussels, Henri came out first in class in his mid-term exam in Schepdaal, and he was also top of class in Catholic religion, after spending just a few months among the Dutch-speaking Catholics of the village. For someone who had been brought up in an urban, secular, Francophone middle-class household of Jewish immigrant parents, that was quite a transformation.

Aristide Rodolphe Zolberg was born in Brussels in 1931 to parents who had come from Poland. Even though Samuel Zolberg and Sabina Fiszhaut had arrived just a decade before his birth, they had quite firmly assimilated into Brussels's secular, Francophone middle class. An only child, he grew up in St. Gilles, a (then) respectable neighborhood of central Brussels; his father ran a luxury handbag manufacturing business. In his memoirs, Zolberg describes his horror when, on the enactment of some of the early anti-Jewish measures in Nazi-occupied Belgium in 1941, he realized that his family would be treated just the same as that of Charles Sonabend, his Jewish classmate at the Ecole préparatoire à l'Athénée de St. Gilles – a primary school attached to a high school – who did not attend school on Saturday morning and whose family would go to the synagogue. (Sonabend, who lives in London, was not well enough to be interviewed for this piece. In 1942, he and his older sister, Sabine, were taken by their parents – his father was Belgium’s main importer of Swiss watches – to the treacherous safety of Switzerland. The family of four was picked up by Swiss police and deported across the border to German-occupied France. Charles and Sabine survived the war; their parents were killed in Auschwitz. They eventually won an out-of-court settlement with the Swiss government in a landmark case in the late 1990s.)

One of the things that set pre-war Belgium’s Jewish community apart from other communities in Western Europe was its composition - the bulk of it was made up of recent immigrants from the east. When the Germans occupied the country, just 6% of its Jews were Belgian nationals.

Polish Jews had been arriving in Antwerp in their thousands on their way to America; but many found opportunities there and stayed, a trend that was accelerated when the US and the Latin American countries began restricting immigration. Even today, Antwerp has one of the most closely-knit and thriving Jewish communities in Europe, with a high share of Yiddish-speakers. The Jewish community of Brussels tended to be more secular and more integrated into the city’s French-speaking middle classes than its counterpart in Antwerp. Whereas Belgium had no more than about 10,000 Jews before World War I, it had five times that number by 1930. On the eve of World War II, around half of Belgium’s Jews – who numbered perhaps 60-70,000 – were of Polish origin. It would appear that the Jewish population was about evenly divided between Brussels and Antwerp, although some historians believe that the community in Antwerp was considerably larger (about two-thirds of Belgian Jews, with one-third in Brussels). Either way, all but a few thousand of Belgium’s Jews lived in Brussels and Antwerp.
Aristide was sent into hiding after an order in the early summer of 1942 – just weeks before deportations to "the east" began from an assembly camp in Mechelen/Malines, at around the same time as trains left from Drancy in France and Westerbork in Holland - forbade Jewish children to study beyond primary school. In his memoirs, Zolberg writes that his parents interpreted this as a sign of the Germans' intention to exclude Jews from society altogether, an astute interpretation even though they had no inkling of the emerging 'final solution'. Through Samuel Zolberg's gentile lawyer, they found a school principal in Schepdaal, in the Flemish countryside surrounding Brussels, who was willing to put Aristide up for a monthly stipend and to pass him off as a distant relative who was eager to learn proper Flemish before going on to high school (the school principal in 1953 became mayor of Schepdaal, and a central street in the village is today named after him).

"Terror prevailed even though reality turned out to be unimaginably worse," Ary wrote later of that time.

Aristide's transformation, in the span of less than two years, from a secular, urban French-speaker into a Catholic, rural Dutch-speaker, by way of an essentially other-imposed Jewish identity – recall his horror at being lumped in with the observant Sonabends – is a poignant story of salvation, not of the spiritual kind but of the most basic, existential kind. To think that just three and a half years later, he would begin another transformation – from a French-speaking European into a proper American, by way of Orthodox Brooklyn – adds to its poignancy. But might there be another conclusion to be drawn from the story? Might the Belgian Aristide – and who knows, perhaps the American Ary as well? – have been an outsider to a greater extent than he understood? His parents were assimilated into the Brussels secular middle class of businesspeople and merchants. But when the Nazis came along, their Jewish ancestry suddenly became salient, and they were made even more vulnerable by their immigrant status. It is hard not to see echoes of this early experience in Ary's work as a scholar.

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A Tribute to Aristide Zolberg

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One of the things that struck me most upon learning of Ary’s declining health and eventual passing was how often I heard myself and others remark that we would always be “students of Ary’s”. I took this to mean that those of us lucky enough to work closely with Ary in graduate school were indelibly marked by the experience, and that his influence continues to shape how we approach our professional lives as researchers, scholars, and teachers. My experience as Ary’s student formally lasted for almost a decade, from the first class I took with him in 1998 to the defense of my dissertation in 2006, which he chaired. During that time, I had the opportunity to work with and learn from Ary as his student, his advisee, and his administrative assistant at ICMEC (the International Center for Migration, Ethnicity and Citizenship at the New School for Social Research). More informally and since then, I learned from Ary while watching him overcome serious health crises to complete and continue his work, engage equally rooms full of practitioners and academics, and enjoy a bottle of wine with a fine meal and good company. In this spirit, my remarks below reflect what it has meant for me to be Ary’s student, particularly the lessons I try to carry forward from the example he set.

The first is that good academic work must be driven by intense curiosity, high stakes, and even passion. I will always remember the first serious meeting I had with Ary about possible dissertation topics, in which he threw me completely off guard by asking me repeatedly: “But what excites you about that?” I quickly learned that Ary wasn’t satisfied by vague expressions of interest or subtle deviations within well-tread territory from his students. He expected to see an emotional and intellectual commitment to an issue of complexity, depth, and import. He wanted to see us struggling with unresolved questions and defending the need to find some answers. When he asked “why does this matter?”, he wasn’t simply looking for us to place our work within some established literature, but to justify our work in terms of what previously unknown story we could tell and how it mattered for people’s lives. This is when I first began to understand that the study of politics could – and should – be a deeply engaged and humanistic pursuit, and not simply an intellectual exercise.

The second lesson is the importance of storytelling. In his life and work, Ary was a talented storyteller. He had the eye of a journalist and a great sense of narrative. He used both to tremendous effect in his writing on migration, identity politics, and nation-building, from his early days in post-independence Africa to the streets of Paris in 1968 to his reckoning with the history of US immigration policy. By being there on the ground, asking questions, and reading the newspapers and the histories, Ary was able to uncover and unpack the various threads of a case and weave them into a compelling narrative of the politics involved that not only did justice to the complexities of the place and time, but was a pleasure to read. Ary’s work is a reminder that as analysts of social and political phenomenon, we should not shy away from complexity, but should pull on as many threads as necessary to discover the story that makes the most sense. The specifics of a case – its history and culture, the individual characters, the economic, social, political backdrop, organized groups and their interests, its institutions - matter deeply in finding and understanding that story.
The third lesson learned by a student of Ary’s, however, is to not lose sight of the forest for the trees. Ary’s work is classic not only because it gave such complete pictures of the actual messy politics shaping outcomes, but because of his ability to place specific cases into broad and innovative comparative frameworks. Ary saw larger structural similarities among seemingly disparate cases as he explored the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, be they ideological, economic, or identity-based. Even while deep in the complexity of a specific case or set of cases, he always maintained a “global perspective” in his work, which often led to surprising and intellectually fruitful comparisons. For example, in his early work when he presciently saw historical parallels to the dangerously homogenizing, and often violence-producing, processes of European nation-building in the struggles of post-independence African states, where others saw only small blips on the road to modernization. Or in work comparing the debates over Spanish-language inclusion in the US to those over accommodations of Islam in Europe. Or in his magnum opus, A Nation by Design, in which he tells the story of US immigration policy as a battle over boundary creation and the trajectory of nation-building, fought between economic and identity-based interests in a changing global and institutional context. In this way, Ary’s work reminds us that we need not, and should not, sacrifice analytical utility while dealing with complex cases, nor should we ever see “our” case/s as too special or precious to be “like” another in some meaningful way. These moments of often unexpected comparative insight are what bring vitality to our work, create opportunities for exciting collaborations across and within disciplines, and allow for a career like Ary’s that spans the globe regionally, but remains coherent and vital analytically.

The final lesson is about mentorship. Ary was not the kind of advisor who would edit your writing, tell you how to go about doing your research, or easily dole out praise. Instead, much more usefully, he was the kind of mentor who would push you, debate with you, and disagree with you, forcing you to defend your position with rigor and evidence. He was also deeply committed to creating opportunities for his students, be they for funding, networking, presenting, collaborating, or working. Through ICMEC, he supported dozens of students throughout the years, giving them the chance to work in areas that interested them, plan and attend conferences, and make important contacts in their fields. The grants administered through ICMEC always had substantial funding for graduate students built into them, something that Ary insisted on. I know that I and many others benefited substantially from the opportunity to work at ICMEC, and from Ary’s generosity of time and spirit. This charge from Ary to go beyond the dutiful office hours chat, to really engage students and their ideas, to push them towards larger goals, to create opportunities for them, and to mentor younger scholars, is something I strive towards in my own

career, and a commitment I see strongly represented in those other “students of Ary’s” with whom I am still in contact. Through us, another piece of Ary's legacy lives on.

Myra Waterbury is Associate Professor of Political Science at Ohio University. Her recent publications include Between State and Nation: Diaspora Politics and Kin-State Nationalism in Hungary (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), and “Bridging the Divide: Towards a comparative framework for understanding external kin-state and migrant sending-state diaspora politics” in Rainer Baubock, et al., eds. Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010). She is currently working on projects related to ethnic citizenship and diaspora politics, ethnic association in the European Parliament, and minority political integration in Eastern Europe.

Section News:
January - May 2013 in Brief– Books, Journal Articles, APSA, Member News

Books


Hennebry, Jenna and Bessma Momani (2013). Targeted Transnationals: The State, the Media, and Arab Canadians. UBC Press.


Maas, Willem (see Member News)

Ness, Immanuel (see Member News)


Journal Articles

American Journal of Political Science


1 A note on methodology. Journals were selected from the list of 90 political science journals included in Michael Giles and James Garand’s article “Ranking Political Science Journals: Reputational and Citational Approaches” (PS, October 2007, 741-751). We selected those that included at least 3 migration and citizenship related articles over the past decade (using the search terms “migration,” “citizenship,” “multiculturalism”). We only included articles written in English. We apologize for any oversight. For feedback and suggestions, please contact the editor.

American Political Science Review

Comparative Politics

Ethnopolitics

Journal of Common Market Studies

The Journal of Politics

Party Politics

Political Geography

Political Psychology

Political Studies
Political Theory

Politics & Society

Public Opinion Quarterly

Review of International Political Economy

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science

World Politics
- Maxwell, R. (see Member News)

APSA 2013 Migration and Citizenship Section Events

Please come to as many panels as you can as your attendance will boost our panel allocations for next year! And, of course, join us for our business meeting and our reception.

BUSINESS MEETING

Friday, August 30, 6:15-7:15pm (Hilton Chicago room 4M)

RECEPTION

Friday, August 30, 7:30-9pm (Location TBA)

SECTION CO-SPONSORED PANELS

52-1 Theme Panel: Power and Persuasion in the Politics of Labor Migration
Date: Friday, Aug 30, 2013, 8:00 AM-9:45 AM
Co-sponsored by Advanced Industrial Societies

Chair(s): Gallya Lahav
SUNY, Stony Brook University, gallya.lahav@sunysb.edu
Author(s):  
Power and Persuasion in Germany’s New Politics of Labor Recruitment  
Antje Ellermann  
University of British Columbia, antje.ellermann@ubc.ca

Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos  
University of Toronto, triadafilopoulos@utoronto.ca

Gendering High Skilled Immigration Selection: A Global Analysis  
Anna Katherine Boucher  
University of Sydney, anna.boucher@sydney.edu.au

Eiko Thielemann  
London School of Economics, e.thielemann@lse.ac.uk

Natascha Zaun  
University of Bremen, Jacobs University, nzaun@bigsss-bremen.de

Technocratic Shepherding of Migrant Rights: The Power of Legalism to Reframe State Interests  
Leila Kawar  
Bowling Green State University, kawar@post.harvard.edu

Discussant(s):  
Terri E. Givens  
University of Texas, Austin, tgivens@austin.utexas.edu

Valerie F. Hunt, vfhunt@gmail.com

52-2 Global Migration Governance: The Challenges of Migration  
Date:  
Friday, Aug 30, 2013, 10:15 AM-12:00 PM  
Co-sponsored by International Collaboration

Chair(s):  
James F. Hollifield  
Southern Methodist University, ihollifi@mail.smu.edu

Participant(s):  
Thomas Lacroix  
University of Poitiers, thomas.lacroix@univ-poitiers.fr

Author(s):  
‘Mixed Migration’: International Organisations’ Competition and Theoretical Innovation in the Management of Mobility  
Helene C. Thiollet  
Sciences Po, helene.thiollet@sciences-po.fr

From the Governance of Internal Displacement to the Governance of Environmental Migration: What the Latter Can Learn from the Former?  
Francois Gemenne  
Institut d’Etudes Politiq de Paris, Francois.Gemenne@sciences-po.org

Pauline Brucker  
IDDRI, pauline.brucker@iddri.org
International Organisations and the Politics of Migration  
Antoine Pécoud  
Université Paris 13, antoinepecoud@hotmail.com  
Martin Geiger  
Carleton University, martin.geiger@carleton.ca  

Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement  
Alexander Betts  
Oxford University, alexander.betts@politics.ox.ac.uk  

Discussant(s): James F. Hollifield  
Southern Methodist University, jhollifi@mail.smu.edu  

52-3 Migrants, Borders, and American Political Development  
Date: Thursday, Aug 29, 2013, 4:15 PM-6:00 PM  
Co-sponsored by Politics and History  

Chair(s): Els de Graauw  
CUNY-Baruch College, Els.deGraauw@baruch.cuny.edu  

Author(s): Redrawing the Boundaries of Social Citizenship: The Rise of Legal Status Restrictions in American Social Welfare Policy  
Cybelle Fox  
University of California, Berkeley, cfox@berkeley.edu  

States Running Immigration Policy—Immigration Federalism in the Antebellum Period  
Anna O. Law  
CUNY Brooklyn College, alaw@brooklyn.cuny.edu  

Ties That Bind: Race, Families, and the Quest for Skilled Immigration in American Politics  
Daniel Tichenor  
University of Oregon, tichenor@uoregon.edu  

For Party and Nation: The Politicization of U.S. Immigration at the Federal and Local Levels  
Karthick Ramakrishnan  
University of California, Riverside, karthick@ucr.edu  

Discussant(s): Janice Fine  
Rutgers University, fine@smlr.rutgers.edu  

52-4 Theme Panel: Power and Persuasion in the Politics of Labor Migration  
Date: Saturday, Aug 31, 2013, 2:00 PM-3:45 PM  
Co-sponsored by Normative Political Theory  

Chair(s): Loren King  
Wilfrid Laurier University, lking@wlu.ca  

Author(s): Boundaries and Legitimation  
Margaret Moore  
Queens University, margaret.moore@queensu.ca
Taking Place Seriously: Place-Sensitive Duties and the Political Rights of Immigrants
Paulina Ochoa Espejo
Yale University, ana.ochoaespejo@yale.edu

Terrestrial Cosmopolitanism and the Right to Place
Aveery Kolers
University of Louisville, akolers@louisville.edu

Justice in Immigration
David Miller
University of Oxford, david.miller@nuffield.ox.ac.uk

Discussant(s): Gillian Brock
University of Auckland, g.brock@auckland.ac.nz

52-5 Immigrant Integration in Europe – Critical Issues and Policies
Date: Sunday, Sep 1, 2013, 10:15 AM-12:00 PM
Co-sponsored by European Politics and Society

Chair(s): Alex Street
Cornell University, street.alex@gmail.com

Author(s): Legislating Equality: The Politics of Antidiscrimination Policy in Europe
Terri E. Givens
University of Texas, Austin, tgivens@austin.utexas.edu

The New Minority: White, Working Class Britons and Anti-immigrant Sentiment
Justin Gest
Harvard University, gest@fas.harvard.edu

Intersections of Social and Integration Policies: Immigration, Austerity, and Policy Change in Western Europe
Sara Wallace Goodman
University of California, Irvine, s.goodman@uci.edu
Gregory Charles Baldi
Western Illinois University, baldi@wiu.edu

The Professional Context of Attitudes Towards Immigrant-Origin Racial Minorities
Rahsaan Maxwell
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, rahsaan@email.unc.edu

Discussant(s): Alex Street
Cornell University, street.alex@gmail.com
Erica Dobbs
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, edobbs@mit.edu

52-6 Migrants Rights: Domestic and International Determinants
Date: Thursday, Aug 29, 2013, 10:15 AM-12:00 PM
Co-sponsored by Human Rights

Chair(s): Jeannette Money
University of California, Davis, inmoney@ucdavis.edu
Author(s):  

The Price of Rights. Labour Immigration Policy and the Rights of Migrant Workers.  
Martin Ruhs  
Oxford University, martin.ruhs@compas.ox.ac.uk

Leaders and Shirkers: Comparing Refugee Rights in Liberal States with IMPALA Database  
Eiko Thielemann  
London School of Economics, e.thielemann@lse.ac.uk

Emerging Migration Policies in Emerging Democracies  
Shaina Western  
University of California, Davis, sdwestern@ucdavis.edu

Migrant Rights and the UN Convention  
Jeanette Money  
University of California, Davis, jnmoney@ucdavis.edu  
Shaina Western  
University of California, Davis, sdwestern@ucdavis.edu

Sarah P. Lockhart  
Fordham University, slockhart3@fordham.edu

Human Rights and Immigration Control Wrongs  
Tom K. Wong  
University of California, San Diego, tomkwong@ucsd.edu

Discussant(s):  Julie Mostov  
Drexel University, mostvjdrexel.edu

52-7 Immigrants and Political Engagement in the United States  
Date:  Saturday, Aug 31, 2013, 8:00 AM-9:45 AM  
Co-sponsored by Race, Ethnicity, and Politics

Chair(s):  Alexandra Filindra  
University of Illinois, Chicago, aleka@uic.edu

Author(s):  The Impact of Parents’ Political Experiences and Legal Status on Second Generation Immigrants’ Political Engagement  
Michael A. Jones-Correa  
Cornell University, mj64@cornell.edu

Assessing the Power of Citizenship for Asian and Latino Immigrants  
Taeku Lee  
University of California, Berkeley, taekulee@berkeley.edu

Who is We? A Comparative Analysis of Identity and Political Engagement among Afro-Caribbeans in New York and Los Angeles  
Cory Charles Gooding  
University of California, Los Angeles, cgooding@ucla.edu
Tell me more, Dime mas: Examining the Role of Mexican Immigrants’ Children in Political Information Acquisition and Learning
Marcela García-Castañon
University of Washington, marcegc@u.washington.edu

Discussant(s): Alexandra Filindra
University of Illinois, Chicago, aleka@uic.edu

52-8 Race/Gender and the Reconfiguration of Citizenship in France and Beyond
Date: Saturday, Aug 31, 2013, 8:00 AM-9:45 AM
Co-sponsored by Association Française de Science Politique Group

Chair(s): Daniel Sabbagh
Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, sabbagh@ceri-sciences-po.org

Author(s): An Intersectional Approach to Contemporary French and Turkish Secularism
Amelie Barras
University of Montreal, barrasamelie@hotmail.com

Interstitiality and the Hijabi: Producing the Unruly Muslim Female Citizen Within Western Liberal Frameworks
Falguni Sheth
Hampshire College, fsheth@hampshire.edu

Discipline and Freedom as Alternative Practices: Muslim Women’s Responses to Republicanism and Islam
Ines Valdez
Ohio State University, inevaldez@gmail.com

Discussant(s): Cecile Laborde
University College London, c.laborde@ucl.ac.uk
Rafaela Dancygier
Princeton University, rdancygi@princeton.edu

POSTER SESSIONS

D060-024: Poster Group: Migration and China
Date: Thursday, Aug 29, 2013, 2:00 PM-3:45 PM

Author(s): The Politics of Immigration Reform and Economic Modernization in China
Rey Koslowski
SUNY, University of Albany, rkoslowski@albany.edu
Sheng Ding
Bloomsburg University, sding@bloomu.edu

Institutional Change in a Single-party Authoritarian System: Migration, Citizenship, and the Household Registration System in China
Kay Shimizu
Columbia University, ks2679@columbia.edu
Shut Them Down, Take Them Over, or Certify Them: Migrant Citizenship and Modes of Incorporation in China  
Alexsia Chan  
University of California, Berkeley, alexsia@berkeley.edu

**D060-030: Poster Group: Migrants, Minorities, and the Media**  
**Date:** Thursday, Aug 29, 2013, 2:00 PM-3:45 PM  
**Author(s):**  
*Portrayals of Muslims in the British Media: How Much of an Out-Group are They, and Why?*  
Erik J. Bleich  
Middlebury College, ebleich@middlebury.edu

*Immigrants in the Media: Civic Visibility in the United States and Canada*  
Els de Graauw  
CUNY-Baruch College, Els.deGraauw@baruch.cuny.edu  
Irene Bloemraad*  
University of California, Berkeley, bloemr@berkeley.edu  
Rebecca Hamlin*  
Grinnell College, hamlinr@grinnell.edu

*not presenting*  

*Is There a European News Portrayal of Immigration? Results from a 5-Country Study*  
Alexander A. Caviedes  
SUNY, Fredonia, Alexander.Caviedes@fredonia.edu

*Moral Panics, Culture, Immigration and Hegemonic Strategy*  
Ferruh Yilmaz  
Tulane University, fyilmaz@tulane.edu

*Shaping Immigration News in the U.S. and French Journalistic Fields 1973-2006*  
Rodney Benson  
New York University, rdb6@nyu.edu

**Discussant(s):** Daniel C. Hallin  
University of California, San Diego, dhallin@ucsd.edu

**D060-027: Poster Group: Migration and Political Theory**  
**Date:** Thursday, Aug 29, 2013, 2:00 PM-3:45 PM  
**Author(s):**  
*Justice of Border Crossing Communities: The Partial Citizenship Approach and its Alternatives*  
David Watkins  
University of Dayon, djw172@gmail.com

*Methodological Nationalism, Migration, and Political Theory*  
Alexander Sager  
Portland State University, asager@pdx.edu

*Liberal Borders? Rethinking Sovereignty and Justice at the State’s Edge*  
Matthew Longo
Emigration, Losses, and Burden-Sharing: Which Arrangements are Fair?
Gillian Brock
University of Auckland, g.brock@auckland.ac.nz

D060-029: Poster Group: At the Margins of Membership
Date: Thursday, Aug 29, 2013, 2:00 PM-3:45 PM
Author(s): The Case for Immigration Sponsorship
Claudio Lopez-Guerra
CIDE, claudio.lopezguerra@cide.edu

Individual Rights and the Democratic Boundary Problems
Luis Cabrera
Washington State University, a.l.cabrera@bham.ac.uk

D060-025: Poster Group: Does Citizenship Status Matter?
Date: Thursday, Aug 29, 2013, 2:00 PM-3:45 PM
Author(s): Translocal Citizenship: Political Membership and Migration in Indigenous Mexican Communities
Gilda M. Rodriguez
Kenyon College, gilda.rodriguez@gmail.com

Metis and the Migrant: Theorizing Citizenship Practices Beyond Agonism, Resistance, and Dissensus
Marins Kaneti
New School for Social Research, marina.kaneti@gmail.com

A Fundamental Right? A Comparative Examination of External Citizens’ Enfranchisement in the United States and Germany
Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels
University of Kent at Brussels, ak248@kent.ac.uk

Citizenship as Label, Right and Rhetoric-Assessing Atypical State Membership Policies in India, the UK, and the EU
Daniel Naujoks
United Nations Development Programme, daniel.naujoks@gmail.com

D060-028: Poster Group: Migration and Europe
Date: Thursday, Aug 29, 2013, 2:00 PM-3:45 PM
Author(s): Fortress Europe? Power and Persuasion in European Migration and Citizenship Policies
Ellen M. Immergut
Humboldt University Berlin, immergue@cms.hu-berlin.de
Yotam Margalit*
Columbia University, vm2297@columbia.edu

*not presenting
D060-026: Poster Group: Varieties of Racism
Date: Thursday, Aug 29, 2013, 2:00 PM-3:45 PM

Author(s): The Long Road to Justice: Latino Migrant Politics and the Homeland Security State
Alfonso Gonzales
Lehman College (CUNY), alfonso.gonzales@lehman.cuny.edu

Difference-Blind Racism: Spatial and Temporal Distancing among Angelenos
Natasha Behl
Occidental College, nbehl@ucla.edu

APSA SHORT COURSE
Inclusive Cities: The Policies and Politics of Immigration and Integration in Comparative Perspective

Note: Even though there is no registration fee, space is limited. Please register (via apsanet.org) as soon as possible to avoid disappointment.

Wednesday, August 28. 9.30am – 4.30pm

9:30-9:45 Introduction

9:45-10:00 Opening Remarks: James Hollifield, Southern Methodist University

10:00-11:30 Panel 1: Comparative Immigration Policies: Inclusion and Exclusion at the National Scale
Phil Triadafilopoulos, University of Toronto Scarborough
Alexandra Filindra, University of Illinois,
Marc Helbling, Social Science Research Center, Berlin
Moderator: Jill Simone Gross, Hunter College, CUNY

11:30-1:00 Lunch on your own

1:00-2:00 Panel 2: The Multilevel Governance of Immigration
Jill Simone Gross, Hunter College, CUNY
Mara Sidney, Rutgers University-Newark
Mireille Paquet, Concordia University
Moderator: Ron Vogel, Ryerson University

2:00-2:15 Linking National to Local: Richard Stren, University of Toronto

2:15-3:30 Panel 3: Governing Immigration at the Subnational Level: Comparing Urban Responses
Adolfo Hernandez, Director, Chicago’s Office of New Americans
Els de Graauw, Baruch College, CUNY
Annika Hinze, Fordham University
Susan Clarke, University of Colorado
Moderator: Mara Sidney, Rutgers University-Newark

3:30-3:45 Summary and Conclusions: Willem Maas, York University
Selection Procedures for APSA Program
Joseph Carens, University of Toronto, jcarens@chass.utoronto.ca
James F. Hollifield, Southern Methodist University, jhollifi@mail.smu.edu

We chaired the program for the Migration and Citizenship division of the APSA program this year. (A note on terminology – for APSA program purposes, each section is a division.) We thought that it might be helpful to share with the entire section (and with the migration and citizenship listserv) the issues that we faced and the principles that we used in selecting panels and papers. Many of you submitted proposals that were not accepted and this will help you to understand why. It will also enable others to comment on these principles and to suggest alternatives for next year.

Background. The key problem that we faced this year was that as a new section we were allocated only 3 panels, but we received proposals for 15 panels and an additional 207 individual papers. This means that we had an acceptance rate of 3.3% (given the way the APSA calculates acceptance rates). To put this in perspective, at the 2011 APSA conference, the median acceptance rate was 21% and the lowest acceptance rate for any division was 11.2%. We protested to the APSA about this. Indeed, we submitted a formal appeal to the APSA Council, requesting more panels, but they denied our request.

We did not rest content with our meager lot. We proposed two (co-sponsored) panels as theme panels and had one accepted. This did not count against our allocation and gave us another .5 slot. There were only 13 theme panels available for the 52 divisions, so this was a good outcome. We encouraged other divisions to take our panels and papers by themselves, and two full panels and a few dozen papers found homes that way. And we greatly expanded the poster sessions. As we all know, they are not very satisfactory as venues, but they do enable some people to get their conference expenses paid.

Don’t conclude from this tale that it would be a mistake to apply to the Migration and Citizenship division next year. On the contrary. Next year we will have many more panels, precisely because our acceptance rate was so low this year. The APSA has an established formula to compensate for a low acceptance rate in one year with more slots in the next year. If the overall numbers regarding applications and acceptances from 2013 are comparable to the 2011 numbers, the Migration and Citizenship division will have at least 15 panel slots for 2014. Moreover, attendance also figures into APSA’s panel allocation formula. So, those coming to the APSA meeting in Chicago should try to attend the Migration and Citizenship panels. High 2013 attendance will mean even more panels at the 2014 meeting.

Principles. Given this context, what selection principles did we use?
(1) Co-sponsorship. The fact that we had so many proposals and only 3 panels determined our first selection principle: we would not accept any proposal for which we could not find a co-sponsor from another division. (When a panel is co-sponsored, it only counts as .5 against each division's allocation.) This meant that we could aim to have 6 panels altogether from the Migration and Citizenship proposals. It also meant, however, that some excellent proposals were eliminated from consideration when it became clear that the other division to which a proposal had been submitted was not willing to co-sponsor it. In future years, with many more panels, it will be reasonable to have some panels that are sponsored exclusively by the Migration and Citizenship division, but we thought that it would not be fair this year to use one of only three panels for that purpose.

(2) Intellectual Quality. This is the most important consideration, but also one of the most difficult to judge, given differences in interests, approaches, tastes, etc. We thought it important not to have the program choices simply reflect our own intellectual preferences. Moreover, there were many, many more proposals that met a high standard of academic excellence than we were able to accept. So, we supplemented this with two other considerations.

(3) Balance of Academic Interests and Approaches. Our division draws on at least 4 different subfields (American, Comparative, Theory and IR) and on a variety of approaches within those subfields. In selecting among the proposals that we regarded as of high intellectual quality, we wanted to make sure that we had at least one panel from each sub-field and that the program, taken as a whole, reflected a variety of methods and approaches.

(4) Diversity of Ages and Backgrounds. Again, with the constraints of selecting only proposals that met a standard of high intellectual quality, we gave some preference to panels that included scholars at different career stages and ones that would not draw a majority of participants from the same institution (whether current location or place of training). We also paid attention to other diversity-related issues such as gender, race, and ethnicity.

(5) Encouraging New Directions in the Field. This was a consideration that we talked about but did not actually use in our final selections, because of competing considerations. In particular, we both agreed that the overwhelming focus of the field (and hence of our selected panels) was on Europe and North America and on South-North migration. We thought that it would be highly desirable to have panels dealing with other areas of the world and with South-South migration. There were some very good individual paper proposals on those topics, but for various reasons we were not able to construct an appropriate, co-sponsored panel out of them. In the future, with more panels, it may be easier to do so, and we think one appropriate consideration for panel selection is to encourage such new directions.

Finally, an acknowledgment about something that played a role without being a principle. Proposals come as either complete panels or as individual papers. Although we did not favor full panels over individual papers as a matter of principle, it would be disingenuous for us not to acknowledge that the full panel proposals had a much higher success rate than the individual paper proposals. In part that was because the co-sponsorship issues were easier. Each panel was submitted to another division which could potentially serve as a co-sponsor. Individual papers are also normally submitted to a second division, but the papers have to be put into a panel and not all the papers that
one might want for a panel may have been submitted to the same second division. That can complicate matters. Moreover, the intellectual work of seeing how papers fit together is already done in a panel proposal. If one constructs a panel from paper proposals, the program chairs have to figure that out themselves. We did in fact read all of the individual paper proposals and we spent a lot of time talking about how to put individual paper proposals together into panels, thinking about common themes, and so on. Indeed, on a couple of occasions, we thought we had a panel constructed from individual papers and then some other division took one or another of the papers that we wanted to use. The bottom line, however, is that at the end of the process we drew more heavily on the panel proposals for the program than on the paper proposals (while still having to reject a number of excellent panel proposals). Based on our experience with past APSA meetings, we suspect that this is the normal pattern in other divisions as well.

The division council and the membership at large may want to discuss this issue and recommend guidelines to the next program chairs regarding the way in which the program is constructed. Individuals may also want to take this factor into account in deciding how to apply to the APSA program next year. We would say, however, that in our view it would be unwise to impose any strict proportional requirements on the sources for the program, both because of the administrative demands involved in turning papers into panels and because, in our judgment, the panels were, on average, of higher intellectual quality than the individual paper proposals and that should remain the most important consideration.

**Member News**

**Kristy Belton** (Political Science, University of Connecticut)

**Antje Ellermann** (Political Science, University of British Columbia)
- Was awarded a research grant by the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for the project “The Ethics of Immigrant Admissions: Race, Gender, Class, and Disability in Immigrant-receiving Democracies” ($197,750)

**Alexandra Filindra** (Political Science, University of Illinois at Chicago)
- With N. Kaplan, was awarded 2014 Chicago Area Study ($65,000), 2013-2014
- Was awarded UIC Social Science Seed Grant ($5,500), 2012-2013, and UIC LAS Dean’s Award for Faculty Research in the Humanities ($2,000), 2013
Els de Graauw (Political Science, CUNY-Baruch College)

Jean-Michel Lafleur (Centre for Ethnic and Migration Studies, University of Liege)
- Promoted to Associate Director of the Centre for Ethnic and Migration Studies (CEDEM)
- Published Transnational Politics and the State. The External Voting Rights of Diasporas, Routledge.

Willem Maas (Glendon College, York University)

Rahsaan Maxwell (Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst)

Immanuel Ness (Brooklyn College, City University of New York)
- Published edited book The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration, Wiley.

Marie Provine (School of Social Transformation, Arizona State University)

Monica Varsanyi (Political Science, John Jay College)

Sara Wallace Goodman (Political Science, University of California, Irvine)

Dvora Yanow (Communication, Technology and Philosophy, Wageningen University)
- Published with Marleen van der Haar, “People Out of Place: Allochthony and Autochthony in Netherlands Identity Discourse – Metaphors and Categories in Action,” Journal of International Relations and Development, 16(2), 227-261.
How to become a Section member?

1. Go to the APSA website: http://www.apsanet.org/
2. Click on “Membership”
3. Click on “Join or Renew NOW!”
4. Log in if you already are an APSA member (or create a new account and then log in if you are a new APSA member)
5. Go to the “Membership” section:
   a. If you already are an APSA member: click on “Your Section Membership” and then find “43. Migration & Citizenship”
   b. If you are a new APSA member: fill out both the general membership and section membership information
6. Click “Continue” – Section membership is only $8 for faculty, $3 for grad students

Tada, you are a now Section member and will automatically receive the next newsletter!