PROTEST EVENTS: CAUSE OR CONSEQUENCE OF STATE ACTION?
THE U.S. WOMEN’S MOVEMENT AND FEDERAL CONGRESSIONAL
ACTIVITIES, 1956-1979*

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Using data compiled from a variety of different sources, we seek to answer questions about the emergence and outcomes of women’s collective action in the United States between 1956 and 1979. In particular, we examine hypotheses derived from political opportunity and resource mobilization theories about the emergence of women’s protest. We also examine the consequence of women’s collective action on congressional hearings and House and Senate roll call votes on women’s issues. We find support for arguments about the effects of resources on the emergence of protest. We also find mixed support for arguments about the effects of political opportunity on the emergence of protest. Finally, we find little support for arguments about the effects of women’s collective action on congressional hearings and House and Senate roll call votes on women’s issues.

In the field of social movements, the most common research topic is movement emergence. Indeed, “in the long history of research and theorizing about social movements, no question has received more attention than that concerning the origins of social movements (Marx and McAdam 1994: 77). While there is a great deal of research addressing this topic, there is a tendency in much of this research to betray an allegiance to an implicit theoretical perspective, making the work less a systematic test of various theories than a plausible, post-hoc account of movement emergence seen through a particular explanatory lens.

Recently, movement outcomes has joined movement emergence as a common topic in social movement research (see Giugni 1998 for a review). Unlike the topic of emergence, however, there have been relatively few empirical studies on the outcomes of social movements.† That is, we really do not know what effect, if any, protest activity has on the pace and direction of social change, even the kind of institutionalized politics that would presumably

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be the easiest to monitor and link to movement activity.

We aim here to move beyond these possible blind spots to a more systematic analysis of the rise and the impact of social movements. We do so by analyzing the degree to which: (1) movement related protest activity is responsive to changes in either dimensions of political opportunity or organizational resources, and; (2) federal actions are predicted by the rate of movement protest. We do this for the U.S. women’s movement in the period, 1956-1979. To do this, we use two existing time series data sets relevant to the women’s movement: Rosenfeld and Ward’s data on women’s movement events for the period 1956-1979 (1985; 1996), and Minkoff’s annual count of women’s social movement organizations covering the same period of time (1994; 1995; 1997). In addition to these two data sets, we have added several theoretically relevant measures of political opportunity and resource mobilization, as well as a number of other plausible predictors of women’s movement activity. We will take up the theoretical justification for and methodological details underlying each of these additional measures in a later section of the article. For now, we simply want to underscore their use in answering the two central questions animating this article. First, how much explanatory power do various measures of organizational resources and political opportunities have with regard to the timing and pace of women’s movement events? And, reversing the causal order, does the pace of feminist protest predict subsequent federal action on women’s issues? Before we attempt to answer these questions, we first review extant work on the questions of movement emergence and outcomes.

MOVEMENT EMERGENCE

As we noted above, the question of movement emergence has long been central to theory and research in the field. Virtually all of the theories in the field attempt to explain why movements arise when and how they do. In its classic formulation, resource mobilization theory describes movements as emerging in response to an increase in the resources needed to sustain collective action and in the availability of formal social movement organizations to coordinate the overall effort. The political process model stresses the importance of expanding political opportunities as the catalyst for initial mobilization. These theories have been adapted to explain the causes and pace of collective action as well, as we will do here.

In our view, both these theories have something to recommend. But they share a similar flaw in that they both rest on a central explanatory factor that is sufficiently amorphous as to permit considerable interpretive latitude to anyone seeking to apply the theory to a given movement. Take the concept of "political opportunity." The earliest formulations of the concept were, without exception, quite vague. Any environmental factor that facilitated movement activity was apt to be conceptualized as a political opportunity. This conceptual plasticity has continued to afflict work in this tradition, threatening to rob the concept of much of its analytic power. In the words of Gamson and Meyer (1996: 275), the term political opportunity, "threatens to become an all-encompassing fudge factor for all the conditions and circumstances that form the context for collective action."2

The same could be said for resource mobilization theory as well. The concept of "resources"3 is as malleable as "political opportunity." In both cases, it would be hard to find a movement whose emergence could not be accommodated within the broad

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2 For an excellent review and suggestions for clarification, see Meyer and Minkoff (1997).
3 Cress and Snow (1996: 1090) remark that, despite the ubiquity of the concept of resources in the literature, it remains "slippery and vague." Their work provides us with one of the best attempts to clarify the concept of resources.
interpretive latitude provided by the theory. For all the empirical attention to the topic of movement emergence, most of the extant studies invoking a political process and/or resource mobilization theory amount to little more than plausible post-hoc accounts of the rise of this or that movement, framed in terms of a given theoretical perspective.

One of the chief goals of this article is to move beyond the obvious limits of this kind of post-hoc case making style of research. More specifically, we construct measures designed to test the predictive utility of resource mobilization and political process accounts of movement emergence, while controlling for other plausible explanations of protest. We will take up the methodological specifics of this effort in a later methods section.

MOVEMENT OUTCOMES

Notwithstanding the shared conviction of movement analysts that movements constitute an important force for social change, there are other plausible accounts of social change that would deny this status to movements. For instance, both traditional Marxist and world system theory anticipate the rise of movements and revolutions as byproducts of broader change and conflict processes. Movements, in both formulations then, are outcomes, rather than causes, of social change processes.

Given these alternative theoretical accounts of the relationship between social movements and social change, analysts must move beyond assertions of the causal importance of their subject matter to a more systematic examination of the link between movement activity and change processes. What little research has been done on the topic has yielded interesting but contradictory results, suggesting that the answer to the question of whether movements are products or producers of change is complicated and therefore deserving of further study. Perhaps the most rigorous study of movement outcomes is that of Andrews (1997), which shows that civil rights activity at the county level was predictive of subsequent electoral gains by blacks in Mississippi. In contrast to Andrews’ work, Burstein and Freudenburg (1978) find no direct effect of antiwar demonstrations on Senate votes on motions related to the Vietnam War, and Soule (forthcoming) finds no direct effect of the shantytown movement on divestment of South Africa-related securities by universities. In their study of the ”Second New Deal,” Amenta et al. (1994) complicate the matter further by raising the possibility that what many tend to regard as movement impacts may actually owe to the broader expansions in ”political opportunities” which set the movements in motion in the first place.

In essence, the relative paucity of empirical research on the topic and the inconclusive results of the extant studies argues for more systematic attention to the subject of movement outcomes. In this article, we examine the impact of organized feminist activity on certain institutionalized political outcomes. Before turning to the specific operational measures we employ, we briefly review research on the U.S. women’s movement.

THE U.S. WOMEN’S MOVEMENT, 1956-1979

Social scientists have approached the study of the women’s movement in a number of different ways. Freeman's (1975) early work on the movement stressed the role of relative deprivation (as well as resource mobilization) in the origins of the movement. Essentially, women compared their earnings and occupational opportunities with men of the same age and similar educational background and realized great discrepancies. This led to discontent on the

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4 Most scholars of the present day women’s movement demarcate the beginning at about 1960 (see Evans 1980; Gelb and Palley 1982; and McGlen and O’Connor 1983).
part of many women, which laid the foundation for movement in the early 1960s.

Other researchers have employed a resource mobilization framework. Gelb and Palley (1982: 37) assert that "resources including staff, funding, and membership both dictate and constrain possibilities for political influence." Both Freeman (1975) and McGlen and O'Connor (1983) stress the importance of preexisting communication networks, and McGlen and O'Connor (1983) also emphasize preexisting organizational bases, outside resources, as well as a "sense of collective oppression" and a mobilizing event. Conover and Gray (1983) hold that the media, the government, and various interest groups are resources that shape the emergence and success of a movement. Finally, Staggenborg (1988; 1989) examines how the internal organizational structure of two Chicago-based women's organizations affected their strategies and tactics of protest.

Several scholars have developed systematic political opportunity accounts of the emergence and trajectory of the women's movement. For example, Costain (1992) concludes that the federal government played an important role as facilitator of the women's movement by passing legislation favorable to women's issues. In her earlier work, Costain (1988) finds that the success of the women's lobby depended on, among other things, elite allies in Congress who provided direction for early lobbying efforts (Costain 1988: 41). Klein (1984) also invokes a political process model, at least implicitly, when examining the interplay between women's political activism, access to political authorities, and the influence on legislative outcomes on feminist issues (1984: 11).

The emergence of the contemporary women's movement and its bursts of collective action are captured by our study's time frame (1956-1979). As we will illustrate, the 1970s saw rapid increases in the formation of women's groups and increasing levels of collective action around women's issues, particularly around the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). The period was also characterized by increasing activity of authorities around women's issues, culminating in the 93rd U.S. Congress (1973-74), which represented a high point in the passage of federal laws addressing women's concerns (Costain 1992).

**Figure 1.** Changing Frequencies of Congressional Activities, Women's Mobilization Events and SMOs, 1956-1979
Our first goal in the following analyses is to evaluate the resource mobilization and political opportunity accounts of the causes and pace of women's collective action. We will, however, include measures of the relative status of women and media attention to women's issues to control for some alternative accounts of variations in that collective action.

Our second goal is to examine some of the outcomes of this collective action. Alongside the growth in women’s collective action and women’s groups during the 1970s, there were rapid increases in the number of congressional hearings and roll call votes in both the U.S. House of Representative and U.S. Senate, as can be seen in figure 1.

We are interested in examining the relationship between collective action around women’s issues and public hearings and roll call votes by the U.S. Congress on women’s issues through time. Such relationships, if uncovered, of course, may be interpreted in one of two ways. Stated theoretically, these interpretations are: 1) that collective action around women’s issues opens up political opportunities by pressuring Congress to consider remedial action, and 2) that the opening up of political opportunity through Congressional hearings and roll call votes encourages collective action around women’s issues. The number and tenor of hearings is one indication of congressional responsiveness to collective action, but it may also spur collective action. Our analyses will proceed on the assumption that political opportunity and collective action are, in fact, reciprocal.

MEASUREMENT AND HYPOTHESES

For the 24 year period between 1956 and 1979, we have assembled an event count data set containing measures of a number of key concepts described below. In a first set of analyses we treat women’s collective action as the dependent variable and examine how the political opportunity structure and availability of organizational resources affect it. In a second set of analyses, we examine one of the many potential outcomes of women’s collective action: changes in the political opportunity structure. Based on preliminary analyses, we decided to use three month intervals as the unit of analysis in which we would estimate event occurrence. Using quarter-years generates 96 observations in our sample (24 years multiplied by 4 quarters/year).

Women’s Movement Event Counts: Insider vs. Outsider Events

We use Rosenfeld and Ward’s (1985; 1996) data to obtain the collective action event counts for our period. Rosenfeld and Ward (1985; 1996) used The New York Times index to identify a range of women’s movement activity including many events that are not collective action events (Rosenfeld and Ward 1985: 4-5). From the subset of their data that is about collective action events, we identify two different types of women’s movement events: collective action that took place outside of the institutional political arena (outsider events) and collective action that took place within that arena (insider events). In all, there were 101 outsider events and 318 insider events during the 1956-1979 period.

The insider/outside tactics distinction is a common one (Walker 1991). Insider tactics are those that attempt to exert influence within the confines of the institutionalized political system. Outsider tactics are those that attempt to exert influence through other mechanisms (e.g. protest, grass-roots lobbying, etc.). Social movement theorists have

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5 It may be argued that a more appropriate time period in which to study the women’s movement would start in, say, 1960 or 1965. To test this argument, we ran all of the analyses presented below for the 1960-1979 and the 1965-1979 periods and found no substantial differences in the results reported below.
typically seen these two tactical approaches as alternatives to one another. Thus, in the analyses presented below, we treat insider and outsider events separately, examining how our indicators of political opportunity and organizational resources affect each of these two types of collective action. We also examine how these two types of collective action affect one another. Finally, we examine whether or not the lagged number of events affects the number of events in any particular quarter. In particular, we examine how the number of events that took place in the analogous quarter the year before affects the number of events in the quarter in question. We chose this particular lag structure to capture both ‘anniversary events’ (e.g. protests on the anniversary of Roe v. Wade) and any seasonal effects on protest (e.g. potentially higher rates of protest in warmer months).  

Emergence: The Importance of Political Opportunity

We have chosen for the purposes of this article to focus on two different dimensions of political opportunity structure: the level of institutional access and the presence of elite allies. These two dimensions are among those most commonly mentioned by those analysts who have sought to differentiate the various components of the political opportunity structure (Brockett 1991; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, and Giugni 1992; Tarrow 1994; McAdam 1996; Rucht 1996).

To operationalize the level of institutional access available to the women’s movement, we have collected data on congressional hearings and Senate and House roll call votes on women’s issues. For all three of these indicators, we use the lag structure described earlier. That is, we use the number of hearings or roll calls that took place in the analogous quarter the year before as independent variables in the analyses presented below.

Congressional hearings, we argue, are a good measure of the level of the openness of the House and Senate to women’s issues. It is typical of the committees of these two bodies to hold hearings around issues deemed to be worthy of attention, debate, and the introduction of legislation. Such hearings may or may not lead to the actual introduction of new legislation, and, if introduced, such legislation may not succeed in being enacted. Hearings can be thought of as signals of issue interest by elements of those bodies, whether or not there is enough support for the passage of specific legislation. We define congressional hearings relevant to women’s issues as those hearings in which women’s interests as a group are explicitly mentioned or discussed. The data were assembled from the computer searchable databases, known as CIS Congressional Masterfile (Congressional Information Services, 1993), which contains bibliographical records of congressional publications issued from 1789 to the present.  

Roll call votes by either the House of Representatives or the Senate on bills related to the interests of women can also be taken as signals of openness to women’s influence. We include these two indicators, in addition to Congressional hearings, in an attempt to get at differences between institutional access to the House and Senate. The data on House and Senate roll calls come from Poole and Rosenthal’s book, Congress: A Political-Economic Economic History of Roll Call Voting (1997).  

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6 We also examined the effect of the number of events in the immediately preceding quarter. In all models presented below, the number of events in the immediately preceding quarter had no effect. Thus we only report the findings of the lag structure described above.

7 For each Congressional hearing, the index includes a short abstract of its substantive content, when it was held, which committee held it, and who testified. In order to identify candidate hearings for possible inclusion in our data set, we searched this text database beginning with key words designed to get at women’s issues.

8 In this work, Poole and Rosenthal (1997) assign each roll call vote an issue code, and from their data, we identify
Following arguments about political opportunities, we expect that these measures of the level of institutional access should affect levels of insider and outsider events. In particular, we expect that congressional hearings and House and Senate roll calls (lagged, as described earlier) will increase both insider and outsider collective action events, as activists may perceive that the system is more open to hearing their demands.

In addition to these measures of the first dimension of political opportunity structure, we have also collected data on two different measures of our second dimension of the political opportunity structure, the presence of elite allies. First, we include a dummy variable for each quarter which is coded 1 when the President was a Democrat. Members of the Democratic Party during this period were generally more sympathetic to women’s concerns than members of the Republican Party, and the Democratic Party controlled both Houses of Congress throughout most of our study period. However, there was variation with regard to which party controlled the Presidency. As a consequence, the period saw a shifting mix of supportive elite allies, sometimes including both Congress and the executive branch and at other times only the Congress. We also include the percentage of the House and Senate seats that were held by female legislators in each quarter as a second measure of the presence of elite allies. As was the case with the first dimension of political opportunity, we expect that the presence of elite allies should increase the amount of both insider and outsider protest activity.

Emergence: The Importance of Resources

In an attempt to measure the changes in organizational resources available to women, we extracted a yearly count of total number of women’s social movement organizations (SMOs) from Minkoff’s (1994; 1995; 1997) data set, which was assigned to each quarter of the appropriate year. Minkoff collected data on national voluntary organizations in the U.S. from the first 23 editions of the Encyclopedia of Associations (Gale Research Company). This rich data set includes information of a variety of different types of women’s organizations (as well as ethnic organizations), but we utilize only the information on women’s social movement organizations.9

As figure 1 shows, many new women’s movement groups were formed during our study period so that the total population of groups capable of organizing collective action continued to increase. And we know that most of the collective action around women’s issues during the period was organized by such groups (Minkoff 1997). As a result, we would expect the sheer intensity of SMOs devoted to women’s issues to account for much of the variation in the level of collective action around women’s issues. Thus, we expect that the number of women’s social movement organizations should increase the number of both insider and outsider events, as we assume that organization facilitates mobilization.10

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9 In the analysis presented below, we also include a measure of women’s labor force participation as a control variable. But, we recognize that this might also operate as a measure of the amount of monetary resources available to women, one traditional type of resource (Cress and Snow 1996).

10 It is important to note, though, that Minkoff (1997) finds a negative effect of the density of women’s organizations (lagged 2 years) on the yearly count of women’s protest events. Her finding runs counter to our hypothesis and she notes that this finding "suggests a trade-off between protest events and organization-building—investing in new organizations may direct resources away from protest" (Minkoff 1997: 790).
Control Variables

The first control variable that we include in the analysis presented below is the ratio of the female to male labor force participation in the U.S. (U.S. Department of Labor, Series ID# EEU 00000002). This data is measured yearly, and we assign the yearly value to each quarter of that year.\(^{11}\) This follows the strategy of Minkoff (1997) and is designed to capture any rise in feminist consciousness associated with labor force participation (Klein 1984).

The second control variable that we include is a dummy variable coded 1 during congressional election years. We include this variable to control for potentially higher rates of protest during election years.\(^{12}\)

Third, we collected data on the quarterly count of articles on women and women’s issues that were indexed in the *Reader’s Guide to Periodic Literature*. To do this, we searched the yearly volumes of this source using the same key words used for the congressional hearings search and then counted the number of articles indexed for each quarter. The logic for including our media attention measure is to control for the normal tendency of media institutions to cover protest events that resonate with their cyclic attention to issues (McCarthy et al. 1996). In other words, we argue that the more focused the media is on women’s issues, the more likely any protest on such issues will be covered. By including this measure, we hope to control for the media issue attention cycle. We want to avoid misinterpreting changes in the reporting of women’s collective action that result from the media attention as *actual* changes attributable to variation in political opportunity and/or resources.

Outcomes of Women’s Collective Action

Once we have investigated how our key variables affect levels of insider and outsider protest events, we turn to the second broad goal of this article; that is, to examine whether or not protest results in changes in the political opportunity structure. To assess this, we treat the number of House and Senate roll calls on women and the number of Congressional hearings on women as dependent variables and investigate how insider and outsider events, as well as a number of our key variables, influence these outcomes.\(^{13}\)

We expect that levels of both insider and outsider protest should increase the amount of institutionalized political attention to women’s issues. That is, if protest is efficacious, we ought to see a resultant opening of institutional access, as indicated by increasing numbers of hearings and/or roll calls on women’s issues. If we are correct about the reciprocal nature of political opportunities and protest, this in turn should lead to an increase in collective action.

We expect that women’s labor force participation will increase the level of institutional access because an increase in labor force participation ought to be...
accompanied by an increase in women’s share of societal resources and, potentially, an increase in the value society places on women. For similar reasons, we also expect that the number of women’s SMOs should increase the number of Congressional hearings and House and Senate roll calls, as a higher degree of women’s organization ought to influence these three outcome variables.

Finally, we also expect that media attention to women’s issues should result in a higher degree of receptivity to women’s issues. Again, as media attention to a particular issue increases, public opinion, as well as the opinion of politicians, may change. This awareness may lead to an increasing receptivity to issues deemed important by the women’s movement.14

The Model

To examine the impact of the political opportunity structure and organizational resources on protest events, we investigate the effects of congressional hearings, House and Senate roll calls, female legislators, women’s SMOs, and party control of the presidency, on both insider and outsider events. To examine the impact of protest on outcomes, we investigate the effects of insider and outsider events on Congressional hearings and Senate and House roll calls. In both sets of analyses, we include the control variables described above. In all, then, we have five different dependent variables: insider events, outsider events, Congressional hearings, House roll calls, and Senate roll calls.

Again, we have quarterly counts of these five key concepts representing five separate dependent variables. Since we have count data, we use Poisson regression. Unlike ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, Poisson regression does not require a normal distribution of the event counts. Since we have counts of events, hearings, and roll calls over time, some special issues with Poisson regression arise (Barron 1992). In particular, the problems of overdispersion and autocorrelation arise, which could bias our estimates. To deal with these problems, we employ quasi-likelihood15 methods using PROC GENMOD in SAS (SAS Institute Inc. 1997: 284-285).

EMERGENCE: INSIDER VS. OUTSIDER EVENTS

Tables 1 and 2 show the results of quasi-likelihood estimation of the effects of our covariates on the quarterly count of women’s outsider and insider events, respectively. The results show mixed support for arguments about how the political opportunity structure affects the emergence of collective action. Recall that we had hypothesized that the presence of elite allies in the form of a Democratic president and/or female legislators would increase both insider and outsider events. In both table 1 and table 2, we see the same effect of these two measures of elite allies on both types of collective action: a Democratic president decreases insider and outsider collective action, while the number of female legislators increases both types of collective action.16 Across all of the models

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14 It might be argued that to fully capture the potential effect of media attention on public and/or politicians’ opinions, we would need to use the lag of media attention. We tried this (lagged one quarter as well as lagged to capture the analogous quarter the year before), and the effects were consistent with those presented below.

15 We also used generalized quasi-likelihood methods in preliminary analyses and found the estimates to be indistinguishable from those reported here (Barron 1992; King 1988).

16 It should be noted that this finding is what Krøies et al. (1995) would have predicted based on their study of new social movements in Western Europe. In this study, mobilization was lower when the left controlled the government, in part because when "the left takes power, the need for mobilization decreases for new social movements, because of anticipated
presented in tables 1 and 2, the direction of the coefficients on these two measures is consistent and significant. Female legislators served as a significant elite ally to the women’s movement during this period, while a Democratic president did not. The effect of female legislators supports our hypothesis that the presence of elite allies increases protest, while the effect of the Democratic control of the presidency runs counter to our hypothesis about elite allies and protest. However, we should also note that this finding does support arguments in the literature on political opportunity that emphasize the importance of a divided elite in spurring mobilization (Tarrow 1994). That is, our finding that protest increases when there are elite allies in the legislature and a less friendly Presidency, lends support to the argument that divisions within the elite provide openings for opposition movements.

When we consider the effect of our second dimension of political opportunity structure, the level of institutional access, we also find mixed support for political opportunity arguments. We had expected that congressional hearings and roll call votes on women’s issues would increase rates of insider and outsider collective action. In models 3 and 4 of table 1, we find chances of reform in their favor (1995: 60). Additionally, the effect of the Democratic control of the presidency resonates with Van Dyke’s (forthcoming) finding that a Democratic president decreases left-wing student protest in the U.S. between 1930 and 1990.

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*p < .10  **p < .05  ***p < .01
support for the hypothesis that an increase in congressional hearings on women’s issues increases outsider events, but we do not find this to be the case for insider events (model 3 and 4, table 2). Additionally, House roll call votes on women’s issues do not affect insider or outsider events (models 7 and 8, tables 1 and 2). Finally, Senate roll calls increase insider events (models 5 and 6, table 2), but decrease outsider events (models 5 and 6, table 1). To summarize, then, outsider events are increased by congressional hearings on women’s issues, but decreased by the number of Senate roll call votes. Insider events are increased only by the number of Senate roll call votes.

The fact that these results show that insider and outsider events are affected differently by the different indicators of level of institutional access is important, as it support the analytical distinction between insider and outsider tactics (Walker 1991). These results also supports the notion that there are differences between the Senate and House with regard to institutional access. Thus, it is important that analysts consider this when attempting to measure this dimension of the political opportunity structure in the future.

Turning to our hypothesis about how organizational resources affect collective action, we see a similar effect of the number of women’s social movement organizations on both insider and outsider events. Across all the models in table 1 and table 2, we see that, as per our hypothesis, the number of women’s social movement organizations increases both insider and outsider collective action by women (although the coefficient is not significant in all of the

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\( \chi^2 = 85.86, 86.82, 83.47, 85.53, 84.13, 85.70, 83.37, 84.78 \)

* \( p < .10 \)  ** \( p < .05 \)  *** \( p < .01 \)
models we present). Greater organizational resources, in general, increase both insider and outsider collective action, a finding that supports resource mobilization theory.\footnote{Although this supports our hypothesis, the finding runs counter to Minkoff’s (1997) finding. The discrepancy could be due to a few key differences between our analyses and Minkoff’s (1997). First, we use quarterly counts of women’s collective action, while Minkoff (1997) uses yearly counts. Second, Minkoff (1997) uses a different lag structure than we do. Finally, Minkoff (1997) does not differentiate between insider and outsider events.}

In tables 1 and 2, we also examine the question of how each type of event, insider and outsider, affects the other. Across all the models in table 1, we see that the number of insider events increases the number of outsider events (quarterly counts), although the coefficient is not significant in all of the models presented. In table 2, we find no significant effect of the number of outsider events on insider events (quarterly counts). It is interesting that the effect on insider and outsider events is not reciprocal. That is, insider events increase outsider events, but the opposite is not true.

When we examine how the number of each type of event in the same quarter during the previous year affects the current quarter’s event count, we find that for both types of collective action, the lagged value increases the count. Outsider events in the previous year (same quarter) increase the outsider events in the current year (all models, table 1). Insider events in the previous year (same quarter) increase the insider events in the current year (all models, table 2). These findings, along with the positive effect of insider events on outsider events, lend support to arguments about protest cycles (Tarrow 1994).

Finally, turning to the control variables that we include in the analyses presented in tables 1 and 2, we see that the ratio of women to men in the labor force has a consistent effect on the level of insider and outsider events. Across all models in these two tables, we find that women’s labor force participation increases the level of women’s collective action, a finding similar to Minkoff’s (1997). This lends support to the argument that women’s labor force participation facilitates the development of a feminist consciousness and empowers women to act collectively on gender issues. In addition to being an important control variable, this also supports arguments about the mobilization of resources. As women’s monetary resources increase, the level of collective action on women’s issues also increases.

The second control variable is a dummy variable for whether or not the year in question was a congressional election year. Across all models in table 1 and table 2, the coefficient is not significant. However, it is interesting that the direction of this coefficient differs between outsider and insider events. In table 1 (outsider collective action), the coefficient is positive, while in table 2 (insider collective action), the coefficient is negative. The last control variable is our measure of media attention to women’s issues. We find a different effect for media attention on outsider and insider events. In table 1, for all models, media attention to women’s issues increases outsider collective action; while in table 2, for all models, the coefficient is not significant (but is in the negative direction). The positive effect of media attention on outsider events supports our hypothesis that the more the media focuses on women’s issues, the more likely women’s protest will be covered. By including this variable in the models, we control for this tendency so that we can confidently interpret the main effects of political opportunities and resources. Its insignificant negative effect on insider events suggests that media coverage of these events is driven by some other process.

**OUTCOMES: CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS AND ROLL CALLS**

Table 3 presents the results about how the women’s movement affects the quarterly number of congressional hearings and Senate and House roll calls on women’s issues.
Perhaps the most striking finding presented in table 3 is that, across all three models, the best predictor of House roll calls, Senate roll calls, and congressional hearings is female labor force participation. This indicates that as women begin to obtain a greater share of economic resources, the level of institutional access increases. In other words, "money talks" when it comes to institutional access for women. These results, when considered with our finding that women's labor force participation increases both insider and outsider events and Minkoff's (1997) finding that labor force participation also increases SMO founding rate, raise an important issue.

These findings support arguments that broad structural changes such as the incorporation of women in the labor force lead to congressional outcomes, the growth of SMOs, and collective action. In other words, these findings support the argument that movements themselves do not cause social change, but are instead a result of social changes. We don't necessarily discount this argument, but call for more analyses such as ours and Minkoff's (1997) to unpack these complex relationships.
A second striking finding presented in table 3 is that neither insider nor outsider collective action events increase Senate roll calls and congressional hearings on women’s issues (models 3, 4, 5, and 6). This finding sheds light on questions about whether or not collective action affects the political opportunity structure; in these two cases, it does not. However, in models 1 and 2 of table 3 we see that insider events increase the number of House roll call votes. This suggests that the House of Representatives is swayed more by insider tactics than by outsider tactics when it comes to women’s collective action and lends partial support to our hypothesis that one potential outcome of collective action is an opening of the political opportunity structure. 18

Table 3 also shows that the media attention to women’s issues affects only the number of House roll calls, not Senate roll calls nor congressional hearings. Apparently, the House is more sensitive to the media coverage of women’s issues than the Senate, and the number of congressional hearings on women’s issues is unaffected by media coverage of women’s issues.

The results in table 3 show that during congressional election years, the number of House roll call votes on women’s issues is lower, while the number of Senate roll call votes on women’s issues is higher. This indicates that the Senate may be more willing to initiate roll call votes on potentially controversial or unpopular issues during election years, while the House is less likely to do so. Congressional hearings on women’s issues, like House roll call votes, are lower during election years. This suggests legislators are less likely to devote time to hearings during election years when they are preoccupied with time-consuming reelection campaigns.

The Democratic control of the presidency operates differently depending on the outcome of interest. The coefficient on this measure is not a significant predictor of House or Senate roll calls on women’s issues; however, it decreases the number of congressional hearings on women’s issues. This is an interesting finding considering the negative effect of a Democratic president on insider and outsider events. Perhaps when there is a Democratic president, female activists find fewer obvious grievances than when Republicans control the presidency. Similarly, when there is a Democratic president, perhaps Congress is less compelled to initiate hearings on women’s issues because there are fewer obvious grievances.

The final three hypotheses are about how each of these three outcome variables affect one another. Table 3 shows that all three outcomes are sensitive to the quarterly number of Congressional hearings, however the direction of this sensitivity varies. Both House and Senate roll calls are decreased by congressional hearings on women’s issues during the analogous quarter the year before. However, congressional hearings are increased by the number during the analogous quarter the year before. Similarly, the lagged number of House roll calls increases the current number, but decreases the number of congressional hearings. Finally, the lagged number of Senate roll calls has no effect on congressional hearings nor the current number of Senate roll calls.

CONCLUSIONS

We began this article with two goals. First, we wanted to investigate the question of women’s collective action emergence in the 1956-1979 period with an eye toward testing

18 We investigated the possibility that only a combination of insider and outsider events affects the political opportunity structure by including a measure that combined both types of events. The coefficient on this variable was positive in models run, but never significant.
hypotheses about the mobilization of resources and the political opportunity structure. In so doing, we also hoped to illuminate two important dimensions of the political opportunity structure, the level of institutional access and the presence of elite allies as they pertain to the U.S. women’s movement. Our second goal was to examine one potential consequence of collective action: changes in the political opportunity structure. In particular, we wanted to describe both how the political opportunity structure increases collective action, and how collective action affects the political opportunity structure.

Our findings show mixed support for arguments about how the political opportunity structure affects collective action. The presence of a Democratic president, arguably an elite ally to the women’s movement, actually decreases the amount of insider and outsider collective action. This finding runs counter to what we had expected. Because the women’s movement emerged during a period of Democratic control of the presidency, and flourished during a long period of Democratic control of the U.S. Congress, we had hypothesized that a Democratic president would increase rates of collective action. However, we did find support for arguments about elite allies when we examined the number of female legislators. As the number of female legislators increases, the level of insider and outsider collective action increases. These findings, when taken together, support arguments about the effect of a “divided elite” on protest.

When we examine the effects of the second dimension of political opportunity structure, the level of institutional access, we also find mixed support. Insider events are higher when the Senate is more receptive, but outsider events are higher when the Senate is less receptive. Finally, the number of congressional hearings, an indicator of the overall institutional access of Congress to women’s issues, increases the number of outsider events, but has no effect on insider events. These findings suggest the importance of treating the two bodies of Congress separately when considering the political opportunity structure. Clearly, the effects are different depending on whether it is the House or Senate in question. Additionally, these findings highlight the importance of distinguishing between insider and outsider tactics (Walker 1991).

Our hypothesis about how the level of organizational resources affects collective action is supported. We found that the number of women’s SMOs increases both insider and outsider collective action. We also note, however, that the level of female labor force participation increases both types of protest. Although we consider this variable to be a control, one might argue that this is a measure of the overall level of resources available to women. These two findings, when taken together, lend support to arguments about the importance of resources—both monetary and organizational—on collective action.

With regard to the outcomes of protest events, we find little support for arguments about the efficacy of insider and outsider collective action; with one exception, neither insider nor outsider events had any effect on congressional hearings, or Senate and House roll call votes. The exception is our finding that insider events seem to increase the House roll call votes, but outsider events seem to decrease House roll call votes. In general, we find little support for arguments about the reciprocity of the relationship between protest and the political opportunity structure.

When combined with the consistently strong effects of women’s labor force participation, the failure of movement events to predict institutional outcomes raises an important suggestive possibility. Analysts who see movements less as independent change vehicles than as byproducts of broader societal trends will find suggestive support in our findings. One could well interpret our results as supporting the notion that the progressive integration of women into the labor force set in motion complex processes that resulted in the emergence of the modern women’s movement and the increased institutionalized political attention to women’s issues. We are certainly not pronouncing a final verdict on
this question based on these preliminary findings, but at the very least, we think our results should encourage scholars to accord the issue of outcomes more systematic attention. More generally, sorting out the complex relationship between movements and other change processes remains a critical and worthy topic for scholars working in the field.

REFERENCES


US Women's Movement and Congressional Activities


