False Memories for Fake News During Ireland’s Abortion Referendum

Gillian Murphy1, Elizabeth F. Loftus2, Rebecca Hofstein Grady2, Linda J. Levine2, and Ciara M. Greene3

1School of Applied Psychology, University College Cork; 2Department of Psychological Science, University of California, Irvine; and 3School of Psychology, University College Dublin

Abstract
The current study examined false memories in the week preceding the 2018 Irish abortion referendum. Participants (N = 3,140) viewed six news stories concerning campaign events—two fabricated and four authentic. Almost half of the sample reported a false memory for at least one fabricated event, with more than one third of participants reporting a specific memory of the event. “Yes” voters (those in favor of legalizing abortion) were more likely than “no” voters to “remember” a fabricated scandal regarding the campaign to vote “no,” and “no” voters were more likely than “yes” voters to “remember” a fabricated scandal regarding the campaign to vote “yes.” This difference was particularly strong for voters of low cognitive ability. A subsequent warning about possible misinformation slightly reduced rates of false memories but did not eliminate these effects. This study suggests that voters in a real-world political campaign are most susceptible to forming false memories for fake news that aligns with their beliefs, in particular if they have low cognitive ability.

Keywords
false memory, politics, fake news, misinformation, bias, open data, open materials

Received 11/8/18; Revision accepted 6/21/19

Political campaigns often produce memorable moments. A candidate misspeaks or a scandal is exposed, and the campaign momentum swings rapidly. People tend to vote on the basis of their recollection of candidates and campaign events (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006), but are these memories always accurate? Can voters be influenced to form false memories for fabricated events during a political campaign?

False Memories
Many studies have demonstrated the ease with which individuals can form rich false memories (Loftus, 2005). The source-monitoring framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) posits that memories are not stored with tags that identify their source. Instead, the source is inferred through a rapid evaluation of the memory details, including heuristic judgments (e.g., temporal, spatial, and affective qualities) and systematic judgments (e.g., comparing the memory with preexisting beliefs and knowledge). For example, when asked about a political scandal, a voter makes a series of judgments, both heuristic (Is this recollection vivid and detailed?) and systematic (Is this in line with other information I have about this politician?). False memories can arise when these mechanisms lead individuals to unwittingly manufacture thoughts and images and mistake them for prior experience (Sacchi, Agnoli, & Loftus, 2007; Strange, Garry, Bernstein, & Lindsay, 2011).

Research suggests that individuals may be particularly susceptible to forming false memories about events that are congruent with their beliefs. Frenda, Knowles, Saletan, and Loftus (2013) presented participants with true and fabricated political events and found that liberals were more likely to “remember” President Bush vacationing with a famous baseball
player in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, whereas conservatives were more likely to “remember” President Obama shaking hands with Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Cognitive ability may also predict susceptibility to false memories. Lower cognitive ability has been associated with an increased tendency to incorporate postevent information into eyewitness memories in both younger adults (Zhu et al., 2010) and older adults (Roediger & Geraci, 2007). Individuals with lower cognitive ability are also less likely to update their attitudes when presented with evidence that the basis for their attitudes is inaccurate (De keersmaecker & Roets, 2017). These findings suggest that individuals with lower cognitive ability will be more susceptible to forming false memories concerning fabricated political events, and this may be especially true for ideologically congruent stories. Because this interaction has not yet been assessed, it is unclear whether the tendency to falsely remember ideologically congruent events is a result of some insurmountable partisan bias that distorts the systematic source-monitoring judgment or whether it can be overcome by individuals with higher cognitive ability, who likely engage in more effective source monitoring.

Although previous studies have recorded false memories for political events, none have done so during a real-world political campaign. Research has demonstrated that explicit warnings about the possibility of misinformation can sometimes modestly reduce false memories and beliefs (e.g., Blank & Launay, 2014; Pennycook, Cannon, & Rand, 2018; Qin, Ogle, & Goodman, 2008). In everyday life, however, people are unlikely to encounter news stories with explicit warning labels. What are sometimes seen are general warnings about unreliable news sources, with consumers urged to think critically. For example, during Ireland’s 2018 abortion referendum, all Irish Facebook users were presented with tips for detecting fake news, and media reports urged voters to be vigilant against misleading information (Graham-Harrison, 2018; Ñ Í Aodha, 2018). Because no previous studies have examined false memories during an active campaign, it is unclear whether voters in such an environment would be susceptible to forming false political memories. To explore this issue, we examined the consequences of explicitly warning participants that they may have been exposed to fake news. This examination of false memories in a high-stakes, highly emotional campaign has important applied implications (e.g., devising strategies to prevent false voter memories) but is also of theoretical importance. It has been argued that false memories form because individuals use lax criteria in source decisions (Qin et al., 2008) and that warnings may encourage stricter source monitoring (Echterhoff, Hirst, & Hussy, 2005). If the in-group political-orientation effect observed by Frenda et al. (2013) is solely due to lax monitoring, it may be moderated under conditions in which voters receive warnings that make them suspicious. Likewise, it is unclear from previous research whether the effect of cognitive ability on false memories is due to a reduced tendency to monitor sources effectively or an inability to do so even when explicitly warned.

Ireland’s Abortion Referendum

On May 25, 2018, a referendum was held in Ireland to repeal the eighth amendment to the constitution. The eighth amendment guaranteed “the unborn” a right to life equal to that of a pregnant woman; as a consequence, Ireland had some of the most restrictive abortion laws in the world (Taylor, 2015). Abortion has long been a deeply divisive issue in Ireland, prompting complex public discourse (McCarthy, O’Donnell, Campbell, & Dooley, 2018). The referendum thus provided an ideal opportunity to study political false memories because it involved an emotional debate between two camps with deeply held convictions. Furthermore, a 1995 Supreme Court decision requires Irish state broadcasters to provide balanced coverage of both sides of a referendum (Reidy & Suiter, 2015). In contrast with studies conducted in the partisan environment of U.S. politics, in which consumers may choose news sources that align with their ideology, this ensured that voters were relatively well informed about both campaigns and reduced concerns about differences in media consumption. Voter turnout for the referendum was high (64.5%), further confirming that this was an important issue for the electorate. The landslide victory for a “yes” vote (with 66.4% of voters in favor of repealing the abortion ban) came as a surprise to most commentators because the vote was expected to be close (Bohan, 2018).

The Current Investigation

During the week preceding the referendum, participants completed an online survey featuring true and fabricated campaign events. We tested three hypotheses. First, we expected voters to report more false memories for stories consistent with their beliefs (i.e., “yes” voters would remember more scandals about the campaign to vote “no,” and “no” voters would remember more scandals about the campaign to vote “yes”). Second, we expected lower cognitive ability to be associated with increased false memories, particularly for stories in line with participants’ beliefs. Third, we expected political orientation and cognitive ability to predict participants’ ability to identify the fake news
stories after they were warned about the possible presence of misleading information.

Method

Participants

Participants ($N = 3,140$) were recruited via social media, university mailing lists, and an article on TheJournal.ie, an Irish online news outlet (for details, see the Supplemental Material available online). The mean age of the sample was 32.02 years ($SD = 13.11$). Participants reported their biological sex as female ($n = 2,122$), male ($n = 991$), or other ($n = 3$); 24 participants declined to answer. The majority of the sample ($n = 2,342$) indicated that they would be voting “yes” (to repeal the ban on abortion), 379 indicated that they would be voting “no” (to retain the ban on abortion), 147 were unsure how they would vote, 128 reported that they would not or could not vote, and 144 declined to state their voting preference. Although “no” voters were specifically targeted in recruitment efforts, the online data collection was perhaps more suited to “yes” voters; exit polls showed that the only age cohort with a majority of “no” voters was individuals older than 65 years; 87% of 18- to 24-year-olds reported voting “yes” (Leahy, 2018). We calculated that a sample of 260 participants (130 per group) was needed to detect the smallest effect size reported in similar studies (Frenda et al., 2013).

Materials

The news events presented in this study consisted of an unaltered photograph accompanied by a short summary (for similar methods, see O’Connell & Greene, 2017; Strange et al., 2011). After reading the story, participants were asked whether they remembered the event, to which they could respond, “I remember seeing/hearing this,” “I don’t remember seeing/hearing this but I remember it happening,” “I don’t remember this but I believe it happened,” “I remember this differently,” or “I don’t remember this.” Unlike participants in previous studies in this area, participants here were given the option of reporting a mere belief that an event had happened, allowing the data to speak to the recent debate concerning the prevalence of false memories versus false beliefs (Brewin & Andrews, 2017; Wade, Garry, & Pezdek, 2018). Participants were also asked whether they remembered where they had heard about the event, and they could select from a range of options (e.g., television, social media, a friend, other source) or could indicate that they did not remember where they had heard it. Finally, participants were asked, “How did you feel at the time?” and were provided with a text box to write an open-ended response.

Each participant saw four true news stories, selected from a potential pool of eight (see the Supplemental Material). None of the stories concerned information about the referendum itself or the proposed legislative changes to ensure that the study did not influence voting behavior so close to a referendum. Instead, both the true and false stories focused on events from the campaigns (e.g., the actions of politicians or campaign leaders), and there was a balance of positive and negative events concerning each side.

There was a total of four fabricated news events (see Fig. 1). The first story concerned either the “yes” side or the “no” side having to destroy campaign posters purchased illegally using foreign funds. This story was plausible because speculation about foreign interference in the referendum had dominated headlines in the preceding weeks (Ni Aodha, 2018). Facebook announced a ban on all ads from foreign sources only 2 weeks before the referendum, with Google going further and banning all referendum-related ads, citing fears over election integrity. Crucially, neither group’s posters were found to be funded with foreign money, and none were destroyed at any point. The second fabricated story linked the referendum campaign to a high-profile sexual-assault trial that took place in Northern Ireland in 2018. The “yes” and “no” versions of this story were designed to specifically tap into existing stereotypes of each group of voters—that the “yes” side comprised dramatic feminists who were exaggerating the negative impact of the eighth amendment, and that the “no” side comprised misogynists who did not trust women to make their own decisions.

To assess cognitive ability, we invited all participants to complete Wordsum at the end of the study. Wordsum is a 10-item subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale vocabulary test (Wechsler, 2008). Participants are presented with a target word and asked to select the closest match from a list of five other words (Thorndike & Gallup, 1944). Wordsum has been used extensively in the General Social Survey in the United States, where the average score is 6 correct out of 10 (Meisenberg, 2015) and is highly correlated with scores from more extensive IQ tests (Miner, 1957).

Procedure

The study procedures were approved by the School of Applied Psychology Ethics Committee, University College Cork. The survey was described to participants as “investigating attitudes towards the referendum and the two campaigns.” After the participants provided demographic information, half of them completed questions
concerning the referendum, including how they planned to vote, how important the referendum was to them, and how much they approved of each campaign. The remaining participants completed these questions at the end of the study. Participants were then presented with six news stories (four true and two fabricated) in random order. The fabricated stories involved the illegal poster (concerning either the “yes” or “no” campaign) and the sexual-assault-trial comments (concerning the other campaign).

Fig. 1. The four fabricated news events used in the study. Each participant saw one story about the “yes” campaign (left column) and one story about the “no” campaign (right column). One story was drawn from the top row concerning illegal posters, and one was drawn from the bottom row concerning a high-profile sexual-assault trial. The image on the bottom left was provided by TheJournal.ie, and the image on the bottom right was taken by Aidan Crawley; both are reprinted with permission. The two images in the top row were taken by the first author.
After viewing all six stories, participants were told the following:

Some participants who undertook this survey were shown fake news stories (stories concerning events that did not happen, entirely fabricated by the researchers). If you think you may have been shown any fake stories, please select any story you believe to be fake.

Finally, participants were debriefed and invited to complete Wordsum.

Results
We first dichotomized participants’ responses into remembering the event (those who selected the options “I remember seeing/hearing this” or “I don’t remember seeing/hearing this but I remember it happening”) and not remembering the event (those who selected the options “I remember this differently” or “I don’t remember this”). Unless otherwise stated, participants who selected “I don’t remember this but I believe it happened” were removed from the analyses comparing those who “remembered” an event with those who did not.

On average, participants had a hit rate of 56% for the four true stories and a false alarm rate of 32% for the two fabricated stories. Almost half (48%) of participants reported remembering at least one of the two fabricated events that they were shown (37% reported a specific memory of hearing or seeing one of the events; 11% reported a more general memory that the event had happened). When the “believe” option was included, 63% of participants reported either a memory or a belief in at least one of the fabricated events. Participants who indicated that they remembered an event were more likely to select a specific source where they first heard about it (e.g., television, radio, social media) for true stories ($M = 93.85\%$ across all true stories, 95% confidence interval, or CI $= [92.23, 95.47]$) than for false stories ($M = 84.73\%$ across all false stories, 95% CI $= [81.82, 87.64]$), $t(487) = 5.73, p < .001, d = 0.34$.

Hypothesis 1: political orientation
The percentage of true stories remembered by “yes” voters (57%) and “no” voters (58%) did not differ significantly, $t(2719) = 0.53, p = .60$ (for responses to each true story, see the Supplemental Material). As shown in Figure 2, “yes” voters were more likely to remember or believe the fabricated “no” poster story (54% remembered or believed) than “no” voters (38% remembered or believed), $\chi^2(1, N = 1,312) = 16.11, p < .001, V = .11$.

Similarly, “no” voters were more likely to remember or believe the fabricated “yes” poster story (40% remembered or believed) than “yes” voters (30% remembered or believed), $\chi^2(1, N = 1,409) = 8.48, p = .004, V = .08$.

Importantly, these group differences were evident no matter how memories were classified: when comparing only participants who reported a specific memory of the event—“no” poster: $\chi^2(1, N = 1,312) = 6.41, p = .011, V = .07$; “yes” poster: $\chi^2(1, N = 1,409) = 15.01, p < .001, V = .10$—or when comparing participants who reported a specific or general memory of the event but excluding those who merely believed it had occurred—“no” poster: $\chi^2(1, N = 1,126) = 13.10, p < .001, V = .11$; “yes” poster: $\chi^2(1, N = 1,274) = 12.44, p < .001, V = .10$.

It is worth noting that the “no” poster story may have been more believable than the “yes” story overall; among participants who indicated that they would not be voting, the “no” story (35% remembered) was recalled at more than twice the rate of the “yes” story (16% remembered), $\chi^2(1, N = 113) = 5.35, p = .02, V = .22$.

Qualitative responses to both versions of the story suggested that some participants formed rich and detailed false memories. Responses to the “no” poster story included, “I had my mind made up prior to these posters, however, after this story I was disinterested in the No campaign as I didn’t agree with the involvement of other countries in our countries decisions” (female, 24 years, voting “yes”) and “I didn’t think anything wrong happened and the posters shouldn’t have been burned” (male, 19 years, voting “no”). Responses to the “yes” poster story included, “Thought it was hilarious!” (male, 71 years, voting “no”) and “I didn’t see why it mattered” (female, 19 years, voting “yes”).

Fabricated stories about inflammatory comments linking the referendum to a high-profile sexual assault did not result in a similar effect. As Figure 3 shows, there was no difference between voting groups in rates of false memories for either version of the inflammatory comments story. For the “no” campaign story, “yes” voters were as likely to remember or believe the inflammatory comments (49% remembered or believed) as were “no” voters (42% remembered or believed), $\chi^2(1, N = 1,409) = 3.08, p = .08$. Similarly, for the “yes” campaign story, “no” voters were as likely to remember or believe the inflammatory comments (47% remembered or believed) as were “yes” voters (48% remembered or believed), $\chi^2(1, N = 1,312) = 0.10, p = .76$.

Examination of qualitative responses to the inflammatory comments stories suggests a possible explanation for this null finding and led us to focus on the poster stories in subsequent analyses. Specifically, some participants’ responses focused on the sexual-assault trial itself rather than on the fabricated inflammatory comments of campaigners after the verdict (e.g., “Angry that the
men were innocent and were accused and their careers and lives have been extremely negatively influenced due to it” and “Don’t think they were as innocent as they made out to be”). Because some participants focused on the trial (which did occur), whereas others focused on the inflammatory comments (which were fabricated), it was unclear which feature of the comments stories participants’ memory ratings referred to. Therefore, the remaining analyses refer only to the poster stories. All of our data (including further responses related to the comments stories) have been made available online (https://osf.io/9q23j).

**Hypothesis 2: cognitive ability**

A total of 2,181 participants (69% of the sample: 73% of “yes” voters, 71% of “no” voters) completed the cognitive-ability test (for a comparison of participants

---

**Fig. 2.** Responses of “yes” and “no” voters to the fabricated stories concerning the destruction of “yes” and “no” posters purchased illegally with U.S. funding. Error bars are not included because these are count data reported as percentages.

**Fig. 3.** Responses of “yes” and “no” voters to the fabricated story concerning inflammatory comments made by the “yes” and “no” campaign that linked the referendum to a high-profile sexual-assault trial. Error bars are not included because these are count data reported as percentages.
who completed Wordsum and those who did not, see the Supplemental Material). The mean score was 7.61 out of 10 (95% CI = [7.54, 7.68], Mdn = 8). There was no difference in cognitive ability between “yes” voters (M = 7.61, 95% CI = [7.54, 7.69]) and “no” voters (M = 7.60, 95% CI = [7.40, 7.81]), t(1,756) = 0.09, p = .93. A hierarchical binary logistic regression was conducted to assess how false memories for the illegal-poster story were predicted by ideological congruence—that is, whether participants viewed the story that concerned the campaign they supported (0) or the opposing campaign (1)—and cognitive ability. This analysis included the 1,756 participants who remembered or did not remember the fabricated poster story; those who selected “I don’t remember this but I believe it happened” were excluded.

Table 1. Results of a Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting False Memories for the Illegal-Poster Story (n = 1,756)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model and predictor</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SE b</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Exp(b)</th>
<th>95% CI for exp(b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological congruence</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>83.72</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>[2.17, 3.32]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive ability</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>13.97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>[0.83, 0.95]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological congruence × Cognitive Ability</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>11.40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>[0.70, 0.91]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.40</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>13.02</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Significant predictors are shown in boldface. CI = confidence interval.

Overall, 31% of participants who falsely remembered the poster story as fake, 95% CI = [1.68, 1.76], with 81% of participants choosing between 1 and 3 stories and 15% failing to select any stories. There was no difference in the total number of stories selected as fake by “yes” voters (M = 1.72, 95% CI = [1.68, 1.77]) and “no” voters (M = 1.74, 95% CI = [1.62, 1.85]), t(2719) = 0.24, p = .81. The fabricated stories were identified as fake (47%) at more than twice the rate of the true stories (19%), with the poster stories selected as fake by 52% of participants, and the comments stories selected by 43% of participants. Selection of the true stories as fake ranged from 9% to 31%.

Hypothesis 3: identifying fabricated stories after an explicit warning

After being warned that some of the stories they viewed might have been fabricated and being asked to identify which ones, participants selected an average of 1.70 of the 6 stories they viewed as fake, 95% CI = [1.68, 1.76], with 81% of participants choosing between 1 and 3 stories and 15% failing to select any stories. There was no difference in the total number of stories selected as fake by “yes” voters (M = 1.72, 95% CI = [1.68, 1.77]) and “no” voters (M = 1.74, 95% CI = [1.62, 1.85]), t(2719) = 0.24, p = .81. The fabricated stories were identified as fake (47%) at more than twice the rate of the true stories (19%), with the poster stories selected as fake by 52% of participants, and the comments stories selected by 43% of participants. Selection of the true stories as fake ranged from 9% to 31%.

Because of the difficulties in assessing responses to the comments stories, only the poster-story responses were analyzed further. As we expected, participants who initially reported remembering the poster story (excluding believers) were significantly less likely to later select it as fake, χ²(1, N = 2,774) = 271.92, p < .001, V = .31. Overall, 31% of participants who falsely remembered the poster story in the first part of the study then went on to select that story as fabricated. This relatively low rate suggests robust false memories for 69% of participants,
who failed to retract their memory even when alerted to the possible presence of misleading information.

To assess factors predicting success in selecting the fabricated poster story as fake, we built a hierarchical binary logistic regression model using the same variables as in the earlier regression model (cognitive ability, ideological congruence, and their interaction). Participants were excluded if they did not complete the cognitive-ability assessment or did not indicate whether they would be voting “yes” or “no.” Ideological congruence and cognitive ability were entered in the first block, followed by the interaction term in the second block. The first model was significant, $\chi^2(2, N = 1,756) = 96.26$, $p < .001$, Cox-Snell $R^2 = .05$, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .06$, and correctly classified 63% of cases. As shown in Table 2, there was a main effect of ideological congruence; participants were less likely to identify the story as fake when it was in line with their beliefs. There was also a main effect of cognitive ability; for every 1-point increase in their Wordsum score, participants were 13% more likely to identify the story as fake.

The addition of the interaction term in the second block improved the model fit ($p = .003$), $\chi^2(3, N = 1,756) = 105.33$, $p < .001$, Cox-Snell $R^2 = .05$, (Nagelkerke) $R^2 = .07$, and correctly classified 63% of cases. There was a main effect of ideological congruence; participants were 88% less likely to identify the story as fake when it aligned with their beliefs. As with the false-memory findings, the main effect of cognitive ability was rendered nonsignificant in the second block, but there was an interaction between cognitive ability and ideological congruence; participants who scored high in cognitive ability were more likely to identify stories in line with their beliefs as fake.

**Discussion**

The current study is one of the largest false-memory experiments to date, with a sample equating to 1 in every 1,000 registered voters in the Republic of Ireland. The findings demonstrate the ease with which memories for fabricated scandals can be created during emotional, highly consequential political campaigns, with almost half of participants reporting a false memory. The qualitative responses suggest that some participants created rich false memories, reporting novel details (e.g., that the illegal posters were burned). Participants were relatively poor at identifying the fake stories even after they had been alerted to the study’s purpose, further underscoring the strength of these easily created false memories.

As hypothesized, political orientation impacted false memories, with “yes” voters more likely to remember the “no” poster scandal than “no” voters, and “no” voters more likely to remember the “yes” poster scandal than “yes” voters. The current study is the first to demonstrate this during a real campaign. A novel contribution of this study is the use of identical stories for both sides, reducing concerns about matching story complexity. However, the data suggest that “yes” voters were especially likely to remember the fabricated “no” poster story. We do not believe that this is indicative of any difference in gullibility between voting groups, especially in light of the fact that no difference in cognitive ability was
observed between “yes” and “no” voters, but rather that the poster story was more easily attributable to the “no” campaign. This is likely because foreign-funding accusations were more common for the “no” campaign (Graham-Harrison, 2018).

Importantly, the difference between “yes” and “no” voters was evident for the poster story no matter how memories were classified: assessing precise memories only or including more general memories or beliefs. It has been suggested that studies may overestimate false memories by participants who simply find an event believable (Wade et al., 2018). Here, we clearly distinguished between these two possibilities, and even omitting participants who merely believed the event occurred, we found that 34% of participants reported false memories for the illegal posters. The participants in the current study were self-selected and likely highly interested in the referendum. Because interest in a topic has been shown to increase false memories (O’Connell & Greene, 2017), the observed rate of false memory is likely to be characteristic of groups who are invested in political campaigns.

In the final regression model, there was no main effect of cognitive ability, suggesting that lower cognitive ability did not globally increase false memories. Instead, lower cognitive ability was associated with an increased effect of ideological congruence on false memories. This finding contributes to research that has identified the propensity to engage in analytic thinking as a predictor of resistance to fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2019) but further suggests that high cognitive ability may allow individuals to overcome the biasing effect of political orientation and more effectively monitor the sources of their memories. This is important in understanding the role of bias in source-monitoring judgments and suggests that individual differences in susceptibility to fake news are complex and multilayered.

Perhaps because of the many warnings of fake news circulating in Irish media at the time of the survey, participants often seemed suspicious of our motives (e.g., “Did this happen?… Is this survey a No campaign scam?” and “I think this survey is incredibly biased towards Yes”). That the political-orientation and cognitive-ability effects persisted despite this suspicion and, indeed, despite an explicit warning about possible fake news in the second part of the study suggests that these effects cannot simply be eliminated by encouraging stricter source monitoring (Echterhoff et al., 2005). This suggests that political orientation, especially when combined with low cognitive ability, may bias the heuristic and systematic source-monitoring judgments to such an extent that warnings do not eradicate the effects. This has applied implications for combating fake news and merits further study.

**Table 2.** Results From the Logistic Regression Analysis: Cognitive Ability, Ideological Congruence, and Their Interaction as Predictors of Correctly Identifying the Illegal-Poster Story as Fabricated (n = 1,979)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model and predictor</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SE b</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Exp(b)</th>
<th>95% CI for exp(b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological congruence</td>
<td>−0.82</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>77.04</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>[0.37, 0.53]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive ability</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>19.31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>[1.07, 1.20]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−0.17</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.436</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological congruence</td>
<td>−2.13</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>22.76</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>[0.05, 0.29]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive ability</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.408</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>[0.95, 1.12]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Congruence × Cognitive Ability</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>9.01</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt; .003</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>[1.06, 1.33]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Significant predictors are shown in boldface. CI = confidence interval.

Perhaps because of the many warnings of fake news circulating in Irish media at the time of the survey, participants often seemed suspicious of our motives (e.g., “Did this happen?… Is this survey a No campaign scam?” and “I think this survey is incredibly biased towards Yes”). That the political-orientation and cognitive-ability effects persisted despite this suspicion and, indeed, despite an explicit warning about possible fake news in the second part of the study suggests that these effects cannot simply be eliminated by encouraging stricter source monitoring (Echterhoff et al., 2005). This suggests that political orientation, especially when combined with low cognitive ability, may bias the heuristic and systematic source-monitoring judgments to such an extent that warnings do not eradicate the effects. This has applied implications for combating fake news and merits further study.

**Action Editor**

Caren Rotello served as action editor for this article.

**Author Contributions**

G. Murphy developed the study concept. All the authors contributed to the study design. G. Murphy collected the data, and G. Murphy and C. M. Greene analyzed the data. G. Murphy drafted the manuscript, and all the authors provided critical revisions. All the authors approved the final manuscript for submission.

**ORCID iDs**

Gillian Murphy [https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8898-139X](https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8898-139X)

Linda J. Levine [https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9013-3787](https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9013-3787)

**Acknowledgments**

We would like to thank TheJournal.ie and, in particular, the editor Susan Daly for her support.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared that there were no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship or the publication of this article.

Funding
This research was supported by a Charlemont award to G. Murphy from the Royal Irish Academy.

Supplemental Material
Additional supporting information can be found at http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/0956797619864887

Open Practices

All data and materials have been made publicly available via the Open Science Framework and can be accessed at osf.io/9q23j. The design and analysis plans for this study were not preregistered. The complete Open Practices Disclosure for this article can be found at http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/0956797619864887. This article has received the badges for Open Data and Open Materials. More information about the Open Practices badges can be found at http://www.psychologicalscience.org/publications/badges.

References


