

Indexing Immigration and Integration Policy: Lessons from Europe

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Immigrant-related policy indexes have become popular in both U.S. and European contexts, yet these projects boast distinct and divergent trajectories. European indices are characterized by rigorous conceptualization, specificity in elements of policy design (e.g., settings like fees or appeal process), and a variety of measurement strategies. By contrast, U.S. state-level policy indices exhibit a lack of differentiation between immigration and integration policy and excessive generality in measurement and representation of policy instruments and settings, exacerbated in presenting a policy index as an aggregate count. This paper argues U.S. policy indexing can benefit from the European indexing experience. Following an overview of the state of each field, assessing concept differentiation, specification, and measurement in each, the paper illustrates how even the well-conceived and specified European integration policy indices run into problems at the analysis stage. It presents a replication-replacement study to illustrate divergent performance of highly correlated and conceptually agreeing indices, as well as methodological issues inherent to indices of low-N, including using a policy index as a dependent variable and index selection absent a priori theorization. It concludes with suggestions for improving American immigration policy indices, as well as general observations on working with statistical power-challenged indices and data limitations.

KEY WORDS: citizenship, immigration, integration, policy index

与移民相关的政策指数在美国和欧洲研究中都很受欢迎，但它们却拥有截然不同的发展轨迹。欧洲指数的特点是严格的概念化、政策设计要素的特异性（例如在费用或者申诉程序的不同背景）以及度量策略的多样性。相比之下，美国州级的政策指数缺乏对移民和一体化政策的区分，对政策工具和环境的度量表示也过于通用，而以总计数量政策指数使这一情况更加恶化。本文认为，美国的政策指数可以从欧洲的指数经验中受益。在概述了每个领域的状态，评估了每个领域的概念差异、规范和度量之后，本文表明，即使是周密规划且详细阐述的欧洲一体化政策指数在分析阶段也会遇到问题。本文展示了一个复制性研究，来说明概念上valide的（即高度相关）指数的不同表现，并指出了在小样本以及没有先验理论的情况下进行指数选择所固有的方法论问题。最后，本文提出了改进美国移民政策指数的建议，并为使用统计效力大打折扣的指数这一情况提供了一个大体观察结果。

Introduction

The study of citizenship and immigrant integration policy has become a large, interdisciplinary subject of research. Studies investigate many dimensions of policy, ranging from factors that influence laws (Howard, 2009), elements of design (Goodman, 2014), as well as policy effects on immigrants and their families (e.g., Koopmans, 2010; Street, 2014; Wright & Bloemraad, 2012). While only targeting a minority of the population, these policies reflect shared goals of a political system and a national or regional political community. Or, to put it more plainly, policy toward outsiders tells us a lot about the attitudes, beliefs, and priorities of insiders. However, to systematically analyze the determinants of policy output requires scholars to create measures that representatively capture the essence of various policies. The effort to conceptualize, organize, and score immigrant-related policy produced at various levels of government, in both European and U.S. contexts, has led to an increasingly sophisticated literature that tackles issues of methodology and policy representativeness.

Despite the parallel pursuit of categorizing immigrant-related policy, research on the U.S. and European case studies has invariably produced quite distinct literatures. In terms of the latter, an interdisciplinary community of political scientists, sociologists, and legal scholars have—for over two decades now—examined European countries by developing complex, multi-dimensional indices capable of differentiating across types of policies, target groups, and instruments, to mention a few (Goodman, 2010; Jeffers, Honohan, & Bauböck, 2012; Koopmans, Michalowski, & Waibel, 2012; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005; Waldrauch & Hofinger, 1997). Recently, Europeanists have engaged in extensive debates over conceptualization, specificity, and measurement leading to a set of rigorous standards for differentiating and operationalizing indices (Goodman, 2015; Helbling, 2013).

Americanists, by contrast, have only become involved in developing immigration policy indices in the past decade, in which we have observed an “explosion of state-level immigration policies” (Boushey & Luedtke, 2011), with states became more involved in regulating immigrants within their borders (for a recent treatment, see Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2015). The American indexing approach differs from the European literature in several respects, including conceptualization, specificity, and measurement. For the most part, Americanists have developed simple indices, often binary counts that capture only the hostile or welcoming character of a law (cf. Monogan, 2013). These measures are often based on underspecified definitions of what constitutes “immigration” or “immigrant” policy; lack differentiation between immigration and integration policy domains; and display low specificity when it comes to representing instruments, settings, targets, the legislative process itself, etc. Each of these problems may become amplified by aggregation choices.

The central task of this article is to compare the European immigrant-related policy index enterprise to that of the U.S. experience. Through this comparison, and as a function of its earlier development, I draw from the European immigrant integration indices experience to identify a number of “lessons learned” for application in nascent U.S. projects (where immigration policy coding has so far dominated the

field). It begins with a theoretical argument that—due to the European members states' unique relationship with the European Union on matters of immigration and, in particular, immigrant integration—comparisons between European states and U.S. states are appropriate as manifestations of models of comparative federalism and, therefore, illustrative for pointing out similar contexts for indexing potentially multi-level policy. Second, the paper takes stock of the state of the field in American state immigration indexing compared to that of European citizenship and integration policy indices, evaluating each through the criteria of conceptualization, specificity, and measurement. Specifically, it argues inattention to these issues results in not only missed opportunities, but problems for description and analysis.

The third part of the paper studies the relationship between concept validity and predictive validity in considering the effects of conceptualization, specificity, and measurement on analysis. Centrally, it shows that even when some of these issues have been grappled with prior to model specification, conceptually similar indices can produce different findings. This is particularly the case with low-N subject matter. Thus, I illustrate some of the pitfalls of using even well-conceived policy indices in statistical models, using European data and integration policy measures to address a basic research question: Does far-right support produce restrictive integration policy? Two prominent lessons emerge: (1) construct validity (i.e., highly correlated indices) may not align with predictive validity (i.e., perform similarly in a model); and (2) overcoming the problems of small-N is a continued challenge. Finally, the paper concludes with thoughts on future directions for U.S. index-building. This paper raises more questions than it produces answers, but the central goal is to help move U.S. index-building toward a more dynamic and sophisticated understanding of immigration and integration policy, with more precise instruments for capturing it.

Apples and Oranges? Comparing Units of Analysis

Despite obvious differences between U.S. states and independent European nation-states in terms of political authority, there are several reasons that suggest comparison is both appropriate and informative. First, in a general sense, it is right to think of EU member states as existing in a federal relationship to the European Union.¹ Indeed, a number of scholars analyze the EU through the lens of comparative federalism (see for example Börzel, 2005; Börzel & Hosli, 2003; Kelemen, 2000; McKay, 1999), with some in explicit comparison to the United States (Ansell & Di Palma, 2004; Fabbrini, 2005; Menon & Schain, 2006).

Moving from a general observation to a more specific point about policy, both the United States and EU are federalized in the domains of immigration and integration policy, albeit in different ways. In principle, these are distinct policy domains. Immigration can be generally defined as policies that determine who can enter or exit a sovereign territory. Immigration rules extend from short-term categories like tourists, students, seasonal agricultural workers, or temporary residence, to long-term categories including permanent residence and diasporic repatriation. For long-term immigrants, entry is

often the first step of a path to member *making*, i.e., citizenship. By contrast, integration policies are preoccupied with member *shaping* (Goodman, 2015), namely successful incorporation into the host society in terms of acquiring skills (language, values) and behavior across any number of dimensions, including social, cultural, civic, economic, and political.² In practice, however, these policy areas are oftentimes interrelated and overlapping. For example, in Europe, entry often requires meeting certain expectations of integration, like language proficiency or cultural familiarity (FitzGerald, Cook-Martín, García, & Arar, 2018; Goodman, 2011). Moreover, as we will see in the review of existing studies, integration policy is typically treated as a subtype of a larger category that is “immigration policy” in both U.S. and European policy studies.

In the following section, I provide a brief overview of immigrant-related policymaking in both U.S. and EU systems. This discussion of “where” policy decisions are made reveals a similar pattern: differentiation in competencies in both immigration and integration policy occur across both federal and state levels. Specifically, this means, in both the United States and Europe, states-as-lower-level units have established and/or reserved competencies in immigrant-related policies despite or alongside federal/supranational authority. This “similarity of differentiation” holds in some policy areas more than others (e.g., integration, not entry). Therefore, considering these similarities, we can use one (Europe as a newer federation) to shed light on practices of the other (United States as an older federation). Moreover, because integration policy indexing in Europe is both chronologically prior to—and comparatively more methodologically diverse than—U.S. policy indexing, the former can provide guidance and guidelines for thinking about how to improve immigrant-related policy indices in the latter, specifically in differentiating integration.

U.S. Immigration and Integration Policymaking

In the United States, each individual state’s power on immigration is negatively delimited from federal competence; in other words, that which the federal government does not manage is left to state discretion. In practice, this means a full federal approach to citizenship, a strong approach to immigration rule-making, and significant state discretion in immigrant integration policy, in which the federal government provides little guidance or funding to the states. Though states are limited in terms of immigration policymaking—being a central prerogative of the federal government³—they are not stripped of immigration control altogether. On the contrary, states have “enthusiastically affirm[ed] and defend[ed]” (Schuck, 2007, p. 58) their role in the development and administration of immigration law. As such we see states use a variety of strategies, including judicial channels, discretion over implementation, and specific practices like policing (Provine, Varsanyi, Lewis, & Decker, 2016) to challenge the line of federal authority.⁴ And while states continue to try and carve out more leeway with regard to immigration policy and law enforcement (e.g., SB 1070, the Arizona law empowering local authorities to arrest individuals on “reasonable suspicion” of deportable offense), oftentimes supported by direct democracy (Reich & Barth, 2012), they are most successful in areas already under state jurisdiction, like education and licensing (Tichenor & Filindra, 2012).

By contrast, immigrant *integration* is a policy area largely unregulated by the federal government.⁵ In the absence of uniform integration policy, significant federal funding⁶ or central agenda-setting, states exert a great deal of authority through budgeting decisions, regulations, and implementation in fulfilling basic social services like education, health care, welfare, and job training. Moreover, across both broadly inclusive and restrictive state environments, cities and community-based nonprofit organizations often pick up the slack of a decentralized policy in their capacity as primary service-providers (de Graauw, 2008, 2016). As such, at the city level, we also observe wide variation between permissive (e.g., establishing themselves as a “sanctuary city,” allowing for “day labor” centers for safe recruitment of unauthorized labor) and restrictive locales (e.g., prohibiting landlords from renting to unauthorized immigrants) (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2015, Hopkins, 2010).

EU Immigration and Integration Policymaking

Immigration in the European Union is largely bifurcated by its external and internal dimensions. The EU as a supranational body obtained competence on external matters of immigration control, namely illegal migration, visas, asylum, and security cooperation with the Amsterdam Treaty (1999). At the same time, EU member states have retained regulatory power when it comes to internal aspects of immigration, with matters of integration being deliberately excluded from harmonization in the Lisbon Treaty (2007). Yet here the fault line is not squarely along policy domain (immigration versus integration) but rather immigrant category, e.g., labor, asylum, family, etc. Specifically, intra-EU movement, including EU citizens and permanent residents, is an EU-level competence under the Schengen Agreement and as a dimension of the customs union and internal market. This means the supranational institutions of the EU (specifically, the Commission as its chief executive body) have harmonized and implemented common rules and procedures (e.g., labor mobility through free movement, as well as the intake and processing of asylum seekers through the Dublin procedure), while other aspects of regulation and immigration control remain at the state level, including entry of non-EU (i.e., third-country) migrants, review and decision on asylum applications, as well as naturalization.⁷ Of course, much like in the United States, supranational jurisdiction does not go uncontested. Member states often flout Commission recommendations, such as asylum intake quotas following the 2015 refugee crisis.⁸ And, among the many lessons of Brexit, we see how opposition to “Brussels sovereignty” and the desire to “take back control” of national borders can lead a majority of an electorate to reject EU membership altogether.

Where immigration is divided between external and internal dimensions, immigrant integration in Europe—similar to the United States—is exclusively crafted and implemented at the member state level.⁹ Here, European nation-states maintain explicit, highly defined, top-down integration laws and ministries: Germany’s 2016 Integration Law (“*Integrationsgesetz*”), The Netherlands’ 2006 Law on Civic Integration (“*Wet inburgering*”), Denmark’s Ministry of Immigration and Integration, or France’s 2005 Social Cohesion Planning Act (“*Loi de programmation pour la cohésion sociale*”).¹⁰ With state sovereignty firmly secured, we observe a

variety of approaches to regulating membership, through policies of naturalization and citizenship (Howard, 2009), cultural requirements like language and country knowledge (Goodman, 2014), as well as rules in which integration may be a chief byproduct, such as anti-discrimination (Givens & Case, 2014; Joppke, 2007) and multicultural practices (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013). And, where permitted, we also observe regional difference in integration, e.g., between Wallonia and Flanders as well as various interpretations of federal rules by the *Länder* in Germany.

To summarize, both the U.S. states and EU member states are constrained and enabled by their respective federal and supranational relationships. Both exhibit federalized immigration policy and, likewise, state push-back and contestation. In the integration domain, both U.S. states and European nation-states enjoy greater power, and here the differences in how they exercise that power is quite stark. One interpretation is that U.S. state policy is underdeveloped in the integration domain—particularly at the federal level; another read of that comparison is European states are obsessed with integration, from mandatory integration schemes to ministries.¹¹ Still, this difference may not be one of scale but one driven by lack of information, in that we lack precise, aggregate, and comparable measures for categorizing and comparing U.S. state integration policy. The next section looks more closely at this issue by providing an overview of the state of immigration and integration policy indexing in the United States, with attention to conceptualization, mobile scoring rules, and specificity.

Evaluating U.S. Immigration and Integration Indexing: State of the Field

American state scholars identify a great deal of variation in immigration policy practice, observed in degrees of restriction and punitiveness. How do these studies categorize immigration and integration policy at the state level to reach such conclusions? Table 1 presents a sample of U.S. state-level policy indices, providing information on index content, type, scope, and source. As the table shows, there are also some key, unifying characteristics among the majority of measures. First, indices largely do not differentiate between immigration and integration policy domains. Second, indices are not sensitive to specificity of rules, such as types of policy instruments or settings, e.g., *how* control is executed, which populations are regulated, etc. And third, they employ similar scoring rules, using unweighted (cf. Monogan, 2013) dummy scores of 1s and 0s, reported to represent presence or absence of policy, or whether policies are restrictive or not. When aggregated, these produce count variables (e.g., typically number of policies per state per year) bound at zero, or repackaged as ratios and proportions.¹² These three issue areas comprise the core challenge for American state-level indices: conceptualization, specificity, and measurement.

Conceptualization refers to precision around the discrete event or phenomenon under examination,¹³ specificity refers to which dimensions of those policies we are capturing, and measurement is how we capture or represent those dimensions “on paper.” Necessarily, the appropriate workflow is conceptualization precedes specificity which precedes measurement. Therefore, starting with conceptualization, we observe little differentiation between immigration *control* and immigrant *integration*

Table 1. Review of Select U.S. State Immigrant-Related Policy Indexes (Ordered by Publication Year)

	Content	Variable type	Scope	Source
Chavez and Provine (2009)	Laws (bills enacted) for nonauthorized immigrants	2 dummy (restriction, pro-immigration legislation)	50 states, 2005–2006	NCSL
Boushey and Luedtke (2011)	Laws for legal and undocumented (all immigrants)	2 count (immigrant integration, immigration control)	50 states, 1997–2008	Progressive State Network
Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty (2011)	Laws for all immigrants	Summative index with 8 subcategories	50 states, 2005–2007	NCSL
Filindra and Pearson-Merkowitz (2013)	Bills and resolutions on employment and law enforcement for all immigrants	2 proportions (punitive bills introduced to total; punitive bills passed)	50 states, 2007	Migration Policy Institute
Marquez and Schraufnagel (2013)	Laws for all immigrants	2 count (liberalizing, restricting); composite restrictive score	50 states, 2008–2012	NCSL
Monogan (2013)	Laws for all immigrants	Ratio (welcoming tone to hostile, weighted by scope scale)	50 states, 2005–2011	NCSL
Zingher (2014)	Bills and laws on omnibus immigration policy, employment, and enforcement	Dummy (pooled across categories)	50 states, 2005–2011	NCSL
Ybarra, Sanchez, and Sanchez (2016)	Punitive immigration policy ^a for all immigrants	Count (neutral, beneficial, punitive)	50 states, 2005–2012	NCSL
Commins and Wills (2017)	Immigration laws for all immigrants	Count (restrictive, beneficial)	50 states, 2005–2012	NCSL

^aAllows for an omnibus law to be broken into parts and for separate policies contained therein to be counted (Ybarra et al., 2016, p. 322).

measures. A notable exception is Boushey and Luedtke (2011, p. 394), who marshal conceptual clarification to indexing by distinguishing immigration as “control policies [that] deal with keeping out unwanted immigrants” and integration policy as “dictat[ing] the transition and settlement of resident immigrants.” This, of course, reflects a seminal distinction in the migration field made by Tomas Hammar (1985, pp. 7–9), who distinguishes “immigration regulations” as referring to control of entry and stay of foreigners while “immigrant policy” references “conditions provided for resident immigrants.” Recognizing these divergent purposes allows for policy relationships to be dynamic, orthogonal, even strategic. Obfuscating them merely projects an interest in immigrant-related policymaking, with unclear signposts as to its intent, force, or direction.

Conceptual blurriness or misinformation is a problem on its own. When combined with lack of specificity and poor measurement strategies, problems can multiply. For instance, reporting policy with a dummy variable (measurement) may increase simplicity but reduce specificity, such as the nature of the legislative process, nature of rule—bill versus law, category of migrant—documented versus undocumented, policy output versus outcome, area of policy (welfare, healthcare, education), etc. Binary classifications are not inherently problematic; in fact, they are subject to less measurement error. Yet, their use requires the concept in question have just one dimension. If, theoretically, any of the aforementioned aspects of policy are consequential to how a policy is experienced, then measurement choices that overlook specificity produce problems down the line for analysis. For example, in the U.S. literature there is evidence to suggest not all “restriction” is created equal when it comes to welfare, health care, or education, especially since different federal rules govern these domains (Filindra, 2013). Simply put, immigration and integration policies vary across dimensions. Restricting them to a single dimension reduces the data analyst’s ability to observe variation that may be theoretically meaningful. Furthermore, problems of measurement can be compounded by aggregation choices, in which domain specificity can be obfuscated (a problem of conceptual “muddiness”), diluted or lost (e.g., Zingher, 2014). In short, if careful conceptualization does not precede measurement, then a series of scores may be produced but it remains unclear (or unconvincing) what the scores represent. Needless to say, the presence of these issues raises serious reservations even before issues of model specification.

Here is a clear example of some of these issues in the American state politics literature. Marquez and Schraufnagel (2013) find a relative increase in each state’s Hispanic population to be a main driver in producing new restrictive immigration policy. To categorize and compare American state immigration policy, the authors content analyze new immigration bills in the NCSL between 2008 and 2012, characterizing “state moves that alternatively integrate and restrict” (p. 349). Restrictive laws are defined as cutting off “some benefit to immigrants or subject them to added scrutiny by state and local law enforcement” while liberalization “encourages immigration in some manner” (p. 354). New immigration laws were then assigned a binary score for whether the law was “restrictive,” “liberalizing,” “both,” or “neither.” These scores were aggregated to produce an overall “restrictive score”

(subtracting the number of liberalizing laws from the number of restricting laws) for each state–year combination.

This coding is a good starting point for portraying the size and general direction of new policy. However, with careful consideration of conceptualization, specificity, and measurement, scholars can learn much more about policy, including potential patterns in how states think about integration as well as what it is about Hispanic population change *in particular* that produces certain kinds of policy. On this point, as aforementioned definitions show, integration is not merely “encouragement” or liberalization; it often manifests as a bevy of social services, specific entitlements, education policies like bilingualism, health-care services, etc. that assist in migrant settlement. In short, integration is not the opposite of immigration but a distinct concept. Specifically, it can resemble a dense network of settlement procedures and policies, and the nature of those policies convey important information about state priorities.

This points to the issue of specificity. If indices could reflect policy domain, target populations, etc., researchers might see different types of patterns, like changes in health- versus education-related immigration rules across diverse population contexts. Specificity might also point to changes in rules that affect specific populations, e.g., aspects of immigration that disproportionately impact Asian versus Hispanic populations. Finally, beyond suggestions for coding issues and groups (we could also add procedures to this list), there are measurement concerns to consider. The aggregation strategy here projects overall direction of policy in total but assumes—in addition to the immigration-integration muddiness—that volume is equivalent to effect size. One liberalization law may not equal or negate one restriction law, and a nuanced scoring and aggregation scheme may be able to address this concern. Thinking more carefully about the concept, it could also be that restrictive policies are about immigration control and security while integration or liberalization are about other policy domains. An obvious example of this kind of restriction is Arizona’s SB 1070. If liberalization laws are not about reversing or ameliorating these specific conditions, then the aggregation method creates a false equivalence.

These choices matter not merely because they account for policy change as a function of potentially important and controversial covariates, e.g., ethnically diverse population change, but because the index enterprise is cumulative: Avery, Fine, and Márquez (2016) rely on Marquez and Schraufnagel (2013), which in turn builds from Boushey and Luedtke (2011). There are also central democratic consequences; for example, Avery et al. (2016, p. 750) argue greater Latino voting power mitigates restrictive immigration law, a finding that underlines the substantial “importance of voting for minority substantive representation.” Therefore, the closer these indices get to conceptual accuracy and validity, the closer to understanding the rich conditions that enable or inhibit participation.

In sum, conceptualization, specificity, and measurement in American immigration policy index-building represent critical issues for index representativeness, analysis, and findings in the form of potential empirical and theoretical contribution. In the

next section, I argue we know these are not merely missed opportunities but serious problems, as illustrated by the European integration and immigration policy index literature. Thus, American state scholars can benefit from its experience and insights.

European Migrant-Related Policy Indexing: Highlighting Methodological Concerns

Policy indices have become *de rigueur* in the study of immigrant-related policies in Europe, starting with citizenship and moving to integration and immigration more recently. There are any number of motivations behind this trend, which dates to the mid-1990s. Generally, there was a desire to create comparable metrics of policy in an ever-integrating Europe, on the coattails of the Maastricht Treaty (1992). Specifically, there was an empirical need to characterize and categorize citizenship policy change across member states, which experienced unprecedented change (namely, liberalization) in this decade (Howard, 2009). Finally, there was a normative motivation, as evident from the manifold index names (as well as some of the scoring rules, see below): immigrant inclusion. The first of these citizenship studies was Waldrauch and Hofinger's (1997) examination of legal obstacles to integration. This index inspired a number of subsequent projects, from the comprehensive comparative analyses and case studies collected by EUCITAC (Bauböck, Ersbøll, Groenendijk, & Waldrauch, 2006a, 2006b) which ultimately became the Citizenship Law (CITLAW) index under GLOBALCIT, to Marc Morjé Howard's (2009) Citizenship Policy Index (CPI).¹⁴

But indexing did not stop with citizenship. Studies have already documented the expansion of the indexing enterprise to integration (Goodman, 2015; Helbling, 2013), but I provide an overview in Table 2 for the unacquainted reader. Presented in (roughly) chronological order, we see how citizenship and integration indices take on more specificity of policy coverage and instrument settings over time, as well as more methodological consideration for issues like conceptualization, aggregation, and weighting strategies.¹⁵ Moreover, this table does not even include *immigration* policy indices—a comparative latecomer to the index literature. Some of these include Timothy Hatton's Asylum Policy Index (Hatton & Moloney, 2015, Hatton, 2009), Martin Ruhs's Openness and Migration Rights Indicators (2013); Helbling, Bjerre, Römer, and Zobel's (2017) Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC); the International Migration Policy and Law Analysis (IMPALA) database (Beine et al., 2015); Cerna's (2016) index of states' openness to high-skilled immigrants (HSI); and the Determinants of International Migration (DEMIG) policy database, which tracks policy change across 45 countries between 1945 and 2013 (De Haas, Natter, & Vezzoli 2015).

Conceptualization had been a belated consideration in the index field. As Goodman (2015, p. 1909) observes, "the entrepreneurial spirit of developing and applying unique indicators has generally outpaced a concurrent conversation on methodology."¹⁶ At the same time researchers were developing aforementioned citizenship indices, others were working on integration indices, including Indicators

Table 2. Review of Select European Integration and Citizenship Indices (Ordered by Publication Year)

	Content	Variable type	Scope (# of Countries; Years)	Source
Waldrach and Hofinger (1997)	Legal Obstacles to Integration (LOI): both integration (labor market access, family reunification) and citizenship (naturalization, and settlement conditions)	Count	8; 1995	Authors
Howard (2009)	Citizenship Policy Index (CPI): items on <i>ius soli</i> , <i>ius sanguinis</i> , naturalization, and generational access	Count with weights (for substantive or procedural conditions, e.g., naturalization rate)	27; 1980s, 2008	Bauböck et al. (2006b); Author
Janoski (2010)*	Barriers to Naturalization Index (BNI): 12 dimensions of naturalization	Dimensions averaged as part of four components, aggregated to a 0 to 1 scale	18; 1970, 1980, 1990, 2002	Author
MPG (2010, ongoing)*	Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX): 167 policy indicators across eight domains of citizenship and integration (e.g., labor market access, political participation, antidiscrimination)	0–100 scoring, averaged within domain and then averaged across domains	38; 2007–2014**	Country experts
Goodman (2010, 2014)	Civic Integration Policy Index (CIVIX): language and civic knowledge, and value requirements for citizenship, settlement, and entry	Count with weights	15; 1997, 2010, 2014	Bauböck et al. (2006b); Author
Koopmans et al. (2012)*; Koopmans and Michalowski (2017)	Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI): 44 policy indicators pertaining to individual equality and cultural differences	–1 to 1 scoring, aggregated across domains	29; 1980, 1990, 2002, 2008	Authors
Akkerman (2012)	Nationalist Immigration and Integration Policy (NIIP): immigration (asylum, family, illegality, citizenship), integration (civic)	–1 to 1 scoring, aggregated across domains	9; 1996–2010	Author; Goodman (2010)
Banting and Kymlicka (2013)*	Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP): policies pertaining to recognition and cultural inclusion for immigrant minorities, indigenous peoples, and national minorities	Count, averaged across domains	21; 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010	Authors
EUDO-Citizenship (2013)/GLOBALCIT (2017)*	Citizenship Law Indicators (CITLAW): rules for 25 modes of citizenship acquisition (<i>ius sanguinis</i> , <i>ius soli</i> , naturalization) and 14 modes of loss (renunciation, withdrawal)	0 to 1 scale with weights across each mode, intermediately aggregated	42; 2011, 2016	Country experts
Blatter, Schmid, and Blättler (2017)	Immigrant Inclusion Index (IMIX) combines existing indicators on citizenship acquisition rules with enfranchisement percentages	Combines 0–100 ordinal and ratio scales, aggregated	22; 2010	EUDO-Citizenship 2013; Author

*Denoted countries include cases that extend beyond Western Europe.

**A significant amount of missing data exists for back-dating (especially for countries added later and for the Health policy domain, which is only 2014).

for Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) (Koopmans & Michalowski, 2017; Koopmans et al., 2012),¹⁷ the Migrant Integration Policy Index (Migration Policy Group, 2011),¹⁸ and the Multicultural Policy Index (MCP). Different from citizenship, integration indices cast wide nets for policies considered part of the integration process. These almost always included some aspects of citizenship policy, be it allowance of dual citizenship (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013; Koopmans et al., 2005, 2012) or nationality rules more generally (Migration Policy Group, 2011). By subsuming citizenship as a component of integration, a clear issue of conceptual boundary maintenance was created. Simply put, citizenship is one path toward integration but there are also clear, top-down expectations that noncitizens also integrate. Moreover, there is nothing teleological about gaining status (citizenship) and integrating; many citizens live outside the bounds of “national culture.”¹⁹ And, here again, index labels only perseverated the problem. For example, Koopmans et al.’s (2012) integration index carries the unfortunate name of the Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) index, suggesting that policies as wide-ranging as religious accommodation, naturalization, family unification, and access to halal meat in schools are all citizen rights, as to more traditional rights like voting, jury duty, etc.²⁰ Finally, a number of these indices also include aspects of immigration policy (namely, family reunification rights). If everything is integration (and a theoretical argument could certainly be made that a policy can facilitate or hinder migrant incorporation), boundary maintenance is hard. This requires *a priori* categorization and specification, and appears especially problematic when distinguishing between omnibus integration and more specified models, like multiculturalism. The increased practice of presenting indices explicitly as or alongside its disaggregated components (e.g., CITLAW, MIPEX) increase opportunities for conceptual boundary maintenance.

This points to the second core issue of index-building: specificity. Along this criterion, European policy indices are prodigious. A potential explanation for why specificity is so prevalent is because the N is inherently limited; thus, where breadth may not always be available, indices have committed to depth. MIPEX scores 167 policies, including access to nationality but also policies like health and education. CITLAW scores 35 different modes of citizenship acquisition and 14 modes of loss. In short, almost all indices present some degree of unique specificity that enriches the research enterprise as a whole. Indices do not merely score the presence or absence of policies but also instruments and settings of that policy. By way of example, CIVIX (Goodman, 2014) measures civic integration requirements (e.g., language, civic knowledge, and values), which is but one component of status acquisition. These requirements are related to citizenship but run orthogonal (Goodman, 2010), as they condition naturalization but also other statuses, including permanent residence and entry. As such, this measure is related by not interchangeable with general integration indices (Helbling, 2013).

Finally, we observe a variety of measurement practices across indices. We see count variables aggregated with weights (CPI, CIVIX) as well as incrementalized scoring, bound between -1 and 1 (ICRI), 0 to 1 (CITLAW), or 0 to 100 (MIPEX). Yet, the most crucial point of variation is what is being measured. This has the most

significant impact on model specification, replication, and robustness. For example, CPI and CIVIX count policies, assign weights based on elements of procedure (e.g., naturalization rates and course fees, respectively), which produces scores where high numbers indicate restriction or difficult criteria. MIPEX scores from 0–100, where a score of zero could be “critically unfavorable” to immigrant integration. This could be a harsh, restrictive policy (e.g., a language test at a high proficiency level) but it could also be the absence of policy perceived to enable, like access to education. Likewise, a score of 100 indicates “favorable” conditions for immigrant integration. A favorable condition for immigrant integration is obviously something like social services for family members (e.g., the Netherlands), but an argument could be made—and evidence shows—that intensive language training also assists in integration (cf. Hoehne & Michalowski, 2015). Thus, what is normatively favorable to the researcher may not be practically favorable for the immigrant.

There are some obvious advantages to the sheer number of indices, chief among them the possibility of conducting external validity checks for measurement reliability, robustness checks (e.g., Koopmans & Michalowski, 2017), and the increased likelihood of covering sufficient countries and years. Opportunities for external validity checks are particularly valuable as indices rely on different sources for policy scoring, drawing on national law, ministry contacts, legal experts, secondary sources, etc. The large number of indices also provide for meaningful differentiation, where one index may focus on procedural elements of citizenship (CITLAW) while another may portray a more ambitious scope by including related policies, like family reunification rules (MIPEX). In sum, unlike the U.S. literature, studies of European studies can isolate immigration, citizenship, and integration policy where theoretically appropriate and not as a factor of data limits.

Further, a methodological benefit to having so many indices is that researchers get to see whether these issues of conceptualization, specificity, and measurement matter when building models and analyzing political and social phenomenon. It turns out they do. In fact, replication tests show even well-conceptualized, differentiated, and highly correlated indices do not perform similarly in statistical analyses. In a series of replication studies that replace policy variables with similar indices, Goodman (2015, pp. 1921–33) illustrates how indices may perform differently. In one study, a replication of Koopmans et al.’s (2012) examination of determinants of integration policy, Goodman shows how replacing ICRI with conceptually similar indices produce different results despite high levels of inter-index correlation. As such, this is not merely a theoretical point about conceptual precision. It is an empirical one: the index we use changes what we know about the determinants of integration policy. Specifically, their finding on the role of right-wing populist parties on restrictive integration policy loses significance with like measures (Goodman, 2015, p. 1925).

In a second example, Goodman (2015, pp. 1927–28) uses Dinesen and Hooghe’s (2010) study of the effects of integration policy on trust to illustrate how subindices of MIPEX—specifically nationality and antidiscrimination—explain levels of immigrant trust significantly better than the aggregate MIPEX integration score used in

the initial study. Here again, we see how index choice and aggregation strategies impact overall findings, where the outcome of the initial study may produce comparatively lukewarm findings about the effects of nationality rules. *A priori* theorization about subindex predictions (i.e., why access to nationality would enhance political trust, instead of an aggregate integration policy score that includes education policy, family reunification rules, etc.) would improve model specification and sharpen relevant findings.

In sum, even when concept differentiation, specificity, and measurement validity are achieved, there may still be issues with predictive validity. It matters not only how indices are *built*, but how they are *used*. By way of illustration, the next section uses new indices to compare performance of conceptually similar indices in a basic model to test a central argument of the integration policy field: far-right party support produces more restrictive integration policy output. With the proliferation of citizenship, integration, and immigration policy indices, scholars have more sophisticated tools than ever for categorizing and comparing policy design and practices. But we see some serious limitations in moving from description to statistical analysis.

Highlighting Problems of Policy Indices: An Empirical Illustration

In this section, I highlight how index construction can have a substantial impact on statistical results by testing integration policy index performance in a standard argument: far-right party support produces restrictive integration policy. The American literature commonly uses this type of structure, i.e., using indices as a dependent variable to uncover what predicts policy across states. By contrast, Europeanists have mostly shied away from such efforts, primarily using indices as an independent variable (e.g., Goodman & Wright, 2015; Koopmans, 2010; Wright & Bloemraad, 2012). Arguably, one reason for this reluctance may relate to the high likelihood of causal equifinality, or the notion that similar outcomes can occur cross-nationally but for different reasons, in different contexts, and by different actors.²¹ It may also reflect considerations of statistical power, with too many independent variables and too few dependent variables (due to number of countries, years of observation, etc.) though U.S. state policy studies obviously benefit from a larger N.²² There is also the issue of missing data for likely covariates. For example, several potential explanations for policy outcomes—like far-right support and foreign population size—rely on quadrennial events like elections or censuses, which generate an insufficient number of observations within an already-constrained N.²³ These problems will be evident in the exercise below, though do not diminish the purpose at hand: to observe how similarly correlated indices “behave” in a model.

Model Specification

In the American context, studies have pointed to a variety of factors to account for policy variation, including ideology (Boushey & Luedtke, 2011; Chavez &

Provine, 2009; Monogan, 2013), demographics (Boushey & Luedtke, 2011; Marquez & Schraufnagel, 2013; Zingher, 2014), interest group pressure (Nicholson-Crotty & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011), sectoral economic interests (Commins & Wills, 2017), increases in state Hispanic populations (Ybarra et al., 2016), and, most pointedly, inaction from the federal government (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2015). This is the starting point for my empirical test, using similar theoretical perspectives with European data to examine the performance of conceptually similar indices in the same model. I structure the analysis around the most conventional explanation for restrictive immigrant-related policies: strength of far-right parties.

Far-right party support (typically measured as percent of vote in national or European parliaments), the equivalent to American measures of partisanship in the legislature, is closely linked to immigrant antipathy and other negative, outgroup attitudes, yet evidence on the effects of party support on integration policy output is mixed. On the one hand, scholars find a strong influence of far-right parties on immigration (Schain, 2006), integration (Koopmans et al., 2012), and citizenship policy (Howard, 2009), while—on the other hand—Akkerman (2012) convincingly writes that “although parties matter, radical right parties do not matter in particular,” drawing attention to minimal coalition and legislative opportunities of the far-right with respect to center-right party invitations and positioning (also see Bale, 2008). She continues by presenting evidence—based on an original indexing of myriad immigrant-related policies in a National Immigration and Integration Policy (NIIP) measure—to show how center-right governments (often with far-right support) produce significantly more restrictive and assimilationist policies than left-wing cabinets, which yield significantly more liberal policy.

This presents a testable question for examining the reliability of integration policy indices: does far-right support produce restrictive integration policy? I focus on integration (instead of immigration policy) for several reasons. First, this is a central argument in the literature (e.g., Koopmans et al., 2012), in which qualitative work has documented the keen interest and legislative achievements of far-right parties when it comes to integration policy, notably in Denmark, Austria, and the Netherlands (e.g., Goodman, 2014). Second, immigration policy measures are still relatively new (to the point that, as of the date of writing, a critical mass [e.g., IMPIC, IMPALA] remain proprietary) and, thus, less familiar on the user end. Third, much of immigration politics are tied to attitudes toward the EU (evidenced by Brexit), not to mention much of immigration policy is made at the supranational level (including Dublin and Schengen Agreements), while integration policy squarely reflects public attitudes about domestic politics.

I estimate a basic linear model using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with four dependent variables: NIIP (Akkerman, 2012), Koopmans et al.’s (2012) Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI),²⁴ MIPEX (Migration Policy Group, 2011), and IMIX (Schmid, Blättler, & Blatter, n.d). Each of these integration policy indices covers slightly different countries in slightly different years, as Table 3 portrays. They also cover slightly different policies: some parsimonious (NIIP; IMIX) and some expansive (MIPEX; ICRI). Yet, all claim to provide a systematic measure of policies of immigrant inclusion. This is not simply an academic point on concept

Table 3. Integration Policy Index Coverage, a Selection

	NIIP	ICRI ^a	MIPEX	IMIX
Cases				
Austria	X	X	X	X
Belgium	X	X	X	X
Denmark	X	X	X	X
Finland			X	X
France	X	X	X	X
Germany	X	X	X	X
Greece			X	
Ireland			X	X
Italy	X		X	X
Luxembourg			X	X
Netherlands	X	X	X	X
Norway		X	X	
Portugal			X	X
Spain			X	X
Sweden	X	X	X	X
Switzerland	X	X	X	X
United Kingdom		X	X	X
Years	1996–2010	1980, 1990, 2002, 2008	2010–2014	2010

^aA recent coding update (Koopmans & Michalowski, 2017) added Italy, Portugal, and Spain as well as a host of other countries outside of Western Europe for the year 2008. Disaggregated scores were unavailable online.

validity; it is a perception reinforced when looking at the high degree of inter-index correlation. Figure 1 shows high correlation between indices.²⁵

The unit of analysis is the country-year. Like the model structure itself, the independent variables also closely follow the American literature to predict the policy outcomes of states. For example, in the U.S. context, scholars of state immigration argue differential level of support for Democrats versus Republicans among the state electorate may influence immigration policy outputs (measured as simple count aggregates of inclusive or restrictive immigration legislation). The literature anticipates states with large Republican electorates may be more restrictive in their immigration policies than those dominated by a Democratic electorate (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2015; Monogan, 2013). Likewise, European scholars hypothesize that political/partisan factors play a role in the types of policies that polities enact (Howard, 2009; Joppke, 1999). Therefore, the equivalent hypothesis is that voters' support for the far right may play a role in the type of immigrant integration policies that states enact.

Far-right support is measured by party vote share in both European Parliament and national elections. Independent variables also include government ideology (per Akkerman, 2012); size of foreign-born population (as a percent of the total population) (per Allport, 1954; Boushey & Luedtke, 2011); growth of foreign-born population (annualized over four years) (per Hopkins, 2010, McLaren, 2002, 2003); gross domestic product (GDP); social spending (as a percent of GDP) (per Wright, 2011); and unemployment rate (as a percent of labor force). Government ideology data are from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2014); far-right party support data




Figure 1. Correlation Among Four DVs (Ten Year Averages).

are from the European Elections database; all other data are derived from the OECD. Descriptive statistics and data summary for all variables are in Appendix Table A1.

Results

First, as a point of departure to precede index comparison in the OLS regression, I run a principal components analysis of these four integration indices. This technique is commonly used to examine relationships among a set of correlated variables by transforming them into linearly uncorrelated variables—the “principal components.” Each principal component is a linear combination of the original variables and explains some proportion of the total variance in the data. As denoted in Table 4, the first principal component explains 81 percent of the variation in the data; the loadings for each variable all point in the same direction, which suggests one highly explanatory factor is described by common attributes in the data. In other words, the DVs tap into a similar attribute of integration and do not contradict each other. The second component accounts for an additional 15.4 percent.²⁶ In this, we see some disagreement between NIP and IMIX scores along the second principal component, though the dominance of the first component means that there is less disagreement than overall agreement. In Figure 2, countries are plotted according to their scores on their first two principal components. We observe France, the Netherlands, and Germany as having the highest absolute scores on the second principal component (the y-axis), which may provide insight for observed

Table 4. Loadings on Principal Components for Integration Indexes

DV	Comp.1	Comp.2	Comp.3	Comp.4
NIIP	-0.37	0.82	-0.31	0.31
ICRI	-0.52		-0.38	-0.76
IMIX	-0.54	-0.55	-0.26	0.58
MIPEX	-0.55		0.83	
Standard deviation	1.815	0.788	0.286	0.182
Proportion of variance	0.817	0.154	0.020	0.008
Cumulative proportion	0.817	0.971	0.991	1.000




Figure 2. Countries Plotted According to the Scores on Their First Two Principal Components. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

divergence. This should also cause the careful researcher to think about the role of influential cases in shaping indices with small N, the nature of index aggregation, and potential theoretical findings.

Having said that, Figure 3 graphically presents coefficient estimates from the OLS regression model (the full table is available in the Appendix as Table A2). Each panel presents the results for a single independent variable across all four DVs. The black dot shows the coefficient estimate while the line shows the 2-standard deviation confidence interval. Because the DVs and samples are different, we are not interested in the scale of these coefficients but rather whether each coefficient is positive or negative. This is largely because of asynchronous year coverage but also from moderate “data-missingness” in the far-right vote share and government ideology variables.²⁷




Figure 3. Covariate Coefficients for Integration Index DVs, OLS.

In considering the effects of the far right, we observe many different answers to this question. Replicating Akkerman’s argument, far-right vote share remains positively and significantly associated with NIIP, her restrictive policy index (reverse coded). Both MIPEX and ICRI are insignificant.²⁸ IMIX is also insignificant in the opposite direction, with large confidence bands. These series of imperfect tests provide no substantial confidence in the role of the far right on restrictive integration policy.

We also observe differential performance of models in the other covariates. Beginning with NIIP scores, we find that government ideology and social spending are negatively and significantly associated, while far-right vote share, GDP, and both foreign-population variables are positively associated. At the (arbitrary) $p < 0.05$ cut-off, all independent variables are significantly associated with NIIP scores except unemployment. Yet, when we move to, say, the MIPEX model, government ideology remains significant, but the sign flips and social spending loses significance. Moreover, unemployment gains significance (at the $p < 0.05$ level) and foreign-born growth becomes more significant (at the $p < 0.01$ level). Both ICRI and IMIX indicators produce no significant covariates.²⁹ Therefore, to summarize the central finding on the research question, only the NIIP dataset shows far-right vote share a significant predictor for integration policy. This is unsurprising as fewer observations mean wider confidence intervals likely to include zero. IMIX in particular has so few observations ($N = 9$) that it yields wide confidence bands. Moreover, underpowered studies overestimate small effect sizes to begin with in order to achieve statistical

significance (Lemoine et al., 2016).³⁰ In sum, we see inconsistent correlations across models and issues of statistical power. Few correlations are significant at $p < 0.05$, and given small N size, this makes p -values problematic. If findings are so dependent on which measure of integration policy is used—and the evidence clearly suggests they are, a study really requires multiple robust checks on the study variable and alternative specifications to convincingly lay claim to theoretical value.³¹

An additional concern with OLS models is that they are easily influenced by outliers and extreme observations, and an inspection of model residuals reveals that outliers exert substantial influence on the results. For example, the Netherlands 2007 observation in the NIIP model (the first-year reflecting Geert Wilders' far-right Freedom Party's electoral success of nine new seats in the Tweede Kamer) has the largest standardized residual (the difference between the observed and fitted values—the value being 2.73). While re-running the model without that observation yields a model with coefficients that are all significant at the $p < 0.10$ level, there is no theoretical reason to remove this observation.³² However, influential cases should not be omitted but highlighted. As such, because frequentist analyses currently lack the power for robust conclusions, researchers should include more cases where possible. In the absence of power or perfect test conditions, increasing the number of imperfect tests combined with circumscriptive language could also assuage a doubtful reader.

To summarize, the proliferation of European integration indices (I only include four in this example) has given researchers a lot of choice when it comes model specification, but this abundance should be viewed with caution. Researchers can select any index that is conceptually resonant to the phenomenon under investigation, but—as illustrated here—even conceptually similar indices with conceptual validity and specificity do not perform similarly in regression models. This shapes what we know and plays a significant role in deciding what the field views as theoretically novel and valid. Index selection and utilization requires weighing trade-offs; more countries might mean fewer years; certain aggregation methods might obfuscate policy dimensions that do the bulk of conceptual heavy-lifting; limitations of data availability in terms of potential explanations can seriously drive down power, which hearkens to a breadth versus depth trade-off. Researchers already demonstrate care in how they use integration policy indices, e.g., seldom are they used as an outcome variable in light of low N. But, given the concerns of reliability raised in this empirical section, research without robust testing under alternative specifications—particularly with other policy measures, should be read skeptically. Results cannot simply be a product of which measure one chooses.

Lessons Learned?

What does this mean for conceptualization, specificity, and measurement across the U.S. states? To summarize, in terms of conceptualization and specificity, policy indices provide little differentiation between or within immigration and integration domains. However, the empirical world is obviously more complex, and structural constraints

as well as interests play a strong role in what policies can and cannot be made. This distinction is not only conceptually appropriate but oftentimes also reflects different actors and their preferences (e.g., between federal and state levels). In sum, with distinct measures of immigration and integration policy, we may not only observe different frequencies per states but also differences in restriction and inclusion.

The wide use of National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) and their definition of “immigration law”—which includes anything enacted by the state that includes the term “immigrant” or “immigration”—only exacerbates the problem of conceptual differentiation. First, symbolic resolutions celebrating Irish or Italian immigration carry the same weight as Arizona immigration restriction laws. Meanwhile, legislation excluding key terms that target language or religion (e.g., English-only laws) are omitted, namely policies of integration that aren’t labeled as such.³³ A further omission are details of a bill itself; whether a bill allocates money for immigrant aid as part of an omnibus budget package versus detailing systematic programming or priorities conveys essential information about state preferences, and potentially partisan or legislative politics. These issues point to using alternative sources and coding approaches where possible, either for triangulation or new index-building.

A further suggestion for increasing specificity is to meaningfully build procedure into the policy measure. There is significant heterogeneity in who can submit legislation and how that happens across states, as well as introduction caps and length of legislative sessions (Filindra & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2013). Is proposing a bill a meaningless signal to one’s voter base or does it reflect priorities of the majority party? Conversely, there is also a likely correlation between the severity of substantive measures in a bill and the probability of it getting passed, so a strict, law-only count may be skewed, over-representing policies as prohibitive that may be more moderate in a wider spectrum of potential policy actions. And if one wanted to model restrictive immigration policy, ignoring procedure may produce overestimation. This may be addressed through coding procedures, but also at the stage of model specification, including legislative professionalism (Boushey & Luedtke, 2011), “full-time” legislatures (Marquez & Schraufnagel, 2013), or as an exclusion criterion (Commins & Wills, 2017). Considerations of process rightfully condition how scholars interpret both bills and laws, but coming up with strategies for holding these processes constant for comparative analysis is a significant challenge.

Finally, as the empirical test with European indices illustrates, even when conceptualization and specificity are addressed, issues of measurement and aggregation remain. The principal components analysis reveals strong agreement among European indices, that they captured something similar. Yet, when imported into the same model, these indices perform differently. We can speculate many reasons for why this is the case, including measurement choices, low statistical power resulting from small N, missing data, limited years, etc. Consequently, results are overestimated and otherwise sensitive to index specification. There may also be substantive reasons for performance differences. For example, all indices perform differently when it comes to significance in far-right vote share; IMIX is the only one that is positive and statistically significant (but with wide confidence bands), NIIP is positive and MIPEX

is negative. But while NIIP and MIPEX both claim to represent integration indices (and correlate at $r = 0.71$), they have dissimilarities (e.g., MIPEX covers political participation and antidiscrimination while NIIP covers asylum and illegality). These are concerns researchers should be upfront about in discussing their research design.

There are a couple of other general suggestions that may prove useful, based off the European experience. Researchers should opt for index improvement over innovation where possible. Despite the novelty and potential career benefits associated with innovation, sometimes pre-existing indices are fit for purpose and a saturation point may soon devolve to issue fatigue. There are still many more indices than there are studies that use them, so the extent to which testing can proceed with existing measures engenders a more cumulative process of precision (e.g., Avery et al., 2016). In particular, pre-existing measures provide a helpful baseline for deeper specification (such as types of integration bills, e.g., economic, social, cultural), differentiation (immigration versus integration; documented versus undocumented), and extension (years). Only where pre-existing indices do not satisfy research needs and cannot be disassembled, where coding rules yield errors, or where new data allow for external validity, should indices be created. Having said that, there is plenty of space for index generation in comparative state immigration and integration policy, specifically regarding integration policy precision and procedural considerations overall. Such endeavors may reveal fascinating patterns of rigorous practice at the state level where *de jure* clues are scant.

In terms of addressing the issue of statistical power, though, to repeat, U.S. studies are better positioned on this front than European studies, scholars might consider mixed-method research designs for explaining policy output. Modeling covariates of policy can be overdetermined, influenced by extreme but intrinsic cases, or susceptible to omitted variable bias, particularly in the case of causal equifinality. A more cautious approach is policy as a contextual, independent variable. But, if the research goal is explaining policy output, then alternative specifications and robustness checks for validity should be standard and, ideally, a 50 state model should be paired with case study. In other words, researchers should bring as much evidence to bear as possible when working with imperfect data. Understanding the determinants of policy is important work, and policy scholars should use all the tools in their arsenal to convincingly present evidence that may yield significant, real-world consequences.

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Notes

1. It should be mentioned at the outset that the selection of the European Union as a point of comparison is theoretically driven as it enables a comparison of the U.S. federal government to the supranational institutions and directives of the EU, unlike other European-wide organizations (e.g., Council of Europe). This choice omits direct coverage of states like Switzerland and Norway, which are not subject to EU-level regulations on asylum and immigration. Yet, the coding rules for EU member

- states can be easily extended to nonmembers (e.g., EUDO citizenship law indicators extend to 42 European states).
2. Wright and Bloemraad (2012) even suggest integration is degree of closeness between an individual and native along these dimensions. Also see Goodman and Wright (2015).
 3. Since the late nineteenth century, Congress has been tasked exclusively with establishing admission, processing, and deportation/exclusion criteria as well as guidelines for naturalization (Tichenor, 2002).
 4. Some examples include California, New York, and Texas together unsuccessfully sued the federal government in 1994 for compensation for the costs of illegal immigration as well as recent suits against the suspension of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Act. On the other end of the spectrum, Utah recently passed legislation to create its own guest worker program (pending federal approval).
 5. An exception here is economic integration (e.g., employment, income). However, states do exhibit practices of economic exclusion toward undocumented immigrants and employers as a means of discouraging unauthorized entry.
 6. An exception here is on refugee resettlement, but even still, NGOs are often required to supplement federal funds and play a key role in placement and community integration.
 7. The EU promotes—but does not regulate—other aspects of immigration, such as high-skilled labor mobility across the EU for non-EU citizens (Council Directive 2009/50/EC).
 8. The Commission can open a case of infringement against noncompliance.
 9. This does not exclude EU soft power from influencing integration matters, such as standard-setting through the Common Basic Principles on Migrant Integration or directives that support integration conditions for immigration, e.g., Long-Term Residence Directive (Council Directive 2003/109/EC)
 10. Other examples are less explicit; Italy made legislative changes in 2009 introducing integration requirements as part of a so-called “Security Package.”
 11. This preoccupation is well documented (Goodman, 2014).
 12. This also presents inherent problems on the assumptions of a linear model.
 13. There is an enormous literature on conceptual formation and what makes a concept “good,” which often involves a series of trade-offs (e.g., Gerring, 1999).
 14. Institutionally, and in terms of leadership, EUCITAC, EUDO-Citizenship and GLOBALCIT can be seen as incremental stages of a similar project, where EUDO-CIT relied on country experts, reports, and citizenship acquisition and loss categories of EUCITAC, and where GLOBALCIT extended the country scope and categories for scoring of EUDO-CIT.
 15. For example, both Howard (2010) and Janoski (2012) include naturalization rates as a way to bridge the gap between citizenship policy and practice, which Helbling et al. (2017) argues is problematic.
 16. By contrast, Goodman (2015) notes immigration indices “show more conceptual discipline and scope.”
 17. Originating in Koopmans et al. (2005).
 18. Originally Geddes and Niessen (2005).
 19. Boundary issues do not stop here. For example, Howard (2010) includes civic integration requirements as a weight in his index, which Goodman (2014) suggests should be more cautiously implemented as requirements span legal categories beyond citizenship to include permanent residence and entry.
 20. A second example would be the Immigrant Inclusion Index (IMIX) (Blatter et al., 2017); the title suggests integration but the measures only capture dimensions of citizenship, electoral access, and enfranchisement practices.
 21. There is a rich qualitative literature examining policy determinants (e.g., Goodman, 2014).
 22. This is especially the case when trying to establish external validity; despite the high number of indices, there is very little overlap in year-measurements.
 23. One solution is to hold a variable’s value constant between measurements. I have done so for this analysis for the far-right support and government ideology variables. This is obviously not without drawbacks; for example, the far-right support variable is now a more valid indicator of far-right

- medium-term institutional power. However, for most states far-right vote shares were relatively stable, implying that underlying far-right support was probably adequately captured by this measure.
24. ICRI scores were derived from Koopmans et al. (2012). ICRI scores were subsequently expanded to include more countries (Koopmans & Michalowski, 2017) but disaggregate data were unavailable.
 25. Akkerman (2012) originally codes immigration and integration policy using negative values to denote more liberal positions. As this is the opposite direction of the three other indices (ICRI uses negative numbers to denote restriction and IMIX and MIPEX use low, positive scores), NIIP is reverse-coded for our purposes here. Additionally, I acknowledge the challenge in demonstrating variable correlation as each DV covers relatively different time periods. Therefore, I take an arbitrary 10-year average between 2005 and 2014 of the four primary DVs.
 26. The first two principal components together account for 97 percent of the total variance; the remaining two PCs are trivial.
 27. There is no data on far-right vote share for Ireland, Portugal, or Spain, nor government ideology data for Switzerland or Norway. Table A3 in the Appendix presents full information on missing data.
 28. This is contrary to Koopman's et al.'s (2012) argument, reiterated here: "countries with strong right-wing populist, anti-immigrant parties saw less strong subsequent expansion or even contractions of immigrant rights." The loss of significance is consistent with Goodman's (2015) prior replication of this argument and index.
 29. Koopmans et al. (2016) acknowledge this likelihood given the N size yet proceed with a stepwise regression model.
 30. IMIX has 21 country-year observations in the full index, but missing data for countries like Cyprus, Malta, Czechia, Slovenia quickly reduce its size.
 31. As a second test, I compare simple correlations between each policy index and the independent variables to identify patterns of similarity and divergence. Appendix Table A4 presents correlations used in each OLS model (the observations used to calculate the correlations are not the same across each column because each column represents a different sample, hence, observations are the same across rows). *P*-values are in parentheses. As we see, sometimes the correlation is positive (IMIX and MIPEX on government ideology) and sometimes it's negative (NIIP and ICRI on the same covariate). Foreign-born growth is positive across all four, while share is negative (with the exception of NIIP). These divergences buttress the central argument.
 32. Robust regression penalizes extreme values and provide an alternate way of examining these relationships. Appendix Tables A5 and Figure A1 present the results from the robust linear regression. Appendix Figure A2 compares observed data to the fitted values from the OLS and RLR. The dotted line represents a one-to-one relationship (the closer the points are to this line, the better the fit). The fits are relatively good, and slight deviations could result from simple regression to the mean.
 33. For example, California Bill AB-952, "Bilingual Teacher Professional Development Program" may be missed as an integration program because it does not contain the word immigrant and does not directly target immigrants, but rather the service provides that enable integration policy.

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APPENDIX A

Table A1. Data Summary

Data Summary					
Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Year	631	2,003.26	8.91	1,977	2,017
NIIP	106	-1.05	3.89	-13.50	5.50
ICRI	40	-0.03	0.32	-0.60	0.51
IMIX	21	39.90	13.71	21.52	62.77
MIPEX	86	60.40	10.29	43.74	80.11
Govt Ideology	393	5.47	1.32	2.91	7.93
Far Right Vote Share	351	8.87	7.20	0.00	28.92
Foreign Born (% Pop)	336	12.79	8.33	2.08	45.90
Foreign Born Growth	282	3.31	3.72	-2.65	29.45
GDP	358	37,479.96	14,949.98	14,903.39	105,767.80
Social Spending (% GDP)	358	23.33	4.01	12.57	31.94
Unemployed (% LF)	297	7.87	4.36	2.25	27.47

Table A2. OLS Regression Results, Integration Indexes

	Dependent Variable			
	NIIP	ICRI	IMIX	MIPEX
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Gov't Ideology	-2.781*** (0.336)	-0.129 (0.097)	11.594 (27.519)	3.450*** (1.219)
Far-Right Vote Share	0.185** (0.077)	-0.022 (0.020)	1.244 (3.957)	-0.210 (0.253)
Foreign Born (% pop)	0.418** (0.169)	-0.031 (0.046)	3.059 (3.978)	-0.041 (0.408)
Foreign Born Growth	0.544** (0.215)	0.042 (0.048)	6.747 (14.899)	1.932*** (0.618)
GDP	0.0002** (0.0001)	0.00002 (0.00002)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.0002 (0.0002)
Soc. Spend (% GDP)	-0.781*** (0.226)	-0.012 (0.040)	-1.994 (7.574)	-0.193 (0.530)
Unemployed (% LF)	0.389 (0.251)	-0.014 (0.071)	1.417 (24.248)	1.583** (0.777)
Constant	17.198*** (6.080)	0.838 (1.207)	49.230 (170.824)	26.391 (20.096)
Observations	60	14	9	51
R2	0.692	0.542	0.891	0.360
Adjusted R2	0.650	0.007	0.131	0.256
Residual Std. Error	2.620 (df = 52)	0.302 (df = 6)	13.223 (df = 1)	7.904 (df = 43)
F Statistic	16.686***(df = 7; 52)	1.012(df = 7; 6)	1.172(df = 7; 1)	3.458***(df = 7; 43)

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A3. DV States Missing from IVs

	NIIP	ICRI	IMIX	MIPEX
Party In Power	CHE	CHE, NOR	CHE	NOR, CHE
Far Right			CYP, CZE, HUN, IRL, MLT, POL, PRT, SVN, ESP	IRL, PRT, ESP
Foreign Born			CYP, CZE, HUN, MLT, POL, SVN	
GDP			CYP, CZE, HUN, MLT, POL, SVN	
Social Spending			CYP, CZE, HUN, MLT, POL, SVN	
Unemployment			CYP, CZE, HUN, MLT, POL, SVN	

Table A4. Correlation Tables for All Variables in Each Model

	NIIP	ICRI	IMIX	MIPEX
Govt Ideology	-0.64 (0)	-0.41 (0.142)	0.31 (0.417)	0.35 (0.012)
Far-Right Share	-0.14 (0.278)	-0.55 (0.04)	0.02 (0.955)	-0.11 (0.427)
For'n Born	0.31 (0.015)	-0.05 (0.867)	-0.23 (0.554)	-0.04 (0.766)
Share				
For'n Born	0.06 (0.671)	0.01 (0.964)	0.61 (0.084)	0.34 (0.015)
Grow				
GDP	0 (0.977)	0.04 (0.885)	-0.15 (0.699)	-0.02 (0.878)
Soc Spend (%	-0.12 (0.366)	-0.44 (0.116)	-0.26 (0.495)	-0.1 (0.496)
GDP)				
Unemployed (%	0.22 (0.089)	-0.01 (0.984)	0.46 (0.214)	0.16 (0.272)
LF)				

Table A5. Robust Regression Results, Integration Indexes

	Dependent Variable			
	NIIP	ICRI	IMIX	MIPEX
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Gov't Ideology	-2.476*** (0.284)	-0.129 (0.097)	0.878 (1.022)	3.901*** (1.209)
Far-Right Vote Share	0.113* (0.065)	-0.022 (0.020)	2.960*** (0.147)	-0.220 (0.251)
Foreign Born (% pop)	0.305** (0.143)	-0.031 (0.046)	0.873*** (0.148)	-0.151 (0.405)
Foreign Born Growth	0.579*** (0.181)	0.042 (0.048)	0.174 (0.554)	1.893*** (0.613)
GDP	0.0002** (0.0001)	0.00002 (0.00002)	-0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0002)
Soc. Spend (% GDP)	-0.837*** (0.190)	-0.012 (0.040)	-4.369*** (0.281)	-0.035 (0.525)
Unemployed (% LF)	0.330 (0.212)	-0.014 (0.071)	12.387*** (0.901)	1.536** (0.770)
Constant	19.046*** (5.127)	0.838 (1.207)	37.389*** (6.347)	18.199 (19.922)
Observations	60	14	9	51
Residual Std. Error	1.503 (df = 52)	0.255 (df = 6)	0.176 (df = 1)	8.195 (df = 43)

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.




Figure A1. Covariate Coefficients for Each Dependent Variables, Robust Linear Regression. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Covariate Coefficients for Each Dependent Variable, Robust Linear Regression




Figure A2. Observed versus fitted DV scores, OLS and RLR