

فصلنامه ژئوپلیتیک - سال دوم، شماره سوم و چهارم، پاییز و زمستان ۱۳۸۵

ص ۱۵۵

چالش‌های استراتژیک حاصل از کشت و تجارت مواد مخدر در افغانستان (چکیده فارسی)

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تاریخ پذیرش: ۱۳۸۶/۷/۱۷

تاریخ دریافت: ۱۳۸۶/۲/۸

چکیده

طی ۲۰ سال گذشته، تولید غیرقانونی مواد مخدر در افغانستان بیش از ۱۷ برابر افزایش داشته است. طی سال‌هایی که افغانستان در اشغال اتحاد جماهیر شوروی بود و همچنین طی سال‌های جنگ‌های داخلی در آن کشور، جامعه بین‌المللی به دلایل مختلف به موضوع تولید غیرقانونی مواد مخدر توجهی ننمود. در آن زمان موضوعات سیاسی افغانستان در اولویت قرار داشت.

طی سال‌های ۲۰۰۲ تا ۲۰۰۶، افغانستان در پیگیری و اجرای مباحث سیاسی کنفرانس بن موفق بوده گرچه از لحاظ اقتصادی - اجتماعی و ایجاد امنیت موفقیت کمتری در تغییر زندگی روزمره مردم داشته است. برای مبارزه با مشکل تولید مواد مخدر در افغانستان یک سیاست واقع‌بینانه مورد نیاز است که موضوعات پیچیده سیاسی و امنیتی آن کشور را در نظر گرفته و دشواری‌های رسیدن به هدف در این مورد ساده گرفته نشود.

واژه‌های کلیدی: چالش‌های استراتژیک، کشت مواد مخدر، افغانستان.

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Strategic Challenges in Dealing with Opium Cultivation in Afghanistan

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Received: 28/04/2007

Accepted: 19/09/2007

ABSTRACT

The illicit drug production in Afghanistan over the past twenty years has increased more than 17 fold. All during the Soviet intervention and later at the time of the civil war, the international community for variety of reasons overlooked the trend as political issues dominated the scene. Since the removal of Taleban from power in 2001, the opium production has been steadily increasing again. In the past four years, Afghanistan with the assistance of the international community has been successful in pursuing the political agenda set out at Bonn Conference. Economically, socially and on the provision of security, however, there has been less success in changing the daily life of the people. A realistic policy needs to be drafted with due consideration for complex political and security background to the Afghan narcotics problem and not underestimate the constraints on overcoming it.

Key Words: Strategic Challenges, Opium Cultivation, Afghanistan.

INTRODUCTION

The 2006 UNODC report reveals increased poppy cultivation in Afghanistan by 59% compared to 2005. Except for the reduction of 100 tons in 2005, the drug production in Afghanistan since the establishment of the Interim Government after the fall of Taleban has increased every year. In 2006, with 165,000 hectares under cultivation, the potential opium

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production in Afghanistan was estimated at 6,100 metric tons.⁽¹⁾

In 2005, the area under cultivation was estimated at 104,000 hectares with 4,100 tons potential opium production.⁽²⁾ In 2004, poppy cultivation in Afghanistan had increased by almost two-thirds compared to 2003.⁽³⁾ It was the second year after the establishment of the Interim Government in Afghanistan that drug production had increased. There were 131,000 hectares under poppy cultivation with potential opium production of 4,200 tons.⁽⁴⁾

In 2003, the first year of the Interim Government, the production was estimated at 3,600 tons with 80,000 hectares under cultivation.⁽⁵⁾

What are the reasons for such an increase, when there is an internationally recognized and supported Government in Kabul, with the presence of Coalition and NATO forces in that country. Does such an increase in production demonstrate the failure of the international community in Afghanistan since January 2002?

The history of illicit drug production in Afghanistan suggests the failure of the international community over the past two decades to recognize the side effects of their policies in Afghanistan and the failure to address the root causes of the problem in Afghanistan in a sustained manner.

The players in drug production arena in Afghanistan are two folds: First, the farmers who cultivate opium because of variety of reasons and second, the middle-men, traffickers and corrupt officials at all levels with huge amounts of profits earned from the illicit opium trade and their role in increasing production of drugs in Afghanistan. Although it is imperative to address the problems faced by the farmers and the need to provide alternative livelihood, the reason behind the increase in poppy production lies behind the second group involved and the political realities of Afghanistan which limits the ability of the Government and the international community's actions against them.

Afghanistan Potential Opium Production (tons), 1986-2006,

YEAR	POTENTIAL OPIUM PRODUCTION IN METRIC TONS		AFGHANISAN'S % OF WOLRD PRODUCTION
	AFGHANISTAN	WORLD	
1986	350	1,821	19
1987	875	2,617	33
1988	1,120	2,794	40
1989	1,200	3,395	35
1990	1,570	3,760	42
1991	1,980	4,274	46
1992	1,970	4,143	48
1993	2,330	4,610	50
1994	3,416	5,620	61
1995	2,335	4,452	52
1996	2,248	4,355	52
1997	2,804	4,823	58
1998	2,693	4,346	62
1999	4,565	5,764	79
2000	3,276	4,691	70
2001	185	1,596	12
2002	3,400	4,491	76
2003	3,600	4,765	76
2004	4,200	4,850	87
2005	4,100	4,620	87
2006	6,100	6,630	92

Source: Annual UNODC Opium Surveys; The Opium Economy in Afghanistan

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW


The drug production in Afghanistan started to increase substantially in early 1980s after the Soviet invasion. Before 1980, the drug production in Afghanistan was minimal compared to world production and was not considered a threat, regionally or internationally.

In 1980, at the outset of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the production of opium in Afghanistan was estimated at around 200 tons. It only took a few years for the production to double in that country. In 1985, the production was increased to 450 tons. In 1987 and 1988 there were substantial increases in production and by 1989, when the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan ended, the production had increased six fold compared to 1980, producing almost 40% of world production.⁽⁶⁾ In 2006, the production is almost 30 fold higher compared to 1980.


The world celebrated the defeat of the Soviet Empire and did not even acknowledge that they had overlooked for a decade, the production of illicit opium in the country, a source of cash for the fighters against the Soviets. As a result, the drug economy got its prominent role in the daily life of poor Afghans and became the main element in the subsistence strategy of the farmers. It is the outcome of a complex array of social, economic, political and environmental processes, with low risk and relatively high profitability.

With the end of Soviet occupation, Afghan fighters (Mujahedin) started carving off different areas of the country under their influence, fighting each other in a civil war from 1990 to 1994. In 1995, Taleban movement started sweeping the country and soon controlled around 90% of Afghanistan.

In 1990s, Afghanistan was the largest source of opium production in the world. The annual average for the amount of opium produced in Afghanistan for the ten years between 1990 and 1999 was 2,591 tons, which amounts to an annual average of 56% of the world production. The lowest was in 1990 with 42% of world production. In 1999, Afghanistan produced a record level of 4600 metric tons of opium, becoming the world's largest producer of illicit opium, equivalent to 79% of all illicit opium produced worldwide. An estimated 90,983 hectares were under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 1999, an increase of over 43% of cultivated land compared to the previous year.⁽⁷⁾



Source: Annual UNODC Opium Surveys



Source: Annual UNODC Opium Surveys

In 2000, opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated to be 82,178 hectares, representing a reduction of almost 10% compared to the 1999 estimate of 90,983 hectares. The production however, estimated at 3,300 tons, was reduced by 28% compared to the year before mostly due to drought. The production of opium in 2000 accounted for 70% of global illicit opium production. Approximately 95% of cultivation took place in areas controlled by the Taleban.⁽⁸⁾

THE TALEBAN BAN ON OPIUM CULTIVATION

On 27 July 2000, the Taleban supreme leader, Mullah Omar, issued a total ban on opium poppy cultivation. With the forceful implementation of the ban in the planting season starting in September 2000, the 2001 opium production was estimated at 185 tons. What happened in Afghanistan in 2001, by the effective implementation of the ban enforced by Taleban, was a historic event, unparalleled in the illegal narcotics business, because of the scale of shortfall in supply and the fact that it was done domestically without international assistance. Compared to other countries such as Pakistan or Thailand, where the elimination of illicit drug production were gradual, taking decades to be successful, one could ask whether rapid forced elimination would be the answer.

Although the Taleban cited the religious considerations for their proclaimed ban, some argued that such considerations could not be the reason for the implementation of the ban,

otherwise it would have been issued much earlier at the time of Taleban's taking control of the poppy growing areas and would have included all aspects of illicit drug, especially its trafficking, and not only the cultivation. Despite the Taleban ban, buying, selling and trafficking of illicit drugs were not prohibited in Afghanistan.⁽⁹⁾

The international community tried to figure out the motivations of Taleban in implementing the ban. This stemmed out of the general outlook regarding Taleban and lack of trust in their actions. There were speculations whether this had been only part of a strategy to absorb the stocks and keep prices high. For the six years, since they took control of almost 90% of Afghanistan, the harvest had been multiplied and 97% of the area under opium poppy cultivation was on territory controlled by Taleban.⁽¹⁰⁾ Suddenly, for the 2001 production season, they decided to declare only the cultivation against the religion.

In a few months after the forceful implementation of non-cultivation, the prices jumped ten fold, from \$30 per Kg to almost \$300 per Kg. The winners were those who had bought all the available stocks, no other than the Taleban themselves. The Taleban might have had other motivations, such as recognition and international assistance, but the fact remains that the losers in this episode were the farmers who were impoverished more than ever before.

The author accompanied an international donor assessment mission from Vienna to Afghanistan in late April/early May 2001 to examine the impact of the Taleban issued ban on poppy cultivation and among others also to assess the sustainability of the ban. In the absence of any measures by the Taleban to address the consequences of the ban, other than an appeal for international assistance, the mission was concerned that sustainability could prove over time to be problematic, especially in the east of the country. Small farmers, particularly share croppers and itinerant farm laborers, were especially hard hit by the economic impact of the ban. In the 2001 production season, Afghan poppy farmers lost four-fifths of their income by switching to other crops. Many were left indebted, and some had to sell their land.

END OF TALEBAN ERA

With the high prices for the opium and the vacuum created by the ouster of Taleban towards the end of 2001 and before the establishment of the Interim Government in Afghanistan as the result of the Bonn Conference, the farmers were motivated to cultivate

opium again in a massive scale. As a result, the area under cultivation for 2002 production, which was harvested between September and December of 2001, rose by almost ten fold and the production was raised almost 18 fold from 185 to 3,400 tons.⁽¹¹⁾ Such a massive production by farmers and the increase in prices and profits, motivated more people with influence in their regions to cooperate with the traffickers or becoming traffickers themselves.

In 2003, compared to 2002 figures, opium cultivation in Afghanistan increased by 8% and the production increased by 6% equivalent to 76% of the world total production. Almost 7% of Afghans were involved in the drug trade, employing 1.7 million people.⁽¹²⁾ In that year, the opium growing families earned an average of \$3,900 and the income per capita of the Afghans involved in illicit opium economy was \$600. With a population of 24 million people, per capita GDP of Afghanistan in 2002 was estimated to be about \$184. The earnings of those involved in illicit opium economy in Afghanistan in 2003 was estimated at \$2.3 billion, 50% of 2002 licit GDP.⁽¹³⁾

In 2004, 10% of Afghans were involved in the drugs trade, employing 2.3 million people. The opium cultivation in Afghanistan increased by 64% and production by 17% compared to 2003. The output of opium for 2004 was estimated at 4,200 tons, equivalent to about 87% of the world total production.⁽¹⁴⁾ It was reported that bad weather and disease lowered the opium yield per hectare that year. If the yield had remained the same as in 2003, the production would have been much higher.

In 2004, the opium growing families earned an average of \$1,700, 56% less than in 2003 and income per capita of the Afghans involved in opium economy was estimated at \$260, 56% less than in 2003, about 25% above per capita GDP in 2003 and 60% above per capita expenditure of households of \$165 in rural Afghanistan in 2003. The per capita GDP of Afghanistan in 2003 was estimated at \$207.⁽¹⁵⁾


In 2004, those involved in the illicit opium economy in Afghanistan, earned around \$2.8 billion, almost 60% of 2003 licit GDP of the country, an increase of 22% compared to 2003. The farm-gate price of opium that year was estimated at \$92 per kg, 67% reduction compared to the \$283 per kg in 2003.⁽¹⁶⁾

In 2005, compared to 2004, opium cultivation decreased by 20% and the production was lowered by only 2.4%. The production level however, was still 87% of total world production. Almost 8.7% of Afghans were involved in the drug trade employing 2.3 million

people. In 2005, the opium growing families earned an average of \$1,800 and the income per capita of the Afghans involved in illicit opium economy was \$280. The per capita GDP in 2005 was estimated to be about \$226. The earnings of those involved in illicit opium economy in 2005 was estimated at \$2.7 billion, almost 52% of licit GDP.

In 2006, 12.6% of Afghans were involved in the drugs trade, employing 2.9 million people. Opium cultivation increased by 59% and production increased by 49% compared to 2005. The output of opium for 2006 was estimated at 6,100 tons, equivalent to about 92% of the world total production.

Between 2000 and 2006, the annual average for production in the seven years was about 3,551 tons, almost 37% increase in production compared to the annual average in the decade before, and 80% increase compared to the annual average of 1980s.



Source: Annual UNODC Opium Poppy Surveys

It is widely believed that Afghanistan receives only about 1% of total global profits that are made in the chain starting with the illicit cultivation of opium poppy to the final retail sales in the streets of London or Frankfurt in the form of heroin. The total income from the 1997 production of opium might not have exceeded \$200 million. In 1999, the total income for Afghanistan from opium was not much higher, since the halving in the retail price of opium had almost entirely offset the doubling in the production of opium in that year.⁽¹⁷⁾

Furthermore, it is not the farmers who are making a financial killing out of opium

production. In 1997, \$130 million, or about 65% went to farmers and itinerant harvesters; the rest was shared by traders and transporters. In 2004, out of the \$2.8 billion total export value of opium to the neighboring countries, \$2.2 billion were made by Afghan traffickers, an increase of 69% over the figure of \$1.3 billion in 2003.⁽¹⁸⁾ In 2005, the total export value of opium to the neighboring countries was estimated at \$2.7 billion, out of which \$2.14 billion were made by Afghan traffickers. In 2006, the total export value of opium to the neighboring countries was estimated at \$3.1 billion, out of which \$2.34 billion were made by Afghan Traffickers.⁽¹⁹⁾ The \$2.8 billion in 2004, \$2.7 billion in 2005 and \$3.1 billion in 2006 are only what remain for Afghans. It is estimated that along the trafficking route from Afghanistan to Europe, Afghan opiates generate a turn-over of about \$30 billion annually with more than half a million people involved in its international trade and about 10 million people (2/3 of opiate abusers in the world) consuming opiates of Afghan origin.⁽²⁰⁾

In 2004, the farmers made \$0.6 billion, a reduction of 41% over the figure of \$1.02 billion in 2003, and 50% lower than the figure in 2002. In 2005, the farmers made \$0.56 billion and in 2006, \$0.76 billion. The farmers' earnings in 2006 and 2005 were estimated to comprise around 11% of GDP, while in 2004 it was 13% and in 2003, the figure was 22%.

WHY OPIUM PRODUCTION?

In Afghanistan, the agricultural sector is structurally weak, with poor marketing, small land holdings and a shortage of agricultural inputs such as improved seeds, fertilizers, basic agricultural tools, and access to water and to formal credit.

The farmers choose to cultivate opium because: there is a high cash value for opium; it can be stored without the risk of perishing and easily traded throughout the year which provides the farmers with relatively secure and substantial cash income; it is one of the very few crops for which farmers can receive advance credits at times of need; there is relatively short time of six months between planting and harvesting; and there is no risk for them as they are protected by the local influential people who are also making enormous profits out of this business. Opium cultivation and harvesting is labor intensive. It provides income to the poor itinerant agricultural laborers who come from all over Afghanistan to the planting areas.

What we need to ask is whether four years after the fall of Taleban and establishment of an administration supported by the international community, are we any where close in providing the farmers with badly needed incentives which have been provided by the

traffickers for the past two decades?

After the fall of Taleban, the international community expected an immediate halt to the production of illicit opium in Afghanistan. It was assumed that drug production was only relevant to the rule of Taleban. It was an assumption based on the lack of understanding of the history of illicit opium in Afghanistan and its contribution to the economy of that country. The history of drug production in Afghanistan over the last two decades would have suggested a more realistic expectation which would have resulted in policies contributing to address the root causes of illicit opium production in Afghanistan and policies which would have affected the daily life of the farmers in that country.

Moreover, looking at the past experiences in the illicit drug producing countries, would also suggest a more realistic approach to the problem. Pakistan with 9,493 hectares under cultivation in 1992 gradually decreased the production to 2,500 hectares in 2003. Lao PDR, with 30,580 hectares under cultivation in 1990, with a couple of exceptional years, has gradually decreased the area under cultivation to about 12,000 in 2003. Myanmar, staying between 150,000 and 165,000 hectares between 1990 and 1997, has dropped the area under cultivation to 62,200 in 2003. Thailand, with 3,727 hectares in 1991, dropped to 750 hectares in 2002. Vietnam, with 18,000 hectares in 1990 dropped to 422 hectares in 1999. Latin America, with 20,886 hectares in 1994 to 8,900 hectares in 2003. They all shared something in common: a balanced approach comprising law enforcement and alternative livelihood.

According to UNODC, the gross income from a hectare of wheat in 2004 was \$390, down 17% from 2003 income of \$470. In 2005, the figure was \$550 and in 2006, it was \$530. On the other hand, the income from a hectare of opium in 2006 was \$4,600, in 2005 was about \$5,400 and in 2004, was about \$4,600, down 64% from the \$12,700 price for 2003. Even after the 64% drop in the prices in 2004, the income from the opium produced per hectare was still about twelve times higher than the figure for wheat.⁽²¹⁾

The farmers make rational business decisions. In an environment, where the power of the central government is limited and local players all benefit from the continued cultivation of opium by farmers, there are limited risks for the farmers in producing an illegal product. The farmer gets easy credit from the traffickers, he produces opium which permits him to pay back the loan and have enough left for him to deal with his other needs

and pay taxes and protection money to the local authorities.

In the two decades preceding the establishment of the Interim Administration in Afghanistan, the number of provinces involved in this business were limited and two provinces alone, were producing about 75 percent of the opium production in that country. Since then, the know-how has been transferred to many other provinces. Visiting many areas of the country between 2002 and 2004, especially the areas where there were almost no opium production in the previous two decades, I was repeatedly told about many opium experts coming from Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, teaching people how to cultivate opium poppy and even investing in their farms.

In 2004, all 32 provinces of Afghanistan were involved in drug production. However, most of the production was still concentrated in 6 traditionally producing provinces and three provinces of Helmand, Nangarhar and Badakhshan accounted for 56% of area under cultivation. Nevertheless, the income produced in the new provinces with even fewer than 1000 hectares under cultivation is enough to change their economic conditions.

In 2006, 77% of the cultivation in Afghanistan took place in 7 provinces. In 2005, the figure was 70% for the same provinces.⁽²²⁾

CONCLUSION

The opium economy in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005 was valued at an average of \$2.6 billion per year, equivalent to over 54% of average GDP for the same years, employing an average of 2 million Afghans per year. No law enforcement policy could be sustainable without adequate resources to fill the shortfall and reinvigorate the economy of Afghanistan. The INCB in its 2003 annual report reiterates that “prevention of the cultivation of illicit crops and their eventual eradication should be of the utmost importance to the Transitional Authority of Afghanistan in fulfilling its treaty obligations and can be achieved only when the relevant laws are fully respected and strictly implemented while sustainable alternative sources of income are provided to farmers.”⁽²³⁾

For Afghanistan, alternative development is ultimately linked to long term development. An extensive and substantial rural development programme goes beyond merely introducing alternative crops. No crops will substitute the income that opium produces. We need to think about generating work and a licit rural economy with substantial government programmes to provide assistance, including non-farm opportunities.

As hundreds of millions of dollars will be spent to put together a law enforcement apparatus to deal with the law-breaking farmers, we need to realize that in Afghanistan, we are making the transition in one of the poorest countries in the world from civil war and the rule of warlords to the rule of law. The transition will not happen over night, regardless of how much money we spend. What we need is patience, perseverance and greater focus on making the transition to the rule of law and a market economy where people can have a decent life without resorting to illegal activities. The farmers in general are still battling with immense poverty.

Parallel to investments in law enforcement, what we need is a focus on investing in the infrastructure and security for investments, so that private sector and individual investors are attracted in investing in the future of Afghanistan; assistance to the farmers and rural communities, in the form of credit with easy terms to invest in licit economy; building the needed infrastructure to support the farmers in making the maximum profits from their licit products; and to establish off-farm opportunities for income generation. Several times the amount being spent on law enforcement aspects of drug control needs to be spent in making a difference in the life of the farmers in Afghanistan.

Summary of Statistics

No.	Description	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
1	Net Opium Cultivation (Ha.)	74,000	80,000	131,000	104,000	165,000
1a	- In % of Global Cultivation	41	47	67	68	82
2	Eradication (Ha.)	NA	21,430	NA	5,103	15,300
3	Production of Opium (Metric Tons)	3,400	3,600	4,200	4,100	6,100
3a	- In % of World Illicit Production	76	77	87	89	92
4	Number of Households Involved in Opium Production	NA	264,000	356,000	309,000	448,000
4a	Number of Persons Involved in Opium Production (Million)	NA	1.7	2.3	2.0	2.9
4b	- In % of Total Population		7	10	8.7	12.6
5	Average Farm-gate Price of Fresh Opium at Harvest Time Per Kg (US\$)	350	283	92	102	94
6	Afghanistan's GDP (Billion US\$)	4.4	4.6	4.7	5.2	6.7
7	Total Export Value of Opium to Neighboring Countries (Billion US\$)	2.5	2.3	2.8	2.7	3.1
7a	- In % of GDP	57	50	60	52	46
7b	Gross Profits of Afghan Traffickers (Billion US\$)	1.3	1.3	2.2	2.14	2.34
7c	Total Farm-gate Value of Opium Production (Billion US\$)	1.2	1.02	0.6	0.56	0.75
8	Household Average Yearly Gross Income of Opium Growing Families from Opium (US\$)	NA	3,900	1,700	1,800	1,675
8a	Per Capita Gross Income from Opium of Opium Growing Families (US\$)	198	594	260	280	259
9	Afghanistan's GDP Per Capita (US\$)	184	207	206	226	291
10	Indicative Gross Income from Opium Per Ha. (US\$)	16,200	12,700	4,600	5,400	4,545
10a	Gross Income from Wheat Per Ha. (US\$)	-	470	390	550	530

Source: Annual UNODC Opium Surveys.

ENDNOTES

1. **United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime** (UNODC) and Ministry of Counter Narcotics of the Government of Afghanistan, "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006", October 2006, p. 1.
2. Ibid.
3. **United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime** (UNODC) and Counter Narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afghanistan, "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004", November 2004, p. 3.
4. Ibid.
5. **United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime** (UNODC) and Counter Narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afghanistan, "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003", October 2003, p. 5.
6. **United Nations**, "The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem", New York, 2003, p. 6.
7. Ibid, p. 30.
8. **United Nations International Drug Control Program** (UNDCP), "Afghanistan Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2000", 2000, pp. ii-iii.
9. **United Nations**, "Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2000", E/INCB/2000/1, p. 57
10. **United Nations**, "Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1999", E/INCB/1999/1, p. 49.
11. **United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime** Prevention (UNODCCP), "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2002", October 2002, pp. 2-4. The UNODCCP became the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on 1 October 2002. The UNODC includes the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP).
12. The figure does not include the itinerant workers who work on poppy cultivation.
13. **United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime** (UNODC) and Counter Narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afghanistan, "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003", October 2003, p. 5.
14. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004", p. 1
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. "The Opium Economy in Afghanistan", pp. 7-9
18. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004", pp. 71-77.
19. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006", p. 1
20. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006", p. 6
21. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004", p. 1.
22. Helmand, Badakhshan, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Farah, Balkh and Day Kundi.
23. **United Nations**, "Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003", E/INCB/2003/1, p. 34.